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Abstract 
 
The present thesis examines the formation and loyalties of the Romanian officers 
originating from the Banat Military Border who reached the rank of general in the 
Austro-Hungarian army between 1870 and 1918. As such, it covers an important 
blind spot in English-, German-, and Romanian-language historiography as, on the 
one hand, it contributes a multiple case study, based on extant personal testimonies, 
to the historical literature on the Habsburg officer corps and, on the other hand, it 
validates and brings together into a coherent narrative the snippets of historical 
evidence invoked in Romanian bibliography on the topic. The thesis goes beyond the 
above-indicated time span and follows the development of the Banat Military Border 
from its establishment in the eighteenth century to its dissolution at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Particular emphasis is placed on the formative environment of 
the military elites under discussion, whether this means historical or legal precedent, 
official stereotypes, or community identity and symbolism. The Border generals are 
presented in their relationships to the state (in its various instantiations), the army 
and civil authorities, as well as in their relations with the Romanian intelligentsia of 
the Empire. The main goal of the thesis is to account for their sense of identity and 
allegiance: who were these generals? to whom were they loyal? 
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Abbreviations of primary sources 
OeStA          ￿sterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archives, Vienna)                                     
         KA              Kriegsarchiv (War Archives, Vienna) 
                             KM Pr￿s              Kriegsministerium Pr￿sidium 
                 MKSM            Milit￿r Kanzlei Seiner Majest￿t des Kaisers 
                             K￿A (MK/KM)  Kriegs￿berwachungsamt                  
                     HHStA        Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv 
 
MAE           Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (The Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Bucharest) 
ANIC          Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale Bucureşti (The Central Historical 
National Archives, Bucharest) 
ANCS   Arhivele Naţionale Caraş-Severin (Caraş-Severin National Archives, 
Caransebeş) 
ANCN         Arhivele Naţionale Cluj-Napoca (Cluj-Napoca National Archives) 
ANS            Arhivele Naţionale Sibiu (Sibiu National Archives) 
ANBN         Arhivele Naţionale Bistriţa-Năsăud (Bistriţa-Năsăud National Archives) 
ANT            Arhivele Naţionale Timiş (Timiş National Archives, Timişoara) 
PRO            formerly the Public Record Office, now The National Archives, London 
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Military and historical abbreviations 
 
FM ￿ Feldmarschall 
FZM - Feldzeugmeister 
FML ￿ Feldmarschalleutnant 
GM ￿ Generalmajor 
k.k. ￿ kaiserlich-k￿niglich (after 1867 used in reference to institutions pertaining to 
Cisleithania) 
k.u.k. ￿ kaiserlich und k￿niglich (after 1867 used in reference to the common 
institutions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with the exception of the army, 
which became k.u.k. after 1888) 
k.u. ￿ k￿niglich ungarisch (used in reference to Hungarian institutions post 
Ausgleich) 
 
Note on the use of place names and proper nouns  
 
For the sake of clarity, consistency, and historical accuracy I have made the 
following choices:  
 
(1) Given that the timespan of the present thesis does not go beyond 1918, I have 
opted for the spelling of place names which was in official use at the time (i.e. 
TemesvÆr instead of Timişoara, Hermannstadt instead of Sibiu). Where necessary, I 
provide in between brackets the Romanian or German counterpart. In quotations I 
retained the author￿s choice of spelling. In the case of Caransebeş, there being so 
many spelling variations (KarÆnsebes, Karansebes, Caransebes, Caransebesiu), I 
have chosen the most frequent spelling used by the Border Generals, i.e. Caransebes. 
 
(2) As regards the names of the generals under consideration, throughout this thesis I 
use the German spelling or, where documentary evidence is available, the spelling 
which they themselves used. The appended list of generals specifies all 
metamorphoses of their names, including their current Romanian spelling. 
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Motto: 
The Unknown Citizen    
(To JS/07 M 378 
This Marble Monument 
Is Erected by the State) 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics 
to be 
One against whom there was no official 
complaint, 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-
fashioned word, he was a 
   saint, 
For in everything he did he served the 
Greater Community. 
Except for the War till the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got 
fired, 
But satisfied his employers, Fudge 
Motors Inc. 
Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views, 
For his Union reports that he paid his 
dues, 
(Our report on his Union shows it was 
sound) 
And our Social Psychology workers 
found 
That he was popular with his mates and 
liked a drink. 
The Press are convinced that he bought a 
paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements 
were normal in every way. 
Policies taken out in his name prove that 
he was fully insured, 
And his Health-card shows he was once 
in hospital but left it cured. 
Both Producers Research and High-Grade 
Living declare 
He was fully sensible to the advantages of 
the Instalment Plan 
And had everything necessary to the 
Modern Man, 
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a 
frigidaire. 
Our researchers into Public Opinion are 
content  
That he held the proper opinions for the 
time of year; 
When there was peace, he was for peace:  
when there was war, he went. 
He was married and added five children 
to the population, 
Which our Eugenist says was the right 
number for a parent of his generation. 
And our teachers report that he never 
interfered with their education. 
Was he free? Was he happy? The 
question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should 
certainly have heard. 
 
From Another Time by W. H. Auden 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The present Ph.D. thesis was initially meant to be an examination of 
inceptive Romanian national discourse. Such a topic had eventually to be qualified 
and narrowed down for two reasons: the sheer extent of the cultural and social space 
to be covered and, more importantly still, the heterogeneous nature of Romanian 
national discourse itself. With a few exceptions, present-day Romanian 
historiography presents a unitary, monolithic view of Romanians as a teleological 
national entity in an evolutionary movement of coalescence, converging slowly but 
surely towards a Romanian unitary state. Following the 1918 Union, whereby 
Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia joined the existing Romanian 
state (formed in 1859 through the union of Wallachia and Moldavia), attempts were 
made to solidify the new political and state unity by stressing cultural commonalities 
(language, ancestry, etc.) and smoothing out administrative and institutional 
differences. Traditional Romanian history writing reflects this centripetal process of 
consolidation by sometimes anachronistically reading national awareness and 
purpose into events and characters￿ actions that do not warrant this. What is not very 
often mentioned is that this apparently seamless unity has existed for less than one 
hundred years and that the present-day Romanian unitary state is the result of a 
conglomeration of provinces with widely divergent historical legacies and a complex 
pattern of loyalties.  
Of all the Romanian-inhabited territories that went into Greater Romania in 
1918, I chose to stop at the Banat of TemesvÆr, the former Habsburg, and 
subsequently, Hungarian province, given its borderland location in relation to both 
its former as well as its current polity and, in particular, given the combination of   10
similarities and dissimilarities with Transylvania, the neighbouring province, which 
has received the lion￿s share of scholarly attention. While compiling the preliminary 
synopsis of historical literature on the Banat, I came across a number of 
contributions on the Banat Military Border. Its extraordinary social, administrative 
and even political peculiarities as well as its close connections with the imperial 
centre and the postulated staunch loyalty of the militarized population led me to 
further narrow down the scope of my thesis to focus on this part of the Banat. By 
virtue of this gradual process of bibliographical whittling down, I arrived at the final 
topic of my thesis: an examination of the process of identity and allegiance 
formation among the military elites of a community whose development has been 
relegated to the periphery of Romanian historiography as well as being 
underrepresented in other historiographies: the militarized population of the Banat 
Military Border.  
The present thesis will, therefore, provide an analysis of the genesis and 
loyalties of the Romanian military elite originating from this segment of the Austrian 
Military Border. For methodological purposes I have opted for a concept of military 
elite confined to the Romanian officers who reached the rank of General in the 
Austro-Hungarian army between 1870 and 1918. The notion of elite is defined here 
in a double sense: in reference to the military hierarchy, it designates the highly 
skilled, decorated and, in some cases, knighted Romanian officers promoted to 
important positions as part of the Austro-Hungarian military apparatus; in relation to 
the Romanian community out of which these officers emerged, the notion of elite 
refers to the educated and politically aware officers, who, on several occasions, 
became the mouthpiece of the community before the authorities and promoters of 
cultural and economic reform.    11
The primary aim of the thesis is that of recovering the ￿voice￿ of this military 
elite, more often than not suppressed or ventriloquized, by tracking down documents 
and personal testimony as well as any type of collateral or incidental evidence that 
can afford an insight into their sense of allegiance and identity. In so doing, the 
thesis is intended as a critique of Romanian historiography, which assimilates these 
officers￿ sense of national identity to the teleological nationalism that helped 
consolidate the Romanian state post 1918 and later on. Additionally, it constitutes a 
multiple case study which contributes a necessary qualification to the view that the 
loyalties of the Habsburg officer corps lay ￿beyond nationalism￿, which represents 
the common denominator of English-language historical literature on the Habsburg 
officer corps.  
I shall proceed to preface the actual exposition of hypotheses underlying this 
thesis with a brief presentation of three historical episodes, which will set the 
parameters of the subsequent discussion. 
                                                      *** 
1737. The Banat of Temeswar. War is raging anew
1 in the recently 
conquered Habsburg province. The local population takes to the forests and 
mountains in what has become a secular ebb-like movement typical of war-depleted 
borderlands. Twenty years after the Peace of Passarowitz, which made the Banat a 
Habsburg possession, the new authorities have developed but a feeble hold on the 
sparse elusive population of the province. Faced with impending destruction at the 
hands of the Turks the people side with the strongest, placate, and bribe in order to 
survive. A Banat chronicler records episode after episode of such negotiations with 
the invaders: 
   12
 ￿Omer Pasha together with his 2000 [soldiers] crossed over at Orsova and coming 
across many stores he was content and set up camp. Many old Romanians came to 
him through the woods with gifts from the villages and he received them. [The 
Romanians] even told him how the Turks could get to the main thoroughfare across 
Strajovaţ, Mehadia￿s hill.￿
∗ 2 
 
And later: 
 ￿Omer Pasha settled as ruler in Mehadia fortress. The villagers who had fled to the 
woods came and bowed in submission to him and brought him rams, lambs, butter, 
and cheese as gifts. And the Pasha gave them writs for safe-passage called ￿buruntii 
(salva guardie)￿, and a Turk or two subpasha and Sipahi to bring their people back 
to their villages.￿
∗∗ 3 
 
At this point in time neither Turks nor Habsburgs could enlist the locals￿ 
allegiance. Sources
4 tell of a population unmoored by any loyalty, not genuinely 
swayed either way but rather acting on sheer survival instinct. The habit of crossing 
over to the enemy and banditry as a way of life gained the Wallachian population the 
notoriety of a ￿disloyal people￿. Marshal Marmont, duke of Ragusa, described the 
state of the Banat population prior to militarization in the following terms: 
 
￿The long wars between Hungary and Turkey and the following devastations had 
reduced the frontier population to a most destitute state: often dispossessed, tossed 
about by the whims of fate, forced to lead a life on the run, full of misery. Someone 
came up with the idea to subordinate them to an organization that could protect them 
and give them stability.￿
∗∗∗ 5 
                                                 
∗  ￿Omer paşa, cu ceăle 2000, [...] el la Oraşava trecu şi afl￿nd multe magazine, ￿i păru bine şi se aşeză. 
Unde mulţi rum￿ni bătr￿ni, cu pocloane, din sate, prin păduri mergea şi el priimea. Carii i-au şi spus 
lui cum pot turcii pre după dealu Mehadii, Strajovaţ, deasupra a eşi, iar ￿n drumu mare.￿  
 
∗∗  ￿Omer paşa ￿n fortu Mehadii s-au aşezat domn. La el săteănii de prin păduri fugiţi, cu berbeci, miei, 
unt, br￿nză poclon viin, să ￿nchina, cu satele; cărora paşa cărţi numite buruntii (:salva gvardie) ￿n 
m￿nă le da, apoi şi c￿te un turc sau doi subaşă şi spahii de-a aduna oamenii ￿n sate-şi le da.￿  
 
∗∗∗  ￿les longues guŁrres entre Hongrie et la Turquie, et les devastations qui en avaient ØtØ la suite, 
avaient rØduit au plus grand Øtat de misŁre la population de la frontiŁre. Souvent dØposØdØe, jetØe ￿a et 
la, suivant le caprice du sort, forcØe ￿ mener une vie errante et malheureuse, on a eut l￿idØe de la 
soumettre ￿ une organisation qui pßt la protØger et lui donner de la consistance.￿   13
 
The beginnings of the Banat Military Border were marked by mutual distrust 
between the population and the Habsburg authorities. Although regimentation, that 
is, assimilation into the Austrian Military Border system and subordination to the 
imperial military authority, brought with it a number of exemptions and privileges, 
the people were initially adamant in their opposition to it. Militarization meant being 
subjected to a strict order, which, as pointed out by some authors, ran counter to the 
lax Ottoman type of administration to which they had been accustomed. A more 
apposite explanation of this resistance to militarization would be that this was not so 
much an instance of nostalgia for good old Turkish days as an attempt to retain the 
fluid status on which their very survival hinged. It can be, moreover, interpreted as a 
clear sign of a non-committal attitude, of a lack of loyalty, not in the negative sense 
of disloyalty, but rather, to use a coinage, that of a-loyalty. 
 
Less than a century later, during the 1848-49 turmoil, when even the most 
kaisertreu of people doubted what side they should be on, the militarized Wallachian 
population in the Banat Military Border are reported to have declined the offers of 
participation in the new government formed by the Hungarian revolutionaries and to 
have called their bluff, while upholding their own status as staunch supporters of the 
Emperor: 
 
￿The expression of dissatisfaction with the new order of things and with the 
introduction of the Hungarian Ministerium showed most clearly among the 
population [...] they unanimously stated that, as long as they did not see the Emperor 
himself and did not hear from his very mouth that he did not need them anymore, 
they would not give credence to any of these discussions and proclamations.￿
6 
∗  
                                                 
∗  ￿Der Ausdruck der Unzufriedenheit mit der [...] neuen Ordnung der Dinge and mit der Einf￿hrung 
des ungarischen Ministeriums zeigte sich bei der Bev￿lkerung am deutlichsten, [...] da sie einstimmig   14
 
And the report is not singular:  
￿In the presence of myself and General Lieutenant Korniz the assembled 
communities of the Corniac Company stated that, given their proved loyalty and 
submission to the Imperial House, they could not understand how they could be 
handed down to the Hungarian Ministerium and they would not break their loyalty 
to Emperor and King; at this, Corporal Ianku Ionescu and frontiersman Ianku 
Stoloschesko, in particular, applauded on behalf of both communities. 
[Stoloschesko] even said, how did they think they could justify themselves if the 
Emperor held them responsible for their gullibility [￿] they demanded even to go in 
person to His Majesty to check if it was true that His Majesty wished to hand them 
down as orphans to the Hungarian Ministerium￿.
7∗∗  
 
Thus, eighty years after the militarization of southern Banat, the Romanian Grenzer 
seem to have undergone a complete volteface from the least reliable of imperial 
subjects to a dependable military force, purposeful and fully aware where its 
loyalties lay.  
 
A quarter of a century later, in 1872, the first Banat Border officer reached 
the rank of general. By 1918 the militarized population of the Banat had given the 
Austro-Hungarian army fifteen generals, as indicated by Antoniu Marchescu in his 
landmark history of the Banat Grenzer: ￿Bacila, Bihoi, Ladislau Cena, Nicolae Cena, 
Traian Doda, Guran, Ion, Iovescu, Lugojanu, Lupu, Matăr￿ngă, Muica, Seracin, 
                                                                                                                                         
￿u￿erten, bevor sie nicht den Kaiser selbst sehen und aus seinem Munde h￿ren, da￿ er sie nicht mehr 
brauche ￿ allen diesen Anreden und Proklamationen kein Glauben schenken werden.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Gleich damals in meiner und des Herrn Grl. Lieut. Korniz Gagenwart ￿u￿erten s￿mtliche 
Gemeinden der Corniac Compagnie, da￿ sie, bei ihrer erprobten Treue und Anh￿nglichkeit an das 
durchlauftigste Kaiserhaus nicht begreifen k￿nnen, wie man [sie] r￿cksichtlos dem ungarischen 
Ministerium ￿berliefern, und sie zwinge wolle, die bisherige Treue gegen ihren Kaiser und K￿nig zu 
brechen, hier applaudirten in Namen s￿mtlichen Gemeinden besonders der [...] Corporal Ianku 
Ionesku und [...] Grenzer Ianku Stoloschesko, welch· letzterer sogar sagte wie man glaubt, sich zu 
rechtfertigen, wenn Kai￿er unsere Leichtgl￿ubigkeit Verantwortung ziehen werden. [...] [sie] 
verlangten sogar pers￿nlich zu Seinen Majest￿t zu gehen, um zu erfahren, ob wirklich an dem ist, da￿ 
Seine Majest￿t sie als verwaitzte Kinder dem ungarischen Ministerium ￿berliefern wolle...￿ 
   15
Şandru, and Trapsia, all of them being self-made men who rose to high ranks and 
positions.￿
8  
 
The above-mentioned historical moments (pre-militarization status, 
kaisertreu position in the events of 1848-49, and the final emergence of high-ranking 
officers from this Border community) have been chosen to illustrate the 
comparatively rapid metamorphosis of a community from an unreliable group prone 
to defection to a hothouse of loyal military manpower and, eventually, to a source of 
military grey matter for the joint army. Thus the questions to which this thesis will 
provide an answer fall under two headings. The first category refers to the 
community as a whole: what were the factors that created a sense of allegiance 
among this disenfranchised population?; is there a tenable connection between 
imperial loyalty and the rise of national consciousness?; to what extent did the 
imperial discourse, which gave rise to Kaisertreue, also foster community self-
awareness?   
The second category of questions refers more specifically to the elite that 
emerged out of this militarized borderland: who were these high-ranking officers and 
how did they reach the rank of general? Can one actually pinpoint and define their 
sense of allegiance? Is there any documentary evidence that would warrant the 
recruitment of these military men  as emblematic figures within Romanian 
historiography? How does national self-consciousness appear in a tightly regulated 
military borderland? Does it define itself in conjunction with, or in contradistinction 
to, imperial allegiance? Can the term ￿nationalism￿ be at all used to describe this type 
of loyalty? Is this allegiance in itself a monolithic, homogenous relationship or does   16
it break down into various brands of loyalty and, if so, what is their nature and their 
relation to one another?  
In tackling the above questions one should not lose sight of the almost 
phenomenological distinction between things as they ￿really￿ happened and things as 
recorded and rehashed by various sources. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the 
bibliography on the Banat Military Border is formed of a string of authors, each one 
drawing on their predecessors￿ work, and thus perpetuating snippets of documentary 
evidence, which eventually lose their reliability through quote, misquote and fuzzy 
paraphrase. Patrick Leigh Fermor￿s insight into the devious workings of history 
writing remains a classic and a valid caveat for all endeavours in the field:  
 
￿￿Let us assume￿ turns in a few pages into ￿We may assume￿, which, in a few more, 
is ￿As we have shown￿; and after a few more pages yet, the shy initial hypothesis 
has hardened into a brazen established landmark, all the time with not an atom of 
new evidence being adduced. Advantageous points are coaxed into opulent bloom, 
awkward ones discreetly pruned into non-being. Obscurity reigns. It is a dim region 
where suggestio falsi and suppressio veri, those twin villains of historical conflict, 
stalk about the shadows with dark-lantern and bow-string.￿
9 
 
Therefore in this thesis I set out to verify to what extent there exists archival 
evidence to substantiate claims regarding the allegiance of the military elites 
originating from the Banat Military Border. I am laying such particular emphasis on 
sources because this constitutes one of the main problems when reading Romanian 
bibliography. Attitudes and personal positioning, although constantly invoked, go for 
the most part unreferenced and are the product of inference and speculation rather 
than interpretation of concrete testimony. Moreover, when it comes to researching a 
period of time spanning the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the very process 
of tracking down documents and extracting information (in the form of deciphering,   17
transliterating and translating) has, I believe, an important bearing on the research 
outcome. I shall reserve the final section of the present chapter for describing the 
challenges I encountered in my research. 
In what follows I will flesh out the historical outline I sketched at the beginning 
of this chapter and delineate the main transformations brought about by 
militarization in the south-eastern part of the Banat of Temeswar. The emphasis will 
be on historical developments conducive to antagonisms that later on would play an 
important role in the politics of allegiance formation, as well as on administrative 
structures that would eventually give rise to differences in social status. 
Since the setting up of the Military Border system is closely connected with 
Habsburg rule, I shall begin this presentation at the point where the Banat of 
Temeswar became a Habsburg land. The very name of the province,
10 the Banat of 
Temeswar, did not come into use before the seventeenth century, when it appeared 
for the first time in Habsburg official documents. Although conquered de facto in 
1716, the Banat was ceded de jure to the Habsburg Crown in 1718 following the 
Peace of Passarowitz (Po￿arevac). The newly conquered territory did not revert to its 
pre-Ottoman status, that is, it was not retroceded to the Hungarian Crown. As a 
consequence of this, the Banat became a bone of contention between the Habsburgs 
and the Hungarian estates, who demanded a restitutio in integrum, that is, the 
restoration of the territory to the Hungarian Crown and, administration-wise, a return 
to the county system prior to 1552. The Habsburgs followed, instead, the victor￿s 
advice: Eugene of Savoy urged the monarch to assume the title of dominum terrestre 
(master of the land) on top of his absolutistic summus principatus (supreme 
lordship/dominion).
11    18
Consequently, the Banat became Crown land administered as a neoacquisticum 
(newly acquired territory), meaning that, from a political and legal point of view, the 
slate was wiped clean so that no landownership rights prior to 1716 were recognized. 
The territory had been acquired jure belli (by right of sword/conquest) and was to be 
eventually ceded to Hungary in 1779, and even then only the civil part of the 
province. The reasons for this were at least two: the strategic position of the region 
in relation to the Ottoman Empire; and secondly, the reluctance to add to the might 
of the already restive Hungarians (the anti-Habsburg revolt led by RÆk￿czi had taken 
place only a couple of years earlier). 
Under the Habsburgs the pattern of landholding was similar to that imposed by 
previous rules: just like the Ottomans and the Hungarians before them, the Habsburg 
Emperor was the absolute owner of land, which was allotted to the inhabitants within 
a usufructuary framework. The same administrative expedient as resorted to by 
previous rulers was applied this time as well. Effective contact with the population 
of the newly conquered territory could only be established by mediation. Thus, the 
village knezi were retained and absorbed within the Habsburg administrative system, 
so much so that a new position came into being which was modelled on the knez 
function. The oberknez was an Austrian creation and endured until 1776. Unlike the 
knezes, the oberknezes were not elected by the villagers but appointed by the Banat 
governor. Unlike the knez, the oberknez was a salaried function.
12  
In 1751 Maria Theresa decreed the separation of civil from military 
administration.
13 Repeated conflicts with the Porte and, in particular, the 1737-1739 
war, which ended with the loss of northern Serbia and Oltenia (Little Wallachia) to 
the Turks, brought home the strategic importance of the Banat as a defence line and 
emphasised the need for a defence system more effective than the existing frontier   19
militia. This had been the rationale behind the formation of the Habsburg Military 
Border, a defence line dating back to the sixteenth century, initially limited to part of 
the Croatian lands, and conceived as a buffer zone between the Habsburg 
possessions and the Ottoman Empire. Starting from the eighteenth century, this 
territory stretching from the Adriatic, and eventually, all the way to the 
Transylvanian border, acquired an organizational structure of its own, whose main 
appeal resided in a self-sustaining economic system based on feudal-type 
distribution of land in exchange for military service and placed under the control of a 
centralized military administration. An important point on Empress Maria Theresa￿s 
agenda of military reform following the Silesian debacle, the organization of the 
Military Border institution aimed at ￿converting an irregular frontier militia into a 
rigidly disciplined and ever-ready military force, maintained at little or no cost to the 
state in times of peace.￿
14 
Amidst efforts to consolidate the military strength of the new province, a land 
militia came into being in 1726 known as Banatische Landmiliz or Temeser 
Grenzmiliz.
15 The setting up of a new military border establishment became 
necessary after the dissolution of the Tisza ￿ Maros (Tisa-Mureş) confinium in 1741, 
a defence line introduced at the turn of the century and marking, at the time, the 
latest Habsburg advance into Ottoman territory. The second wave of Habsburg 
conquests culminating with the Treaty of Passarowitz pushed the frontier line farther 
south to include the Banat, northern Serbia and little Wallachia, and thus rendered 
superfluous an inland military border. The influx of former frontiersmen from the 
Tisza-Maros area together with refugees from Serbia, lost to the Turks in 1739, 
required a solution of relocation.   20
As the Banat Landmiliz proved unsatisfactory upon later inspection in terms of 
discipline, training and territorial distribution,
16 Habsburg authorities proceeded to 
militarize the southern Banat and to assimilate it into the administrative system of 
the Croatian and Slavonian Military Border. Between 1765 and 1768 three new 
Military Border subdivisions were formed: the Illyrian Border Regiment, the 
German Border Regiment and a Wallachian Battalion reinforced by later additions. 
Before moving on to discussing the organization of this extension of the 
Habsburg Border, I would like to make one particular point regarding the semantics 
of the noun ￿border￿. This will, I hope, prevent any confusion that might arise from 
the polysemy developed by the term ￿Border￿ (Rom. Graniţă, Germ. Grenze) in the 
context of the Habsburg institution. Well before one learns about the intricacies of 
military administration and the peculiarities of landholding and resource 
management in this territory, one comes across an unusual use of language in 
reference to the Military Border: ￿Nemulţumiri  ￿n graniţa militară b ănăţeană la 
￿nceputul secolului 19￿ (Discontent in the Banat military border at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century) reads the title of Costin Feneşan￿s 1973 article in Anuarul 
Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie Cluj. But the word ￿graniţă￿ designates a line of 
demarcation between territories or countries and, by extension, between realms, 
abstract domains etc., and as such collocates with surface rather than volume 
prepositions: ￿la graniţă￿ and less frequently ￿pe graniţă￿ (corresponding to the 
German an der Grenze). Nonetheless, the temptation to lay the charge of solecism at 
the author￿s door dwindles considerably as one discovers that the next author too, 
and the next, irrespective of origin, language or period, resort to the same 
idiosyncratic use of language. Costin Feneşan, an important contemporary scholar of 
Banat history, makes a point of using the volume preposition ￿￿n￿ throughout his   21
articles (see also his 1970 article in Studii de Istoria Banatului entitled ￿Contribuţii la 
istoricul ￿nvăţăm￿ntului ￿n graniţa militară bănăţeană la sf￿rşitul secolului al 18-lea, 
￿nceputul secolului al 19-lea￿). Bujor Surdu opts for the same preposition as does Ion 
Georgescu (￿Mişcări anti-habsburgice rom￿no-s￿rbe ￿n graniţa militară bănăţeană la 
￿nceputul secolului al 19-lea￿). Antoniu Marchescu uses the Latinate term ￿confiniu￿ 
(Lat. confinium = border, frontier) as a more academic synonym of ￿graniţă￿ and 
feels the need for the same type of volume preposition: ￿Grănicerii din acest confiniu 
au primit cu nemulţumire măsura luată de ￿mpărăteasă￿. A basic stylistic analysis 
shows that, in this context, graniţă becomes synonymous to confiniu and teritoriu 
militarizat (militarized territory).
17 
As most of the Romanian bibliography on the topic inevitably draws on Austrian 
sources, the origin of this usage cannot be doubted. And indeed we find it in 
Hietzinger￿s seminal work Statistik der Milit￿rgr￿nze des ￿sterreichischen 
Kaiserthums as early as 1817: ￿Da￿ ￿brigens der Vorwurf der Tr￿gheit und 
Unth￿tigkeit nur den Mann, nicht das Weib in der Gr￿nze treffe [￿] hatten wir 
bereits for￿ber zu bemerken Gelegenheit.￿
18 Another Austrian author, Pidoll zu 
Quintenbach writes towards the middle of the nineteenth century: ￿in der 
￿sterreichischen Milit￿r-Grenze sind auch Wiesen ein Privat Eigenthum der 
Grenzer.￿
19 
The explanation for this unusual choice of preposition lies not only in scholarly 
precedent but also in the nature of the referent itself, that is, the object denoted by 
the word ￿border￿. In the case of the Habsburg military establishment, die Grenze 
ceases to designate a mere frontier line punctuated by sparse sentinel posts and 
marked by coils of barbed wire and comes to denote an entire militarized border 
area or country/region (hence Hietzinger￿s reference to it as Soldatenland) engulfing   22
whole village communities, from among whose members the necessary military 
force was recruited, and subject to a completely different administrative system 
regulated according to laws especially laid down to further the defense purpose of 
the Border. The idiosyncratic use of prepositions signals a semantic change deriving 
from the historical specialization of the term. Using the surface prepositions 
customarily associated with the word border/Grenze/graniţă would, in this context, 
be misleading and would strip the term of the specialized meaning it has acquired. 
Coming back to the organization of the Border, I will, in what follows, review 
the two main legal landmarks defining its specific configuration. The Military 
Border Constitution of 1807 (die Grundgesetze der Karlst￿dter, Warasdiner, Banal, 
Slavonischen und Banatischen Milit￿r-Grenze) stipulated that the overriding purpose 
of this institution was the provision of military service. Everything else was, 
therefore, perceived as subordinate to this ultimate goal. Bearing this in mind will 
help one understand why similar associative patterns of landholding yielded 
dissimilar economic outcomes in other parts of Europe.  
The Military Border system was predicated on usufruct of land and other 
possessions in exchange for military service. The land was, thus, literally divided 
into ￿Milit￿r-Lehen￿ (military fiefs), the Emperor retaining absolute possession over 
them in direct, unmediated fashion (jus domini directi).
20 Following the same logic 
of the preeminence of military rationale over any other considerations, the land in 
the Military Border was subject to strict regulations aimed at precluding its 
fragmentation through alienation and, stemming from this, the possibility of breach 
and infiltration, which might weaken the effectiveness of the Border in its twofold 
function of frontier defence and pest control or cordon sanitaire. Consequently 
immovable goods fell into two categories: Stammgut and ￿berland. The former,   23
comprised of house, yard and land, was inalienable, that is, could not be sold, leased, 
mortgaged or given away.
21 The latter, less extensive than the former, was free of 
such constraints. 
The peculiarity of social organization in the Military Border was given by the 
perpetuation of an archaic form of land possession, the zadruga or Hauskommunion, 
in which several families, connected or not by blood ties, lived under the same roof 
and worked their land in common. Although the system is thought to have originated 
among the Slavic populations (Croatians, Serbs, Bulgarians), the validity of this 
hypothesis has been called into question at various times on the ground that 
communal social patterns are typical of archaic societies in general rather than one 
ethnic group in particular.
22 
Unlike modern associative structures of landholding set up across Europe, the 
zadruga or communal household was used within the framework of the Military 
Border primarily for its subsistence potential, for its capacity of absorbing loss and 
weathering hardships, rather than for a modernising, innovative function of profit 
making. The joint-family household was, thus, in a position to maintain itself in 
times of peace and, more importantly still, in times of war, when the men capable of 
bearing arms had to follow the call of duty. The patriarchal hierarchy of the 
Hauskommunion, headed by a pater familias, who saw to the smooth running of 
household duties and the promotion of wellbeing and morality among its members, 
ensured the status quo rather than change with a view to prosperity or otherwise. 
Change was, moreover, inhibited by the administrative ￿gauntlet￿ that had to be run 
in order to obtain permission from the regiment authorities for transferring land or 
possessions, dividing households or even getting married.   24
This closely supervised military system paid off in times of war. According to 
Marchescu, the Military Border as a whole mobilized seventeen regiments, whereas 
non-militarized territories with the same number of inhabitants could only muster up 
to three regiments￿ worth of soldiers.
23 However, from a social and economic point 
of view, the Hauskommunion proved an antiquated, backward system, which, while 
providing for subsistence agriculture, programmatically failed to provide an 
incentive for work and innovation that could bring about economic development and 
increased prosperity. 
What set apart the situation of the Grenzer from that of the inhabitants of the 
civil Banat was the clearly defined system of dues and taxes. This in itself 
contributed to the comparatively enhanced social and economic status of the 
Grenzer, who, in terms of superiors, looked up only to the company and regiment 
authorities and ultimately to the Emperor himself, unlike the civil inhabitants of the 
Banat, who remained subject to manorial corvØes as well as to the ancient judicial 
system in which the noble or owner of the land acted as judge and ad-libitum 
dispenser of justice. In his description of the Transylvanian Border Regiments, 
George Bariţiu stresses the great difference between serfs, who were at the mercy of 
landowners, and the militarized population, subject to strict but ￿concrete￿ laws.
24 
Thus, in the Military Border the introduction of unambiguous regulations regarding 
the amount of labour owed to state and community did away, to a considerable 
extent, with abuses and exploitation. At the very least this rigorously defined corpus 
of rules and regulations offered the legal basis for appeal in case such abuse did take 
place. 
A second advantage of the system of labour dues, as well as a second point of 
difference when compared to the civil part of the Banat, lay in the use to which this   25
labour was put. Thus, in the non-militarized part of the Banat, the robot contributed 
to the welfare of the landowner and presented no benefits for the peasant himself. On 
the contrary, work for the landowner meant more often than not neglecting one￿s 
own land. Hence the peasant￿s reluctance to work at all or to do it efficiently, as 
pointed out by John Paget.
25 While the same reluctance to apply oneself 
characterised the Grenzer as well - see Hietzinger￿s description of the Border system 
as failing to provide the necessary Ermunterung zur Arbeitsamkeit (incentive to 
work)
26 ￿ this was valid only in the case of land cultivation within the joint-family 
system and had nothing to do with taxation and labour obligations. The latter were 
not implemented for the benefit of one individual or authority but were channelled 
towards maintaining and consolidating the infrastructure of Border communities: 
building roads, dredging rivers, draining swamps, erecting buildings for public use, 
etc.
27 The tax on land, commerce, industry and mills as well as the so-called 
exemption tax went into the Grenz-Cassa or Border treasury.
28 Moreover, the tax on 
land paid by the militarized population amounted to only half the tax to which civil 
inhabitants were liable.
29  
In the wake of the political upheaval of 1848-49, the 1807 Military Border 
Constitution underwent significant changes, which can be viewed as an attempt on 
the part of imperial authorities to keep up with the latest developments and to secure 
the continued allegiance of the militarized population. As 1848 saw the abolition of 
serfdom throughout Hungary, feudal relations within the Border became obsolete. 
Consequently, in 1850 the Constitution was altered, in congruence with the same 
change effected throughout the Monarchy, in the sense of terminating feudal 
relations. This brought about the transformation of landholding rights, so that what 
used to be usufructuary possession of land became absolute ownership. As a   26
consequence of this measure, the frontiersmen were freed from their unpaid labour 
obligations to the state. A number of additional reforms were stipulated by the 
refurbished constitution, among which was the introduction of vernacular languages 
at all levels of the educational system as well as in the administration and justice.
30  
This is the general framework within which the Romanian segment of the Banat 
Military Border came into being, acquired organic structure, and was eventually 
dissolved in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Transylvanian segment of 
the Border was the first to be demilitarized as early as 1851, after the Szekler 
regiments sided with the Hungarians in 1848-49. Further steps towards the 
conversion from military to civilian administration of the remaining Border 
segments were taken following the Ausgleich. The Border system was formally 
dissolved over a period of ten years starting from 1872.
31 Its territory was retroceded 
to Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary, while the regiments became regular line troops. 
The regimental division of the Banat Border varied between its establishment in 
1768 and its disintegration one hundred years later: what started out as a Wallachian 
battalion later on merged with the Illyrian regiment (1774), only to be once again 
split into an Illyrian battalion and a Wallachian Regiment in 1838, the latter 
changing names in 1848 from Wallachian to Romanian Banat Border Regiment. The 
numbering of the Border regiments changed in 1790, when they were set apart from 
the rest of the line regiments and numbered from one to seventeen.
32 As a 
consequence of this, the Wallachian-Illyrian Banat Regiment received the number 
thirteen.  
I am dwelling on this seemingly insignificant issue of numbering because one of 
the interesting, but unsubstantiated, hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
Romanians and imperial authorities hinges on a coincidence of numbers. Thus Liviu   27
Groza argues that the reason for which the Romanian Border Regiment received the 
number thirteen was so that the military authorities could hark back to their Roman 
ancestry and in particular as a reminder of the Roman Legion XIII Gemina, which 
had been stationed close to where the Military Border lay now. In support of this 
assumption he brings as evidence the non-consecutive numbering of regiments: as 
the German Banat Regiment was no. 12, it would have been logical that the Illyrian 
Regiment should have been no. 13 after the 1838 split, and the Romanian regiment 
no. 14. To this, he moreover adduces another piece of evidence in the form of an 
inscription on a military flag reading ￿A lui Romul vitejie, peste voi rom￿ni să fie!￿ 
(Romanians, let Rome￿s bravery be in you as well).
33 Although this martial slogan is 
intriguing and does raise questions as to who thought of it in the first place and under 
what circumstances it was adopted, it does not necessarily corroborate the Roman 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the numbering argument is untenable for two reasons:  
firstly, an overview of the territorial disposition of Border regiments will easily show 
how erratic their numbering was throughout the Border, with, for instance, the 5
th 
and 6
th regiments stationed close to the 10
th and 11
th, while the latter were 
completely disconnected from the 9
th and 12
th respectively. Secondly, both Antoniu 
Marchescu and, before him, the Austrian military historian von Wrede show that in 
1838 the Wallachian-Illyrian Border Infantry Regiment no. 13 was split into an 
Illyrian battalion and the Wallachian Banat Border Regiment, which, logically 
enough, retained the number of the old regiment, that is, number thirteen, since the 
numbering took into account only regiments and not single battalions.
34  
 
 In exploring the allegiance of the military elites originating from the Banat 
Military Border, I shall take as my starting point George Bariţiu￿s distinction   28
between cultural and political unity as formulated in his work Părţi alese din istoria 
Transilvaniei pre 200 ani ￿n urmă (1889):  
 
 ￿As for this, [our] adversaries can stand on their heads even, for a Dacoromania will 
always exist no matter what, and that is the Dacoromania represented by, and to a 
certain extent materialised in, the unity of Romanian language and literature, which is 
one for ten million inhabitants living in several states. Just as spoken and written 
French is one and the same in France, Belgium and Switzerland; just as German is one 
in Austria, Germany, Switzerland etc., just as Spanish [is spoken] in Spain and several 
South American states, so is Romanian common to all Romanians in all the states they 
live in.￿
∗ 35 
 
In keeping with the view presented in this quotation, my main hypothesis holds 
that the military elites of the Banat Romanian Border Regiment cherished just such a 
￿cultural￿ sense of national identity, which did not necessarily entail commitment to 
a political irredentist cause and that cases like General Moise Groza￿s, who are held 
to be emblematic for such national commitment among Romanian frontiersmen, are 
an exception rather than the rule. 
The very formulation of this hypothesis depends on the following question: how 
does one establish the allegiance of a population who lived almost a century and a 
half ago? How does one arrive at an understanding of what they felt, in what terms 
they thought of themselves, to whom they were loyal and what the actual depth of 
their loyalty was? The answer can only be a mapping of extant documents. The 
classification of sources into first-person testimony (letters, memoirs, diaries), which 
is the closest one can hope to get to these people short of mind-reading, and reported 
accounts of events (e.g. officers￿ relations about the attitude of the common people), 
                                                 
∗  ￿In catu pentru acesta, adversarii potu se si stea in capu si o Dacoromania totu va exista totdeauna, 
Øra aceea este Dacoromania representata si oresicum incarnata in unitatea limbei si a literaturei 
romane, care este una unica pentru diece mili￿ne de locuitori impartiti in cateva staturi. Precum este 
una limba francesa vorbita si scrisa in Francia, in Belgiu, in Elvetia; precum e limba germana in 
Austria, Germania, Elvetia etc, limba spaniola in Spania si in cateva staturi sud americane, intocma 
este si limba romana comuna tuturor romanilor si t￿te staturilor in care locuiesc ei.￿    29
which, given their redoubled subjective nature (someone￿s report of someone else￿s 
Øtat d￿￿me), should be taken with an epistemological pinch of salt ￿ this 
classification, therefore, imposes a number of restrictions on the very definition of 
the subject of study. There is a fundamental distinction between 1) the ￿silent￿ mass 
of people, who are at best spoken on behalf of, but do not have a recorded voice of 
their own; and 2) the historically ￿audible￿ military elite of Romanian officers, 
formed in the Border and subsequently involved in promoting the welfare of the 
Romanians within the Empire. It is this ￿audible￿, articulate voice of the Romanian 
military elites from the Banat Military Border that will constitute the main object of 
my thesis. The primary aim is, as mentioned above, that of recuperating their ￿voice￿ 
and accounting for their sense of identity and allegiance. 
My initial assumptions are the following: these elites￿ notion of national 
belonging, of national loyalty, was a modus vivendi developed within the framework 
of the Monarchy rather than an instance of inceptive irredentist ambitions. 
Additionally, the centre of gravitation for these military elites was Vienna and the 
Emperor, and after the Ausgleich, possibly Budapest as the location of the Hungarian 
Parliament, and not Bucharest or the Romanian Regat; moreover, in relation to the 
House of Habsburg, the rise of Romanian national awareness was a centripetal, not a 
centrifugal development. The volatility of the term nation and its quality of being 
easily appropriated led subsequent Romanian historiography to assimilate this type 
of ￿nationalism￿ to the teleological nationalism that would help consolidate the 
Romanian state post 1918 and later on. Evaluating the usefulness of this concept as 
well as proposing a more apposite framework of analysis will form the task of 
Chapter Three of the present thesis. 
   30
What follows is an outline of the chapters making up this thesis and of the main 
points they set out to demonstrate. The introductory chapter is followed by a 
selective survey of historical literature. As the subject of the thesis spans several 
bibliographical strands (Austrian Military Border literature, Romanian bibliography 
on the Banat and Transylvanian Military Border, general studies of the Habsburg 
officer corps as well as other, miscellaneous works such as volumes of 
correspondence, family monographs, or studies on the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-
1878), one chapter would have been insufficient to review all available titles. 
Consequently, I have opted to dwell on insights from nineteenth-century studies on 
the Austrian Military Border, which more often than not are relegated to the footnote 
system of subsequent historical literature. As well as providing valuable background 
information on the life style and peculiarities of Border communities, these works 
also consitute, by their a-national character, a necessary counterpart to the Romanian 
historiography on the Military Border, which tends to read pre-1918 events through 
the lens of unitary nation-state ideology. 
The third chapter is devoted to the conceptual framework within which all 
subsequent analysis in the present thesis will take place. Given that most of the 
archival evidence in this thesis revolves around legal cases, trials and contentious 
issues, it is my methodological option to describe the network of legal relations in 
which the Romanian Border officers functioned and, in particular, to account for the 
interaction between their civil and military status and its effects.  
The fourth chapter is an excursus into historical terminology and charts the 
change in legal and religious status of the Romanian population in the Banat of 
Temeswar and in the Banat Military Border as reflected by the change of official 
designations for this population: Wallach to Illyrian to Romanian. The chapter is   31
intended as a necessary preamble to a discussion of allegiance and identity among 
the ethnic community from which an important number of future kaiserlich-(und)-
k￿niglich
∗  generals emerged. As such it highlights official assumptions and 
perspectives on the militarized Romanian population in the Banat Military Border. 
An important part of the chapter is dedicated to an explanation of the Illyrian nation, 
to which the Romanian population in the Banat were affiliated. This explanation has 
the function of removing ambiguity from the usage of concepts such as that of 
Illyrian Privileges and providing arguments for rejecting the attempt to identify the 
Habsburg Illyrians with any one ethnic group (Serbs, Romanians or even Ruthenes). 
It, moreover, accounts for the preservation of Orthodoxy in this border area and the 
feeble representation of Uniatism (as opposed to the situation in Transylvania). The 
great majority of the fifteen generals under discussion were Orthodox, with a few 
notable exceptions, and Orthodoxy, as we shall see, did represent an important 
element of national identity with some of them. 
The fifth chapter examines the formation of the Romanian military elite 
originating from the Banat Military Border and maps, on the basis of both secondary 
literature and official military records (in particular Qualificationslisten and 
Pensionsprotokolle), the various paths to the rank of general and the mechanism of 
promotion.   
The sixth chapter provides a three-tiered view of the social and cultural 
environment of the Border officers. Thus, the first section concentrates on the 
military symbolism existent in the Romanian Border communities and assesses the 
validity of assumptions in Romanian historiography to the effect that the Habsburg 
                                                 
∗  kaiserlich (und) k￿niglich, henceforth abbreviated k. (u.) k., signified imperial(and) royal and 
referred to the joint institutions of Austria-Hungary. In the case of the military, the und or u. appears 
in brackets to indicate the Austro-Hungarian army before and after 1888. The und was added as a 
concession to the Hungarians in 1888.   32
authorities purposefully promoted Roman symbolism as a binding medium between 
the Imperial House and the Romanian Grenzer. The second section moves from the 
local to the cosmopolitan level and examines to what extent imperial cultural centres 
brought the Banat Border officers into contact with Romanian intellectuals from 
across the Empire. The final part of the chapter provides a brief presentation of the 
Habsburg officer corps as envisaged by English- and German-language historical 
literature to date. 
As indicated above, Chapter Five focuses on the fifteen generals listed by 
Antoniu Marchescu in his history of the Banat Military Border. As such, it represents 
a lower, and broader, level in the pyramidal structure of the thesis, in the sense that, 
while there is official information of one type or another on every one of these 
generals, personal testimony is, however, scant. Thus, Chapters Seven and Eight, 
which examine extant expressions of allegiance and national identity, will, therefore, 
reduce the number of generals from fifteen to six (Doda, Trapsia, Cena, Lupu, 
Guran, Domaschnian), out of which only four played a prominent cultural and 
political role and, by virtue of this, left behind an important number of written traces. 
Chapter Seven concentrates on Generalmajor
∗  Trajan Doda, the first k.k. officer 
of Romanian origin from the Banat Military Border to reach generalcy in the Austro-
Hungarian army and also the only one who, after his retirement, became an MP in 
the Hungarian Parliament. The chapter is not intended to be a biographical study of 
Doda￿s life and political activity, but rather an examination of two important 
moments in his political career, which constitute evidence as to the nature of Doda￿s 
loyalties and his identity. The first episode marks the beginning of his political 
                                                 
∗  Generalmajor (henceforth GM) was the lowest rank of general in the Austro-Hungarian army (one-
star general), preceded by Oberst and followed by Feldmarschalleutnant, Feldzeugmeister (or its 
counterparts in the infantry and cavalry), and Feldmarschall.   33
career as a candidate on a national programme to the Hungarian Parliament. It refers 
to the explanations he had to give to the military authorities in TemesvÆr and Vienna 
relative to his political programme. I have chosen to dwell on Doda￿s justifications 
as they cast light on his relationship with the military authorities, on his political 
views and on his stance on the Hungarian nationality law. 
  The second episode covers the end of Doda￿s political career in the context of 
the 1887-1889 press trial under the charge of incitement to hatred against the 
Hungarian nation. The focal point of my analysis is not so much the trial proper as 
Doda￿s petition to the Emperor two years later and its outcome. Doda￿s explanations 
and the, at times, conflicting evidence regarding the discontinuation of the trial 
against him will be used as a starting point for an examination of his loyalties: to the 
Emperor, to his nation, to the ￿Fatherland￿. The chapter relies on new archival 
material and for the first time proposes a contrastive reading of sources revising 
clichØd assumptions from Romanian literature on the subject. 
The eighth chapter is devoted to three other generals, for whom there is available 
documentary evidence to support an analysis of personal allegiance: Michael von 
Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu. Just as in the case of Doda, the 
primary aim has not been a prosopographical presentation of life and activity, but the 
examination of extant testimony conducive to an inference of the nature of their 
loyalties. Thus, with Trapsia, most of the analysis centres on his posthumous 
collection of aphorisms, in which he addresses notions such as legality, nation, Volk, 
state, and Fatherland. I have chosen to dwell on his views on Magyarization as they 
constitute a blind spot in secondary literature on Trapsia and also because, one   34
generation later, they will be echoed by Feldmarschalleutnant
∗∗  Cena in private 
correspondence.  
Belonging to a later generation than Doda and Trapsia, the next two generals, 
Nikolaus Cena and Alexander Lupu, evince commonalities with their predecessors 
as well as differ from them in certain respects. The chapter examines their sense of 
allegiance to the Romanian nation, the accusations of espionage brought against 
them by the Hungarian and Austrian authorities respectively, as well as the role 
played by Orthodoxy in their loyalties to nation and Emperor. 
Whereas the previous chapters examined the Border generals within the 
framework of the Empire in their relationships to civil and military authorities, the 
penultimate chapter views them in relation to the Romanian authorities in Bucharest 
and the fledgling Romanian army. The chapter is conceived in response to diffuse 
and not always substantiated claims in Romanian secondary literature that on the eve 
of, and during, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, there were attempts at recruiting 
high-ranking officers of Romanian origin from the Austro-Hungarian army, among 
them being Trajan Doda, David Urs de Margina, and Alexander Guran. The chapter 
will explore, on the basis of new archival evidence, the negotiations held between 
Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, on behalf of Ion Brătianu, 
the Romanian Prime Minister, and Count AndrÆssy, as a representative of the 
Austro-Hungarian government and of the Monarch, and will show to what extent the 
Romanian Border generals were the target of these overtures and their response to 
them. 
                                                 
∗∗  Feldmarschalleutnant (henceforth FML) was a two-star general, higher in rank than a 
Generalmajor and immediately below Feldzeugmeister/General der Infanterie/General der 
Cavallerie.   35
The final chapter will revisit the initial hypotheses formulated in the introduction 
and establish their validity in view of the evidence deployed in the previous chapters. 
 
Before I proceed to the next chapter I would like to give a nuts-and-bolts account 
of the research process and the challenges implicit in it. In the literature survey as 
well as in some of the later chapters of the thesis I will outline the problems posed by 
Romanian secondary bibliography on the Military Border, that is, the sometimes 
defective referencing system which obscures the dividing line between author￿s 
input and historical document. I tend to lay particular emphasis on this point as it 
calls for a painstaking return to primary sources in search of confirmation that the 
information purveyed by such secondary sources is reliable and can be built on. The 
aspects I would like to talk about in this final section are those regarding the actual 
interaction with Romanian archives and libraries. The following remarks and caveats 
refer to the first three years of my doctoral research, when the Romanian national 
archives had not been reformed. Since then, they have been undergoing a process of 
modernization, which is visibly improving the process of research.  
When I embarked on my research for the present thesis, I encountered a number 
of procedural and even ethical problems. The first challenge was that posed by what 
I would call the needle-in-the-haystack effect. When I began my research in 2005, 
the Romanian archives had no electronic databases or catalogues, which meant that 
they could only be browsed on the premises. Moreover, the system of classification 
of available material can be very general, with holdings which are labelled in a 
vague manner by means of umbrella phrases that give little indication as to the 
information contained in the documents. This is the case of the archival index at the 
Caraş-Severin branch of the National Archives. Here some of the listings have labels   36
such as ￿incoming/ outgoing items￿ or ￿the Sacabert affair￿, etc. Or, when the 
documents are catalogued more accurately, as in the microfilm collection from the 
Viennese archives to be found at the National Archives in Bucharest, the exact 
location of a certain material on the microfilm reel is given with generous 
approximation. Thus, Kossuth￿s 1848 ten-page address to the frontiersmen is listed 
between frames 318 and 456, that is, more than a hundred pages of manuscripts 
more or less legibly penned in the German Kurrentschrift of the time; or documents 
about the intervention of the imperial army in the 1848 revolution are to be found 
between frames 513 and 764, which is a far cry from Gy￿rgy Kurucz￿ Guide to 
Documents and Manuscripts in Great Britain relating to the Kingdom of Hungary, 
where, in addition to an exact location and shelfmark number of the document, the 
reader is provided with a short description of the contents of every single document 
and a good index of names and place names. More flagrantly, in the Mocsonyi 
family archive, for instance, one can find correspondence dating from the 1890s in 
folders containing documents about 1848-1849 and catalogued as such, which 
introduces an additional element of chance in one￿s research. 
Whereas I overcame this first challenge through the exercise of patience and 
perseverance, it nevertheless became a real obstacle in combination with archival red 
tape. Taking my cue from the opening line of the famous Shakespearian monologue 
(￿Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow￿￿) I tend to call this the Macbeth effect, 
which vitiates the reader￿s attempts at coping with the above-mentioned 
shortcoming. In the case of Romanian archives, the line does not function as a 
metaphor but rather as a literal description of the procedures for accessing material. 
Thus, one cannot submit a request for a reading permit (the request must be 
rubberstamped by the director himself), obtain the permit, browse the catalogue,   37
order the items, and view them on the very same day. The permit request form takes 
one day to validate. Depending on the disposition of the archivist, the browsing of 
the catalogue can only be done once the permit has been obtained. Any materials can 
be ordered for the next day only and there is a limit to how many items one can view 
per day (only two microfilm reels can be viewed per day in the Bucharest National 
Archives).  
Depending on the branch of the National Archives one happens to work in, the 
archivist on duty can give you a hard time or can choose to make things easy for 
you. At the Caraş-Severin branch the archivist punctiliously followed every step of 
the procedure, which gave rise to a situation that bordered on the theatre of the 
absurd: I could only obtain a permit and, consequently, be allowed to look at the 
catalogue, if I filled in a request form. On the request form I was to specify my 
research topic, which action, as the proviso at the bottom of the page indicated, was 
of a binding nature in the sense that I would only be allowed to consult material 
strictly related to that topic and none other. Having no notion what the archive 
contained (the catalogue was off-limits until I got the permit) I opted for an all-
inclusive topic. The next day the same archivist told me that the topic had been too 
broadly defined and dictated to me what she thought I was interested in and I would 
be likely to find in the archive. The rewriting of the request form meant another 
wasted day. She did grant me access to the index one day in advance of what the 
rules stipulated but made it clear to me that she was committing an illegal act. It was 
only a year or so ago that the restrictions on material to be viewed were lifted. 
The National Archives in Bucharest, on the other hand, have helpful, friendly 
staff and the ordering and viewing of items is a much smoother process. Even there, 
however, the system could be less than propitious to research previous to the   38
modernization measures implemented of late. If they happened to have a 
photocopying backlog, it could take weeks and even months to have anything 
photocopied irrespective of the number of pages required. In the case of printed 
material this problem could be circumvented by selectively copying material by 
hand. However, when it came to manuscripts in German Schrift it was important to 
have a copy of the original text for further reference and as a way of subsequently 
verifying the accuracy of the initial transliteration. 
The ethical challenge to which I alluded earlier regards the politics of accessing 
unpublished archival material. In the Caraş-Severin National Archives I was allowed 
to view a body of manuscript documents consisting of Military Border officers￿ 
reports about events and military operations that took place during 1848-1849. 
Permission to consult these documents was granted on condition that I did not 
mention this to Colonel Liviu Groza, who, having had a falling-out with the director, 
had been denied access to them. Thus caught between the devil and the deep blue 
sea, I could not discuss the documents with indisputably one of the most 
knowledgeable people on the subject, or if I did that and word got out I risked 
antagonizing the archivists and incurring the same fate as Liviu Groza, that is, being 
myself debarred from documents, which, given the context, could easily be sent to 
be  sine die microfilmed. An informal discussion I had with Professor Nicolae 
Bocşan, the Rector of Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj, highlighted the same 
problem of accessing archival material, depending on circumstances such as the 
archivists￿ and the director￿s good-will, the staff￿s degree of acquaintance with the 
holdings, informal networks (which function in the case of private holdings), etc. 
This apparent elusive character of archival material seems to stem from a peculiar 
view of historical research as a rat race for unpublished documents, which once   39
discovered and printed ensure celebrity for the researcher and become old hat for 
subsequent scholars. 
While the aspects I pointed out in this section are not to be generalized into an 
overall indictment of the archives system in Romania (the Bistriţa-Năsăud branch of 
the National Archives, for instance, is a very welcoming place for research with 
enthusiastic and tremendously helpful archivists), the happenings above are, 
nevertheless, actual incidents that did render research unnecessarily tortuous as well 
as leading to an inefficient use of time and funding.   40
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Chapter 2: Imperial and National Literature  
on the Banat Military Border 
 
As the present thesis seeks to account for the formation and allegiance of 
Banat military elites originating from the Austrian Military Border, this 
bibliographical chapter will concentrate on two types of secondary historical 
literature: 1) statistical studies and travel accounts contemporaneous with the 
Austrian Military Border; 2) Romanian studies on the Banat and Transylvanian 
segments of the Border. Given that English-language scholarship concentrates for 
the most part on the Croatian Military Border, such works will be acknowledged in 
the bibliography of the thesis but, for reasons of space and relevancy, I will not dwell 
on them in this chapter. The main assumptions of literature on the Habsburg officer 
corps will be briefly surveyed in Chapter Six. 
My reason for focusing on nineteenth-century contributions is their double 
level of significance. Most of the subsequent literature on the Border has relied on 
them owing to their denotative value (in other words, the circumstantial information 
they conveyed about the Habsburg institution). There is, however, a second level of 
signification, a connotative one, which has been little explored by later contributions. 
These nineteenth-century writings are not only an invaluable source of concrete 
administrative and demographic data about the Border, but also an index of official 
discourse on the subject, of how the Border and its inhabitants were viewed at the 
time, of the level of knowledge available then, of the stereotypes and possible myths 
that were coming into being at the time.  
Contemporary accounts of the Military Border span the nineteenth century 
and are, for the most part, written by Habsburg authors. Names such as Pidoll von   43
Quintenbach, Schwicker, Vanicek, Carl Bernh. Ritter von Hietzinger, Leonhard 
B￿hm, constitute bibliographical sources that most subsequent studies on the subject 
build on. Paradoxically, this flurry of nineteenth-century studies is attributable not, 
as one might expect, to the success of the Military Border as an imperial institution 
but rather to a sequence of critical moments in its history when it was challenged and 
proposed for dissolution. As a consequence, with some exceptions, most of the 
writings in this period are generated by a polemical context: thus, Demian￿s and in 
particular Marmont￿s contributions are occasioned by the change of hands 
undergone by the first six Border regiments in the early nineteenth century following 
the Napoleonic Wars. The proposed dissolution of the Border became then a subject 
of debate as French representatives advised against its retention as a hotbed of 
Austrian imperial loyalty. Pidoll von Quintenbach writes in 1847 and draws a 
parallel between the Austrian Grenze and the Russian colonies amidst reiterated 
exhortations, especially from the Hungarian side, that the Border should be 
demilitarized and its territory returned to the Hungarian Crown. Schwicker￿s 1883 
study marks the actual dissolution of the institution (one year before, that is, in 1882) 
and is the first post-factum history of the Military Border. 
The first extensive work aiming at a synoptic view of the Military Border and 
bringing together all the loose strands of previous contributions on the topic is the 
impressive three-volume Statistik der Milit￿rgr￿nze des ￿sterreichischen 
Kaiserthums by Carl Bernhard Edler von Hietzinger, published starting with 1817.
1 
The author worked in the Milit￿rgrenze Departement of the Hofkriegsrat and was 
subsequently appointed Kriegssekret￿r and Referent of the General Command in 
Karlstadt and Warasdin (for more information on the author, see the capsule 
biography in the appendix section).   44
For the purposes of this thesis Hietzinger￿s comments on the social 
configuration of the Border are of particular value. The author￿s take on the 
Habsburg institution stands out in that ethnic differences play only a secondary role 
in the description of the militarized population. Instead, he offers a cohesive, 
monolithic view of the Grenzer  (or frontiersmen), who are presented as sharing 
common cross-ethnic traits deriving from their military status: 
 
 ￿All in all there is only one class in the soldier land, that of the frontiersmen, or the 
general frontier class, which is formed of land-tilling warriors. All other classes or 
professional groups of frontier inhabitants exist in relation to the first and one can 
say that the latter are there only for the sake of the former; such is the case of priests, 
officers, merchants, craftsmen, and so on.￿
∗∗  2  
 
As presented in this quote, the Grenzer constituted the raison d￿Œtre for this 
institution with all the other classes discharging a secondary, instrumental function. 
The image Hietzinger offers is a balanced, down-to-earth one, tinged with the 
optimism of eighteenth-century meliorism. The influence of nurture-over-nature 
pedagogy informs the section on Talent and Education (Talent und Bildung), where 
inborn characteristics such as intelligence, power of judgment, wit, and eagerness to 
learn, as well as eloquence are hindered by a lack of proper education. The raw 
material is there in the form of good qualities and proclivities but cannot be fully 
turned to account for want of a suitable education.
3 The result is a culture rife with 
superstition and a community tenaciously clinging to the old ways.  
Hietzinger, moreover, provides valuable insight into the causes of the 
frontiersman￿s seemingly contradictory attitude to work:  
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Es gibt in dem Soldatenlande in Allgemeinen nur einen Stand, den des Gr￿nzers, oder den 
gemeinen Gr￿nzstand, der sich im ackerbauenden Krieger ausspricht. Alle ￿brigen Standes- und 
Berufs-Klassen der Gr￿nzbewohner beinahe stehen in Beziehung zu demselben und man kann sagen 
sie seyen nur um seinetwillen da; so die Geistlichkeit, so die Officiere, so die Handels- und 
Gewerbsleute u.s.w.￿   45
 
￿Generally the frontiersman sheds his laziness when away from home. Of all 
soldiers, there is none so ready as the frontiersman to hand over his house and land 
activities to his billeting officer. At home up until now he has lacked an incentive to 
industriousness for he sees very little advantage for himself in being more 
industrious than others. But in this as well the Constitution has brought some 
progress for him￿
∗∗∗ 4  
 
The passage comes across as a veiled critique of the zadruga or 
Hauskommunion system, which formed the basis of landholding in the Military 
Border: the joint family and not the individual was the usufructuary of land and 
goods, and they engaged in subsistence agriculture, whose ultimate purpose was not 
so much the economic advancement of the community as the upkeep of soldiers. 
Hietzinger￿s connection between the people￿s reluctance to apply themselves and the 
administrative framework within which they lived and worked chimes in with later 
arguments concerning the zadruga system in Croatia and the robot system in 
Hungary.  
Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century Croatian liberals militated 
for the dismemberment of zadrugas as a way of ushering in the bases of capitalist 
economy: the dissolution of the joint family system of landownership was seen as 
conducive to ￿a more intensive tilling of the soil, a firm basis for credit, a greater 
desire for education, fewer infringements of the law, and higher morale in individual 
families.￿
5 The robot system in Hungary was questioned on the same grounds of lack 
of productivity and failure to incentivize the peasant to effective work. ￿The system 
of rent by robot or forced labour ￿ that is, so many days￿ labour without any 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Anm. ￿berhaupt legt der Gr￿nzer au￿er der Heimath seine Tr￿gheit ab. Unter allen Soldaten ist 
keiner so bereit, seinem Quartiergeber in allen h￿uslichen und landwirtschaftlichen Besch￿ftigungen 
an die Hand zu gehen, als der Gr￿nzer. Zu Hause fehlte es ihm bisher auch darum an Ermunterung zur 
Arbeitsamkeit, weil er zu wenig Vortheil f￿r sich sah, wenn er flei￿iger war, als andere. Aber auch 
darin haben ihn die Grundgesetze um einen starken Schritt weiter gebracht.￿   46
specification of the quantity of work to be performed, - is a direct premium on 
idleness,￿ John Paget pointed out in 1839:  
 
￿A landlord wishes a field of corn to be cut: his steward sends out, by means of his 
Haiducks, information to the peasants to meet at such and such a field at such an 
hour with their sickles. Some time after the hour appointed a great part of them 
arrive, the rest finding some excuse by which they hope to escape a day￿s work; a 
Haiduck stands over them to see that they do not go to sleep and between talking, 
laughing and resting they do get something done. Where horses are employed, they 
are still less inclined to hurry lest they should tire them for the next day when they 
use them for their own purposes.￿
6 
 
The common denominator of the above-mentioned critiques is that all these 
systems (Military Border Hauskommunion, Croatian zadruga, Hungarian robot) 
were adverse to individual landownership and counterproductive in themselves as 
they disincentivized the labourer on whom they depended for their existence. In their 
different ways, they all failed to provide what Hietzinger called die Ermunterung zur 
Arbeitsamkeit  (incentive to work). As we shall see later on in this chapter, the 
stagnant economy of the Military Border would come under attack as a feudal 
throwback. One of the aspects I will follow up in Chapter Five is the effect of this 
economic environment on the social dynamics of the Border communities. This 
constitutes one of the blind spots of existing literature on the Border. There are, on 
the one hand, studies that deal with the intricacies of the system of labour dues and 
landholding and, on the other hand, there are analyses of educational reforms and of 
the mechanism of information dissemination within Border military communities. 
What is, however, lacking is the type of literature that would make a connection 
between these two dimensions (the administrative and the cultural), that would 
elucidate the consequences deriving from the combination of the two.    47
Among the social strata that Hietzinger postulated as ancillary to the general 
frontiersmen class (der gemeine Gr￿nzstand) are the Border officers, among whom 
￿reigns to a great extent the usual culture of our cities￿ (herrscht gr￿stentheils die 
gew￿hnliche Cultur unserer St￿dte).
7 The same nationality blindness accompanies 
Hietzinger￿s description of them. One of the points of interest is constituted by the 
book collections and libraries of the Border, Pancsova being one of the few places to 
boast such a facility.
8 The lack of local bookshops as well as that of a local 
newspaper, despite it being presented as an obstacle to reading, seems to work 
paradoxically towards opening up the Border to cultural influences from without: 
￿those in Agram, Hermannstadt and Klausenburg are the only ones which are located 
closer to the frontiersmen.￿
∗ 9 
 
One of the authors that pass the examination of Hietzinger￿s critical eye is 
Johann Andreas Demian,
10 an Austrian military writer and statistician. His study of 
the Military Border represents the fourth and last part of an extensive statistical 
description of the Habsburg Monarchy, which he began in 1804, Darstellung der 
Oesterreichischen Monarchie nach den neuesten statistischen Beziehungen. For the 
purposes of the present thesis I shall be referring to volume four, which was 
published in 1807 and covers the Military Border in Hungary, including the Banat.  
Demian￿s presentation of the Banat segment of the Military Border follows 
the fashionable pattern of statistical writings of the day. A brief historical 
introduction sets the scene for a stark but useful description of the Border in terms of 
physical geography and social structure. The division of the Border into two 
regiments - das Deutsch-Banatische Regiment, based at Panciova, and das 
                                                 
∗  ￿Die zu Agram, Hermannstadt und Klausenburg sind die einzigen, welche den Gr￿nzern zum Theil 
n￿her liegen.￿   48
Wallachisch-Illyrische Regiment, with its headquarters in Caransebes - underlies and 
structures the geographical and social description of the Banat Military Border. The 
description of ￿Das Land selbst￿ has for a counterpart a terse chapter on the Border 
inhabitants and their number, demographic density, and ethnic history. Thus, under 
the heading ￿Ethnic Variety of the Inhabitants￿ (V￿lkerschaftliche Verschiedenheit 
der Einwohner), the Wallachians are depicted in the following terms:  
 
￿The Wallachians are the oldest inhabitants of the Banat. Most numerous are these 
descendants of the most famous of peoples, who were equally devoted to plough and 
sword, in the Wallachian-Illyrian regiment, where they live mostly in the mountains 
on the Wallachian and Transylvanian border.￿
∗∗ 11 
 
 Detailed tables containing data on crops and types of land, use of woodland, 
export and import articles, etc., are not matched by a commensurate appraisal of the 
social composition of the territory. Hence the lopsided rapport between Kultur des 
Landes and Geistige Kultur, the latter being a mere enumeration of the confessions 
to which the inhabitants belong followed by a short review of existing schools. 
Although laconic, the author does point to a fundamental discrepancy between the 
state-funded Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as German schools, on the one 
hand, and the Griechisch Nichtunirte churches and schools, on the other hand. The 
latter are allowed to function but solely at the expense of the communities for which 
they cater:  
 
￿The Non-Uniates of both Banat Border regiments have 120 national schools, which 
were attended in 1802 by 3,588 pupils. [￿] Here as well, the Illyrian national 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Die Wallachen sind die ￿ltesten Einwohner des Banats. Am zahlreichsten sind diese 
Nachk￿mmlinge des ber￿hmtesten, dem Pflug und Degen gleich ergebenen Volks, im Wallachisch-
illyrischen Regiment, wo sie meist in den Gebirgen, an der Wallachischen und Siebenb￿rgischen 
Grenze wohnen.￿   49
schools and their teachers have to be maintained and salaried by the non-Uniate 
communities out of their own pocket.￿
∗∗∗  12 
 
Demian￿s 1810 book on the first six border regiments, which were included 
in the Illyrian Provinces, provides an in-depth examination of these at the expense of 
the other segments of the Military Border. Referring to Demian￿s work, Hietzinger 
points out its shortcomings in the following terms:  
 
￿it lacks ￿ not to mention other things - information on the Transylvanian Border as 
a whole and in the case of the other Border provinces it fails to mention their 
constitution and administration. These important sections were added in the repeated 
editing of the Karlstadt and Banal Border, but this only proved his utter inability to 
talk about these aspects.￿
∗  
13 
 
The blind spot Hietzinger highlights is understandable given that, although 
serving for a while in several infantry regiments (De Vins-, W￿rttemberg-, and 
Coburg-Infanterie) between 1800 and 1803, Demian did not have first-hand 
experience of the Military Border. His detailed information appears to have come 
from his activity of officially collecting statistical material on the k.k. Milit￿rgrenze 
conducted in 1804.
14 Moreover, unlike other nineteenth-century authors, he is more 
of a writer than a military figure and this inevitably influences his perspective. 
                   
The middle of the nineteenth century sees the publication of the first 
comparative study of the Habsburg Military Border. Pidoll zu Quintenbach￿s 1847 
tract Einige Worte ￿ber die russischen Milit￿r-Kolonien im Vergleiche mit der k.k. 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Die Nicht-Unirten der beyden Banatischen Grenzregimenter haben 120 Nationalschulen, welche 
im Jahre 1802 von 3,588 Sch￿lern besucht wurden. [...] Die illyrischen Nationalschulen und ihre 
Lehrer m￿ssen auch hier von den nichtunirten Gemeinden aus eigenen Mitteln unterhalten und 
besoldet werden.￿ 
∗  ￿Doch fehlt darin, der andern M￿ngel zu geschweigen, die siebenb￿rgische Grenze ganz, und bei 
den ￿brigen Gr￿nzprovinzen ihre Verfassung und Verwaltung. Diese wichtigen Abschnitte hat 
derselbe zwar in der wiederholten Bearbeitung der Karlst￿dter und Banal-Gr￿nze [￿] nachtragen, 
dabei aber auch seine v￿llige Unf￿higkeit bewiesen, ￿ber diese Gegenst￿nde zu sprechen.￿   50
￿sterreichischen Milit￿r-Grenze und mit allgemeinen Betrachtungen dar￿ber
15 
draws a parallel between the Austrian system of defence and its Russian counterpart. 
A high-ranking officer in the Hofkriegsrat, Quintenbach holds out a strategist￿s 
perspective on the institution, stressing its advantages as well as its uniqueness of 
purpose and organization. The comparison with contemporary Russian military 
colonies set up in 1810
16 is instrumental in bringing out this singularity.  
Thus, whereas the two institutions were subject to military administration and 
followed a similar organizational pattern (the Russian colonies were subordinated to 
the Ministry of War just as die Milit￿r-Grenze fell within the purview of the 
Hofkriegsrat; both of them, moreover, had a specially designated department in these 
respective institutions, in the Austrian case this being das  Milit￿r-Grenz 
Departement), they, nevertheless, differed greatly in their goals. 
The purpose of the Russian military colonies was that of overcoming the 
serious problem posed to military tactics and deployment efficiency by the sheer 
extent of Russian territory. Consequently, these military colonies functioned as 
partially self-sustaining outposts capable of maintaining an efficient standing army, 
which could be rapidly mustered. Quintenbach goes on to mention a second goal for 
setting up these colonies, that of providing the soldiers with a home, with a 
permanent place of residence.
17 This strikes one as a subsidiary goal, a humanitarian 
justification bolstering up the principal, Realpolitik goal of rationalizing the 
distribution of army forces.  
According to the Hofkriegsrat official, the main difference between the two 
systems was of a social nature and lay in the militarization process undergone by the 
population involved. In the case of the Russian colonies, the term militarization 
applied only to administration but not to the actual process of turning civilians into   51
military. It did not, therefore, designate an instance of social metamorphosis (from 
peasants into soldiers). The soldiers were not part of the peasant communities 
themselves but merely provided for by the latter: ￿in the Border regiments the 
soldiers are usually mingled with the mass of people; in the colonies they are 
completely separate.￿
∗∗ 18 This leads to another, more important, dissimilarity: 
  
￿In Austria the settlers, the peasants, are gradually turned into soldiers. They are 
given officers and non-commissioned officers, who train them in the military 
service. Not so in Russia. There whole standing regiments are inserted among the 
colonists and are all of them already trained soldiers, who must be hosted and cared 
for by the inhabitants of the land.￿
∗∗∗ 19  
 
As the quote shows, from a social point of view the two systems could not be 
more dissimilar: whereas the Russian strategy was predicated on the insertion 
(einlegen) of an alien military element into the peasant communities from which 
they parasitically derived their means of subsistence, the Austrian military border 
was patterned on an organic model of development, that is, on the painstaking 
transformation of peasants into soldiers
20 so that the military community and the 
breadwinning community were, in this case, coterminous.  
The rationale behind the choice of the type of ￿militarization￿ used (that is, by 
expedient insertion or by painstaking ￿cultivation￿) stems from a complex of 
financial and demographic reasons: the depleted population and war-impoverished 
lands constituting the eastern border of the Habsburg Empire made inadequate the 
use of line troops (Germ. Linien-Milit￿r) for cost-effective defence purposes (such 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿in den Grenz-Regimentern sind die Soldaten gew￿hnlich mit der Volksmenge vermengt, in den 
Kolonien sind sie v￿llig unterschieden.￿ 
∗∗∗  ￿In ￿sterreich bildete man die Ansiedler, die Bauern, nach und nach zu Soldaten. Man gab ihnen 
Offiziere und Unteroffiziere, um sie in dem milit￿rischen Dienste abzurichten. Nicht so in Ru￿land. 
Dort legt man ganze bestehende Regimenter bei den Kolonisten ein, alle schon abgerichtete Soldaten, 
welche die Landesbewohner bei sich aufnehmen und verpflegen m￿ssen.￿   52
troops could only function at great expense for the central authorities). The solution 
of setting up self-sustaining border communities, which would also form a steady 
pool of recruitment, took into consideration the colonization imperatives of the area 
and the double threat posed by Turkish raids and disease propagation. The overriding 
goal of the Military Border was to stave off Ottoman inroads of the 1529 and 1683 
type, when the Turks all but conquered Vienna, and at the same time to provide a 
cordon sanitaire, which would keep at bay epidemics and also reinforce the budding 
Habsburg sanitation policies. 
Thus, while the Habsburg authorities introduced the Military Border system 
with a view to economizing, for their Russian counterpart money seemed to be a less 
important issue, as they were able to a considerable extent to finance and invest in 
their colonies: Russian soldiers received their uniforms and their wages from the 
state; according to Quintenbach, well-maintained hospitals were to be found in these 
colonies in contrast to the few and precarious ones in the Military Border; while in 
both militarized territories food and fodder stocks were available for rainy days 
(Fruchtvorrathsspeicher und Fourage-Magazine), in Russia these were better 
provided for; the Russian colonies, Quintenbach points out, benefited from a loan 
system (Leihanstalt), which was nonexistent in the Habsburg Border. 
The geographical disposition of the two strategic formations reflects, in its 
turn, their different functions: the continuity and compact character of the Austrian 
Military Border, stretching all the way from the Adriatic to Transylvania almost 
without interruption, was dictated by its role of buffer-zone and all its elements 
(administration, landowning regulations, etc.) converged in this function of 
precluding incursions and infiltrations of any kind. One of the crucial peculiarities of 
the Border was its system of land tenure, ￿a true feudal system￿, as Quintenbach puts   53
it, ￿in which the frontiersmen are obliged to offer military service in exchange for the 
free use of their lands.￿
∗ 21 T h i s  s h o u l d  b e  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  f u l l  
landownership valid in the Russian colonies, which were discontinuous and 
interspersed with non-militarized territory.
22 This erratic territorial distribution 
shows that the main function of the Russian border settlements was not massive 
defence but rather that of providing nodal points of military strength, thus covering 
the huge Russian expanse by means of a triangulated disposition of armed forces.   
Quintenbach￿s comparison has the merit of highlighting those characteristics 
of the Austrian Military Border which, as I will make a point of analysing further on, 
will form the premises for unique social and cultural developments, and also for 
maintaining the military profession as the most important path of social 
advancement. 
A previous account of the Military Border, to which Quintenbach harks back 
at the beginning of his study, is the 1837-38 travel account by Marshall Marmont, 
Duc de Ragusa, who first introduced the comparison with the Russian colonies, 
which Quintenbach was to take up and develop ten years later. Appointed Governor 
General of the Illyrian Provinces after the Peace of Vienna in 1809, Marmont was in 
charge of the first six regiments of the Military Border
23 and, in this capacity, drew 
up in 1810 Le Rapport officiel sur les Provinces Illyriennnes. 
Marmont￿s evaluation of the Austrian Military Border system is doubly 
valuable as it comes from a marshal in Napoleon￿s army and, as such, a former 
￿enemy￿ of the Habsburg Empire. His great appreciation for the organization of the 
Milit￿r-Grenze stems from close acquaintance with the system and finds its 
expression in his successful attempt to dissuade Napoleon from dissolving it. His 
                                                 
∗  ￿ein wahres Lehn-System, in dem die Grenzer f￿r den freien Genu￿ ihrer Gr￿nde Milit￿r-Dienste zu 
leisten verpflichtet sind.￿   54
plea for retaining the Border is prompted by both enlightened principles of 
government and strategic reasons:  
 
￿Being aware of the serious consequences that must arise for these peoples, happy in 
their own way, and for the government too, out of a change of organization, I 
pleaded with Napoleon in favour of retaining the organization which was already in 
place. [￿] These are the regiments which guard the entire frontier of the Austrian 
monarchy with Turkey, and provide the Austrian Empire with an army of seventy 
thousand men, always ready for war, who cost [the Monarchy] next to nothing in 
times of peace.￿
∗∗ 24 
 
In Marmont￿s observations the strategist￿s awareness of the advantages of the 
Austrian military institution intermingles with philosophical considerations on the 
best-suited form of government and humanist concern for the ￿happiness￿ of the 
population: ￿the first condition for civilizing barbarians is to give them a powerful 
organization so as to establish among them a permanent order and then to give them 
educated leaders￿.
∗∗∗ 25  
While such considerations might be viewed as mere political idealism or as a 
re-reading of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political reasons through the lens of 
French Romantic ideology with its emphasis on le peuple and its welfare, they do 
nevertheless touch on the unwitting social consequences of the Border institution. 
What Marmont presents as the fully intentional attempt by the Austrian authorities to 
improve the life of their hapless subjects in the peripheral regions of the empire is 
rather the by-product or spin-off of a high-politics strategy, which initially had little 
to do with the subjects￿ welfare. 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿PØnØtrØ des consØquences graves qui devaient rØsulter pour ces peuples heureux de leur sort, et 
pour le gouvernement, d￿un changement d￿organisation, je dØfendis ce qui existait auprØs de 
NapolØon. [￿] Ce sont ces rØgiments qui gardent toute la frontiŁre de la monarchie autrichienne du 
cotØ de la Turquie, et donnent ￿ l￿empire d￿Autriche une armØe de soixante-dix mille hommes 
toujours prŒte pour la guerre, qui ne lui coßte presque rien en temps de paix.￿ 
∗∗∗   ￿la premiŁre condition pour civiliser les barbares, c￿est de les organiser fortement, de maniŁre ￿ 
Øtablir parmi eux un ordre permanent, et ensuite de leur donner des chefs instruits.￿   55
As a former commander of the Military Border, Marmont was well 
acquainted with its fortes and its social particularities. He dwells at some length on 
the economic structure and various offices and regulations. Of particular interest is 
his attempt to explain the valour and loyalty of the Grenzer by this very peculiar 
social configuration, which sets the Border apart from all other military 
communities:  
 
￿it is owing to this regime that the soldiers, who are always in the midst of their 
families, spread out on a great expanse of the country, are constantly possessed of 
the military, warrior spirit, as well as that of respect for their officers, and 
obedience, as if they had been formed in a barracks. One finds them as valiant on 
the first day of war as on the last. To what causes should this phenomenon be 
attributed, if not to their childhood impressions, to discourses, to parental example, 
to the opinion of all the population?￿
∗ 26  
 
On the whole, Marmont￿s description of the Romanian segment of the 
Military Border, occasioned by his visit to Caransebes, is more concerned with the 
system in its entirety as an enactment of a solution pertaining to political philosophy:  
 
￿The course to follow is this: bringing together and organizing the individuals, 
making them obedient and giving them enlightened leaders: their progress becomes 
rapid and, when time and the work habit have trained them, they can be left to 
govern themselves. But until then the protective hand of a paternal government, 
which cares for them and leads them step by step, is useful to them. We can only 
admire the salutary effects of this regime when we see the degree of wellbeing and 
prosperity reached by the peoples that were subject to it.￿
∗∗ 27   
                                                 
∗  ￿C￿est grace ￿ ce regime que les soldats, qui sont toujours dans leurs familles, dispersØs sur une 
grande Øtendue de pays, ont constamment l￿Øsprit aussi militaire, aussi guerrier, autant de respect pour 
leurs officiers, autant d￿obØissance que s￿ils sortaient d￿une caserne. On les trouve aussi braves le 
premier jour de la guerre que le dernier. A quelles causes attribuer ce phØnomŁne, si ce n￿est aux 
impressions de leur enfance, aux discours, ￿ l￿exemple de leurs parents, ￿ l￿opinion de toute la 
population?￿ 
∗∗  ￿La marche ￿ suivre est celle-ci: rassambler et organizer les individus, les rendre obØissants et leur 
donner des chefs ØclairØs: leurs progrŁs deviennent rapides, et quand l￿habitude du travail et le temps 
les ont formØs, ils peuvent Œtre livrØs ￿ eux-mŒmes. Mais jusque l￿, la main protectrice d￿un 
gouvernement paternel, qui veille sur eux et les conduit pas ￿ pas, leur est utile. On ne peut   56
 
Although the welfare of the population comes across as a leitmotif of his 
account, there is very little he actually says about the population or their officers. 
Thus, despite the fact that he kept in contact with some of the Border officers, 
Marmont does not feel the need to talk about them, to focus on their way of life, and 
thus bridge the gap between the general description and universal laws of 
government he enunciates, on the one hand, and the tangible pulse of the community 
in all its concrete details and manifestations, on the other. The only part of the 
population that receives some attention are ￿les Zingares￿, nomads panning for gold, 
who alone ￿are worthy of capturing the travellers￿ attention￿.
28 This limited scope is, 
thus, typical of travel accounts, in which the eye of the traveller seeks out the 
unusual, the exotic, and the anecdotal, and remains blind to ￿ordinary￿ activities and 
people. Detail-rich descriptions are only devoted to things out of the ordinary, 
whereas what belongs to day-to-day life is relegated to the realm of generalities. 
If hands-on travel accounts such as Marmont￿s fall short of minimalistic 
descriptions, full-fledged comprehensive studies of the Military Border of the kind 
Johann Heinrich Schwicker was to publish in 1883,
29 following the dissolution of the 
Border, are even less likely to provide the reader with a micro-level account of the 
individual communities forming the Border institution. Schwicker makes it clear in 
the introduction that the focus of his book will be on historical, political, and military 
matters, which he considers to be reflective of the true nature of the Border 
institution.
30 The cultural-historical element comes into discussion only insofar as it 
has any bearing on the military function of the Border.
31 It therefore plays a 
secondary role in Schwicker￿s discussion, a structural choice which influences the 
                                                                                                                                         
qu￿admirer les effets salutaires produits par ce regime, quand on voit ￿ quel degrØ de bien-Œtre et de 
prospØritØ sont arrivØs les populations qui y sont soumises.￿   57
kind of information included in the book and predefines the highlights and blind 
spots of the narrative offered. 
The study is the first complete post-factum history of the Military Border, 
published in the wake of the dissolution of the Habsburg institution. It brings 
together a rich bibliographical apparatus including archival material as well as a 
wide range of secondary sources featuring the works of Griselini, Demian, Hitzinger, 
Vaniček, Bariţiu, B￿hm, and Pesty, among others. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
most relevant chapters in Schwicker￿s book are those concerning the impact of the 
national movements on the Military Border and the crucial events of 1848-49, when 
the loyalty of the imperial troops as well as that of the military communities were 
sorely put to the test. As far as the spread of nationalism in the Border is concerned, 
this is cogently dealt with in the second chapter of Part Two, ￿Die nationale 
Bewegung und die Milit￿rgrenze￿ (the national movement and the Military Border). 
Schwicker distinguishes between two main sources of nationalism in the militarized 
territory: ￿The nationality movement generally came to the Military Border via two 
channels: through the channel of Illyrianism and through the vehicle of Serbian 
nationalism.￿
∗∗∗ 32 However accurate this distinction is, it nevertheless fails to account 
for any other nationalities comprised in the Military Border apart from the Serbs and 
the Croats (that is, the Romanians and the Szeklers).  
Making good the intention stated in the introduction, Schwicker approaches 
the 1848-1849 events from a purely military point of view, so that the chapter takes 
the form of a long enumeration of battles, which leaves the Banat and its social and 
national problems out of the picture. 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Die Nationalit￿ts-Bewegung kam ￿brigens auf zweierlei Wegen nach der Milit￿rgrenze: durch 
den Canal des Illyrismus und durch das Medium des Serbismus.￿   58
Schwicker￿s work is very much a source-based one, rather than one 
stemming from personal experience and close acquaintance with the Military Border, 
as had been the case with previous writers such as Pidoll zu Quintenbach, Marmont 
or even Hietzinger. Moreover, his background was a literary-didactical one, with 
important contributions to the development of school reform in Hungary (he was a 
co-founder of the Banater Lehrerverein among other things),
33 with occasional 
articles published in various Hungarian and Austrian as well as local newspapers and 
a number of historical writings.  
John Paget￿s comments on the Military Border counterbalance, in an even-
handed perspective, the optimistic reformist view of the Border, typical of Austrian 
writings, with the Hungarian side of the story,
34 which reads nowadays as a 
prefiguration of a Foucauldian rationale:  
 
￿We have seen that an immense military force has been thrown round one-half the 
circumference of Hungary: - in what hands does the command of this force lie? 
From what sources does it draw its supplies? What sympathies and feelings are 
encouraged in it? ￿ in other words what is its nationality? In a constitutional country 
these are important inquiries. [￿] There are some, too, who urge that this border 
wall is more efficacious and better constructed for keeping Hungarians within their 
boundaries, than Turks without them, and there are not wanting those even who 
regard the whole quarantine system as a great engine of police. In favour of this 
view of the matter they urge that the cordon has been more frequently strengthened 
on the appearance of what Government is apt to consider most pestilential, - a 
political fever within the country, than of a plague invasion from without￿.
35 
 
The questions Paget raises (control over the Border, nationality and 
allegiance) are vital ones in understanding the dispute between the Habsburg and the 
Hungarian authorities. However, the author merely echoes Hungarian anxieties as to 
the intrusive Germanising effect of the Border system and stops short of a more 
detailed analysis. The repression of Szeklers in Transylvania, who acted on their   59
age-old privileges and resented as a demotion the comparatively new Habsburg 
military impositions, is briefly mentioned but the impact of militarization on the 
Wallachian population and the effect of national schools and enhanced education
36 
on the dynamics of national allegiance are left out. Some of these issues will be later 
taken up by Romanian historians.  
* 
For the most part Romanian bibliography on the Banat Military Border dates 
back to the interwar period. Up until that time one can find publications only 
incidentally dealing with this topic
37 or, through some contingency, falling short of 
it. Thus, in the introduction to Antoniu Marchescu￿s history of the Romanian Banat 
Border Regiment we come across the following explanation for one of the 
historiographical gaps: ￿Patriciu Dragalina, the erudite historiographer of the Banat, 
died before publishing the 4
th volume of his impressive work ￿Din Istoria Banatului 
Severin￿, which dealt with the history of the frontiersmen from the 13
th Regiment. 
Unfortunately the manuscript has remained unpublished to this day.￿
38 
The beginning of the nineteenth century had seen the publication of one of 
the few first-hand testimonies concerning the Banat Military Border in Nicolae 
Stoica de Haţeg￿s Chronicle of the Banat. The author covers the beginnings of the 
Military Border in this region, the process of militarization, and the population￿s 
response to it. The same introduction to Marchescu￿s history as mentioned above 
makes reference to the first autochthonous attempt at writing a history of the 13
th 
Romanian-Banater Border Regiment in 1863. A certain Captain Carol Schwab was 
a s s i g n e d  t h i s  t a s k  a n d ,  t o  t h i s  e n d ,  h e  d r e w  o n  o f f i c e r s ￿  t e s t i m on i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  
available documents.
39 In 1941, when Marchescu￿s prefacer made this reference to 
Schwab￿s history, the manuscript was believed to have gone missing during the war.   60
It was only decades later that it would eventually be tracked down in the history 
museum in Reşiţa.
40 
In the 1930s Grigore Popiţi wrote two tracts based on archival material. The 
first one, printed in 1935,
41 offers a general description of the Banat Military Border 
with its historical subdivision (initially into two districts, after 1838 acquiring a 
tripartite form: the German Banat Regiment, the Illyrian Banat Battalion, and the 
Wallachian Banat Regiment). In his subsequent argument he sought to undercut, on 
ethnic grounds, the logic of this administrative structure: the author was out to 
demonstrate, as prefigured in the title, the Romanianness of the Banat Military 
Border. The evidence he invokes is, for the most part, sensible and well chosen and, 
in part, corroborated by the Austrian military historian von Wrede.
42 Popiţi points 
out a number of discrepancies in various demographic statistics and, more 
convincingly, highlights the number of translations available in Romanian and 
Serbian for various official documents targeted at the military communities. Thus, in 
1807 the new Border constitution was circulated, via the regiments, in all Border 
communes with a view to being made known to the people. Popiţi finds evidence 
that the new law was sent in 500 copies of Romanian translation and only 50 copies 
in Serbian translation.
43 Forestry charts, listing existing types of vegetation, were, 
according to Popiţi, drawn up in German and Romanian, this being taken as proof 
that Romanian was considered the language of the region.
44 At times the polemical 
drift of the argument makes itself felt in certain inconsistencies. This is the case of 
another piece of evidence Popiţi comes up with, which runs counter to a complaint 
he was to express four years later in his second tract. The 1935 contribution invokes 
Maria Theresa￿s salutation at the end of the Illyrian Constitution as proof that this 
was addressed to the Romanian population:    61
 
￿Maria Theresa￿s greeting in the Illyrian Constitution addressed to the Banat 
￿Illyrians￿ in the Wallachian tongue, addressed, therefore, to the Romanians, has 
come true in part and will be fulfilled hereafter: ￿for the future good of the said 
people, for their honour and happiness and increasing glory￿.￿
∗  45  
 
  The tremendous privilege of being thus singled out by the Habsburg 
monarch and bestowed on the boon of imperial favour seems to disappear by 1939, 
when Popiţi prefaces his compilation of archival material
46 with the following 
sentence:  
 
￿One must show the reason that determined the Austrians to lend support on every 
occasion and in every possible way not only to the Germans but also to the Serbs at 
the expense of autochthonous Romanians.￿
∗∗ 47 
 
Notwithstanding such incongruities of argument, the importance of Popiţi￿s 
tracts lies in the fact that they flag up, and for the first time translate into Romanian, 
archival material regarding the relationship between Romanians and Serbs, the 
religious chafing that emerged between them at a time when language became 
increasingly ￿nationalized￿,
48 and the attempts made by the government of the 
fledgling Romanian Kingdom
49 at recruiting Romanian officers from the imperial 
army.  
The same archival enthusiasm informs Nicolae Iorga￿s 1940 book Observaţii 
şi probleme bănăţene,
50 a painstakingly sourced compendium of the history of the 
Banat, reviewing existing material and highlighting new historiographical challenges 
deriving from it. In his sketchy chapter on the Military Border, ￿Noua armată 
                                                 
∗  ￿Urarea Mariei Therezia din ￿Regulamentul iliric￿ comunicat ￿ilirilor￿ bănăţeni ￿n limba valahă, 
deci adresat rom￿nilor, s-a ￿mplinit ￿n parte şi urmează să se desăv￿rşească: ￿şi ￿ntru binele ce va să 
fie a numitului neam, ￿ntru cinstea şi fericirea şi mai mare mărirea lui￿.￿  
∗∗  ￿Trebuie arătată cauza ce i-a determinat pe Austrieci [...] să ajute ￿n toate ￿mprejurările şi pe toate 
căile nu numai pe Germani, ci şi pe S￿rbi ￿n detrimentul Rom￿nilor băştinaşi.￿   62
rom￿nească a grănicerilor  şi noii cărturari￿ (The new Romanian army of 
frontiersmen and their new scholars), Iorga makes two important points. The first 
concerns the quality of the educational system in the Border: according to Iorga, the 
school teachers in the newly established Romanian schools were the best among 
Romanian teachers in the Austrian Empire.
∗∗∗  The second point he makes has to do 
with the interactions between the Banat Grenzer and Romanians in the Principalities. 
One such interaction was occasioned by the Crimean War, when Romanian 
frontiersmen from the Banat formed part of the Austrian army stationed in Moldavia: 
 
￿In one of the churches, at Prigor, they still keep the great church, as well as battle, 
flag, which they [the frontiersmen] had commissioned from a painter in Galaţi at the 
time of their stay in these Moldavian lands of ours.￿
∗   
 
Liviu Groza reviews the episode in one his books and fleshes out the story by 
providing a picture of the church flag and glossing on its symbolism.
51 The 
circumstances and rationale of its acquisition remain, however, as sketchy as Iorga 
left them.   
The following year sees the publication of what would become a landmark of 
Romanian bibliography on the Military Border, that is, Antoniu Marchescu￿s 1941 
history of the Romanian Banat Border Regiment from its inception to its dissolution, 
Grănicerii bănăţeni  şi Comunitatea de Avere (contribuţiuni istorice şi juridice). 
Marchescu, a lawyer in Comunitatea de Avere (literally, the Community of Wealth), 
the administrative unit which emerged following the demilitarization of the Border 
in 1872, achieves an impressive synthesis of primary and secondary sources with 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿au fost cei mai buni dascăli din toată lumea alor noştri supuşi ˛mpăratului, acei ￿nvăţători cari 
scriau frumos numele lor pe scoarţele cărţilor de biserică￿. 
∗  ￿￿n una din biserici, la Prigor, se păstrează marele prapur de biserică, dar şi steag de oaste, pe care ei 
au pus să li-l facă un zugrav gălăţean, ￿n momentul c￿nd se aflau pe aceste locuri moldoveneşti ale 
noastre.￿    63
particular emphasis laid primarily on legal/administrative aspects of the organization 
and development of the Border system as a whole as well as of each of its 
subdivisions. The lucid, source-based account provides the reader with a profusion 
of details rendered in an objective, straightforward style surprisingly free of 
emotional language and high-flown rhetoric. Marchescu￿s original contribution in 
this book is that he goes beyond the mere compilation of secondary source 
information and, in his capacity as lawyer of Comunitatea de Avere, he uses the 
archive of the former Romanian Banat Border Regiment complete with officers￿ 
official notes and reports as preserved from the time of the 1848/49 Revolution.  
A note of caution should be introduced at this point. As with many non-
academic writings, Marchescu￿s book falls short at times of a scrupulously kept 
citation system, not so much in the case of the secondary as that of the primary 
sources he quotes. The military reports to which he makes reference must have 
formed part of his personal library when he wrote his book and, consequently, they 
are only briefly acknowledged as ￿Locot. Nestor Cena: Relation, 20, II, 1863 
(manuscris)￿ or ￿Maior Oreskovics: raportul no. 70/1851 către reg. 13 grăniceri 
(manuscris)￿ or ￿Locot. Schwab: raport, din 4-11-1851, către reg. 13 grăniceri￿, etc. 
No indication is provided as to their location and availability at the time, which, 
compounded with the upheavals of the half a century that has since then elapsed, 
casts doubt on the possibility of retrieving this material. The need to go back to the 
primary sources is felt all the more keenly as the use of inverted commas is rather 
erratic and occasionally fails to distinguish between Marchescu￿s own words and 
those of the officers he quotes. The line between quote and paraphrase is sometimes 
completely blurred so that the narrative reads like an uninterrupted monologue. 
Moreover, as Marchescu chooses a chronological perspective and, consequently,   64
shuttles between reports, their origin, actual information and style remain unknown 
to the reader.  
This bibliographical shortcoming, in conjunction with the preferential access 
to material sometimes practiced in Romanian archives, was to result in a spurious 
sense of mystery and attempts at historiographical ventriloquism prompted by this 
very bibliographical silence. I will begin with the latter case. I.D. Suciu￿s study of 
the 1848-49 Revolution in the Banat points to the problem of the whereabouts of 
Marchescu￿s sources.  The comment, however, does not stop here but goes on to 
imply a purposeful suppression of information on Marchescu￿s part:  
 
￿The unfolding of military operations during the revolution, especially those carried 
out by the Romanian 13
th Regiment in the Banat, can be followed in A. Marchescu￿s 
documented study.  The author is well informed but fails to indicate the whereabouts 
of his sources. The various officer reports are used indiscriminately and because of 
this the great importance of the rebellion of Romanian masses, as well as their 
military contribution, goes unrecognized.￿
 ∗∗ 52 
 
On the other hand, Liviu Groza, whose work I will be discussing further on 
in this chapter, holds out the promise of major revelations and creates a sense of 
mystery surrounding the documents describing the 1848-49 events in the Banat, 
including the Military Border. This, Groza points out, is owing to his not being able 
to access these documents although well aware that they are to be found in the 
Caraş-Severin National Archives:  
￿For a complete picture of the revolution in the Banat as well as the Øtat d￿￿me 
within the Romanian Border Regiment no. 13 based in Caransebeş, researchers 
should consult the reports of the regimental officers which are to be found in a well 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Desfăşurarea operaţiilor militare din timpul revoluţiei, mai ales cele efectuate de Regimentul nr. 13 
rom￿no-banatic, se poate urmări ￿n studiul documentat datorat lui A. Marchescu. Autorul e bine 
informat, dar nu indică depozitul izvoarelor. Rapoartele diferiţilor ofiţeri sunt luate fără discernăm￿nt 
critic şi, din această cauză, marea importanţă a ridicării gloatelor rom￿neşti, ca şi aportul lor militar, 
nu e recunoscut.￿    65
preserved volume in the Caraş-Severin National Archives. These documents have a 
history of their own, but if published and competently interpreted they will shed due 
light on a much debated subject, hidden by history. [￿] To my regret and, 
implicitly, that of those interested, these reports were not available to me for various 
reasons￿.
∗∗∗ 53 
 
As it happens, I was able to access the volume of documents to which this 
author was referring and, after struggling for a while with the sometimes not very 
calligraphically penned military reports, came to the startling conclusion that they 
were none other than the reports quoted by Antoniu Marchescu in his history of the 
Military Border. Upon comparing Marchescu￿s quotes and paraphrases to the 
original reports, I realized that the former were a very accurate rendition of the latter 
and that what I took to be Marchescu￿s own words or paraphrase was in fact a 
verbatim, if unacknowledged, translation of the manuscripts. 
Marchescu￿s is primarily a military history set against a minutely 
reconstituted legalistic background. The involvement of the Romanian 13
th Border 
Regiment with the 1848/49 Revolution (both on the Italian and the Hungarian front), 
the Russian-Turkish war of 1853, the renewed hostilities with Italy (1859), and the 
disastrous conflict with Prussia (1866) are scrupulously recorded as the author 
follows the movement of the detached battalions and maps their victories and 
defeats. 
Wedged in between this section on military history and the third part of the 
book, devoted to Comunitatea de avere, there is a chapter dedicated to the 
regimental elite, that is, to the Romanian generals originating from the Banat 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Pentru a avea o imagine completă a revoluţiei din Banat, inclusiv a stării de spirit din cadrul 
regimentului de graniţă rom￿no-bănăţean nr. 13 din Caransebeş, cercetătorii trebuie să consulte 
rapoartele ofiţerilor regimentului, rapoarte ce se găsesc, legate ￿ntr-un volum bine conservat, la 
Arhivele Naţionale Caraş-Severin. Aceste documente au istorie a lor, dar publicate şi comentate cu 
competenţă vor aduce cuvenita lumină asupra unui subiect mult controversat şi tăinuit de istorie. [￿] 
Spre regretul meu şi implicit al celor interesaţi, aceste rapoarte nu mi-au stat la dispoziţie din varii 
motive￿.   66
Military Border. The chapter is divided into two sections, which distinguish between 
those officers who reached the rank of general within the Austrian-Hungarian army 
and those who crossed over to the Regat while still lieutenants (Moise Groza) or 
Unterlieutenant (Ioan Dragalina) and became generals in the Romanian army. 
Marchescu draws extensively on information taken from Coriolan Buracu (Din 
istoria Banatului Severin, Muzeul Nicolae Cena şi Cronica Mehadiei). Of particular 
note is the disparity between the number of generals who were formed and stayed in 
the k.(u.)k. army to the end of their careers and those officers who chose to enrol in 
the Romanian army. Thus, section A (Generali rom￿ni din graniţa bănăţeană ￿n 
armata rom￿nă/Romanian Generals from the Banat Military Border in the Romanian 
army) contains only three names (Moise Groza, Ioan Dragalina, and Gheorghe 
Domăşneanu), the last one barely fitting the category as he only joined the Romanian 
army after the First World War, up until then having faithfully served the Monarchy 
and, as a consequence, been promoted to the rank of brigadier general in 1917. 
The highlights of these generals￿ military careers follow for the most part the 
same pattern: outstanding results in school, subsequent studies at prominent Austrian 
military academies of the time, wars and decorations, gradual ascent of the military 
hierarchy. With some variations this sequence functions as a leitmotif for the 
presentation of each of the generals. Each biographical outline unswervingly ends on 
the same note: whatever their personal trajectory and commitments, these men 
remained loyal to their ethnic group, to their religion, and to their Romanian 
background. Even while serving the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy as high-ranking 
military, their ￿Romanian feelings￿ remained intact and unsuppressed. This latter 
reference was to General Domăşneanu.    67
However, what is quoted in support of these statements are usually eulogistic 
articles or obituaries or, in the case of Dragalina, the incentivising speech given 
before the Romanian troops on the eve of a major operation during the First World 
War. In other words, snippets of rhetorical, one could almost term them 
￿propagandistic￿ material, and not genuine personal testimonies and professions of 
allegiance. 
 
Staple bibliography for the history of the Banat Military Border is the 
industrious historiographical output of the retired Colonel Liviu Groza. His books, 
covering a considerable time span, resume the work of Antoniu Marchescu. 
Although lacking the latter￿s legalistic emphasis, Groza￿s contributions aim instead 
at fleshing out, in a reader-friendly way, the stark generalities and juridical 
framework delineated by Marchescu and seek to recreate the day-to-day life of 
Romanian Banat frontiersmen through a profusion of eclectic ethnographic, archival, 
and anecdotal data. The slogan behind his endeavours (informing his as well as other 
Romanian authors￿ work) is that of shedding light on less known, yet unjustly 
ignored, historical realities. Hence the ￿extensive￿ approach used, one of 
accumulation, of assiduously compiling miscellaneous information, which 
sometimes leads to startling juxtapositions of valuable primary source material 
gleaned from the Viennese archives and rather bathetic hearsay or unverifiable fable-
like dialogues.
54 
Groza￿s principal study is his 1993 book Contribuţii la cunoaşterea culturii 
grănicerilor bănăţeni, which, together with the monographs dedicated to Generals 
Doda and Trapsia, as well as numerous other booklets covering various aspects of 
the Banat Military Border history and culture, form the only contemporary source of   68
information in Romanian on the subject. These books are too numerous to mention 
in this bibliographical chapter. I will inevitably refer to some of them in the course 
of the present thesis. It is important to note that Groza￿s contributions are a labour of 
love and pioneering in several respects: they have the merit of bringing to light new 
archival evidence and the hypotheses and assumptions they put forward form the 
necessary basis of future scholarship. As I shall stress later on in this thesis, the 
downside to this rich bibliographical source is the irretrievable character of primary 
documents, either because they are mentioned as being in the author￿s possession or 
because, when a call number or Signatur is provided, this is erroneously quoted. 
Liviu Smeu, the author of a 1980 study of a subsection of the Banat Military 
Border establishment, the Almăj Valley,
55 achieves a much more focused study, 
which, although cramped by the ideological strictures of the time, lays before the 
reader important empirical evidence that counterbalances the propagandistic 
conclusions of the study. He achieves a modus vivendi between analysis and 
evidence, whereby the two are kept separate so that, while the former fails the test of 
time, the latter is still valuable nowadays. 
Smeu￿s history of the militarized Almăj Valley builds a strong case for the 
Military Border as a tightly regulated space of Habsburg social and cultural reform. 
The author relies on imperial circulars, the so-called Befehl-Protocoll, containing 
orders sent from the General Command to the Border companies and disseminated 
by the church. On the basis of this documentary material, Smeu conveys the image 
of a community apprised of the latest international developments and compelled, or 
incentivized, as the case may be, to send their children to school.  
Apart from these substantial studies of the Banat segment of the Military 
Border (to which correspond equally detailed studies of the Transylvanian Border   69
regiments
56), there are also a number of volumes of conference proceedings 
testifying to an upsurge of interest in the Austrian Military Border among European 
academics. Thus, in the 1990s several such collections of contributions were 
published: The Austrian Military Border. Its Political and Cultural Impact, edited by 
Liviu Maior, Nicolae Bocşan, and Ioan Bolovan; Microhistory of the Triplex 
Confinium: international project conference papers, edited by Drago Roksandić; and 
Constructing border societies on the Triplex Confinium: international project 
conference papers 2. Plan and practice. How to construct a border society? The 
Triplex Confinium 1700-1750, edited by Drago Roksandić and Nata￿a ￿tefanec.
57 
The first of the three collections of essays is devoted entirely to aspects and 
problems of the Romanian Border regiments (with a Transylvanian bias) whereas the 
last two tackle mainly the Croatian segment of the Austrian Military Border. For the 
purposes of this chapter I shall dwell on one of the Romanian contributions dealing 
with the social and cultural evolutions deriving from the militarization of Romanian 
population in Transylvania: Ladislau GyØmant￿s ￿Die rum￿nische Grenzbev￿lkerung 
aus Siebenb￿rgen ￿ Stellung und Streben￿ (The Romanian Border population in 
Transylvania ￿ their status and aspirations). The author emphasizes the emancipatory 
effect of militarization:  
 
￿Following their liberation from feudal burdens and from a part of the labour they 
had to do for the State, and given their obligation to undertake military service and 
other public services, the military status meant for the overwhelming majority of 
Romanian frontiersmen, who had originally been dependent peasants, an 
undoubtedly significant step forward in comparison with their previous status, given 
their free social position as well as the economic and cultural possibilities of 
emancipation created within the new framework.￿
∗∗ 58  
                                                 
∗∗  ￿bedeutete der Grenzstand f￿r die ￿berwiegende Mehrheit der rum￿nischen Grenzer, die aus Reihen 
der abh￿ngigen Bauern stammten, infolge deren Befreiung von den feudalen Lasten und von einem 
Teil der zugunsten des Staates geleisteten Dienste und deren Verpflichtung, daf￿r Milit￿rdienst und   70
 
This enhancement of social status is seen as conducive to an early ￿ripening￿ 
of group and, subsequently, of national, self-awareness (￿eine fr￿here Reife des 
Eigenbewu￿tseins￿).
59 Thus, in 1784 the Grenzer showed ambivalent feelings 
towards, and even overt sympathy for, Horea￿s uprising. A decade later they were 
lending their support to the petitionary movement that was to produce the Supplex 
Libellus Valachorum.
60 
The Military Border regiments were, in cultural matters as well, an ever-
ready source of support for national initiatives:  
 
￿The officers of the Romanian Border regiments are listed among the subscribers to 
Romanian periodicals and, among them, there were those who gave financial 
support for the printing of textbooks for the national schools. The fact that in the 
1830s Professor Alexandru Gavra turned to the Romanian border regiments for help 
with the projects of his publishing house is symptomatic in this respect.￿
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This is consistent with George Bariţiu￿s description of the Transylvanian 
Border Regiments as providers of educational facilities and also echoes Nicolae 
Iorga￿s earlier-mentioned point about the high quality of Banat Military Border 
tuition:  
 
￿out of those schools came not only people who were necessary in the lower ranks of 
regiments, but also high-ranking officers. The selfsame military schools were a 
genuine boon for the great mass of civil inhabitants. For lack of local schools in 
their communes, priests and lay parents, being desirous to send their offspring to 
                                                                                                                                         
andere ￿ffentliche Dienste, zu leisten, zweifellos einen bedeutenden Fortschritt gegen￿ber der 
vorausgegangenen Lage, sowohl durch die freie soziale Stellung als auch durch die vom neuen 
Rahmen geschafften wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Fortschrittm￿glichkeiten.￿  
∗∗∗  ￿Die Offiziere der rum￿nischen Grenzregimente befinden sich unter den Abonnenten der 
rum￿nischen Zeitschriften, und, unter jenen, die das Drucken von Schulb￿chern f￿r die nationalen 
Schulen materiell unterst￿tzen. Die Tatsache, da￿ der Professor Alexandru Gavra sich an die 
rum￿nischen Grenzregimente um Hilfe f￿r seine Verlagsvorhaben aus den 30er Jahren des 19. 
Jahrhunderts wandte, ist symptomatisch.￿   71
study, sent them to Orlatu or to Nasaud, from where they went on to the gymnasium 
in Blaj, Sibiu, or somewhere else.￿
∗  62 
 
In the Banat, Constantin Diaconovici Loga, one of the leading Romanian 
intellectuals and head of the national schools in the Military Border, supervised the 
final examinations that took place in Caransebes. An association of the Romanian 
primary school teachers of the Military Border came into being in 1865, organizing 
conferences on methodology and giving demonstrative lessons.
63 
One of the more recent and frequently quoted books dedicated to Romanian 
officers is Liviu Maior￿s 2004 study Rom￿nii ￿n armata habsburgică.
64 Drawing on 
IstvÆn Deak and Liviu Groza for his data, as well as on his own previous scholarship, 
Maior emphasizes the loyalty to the Emperor demonstrated by Romanian generals in 
the imperial army and dwells on the particular cases of Trajan Doda, Nikolaus Cena, 
and Moise Groza. The characterization of Romanian military lacks, as do most 
previous studies on the subject, a solid basis of personal testimony. Secondary 
sources are quoted for the most part,
65 while the historical characters involved 
remain silent with the author speaking on their behalf. 
The conclusion of this bibliography survey is, like the reviewed sources, 
twofold. The first part regards Habsburg literature, which has the advantage of 
providing the reader with carefully sourced information and a general view of the 
Military Border and its characteristics. The downside is given by the fact that most 
of these studies focus either on the Croatian segment of the Border or remain at a 
                                                 
∗  ￿din acelea sc￿le au esitu nu numai individi necessari in regimente pentru servitiile inferi￿re, ci si 
oficiari de ranguri inalte. Totu acelea sc￿le militarie au fost unu adeveratu daru si pentru multime 
mare din clasa civila a locuitoriloru. Preoti si alti parinti mireni doritori de a-si da pe fiii loru la carte, 
in lipsa de sc￿le proprie in comunele provinciali, ii trimiteau la Orlatu sau la Nasaud, de unde inaintau 
la gimnasiulu din Blasiu sau la Sibiu sau pe airea.￿ 
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level of generality that does not allow for a study of allegiance or loyalties in any of 
the Military Border regiments.  
Romanian bibliography, on the other hand, takes a close look at the Banat 
and Transylvanian Romanian Border regiments and relies on a rich body of sources. 
However, with a few notable exceptions, most pre-1989 studies on the subject 
necessitate careful sifting of the information they offer and sometimes a painstaking 
return to the primary sources they use. The nature of the primary sources would in 
itself require such revisiting, since accessing them presupposes the twofold task of 
transliterating and translating. The leap of faith one is forced to take in reading 
secondary bibliography on the Banat Military Border is thus redoubled
66 and one 
finds oneself at times in the situation of reinventing the wheel or rather charting 
archival territory where others have gone before and yet failed to produce accurate 
maps of it. 
As mentioned above, another shortcoming of Romanian bibliography is the 
authors￿ tendency to adopt an empathetic, ventriloquial style when confronted with a 
dearth of primary sources. Personal testimony is scant and inadequately referenced. 
Consequently, all assumptions and conclusions regarding the Øtat d￿￿me, the 
attitudes and allegiance of the Romanian military elite in the Austrian Border should 
be taken with a hefty pinch of salt. It is the purpose of the present thesis to fill in this 
historiographical gap by tracking down and analysing extant documents testifying to 
the political stance of Romanian frontiersmen in the Banat Military Border. The 
principal goal of this thesis is to retrieve the identity and personal trajectory of the 
military elite of the Border, to attach actual persons to the names circulated in 
Romanian bibliography, and, archives permitting, to restore their voice, which was 
muted and overwritten by traditional histories.   73
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
Preliminaries to an analysis of nation and nationality  
in the Habsburg Monarchy 
 
As this thesis seeks to provide an account of the sense of identity and the 
loyalties of the Romanian military elite from the Banat Military Border and, 
moreover, given that such a task presupposes dealing with intrinsically subjective 
categories, the present chapter serves as a preface to the analysis proper and 
evaluates the concepts that constitute the investigative tools needed for such an 
analysis: nationalism, national identity, nation and nationality, loyalty, and 
allegiance.  
I would like to start with a discussion of the usefulness of the concept of 
￿nationalism￿ when trying to map the loyalties of a given community (in this case, 
the Romanian Military Border community and, in particular, the elite which emerged 
from their midst). Does ￿nationalism￿ (however defined from our own vantage point) 
help to a better understanding of the questions set in the introductory chapter? Is it 
worth retaining in the following analysis or does it obscure more than it reveals? 
Would it be worth replacing with a less controversial term such as ￿allegiance￿ or 
￿loyalty￿? These are not questions prompted only by the baffling polysemy of the 
term nationalism but rather pertain to the more general sphere of the use and abuse 
of umbrella terms. The notion of culture has given rise to similar queries and, in 
what follows, I shall draw on one of the solutions to the culture debate proposed by 
the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in my attempt to assess the validity of nationalism 
as a conceptual tool of inquiry.    77
Geertz￿s theoretical system belongs to the variegated family of historicist 
thought.
1 He equates the problem of interpreting a different culture with that of 
investigating a past age in that in both cases the culture or the time one lives in ends 
up influencing and distorting the final analysis. In both cases we are dealing with an 
unwitting process of resemanticization, that is, reading into words and practices 
meanings that are alien to that culture or time frame. Geertz￿s solution takes the form 
of a method of enquiry called ￿thick description￿, that is, a detailed description 
(devoid of value judgments) of the system of meanings and signification that 
underwrites cultural and historical manifestations.
2 ￿The point is not to devise with 
hindsight a better explication of past events, but to enhance the way they are already 
￿scientifically eloquent￿ on their own.￿
3  
Thus, in the case of nationalism too, an investigation of a past age should 
start with just such a thick description of the conceptual framework in which a given 
community functioned and which informed their actions and attitudes. While 
present-day notions of nationalism are useful for comparative purposes, they should 
nevertheless be used cautiously when explaining phenomena belonging to a different 
conceptual system. One must take into account the fact that ￿national￿, ￿nationalism￿, 
￿nationalist￿ are all derivative terms and that the root word ￿nation￿ is historically 
fluid. 
Terms such as nation, nationality, nationalist were common in nineteenth-
century public discourse and figured prominently in political debates and personal 
testimonies. The challenge they pose for contemporary research is that of 
ascertaining what exactly was meant by them at the time, particularly within the 
framework of the Habsburg Monarchy and given the historical context in which they 
functioned, dominated as it was by conflicting ideological tendencies and   78
experiments ranging from irredentism to federalism and neo-imperialism.
4 The 
difficulty of pinpointing the meaning of these notions stems from their being fluid 
and easily appropriated while at the same time politically and emotionally charged. 
This is, paradoxically, due not so much to a lack of unambiguous definitions as 
rather to a plethora of personalized definitions verging on humptydumptyism.
5 An 
evaluation of a group￿s allegiance, such as the present thesis seeks to effect, 
necessarily hinges upon the need to elucidate the semantics of this political jargon.  
While the etymology and historical polysemy of nation has formed the 
methodological starting point for most analyses of the concept in its medieval and 
early modern instantiations (Kedourie, Turville-Petre), and cultural filiations of the 
modern acceptation of nation have been traced back to such thinkers as Herder and 
Fichte, the term and its derivatives remain for the nineteenth century as elusive and 
baffling in their polysemy as they had been before, if not even more so. Moreover, 
the nationality blindness in bureaucratic taxonomy further contributed to this 
plurality of meanings. According to Ian Hacking, ￿Austria established a statistical 
office, on the Prussian model, only in 1829￿.
6 The statistical method had, admittedly, 
percolated into the Austrian literary system by the early 1800s as testified by land 
descriptions such as Demian￿s statistical description of the Habsburg Monarchy. At 
that stage, the population of the Banat Military Border was divided into peoples 
(V￿lker), the only express mention of nation being in the old juridical sense and used 
in reference to the Illyrian nation.
7 
If at the official, literate level classifications and demographic categories 
were barely beginning to take shape, at the level of common perception, the 
boundaries between the social and the ethnic were practically nonexistent. A   79
manuscript quoted by I.D. Suciu explains the empirical usage of ethnic labels in the 
Banat: 
 
￿the Romanian from the Banat hated the Hungarian because he did not see 
Hungarians who were like himself nor did he see any Romanians who were like the 
Hungarian. He knew them [i.e. the Hungarians] only as Hungarian nobles and these 
were for the most part either landowners or high officials and, naturally, he did not 
love them because they taxed, judged, punished and ruled over him. So they said the 
Hungarian ruled over everything.￿
∗ 8 
 
Censuses, the official sources of population classification for the nineteenth 
century, added to the general confusion surrounding the concept of nationality and 
its relationship to language groups and the old notion of Volkstum. They introduced 
new categories, such as Umgangssprache, which, while useful for state purposes, 
failed to clarify the intricate relations holding within multilingual and multiethnic 
communities and sparked off controversy.
9 As James C. Scott points out, this was 
due to the fact that census categories were, like all other state simplifications, not 
designed to ￿represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they 
intended to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official 
observer.￿
10 Thus, if imperial census takers in the Habsburg Monarchy took note 
only of the language used in everyday affairs,
11 in the fledgling Romanian state the 
1859 census recorded only citizenship without reference to the ethnic structure of the 
population.
12 
As Costin Feneşan points out in his editorial notes to the Romanian edition of 
Johann Jakob Ehrler￿s 1774 Landesbeschreibung, in the case of the Banat, the 
German term Nationalist was used by eighteenth-century Habsburg administration in 
                                                 
∗  ￿rom￿nu din Banat ura maghiaru că nu vedea maghiar sieşi asemenea, nici alt rom￿n asemenea 
maghiarului ci-i cunoştea numai ca maghiari nobili şi aceştia erau ￿n mare parte sau proprietari sau 
diregători şi pă aceştia fireşte nu-i iubea că ￿i luau dăjdii, ￿i judeca, ￿i pedepsea, ￿i stăp￿nea, şi zicea că 
maghiaru ￿nstăp￿neşte.￿   80
reference to the autochthonous population, Serbs and Wallachen.
13 Alex Drace-
Francis holds, moreover, that, in the Banat, ￿the word Nationalist was used in 
German [￿] to mean a member of the natio Illyrica￿, while ￿in the Bukovina, 
recently under Habsburg domination but where the Illyrian privileges did not apply, 
it was used with an apparently similar meaning to denote a representative of the local 
population.￿
14 
By 1869 the term nationalist was still being used in the Banat but its meaning 
had shed its original Illyrian ambiguity, that is, it no longer signified a representative 
of the natio Illyrica but rather a representative of one given ethnic group (Romanian 
or Serbian), although a commonality of political purpose was still evident in it. The 
semantic specialization of the word comes across in Antoniu Mocsonyi￿s invitation 
to a national conference in Timişoara issued on 20 January 1869 in the following 
terms: 
 
￿Given that the elections date is drawing near, I, acting upon the right that every 
genuine constitution must grant its citizens, and also answering the challenge that 
several nationalist gentlemen proposed to me, hereby take the liberty of inviting the 
distinguished national intelligentsia, or, in the case of those living in far-away 
regions, their trustworthy representatives and the representatives of the people, to a 
brotherly public assembly and conference in Timişoara on 26 January 1869￿.
15 
 
The residual element of Illyrian commonality (see the following chapter for 
an explanation of the Illyrian Privileges and natio Illyrica within the Habsburg 
Monarchy) becomes apparent at the level of political programmes and goals. The 
informal organizational meeting preceding the conference proper brought together 
the members of the Mocsonyi family, and also Vincenţiu Babeş and Constantin 
Rădulescu, among others, as well as the leading Serbian politician Svetozar Miletić. 
The outcome of the conference was the creation of an independent national party   81
which would endorse the bill regarding the nationality issue proposed by both 
Romanian and Serbian MPs in the previous Diet. The new political formation was 
conceived, in Alexandru Mocsonyi￿s words, as a legal means for furthering the 
nationality cause.
16 As such, it would be the political representative of the 
Romanians in Hungary.  
That the word nationality had, by then, become synonymous to the ethnic 
group or Volk is attested by Vincenţiu Babeş￿s speech to his voters in S￿nt-Nicolaul-
Mare, Torontal County, following the 1869 parliamentary elections, where for 
rhetorical purposes the speaker glosses the term:  
 
￿I have had occasion to admire your good understanding, zeal and solidarity, 
irrespective of nationality, Serbs or Romanians, and irrespective of confession, 
uniate or non-uniate￿.
17 
 
For all such explanations, however, terminological variations and idiosyncratic usage 
seems to have been quite common. Thus, the Romanian MP Eugen Ioan Cucu spoke 
of ￿the mistrust between the various nationalities and the Hungarian race￿.
18 
The terms nation and nationality used in the speeches of various MPs became 
problematic when it came to legislating rights for the groups thus loosely designated. 
The controversy triggered by the amendment proposed by the Romanian MP Vasile 
Butean as a modification to the article of 6 December 1868 raised eyebrows over the 
use of the word ￿nations￿ instead of ￿nationalities￿. The proponents defended their 
choice of words on the grounds that ￿nationality is nothing but a derivation of the 
word nation￿
∗  and that those who call themselves a nation are not thereby 
endangering Hungary￿s existence and political unity.
19 
                                                 
∗  ￿Dar aici, onorată casă, e deosebire numai etimologică, fiindcă naţionalitate e numai coloratura 
expresiunei ￿naţiune￿ şi preste tot nu e cu prejudiţiune faţă de cealaltă.￿   82
The quibble over whether the non-Hungarian peoples constituted 
nationalities or nations stemmed from the subsumption of all nationalities to the 
Hungarian nation effected by the controversial so-called Law of Nationalities (GA 
XLIV) of 1868. Its introductory passage stipulated that  
 
￿all citizens of Hungary, according to the principles of the constitution, form from a 
political point of view one nation ￿ the indivisible unitary Hungarian nation ￿ of 
which every citizen of the fatherland is a member, no matter to what nationality he 
belongs￿.
20 
 
This provision constituted the bone of contention for all subsequent interpretations 
and implementations of the law. There were polemical reactions to it such as that of 
the Romanian MP Sigismund Borlea, as quoted by Păcăţian: 
 
￿as regards the observation made by Mr MP Smeskal against the word nation, I 
would point out only this, that it should be taken into consideration that the law and 
its article, whereby we are decreed Hungarians, was not issued with our consent but 
against our will. And he must know, surely, that not only nations, but also 
individuals, who are herded somewhere by force always crave to escape. One can 
even say that if it were possible for living people to be forcefully driven into 
Heaven, they would most likely try to escape just because they were forced into 
it.￿
∗∗ 21 
 
There were also attempts at reaching a compromise between the two principles of 
state unity and equality of rights, stipulated by the law, such as that made by the 
Romanian MP Alexandru Mocsonyi, who ￿was ready to accept even that all citizens 
formed one political nation￿ provided that ￿all the other nations should be recognized 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Ce priveşte observarea făcută de domnul deputat Smeskal ￿n contra cuv￿ntului naţiune, notez 
numai at￿ta, că ar trebui să se iee ￿n socotinţă că legea aceea, precum şi articolul ei, prin care suntem 
decretaţi maghiari, nu s-a creat cu ￿nvoirea noastră, ci contra voinţei noastre. Iar aceea o va şti şi 
Dumnealui, că nu numai naţiunile, ci şi indivizii, m￿naţi fiind undeva cu forţa, năzuiesc totdeauna a 
scapa de-acolo. Ba pot zice, că de s-ar putea ￿nt￿mpla ca oamenii să intre de vii ￿n raiu ￿ dacă cineva 
i-ar introduce acolo cu forţa ￿ zău că şi de-acolo ar ￿ncerca să fugă, numai pentru că au fost forţaţi să 
intre acolo.￿   83
as such within this unique nation￿.
22 Commentators have repeatedly pointed out, as 
the main source of controversy, the language-bound ambiguity of the term ￿magyar￿, 
which was used in reference to both the political nation, including all the other 
nationalities, as well as to the linguistic and cultural community, and which 
eventually constituted the legal premise for a policy of Magyarization.
23 
By comparison, in the Austrian half of the Monarchy nationality legislation 
did not form a separate law, but constituted a passage in the general law on citizen 
rights. Article 19 of law 124/1867 postulated no overarching political nation of the 
kind stipulated by its Hungarian counterpart. Drawing on the Kremsier Constitution 
draft of 1849, the Austrian nationality stipulations laid down equality of rights for all 
Volksst￿mme or peoples, their right to preserve and cultivate their nationality and 
language, as well as the equality of all languages (landes￿bliche Sprachen) in 
school, administration and public life￿.
24 Similar to the Hungarian nationality 
legislation, the Austrian constitution did not recognize the nationalities as political 
entities either, nor were its liberal stipulations fully translated into practice.
25 
As regards the Habsburg, later Austro-Hungarian army, up until the end of 
the nineteenth century, when the language of command became an issue within the 
Dual Monarchy, the military system was, at least at the bureaucratic level of 
personnel classification and characterization, beyond nationalism, as IstvÆn DeÆk put 
it, and, indeed, beyond ethnicity. Officers￿ personal details consisted only of place of 
birth and religion. One￿s mother tongue was relegated to the skills section among 
other languages, so that, as IstvÆn DeÆk points out, it was only by a combination of 
inference and corroborating material that one could deduce the nationality or ethnic 
background of a given officer.
26   84
The legal framework of the joint army was set, together with the other 
institutions of the Dual Monarchy, by the Ausgleich legislation of 1867 and 
subsequent additions to it. As LÆszl￿ PØter and other commentators pointed out, the 
military stipulations were more complex than the economic ones and conditioned by 
the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction. Thus, in the military sphere Hungarian 
jurisdiction was limited, while imperial power was wide ranging if vaguely defined. 
However, although disposal of the army (Verf￿gung ￿ber die Armee) remained the 
Monarch￿s prerogative (Reservatrecht), recruitment was subject to parliamentary 
approval.
27 This latter stipulation became the cause of considerable friction and 
stalemating negotiation and, as has been argued, led in the long run to military 
backwardness and inefficiency in the First World War.
28 
The paradox of the joint army, at least from the Hungarian point of view, was 
the fact that, although it was partly stationed in Hungary, it was subordinated to the 
War Ministry in Vienna and not to the Ministerium in Budapest. Moreover, it was 
dominated by the German element in the high echelons of command and often prone 
to incidents between civilians and officers.
29 
For all these analyses concentrating on the legal stipulations of the Ausgleich 
concerning the joint army and the newly formed HonvØd and Landwehr, most of the 
studies do not touch on the relationship between the military and civil status of the 
officers of the joint army. A host of questions, which, as will become apparent in the 
present thesis, are relevant to an evaluation of the Romanian generals from the 
Military Border, necessitate a detailed explanation of the legal framework regulating 
civil and military jurisdiction: how was citizenship defined in Austria-Hungary? Was 
there a joint Austrian-Hungarian citizenship? Were there an Austrian and a 
Hungarian citizenship respectively? What criteria determined the set of laws   85
(Austrian or Hungarian) one was subject to? How did one￿s civil status impact on 
one￿s military standing and vice versa? An answer to these questions is important for 
clarifying the societal fabric these generals were embedded in, the network of legal 
relations they were a part of and conditioned by, and also the legal avenues that were 
open to them by virtue of the overlapping spheres of jurisdiction, civil and military.  
I consider it important to retrieve the system of relations in which these 
generals evolved as it helps account for the emergence of imponderables such as 
identity and allegiance. These are psychological categories, which have no tangible 
or material existence and cannot be easily pinpointed. In the course of this thesis I 
will seek to ascertain the nature of these officers￿ loyalties on the basis of their 
actions and professions under certain circumstances and particularly in moments of 
crisis, when they clash with the system and are consequently forced to state their 
position and justify their actions. Personal identity and civic and political loyalties 
are, in this view, relational in character. I am thus arguing that the historical and 
cultural context in which the Romanian military elites were formed, and especially 
the legal system within which they moved, are of vital importance in evaluating 
these generals￿ sense of identity and their political and social allegiance.  
I tend to attach so much importance to legal categories for the same reason 
that Ian Hacking stresses the importance of statistical categories in a process which 
he calls ￿making up people￿: 
 
￿I claim that enumeration requires categorization, and that defining new classes of 
people for the purposes of statistics has consequences for the ways in which we 
conceive of others and think of our own possibilities and potentialities￿.
30  
 
The advent of constitutionalism in Austria-Hungary resulted in the 
introduction of new social and political categories as opposed to the fuzzy notion of   86
V￿lker or peoples, which had been used up until then. The concepts of citizenship 
(Staatsb￿rgerschaft) and citizen rights (Staatsb￿rgerrecht) came into legal use 
following the reformation of the Monarchy along constitutional lines (in the 1860s 
and after 1867). The Ausgleich brought into being two ambiguously-related 
constitutional states, each of them with their own laws regulating citizenship. In 
Hungary, as PØter showed in his excursus on Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn, 
prior to 1867 there existed the notion of populus, which designated solely the 
nobility, and that of plebs, or non-nobles, who were subjects of the Hungarian 
Crown. PØter goes on to point out the existence of a third category, that of honossÆg 
(Landesangeh￿rigkeit), which remained ambiguous in its reference, given that the 
acquisition of honossÆg entailed entry into the nobility class. With the constitutional 
transformation of 1867, ÆllampolgÆrsÆg (citizenship) superseded the old concept of 
honossÆg, thus extending its civic scope to the entire population. However, while 
socially all inclusive, the new legal category was at the same time more politically 
restrictive than the previous one. Thus, whereas the honossÆg  brought with it 
political rights, the newly created ÆllampolgÆrsÆg was essentially a passive civic 
status, devoid of political rights.
31  
Given the twofold interpretation of the Ausgleich as a whole and the complex 
and intricate relationship between the two halves of the Monarchy to its very 
dissolution in 1918, there is little wonder that perspectives on Austrian and 
Hungarian citizenship and the relationship between the two should have been equally 
controversial and subject to dual interpretation. This comes across in Ivan 
Soubbotitch￿s 1926 study Effets de la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie sur la 
nationalité de ses ressortissants, in  which the author foregrounds the Hungarian   87
view of citizenship in the Dual Monarchy, while acknowledging the opposite 
perspective. Taking his cue from Arpad Kiralyfi, Soubbotitch argues as follows: 
 
‘There being no Austro-Hungarian state, there was consequently no “Austro-
Hungarian” citizenship. […] The quality of Hungarian citizen was completely 
different from that of Austrian citizen, in the same way that the Hungarian state – 
made up of the community of Hungarian citizens – was distinct from the Austrian 
Empire, composed of the totality of Austrian citizens.’
32  
 
Although Soubbotitch espouses the Hungarian view of the Dual Monarchy, 
he does present the contrary opinion put forward by two Austrian authors, 
Mayerhofer and Herrnritt, to the effect that, in relation to the outer world (par 
rapport ￿ l’Øtranger), there was solely one type of citizenship, the Austro-Hungarian 
one. The Austrian and Hungarian citizenship respectively were valid only within the 
framework of Austrian-Hungarian internal relations.
33 For all Soubbotitch’s contrary 
argument, the second view would seem to be the more convincing of the two, given 
the post-1867 division between unitary foreign policy, regulated by joint institutions, 
and dual domestic affairs, falling under the incidence of the respective legislations in 
the two halves of the Monarchy, Austrian and Hungarian. Karin Olechowski-
Hrdlicka, after revisiting the legal literature on Austro-Hungarian common affairs, 
reaches an intermediary conclusion between that espoused by Soubbotitch and 
Kiralyfi, on the one hand, and that of the above-mentioned Austrian authors, on the 
other hand: 
 
‘The Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy was more than a personal union. It was not only 
the Monarch that was common, there were also other common institutions (a 
common Ministry, Delegations, a common army). From the outside a certain unity   88
was visible, even if – for lack of an Austrian-Hungarian people and an Austrian-
Hungarian state territory – one could not speak of a Reich in the sense of a state.’
∗ 34 
 
In support of her argument, Olechowski-Hrdlicka quotes a note of protest 
from the Hungarian Trade Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the 
usage of the expression ‘Austrian-Hungarian citizens’ (österreichisch-ungarische 
Staatsangeh￿rige) by the Consulate in Baltimore, USA. The Hungarian authorities 
were, thus, drawing attention that this label was constitutionally erroneous 
(staatsrechtlich unrichtig) and that the right designation was that of ￿￿sterreichisch 
oder ungarisch￿.
35    
Even more relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the status of the 
employees of joint institutions in Austria-Hungary and, in particular, of the officers 
of the k.u.k. army. Quoting once again Kiralyfi, Soubbotitch points out that these 
were recruited from among Austrian as well as Hungarian citizens and retained their 
citizenship while in the service of a joint institution (as opposed to the Austrian laws, 
which required that, for entering Austrian civil service, one had to become an 
Austrian citizen). Thus, Soubbotitch concludes, appointment to a position in the joint 
administration had no effect on one’s citizenship.
36  
But what were the criteria used for attributing one type of citizenship or 
another? As Soubbotitch argues, in both the Austrian and the Hungarian cases, jus 
sanguinis, that is, being born to Austrian or Hungarian parents, was decisive in 
determining citizenship, while one’s place of birth (jus soli) had no influence on it. 
Thus, there was one legislation ‘für alle Angehörige der im Reichsrate vertretenen 
Königreiche und Länder’ and another for the lands of the Hungarian Crown, 
                                                 
∗  ￿Jedenfalls war die ￿sterr-ungar Monarchie ￿mehr￿ als eine Personalunion. Nicht nur der Monarch 
war gemeinsam, sondern es bestanden auch sonstige gemeinsame Institutionen (v.a. gemeinsame 
Minister, Delegationen, gemeinsames Heer). Nach au￿en hin war eine gewisse Einheit erkennbar, 
wenngleich ￿ schon mangels eines ￿￿sterr-ungar Staatsvolkes￿ und eines ￿￿sterr-ungar 
Staatsgebietes￿ ￿ wohl nicht von einem Reich im Sinne eines ￿Staates￿ gesprochen werden konnte.￿ 
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including Croatia and Fiume.
37 Unlike the Austrian stipulations, which formed the 
first article in the Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeine Rechte der Staatsbürger of 
1867, the first Hungarian citizenship law was passed in 1879, against the background 
of a European legislative flurry concerning citizenship.
38 The Hungarian law was 
similar to its Austrian counterpart in that it listed descent (jus sanguinis), 
legitimization, naturalization and marriage as ways to acquire citizenship. Thus, 
Hungarian citizenship was granted by virtue of descent to ‘anybody who is a 
legitimate child of a Hungarian father or who was born to a mother of Hungarian 
citizenship’.
39 
What is not clear in this description, or in that of Soubbotitch, is how one 
ascertained that one’s parents were Hungarian in the case of the various nationalities 
or ethnic groups living in Hungary on the basis of jus sanguinis alone. The postulate 
of a unitary Hungarian nation, irrespective of ethnic background, seems to argue, on 
the contrary, for jus soli as a determining criterion of citizenship: someone who was 
born on Hungarian soil (whether their parents were ethnic Hungarians or Slovaks, 
Serbs, Romanians, etc.) automatically became a Hungarian citizen or national. One 
can, of course, similarly deconstruct the rationale behind any type of citizenship 
predicated on jus sanguinis by a reductio ad absurdum of the question ‘what makes 
a Hungarian Hungarian, an Austrian Austrian, etc.’ But in the case of the Hungarian 
nation as decreed by the 1868 law of nationalities, this argument becomes even more 
justified. This incongruity becomes evident in the above quoted article by Norbert 
Varga, where he traces the new legal stipulations on descent as a criterion for 
citizenship to a previous legal provision which evinces all the attributes of a jus soli: 
 
 ‘This legal provision had been in effect even before the passing of the citizenship 
law, since such people were called the “sons of the home country” (nativi Hungari, 
patriae filii).’
40 
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Although neither of these authors address the nationality problem in Hungary 
and although Varga, moreover, presents the reaction of the Hungarian MPs to the 
citizenship bill, but not that of the national MPs, it becomes evident from the 
amendments to this bill that the nationality problem, even if not stated, was at the 
back of the Hungarian statesmen￿s mind. Thus, as Varga shows, section 47 of the 
new bill stipulated that 
 
 ￿those individuals who have been implicitly regarded as recognized citizens in the 
legal practice so far, shall preserve their status unless they will attest within one 
year, as from the Act of Parliament taking effect, that they intend to preserve their 
foreign citizenship.￿
41  
 
The Hungarian Minister of Justice, however, objected to its centrifugal potential and 
noted that  
￿it cannot be trusted to a person￿s will ￿he should be a Hungarian or not, because 
[￿] it will induce that those being liable to or having been enrolled to military 
service could exempt themselves or their sons from this liability with a simple 
declaration asserting that they wish to keep the allegiance to their former homeland 
as without being able to prove the preservation of the foreign citizenship by means 
of their passport or any other document.￿￿
42 
 
As the rationale behind the Hungarian law of citizenship was that of further 
consolidating the Hungarian state and unifying its population not only politically and 
culturally (which is what the law of nationalities in 1868 aimed to achieve) but also 
from the point of civil status, citizenship could not be made entirely discretionary, 
otherwise half of the population of Hungary, by virtue of their ethnic background, 
might be tempted to misuse this legal provision.  
  If one judges by the above criteria of citizenship, all fifteen generals from the 
Banat Military Border will have acquired Hungarian citizenship after 1879, given 
that, by the early Hungarian definition of citizenship as the quality of patriae filii,   91
their parents as frontiersmen were inhabitants of a territory that had been gradually 
integrated into Hungary since 1872, when the dissolution of the Military Border had 
started. As indicated by Soubbotitch, being part of one of the common institutions of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had no influence on one￿s citizenship: if one was 
Austrian, one remained so when fulfilling their job, and if one was Hungarian, one 
remained Hungarian when appointed to a common institution. It follows that the 
officers of the k.u.k. army had one of the two citizenships of the Monarchy while 
being part of the common army. Thus, in their capacity as k.u.k. officers, they were 
subordinated to the Kriegsministerium in Vienna whereas, by virtue of their civil 
status, they came under the incidence of Austrian or Hungarian laws respectively.  
  The stipulations of GA XII: 1867 and the Delegationsgesetz divided the army 
question into three spheres: pragmatic, dualistic and autonomous. Among the last 
category, that of Autonome Angelegenheiten, were listed those dispositions regarding 
the deployment and provisioning of the army as well as those regarding Hungarian 
civil relations, rights and duties of the Hungarian army which had no connection 
with the military service (jener ungarischen b￿rgerlichen Verh￿ltnisse, Rechte und 
Verpflichtungen des ungarischen Kriegsheeres, welche sich nicht auf den 
Milit￿rdienst beziehen).
43 Thus, non-military affairs remained within the purview of 
Hungarian or Austrian jurisdiction respectively. This clarification is necessary 
because it explains why a retired k.u.k. general such as Trajan Doda came to be 
prosecuted under the Hungarian press law in 1887 or why a k.u.k. FML such as 
Nikolaus Cena was placed under arrest by the local Hungarian authorities in 1914. 
On the other hand, as will become apparent in the present thesis, even when retired, 
these generals were still very much part of the army, they received their pension 
rights from Vienna and their military file with the Kriegsministerium remained 
active until their death.   92
  In conclusion, for the purposes of the present thesis I have made the 
following methodological choices: 1) scrapping the umbrella term of nationalism 
and replacing it with the more manageable concepts of loyalty and allegiance; 2) 
sidestepping the infinite regression of meaning implicit in the polysemy of the term 
nation by concentrating on the historical and legal concepts of nation and nationality 
specific to Austria-Hungary in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century; 3) providing a description of the legal/constitutional framework and the 
spheres of jurisdiction existent in Austria-Hungary, which conditioned the evolution 
of the Romanian military elites to be evaluated in this thesis.    93
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Chapter 4. Romanians in Imperial Discourse 
 
 
Motto: 
￿As for national consciousness, I have mentioned that older peasants called themselves 
Masurians and their speech Masurian. They lived their own life, forming a wholly separate group, 
and caring nothing for the nation. I myself did not know I was a Pole till I began to read books and 
papers, and I fancy that other villages came to be aware of their national attachment much in the 
same way.￿  
(Jan Slomka, From Serfdom to Self-government: memoirs of a Polish village Mayor 1842-
1927) 
 
 
It was only after 1848 that the term Romanian (Germ. Rum￿ne,-en) came into 
official use to designate one of the ethnic communities of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Up until then the Romanians had been generally known as Wallachen and, in the 
case of the Banat of Temeswar (including the Banat Military Border), alternatively 
lumped together with other Greek Orthodox peoples under the umbrella term of 
Illyrians. Although this shifting terminology points to a change of status and a 
recategorization of this community within the framework of imperial discourse, 
historical bibliography tends, however, to proleptically use the word Romanian in 
reference to time periods when the term had not yet come into official use. However, 
naming introduces relationships and, as such, is anything but innocent, even less so 
in a political-historical context, where the recognition of rights and bestowal of 
privileges are crucially dependent on a legal hermeneutics of names. 
The present chapter proposes to analyse the three community labels that were 
applied, at different points in time, to part of the Banat population and, implicitly, to 
the inhabitants of the Banat Military Border. Although this evaluation of historical 
terminology precedes the actual time span with which this thesis is concerned, I   96
consider it is necessary to map the social status of the Romanian Border community 
within the Habsburg Monarchy as they constituted the demographic pool out of 
which the Romanian military elites emerged. The first Border officers who went on 
to become generals in the k.(u.)k. army after 1870 were born in the 1820s and 1830s 
in the Banat Military Border amidst a community which was still officially referred 
to as Wallachen, a community which, as we shall see in the present chapter, had for a 
long time been dogged by ill repute in Habsburg circles and which, up until 1848, 
had enjoyed an enhanced social status by comparison with the civil population of the 
Banat.  
By dwelling on the three labels attached to the Banat Romanian community, I 
am aiming to account for the historical and social background against which these 
military elites would define themselves in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A 
study of the historical meaning of the Illyrian nation within the Habsburg Monarchy 
will, moreover, enable me to delineate the premisses of the unchallenged 
preservation of Orthodoxy among Banateers. Orthodoxy was to play an important 
role in the identity of the Border community and also, as we shall see in particular in 
Chapter Eight, in that of some of the Border generals. 
  The semantics of the three names (and, implicitly, of the transition from one 
to the other) will be analysed starting from emblematic historical episodes, when the 
community acquired topicality in the eyes of Habsburg authorities (and not only) 
and, consequently, figured prominently in a number of documents of the time.   
 
4.1. The Wallachen 
Within the Habsburg Empire, the Wallachen appeared as an ethnic minority 
following the conquest of Transylvania from the Turks in the late seventeenth   97
century. Prior to that, Byzantine and early medieval chronicles had mentioned at 
various points in time the romanized population north and south of the Danube. Most 
generous in information on the north-Danube Vlachs and the source of the first 
attempts at writing a history of the people (and also at mythologizing it in the 
process) are the works of Italian Renaissance humanists.
1 The myth launched by 
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, also known as Pope Pius II, to the effect that the term 
Valahia is a derivation of Flaccus, the Roman army leader sung by Ovid,
2 caught on 
and circulated in the works of leading humanists such as Antonio Bonfini and 
Sebastian M￿nster.
3  
Within Hungarian medieval historiography, the Vlachs acquired topicality 
and were seen to necessitate genealogical vindication whenever they formed the 
ethnic background to Hungarian nobility and royalty. Thus, during the reign of 
Matthias Corvinus, himself of Vlach origin after his father, the court chronicler 
Antonio Bonfini duly highlighted the noble Roman origins of the king.
4 The 
humanist Nicolaus Olahus, Archbishop of Esztergom, and a relative of John Hunyadi 
(Iancu de Hunedoara), the latter being the father of Matthias Corvinus, wrote at more 
length about his fellow Vlachs and their Roman descent. The picture that results 
from these documents is considerably more complex than the ethnically construed 
dichotomy promoted by Romanian historiography: Hungarian (nobility) ￿ Vlach 
(peasantry). One￿s Vlach origin did not automatically entail exclusion from political 
life and represented no hindrance to being part of the Hungarian nation, participation 
in which did not constitute a denial of this origin. The name of Vlach was differently 
valorized at various points in time. In Transylvania, the institutionalization of the 
negative sense of Vlach came later, following Michael the Brave￿s late-sixteenth-
century ephemeral rule of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania. According to   98
David Prodan, subsequent seventeenth-century Diet decrees (the Approbatae and 
Compilatae) record this event as a before-and-after landmark for a differentiated 
treatment of runaway serfs,
5 with the Vlachs being singled out for discriminatory 
measures.
6 
The status of the Banat population and the significance of the name Vlach or 
Wallach after the Habsburg conquest of the province in the early eighteenth century 
was not affected by these prejudices legislated by the Transylvanian Diet. Given the 
neo-acquisitum status of the Banat and its uncompromising subordination to imperial 
authorities, Hungarian law as well as precedents of any sort (legal, political, 
proprietorial) had no bearing on this territory. In what follows I propose to delineate 
the image of the Wallachisch population in the Banat as it gradually coalesced within 
eighteenth-century sources (that is, those sources which were contemporaneous with 
the setting up of the Banat Border Regiments) and to convey in particular, but not 
solely, Habsburg perceptions of this community. 
My approach will be that of concentric circles, closing in on the Banat 
Wallachen together with official documents of the time. The documents I shall be 
reviewing range from the most general and remote accounts to first-hand 
testimonies, i.e. from diplomatic correspondence, dealing mainly with high politics 
and taking a bird￿s eye view of the Banat and its inhabitants, to travel writings, rich 
in individual perceptions of the land and ethnographic descriptions as a result of 
direct unmediated contact. 
The Banat is mentioned, as a side issue, in mid-eighteenth-century British 
diplomatic correspondence surrounding the Turkish war of 1737-1739 (as a result of 
which the Banat became once again a Habsburg borderland). The letters provide a 
contemporary gloss on the crisscrossing interests of Moscow, Vienna, and   99
Constantinople in the lower Danube region. Of particular interest are the comments 
of Sir Everard Fawkener, the British ambassador in Constantinople, on the 
ambivalent relations between Vienna and Moscow, which occasion a brief reference 
to the Banat of Temeswar: 
 
￿there are considerations of the greatest Moment why they [i.e. the Austrians] should 
desire the Russians may not pass the river Bog. They would then become borderers, 
and a weak declining Empire is a less dangerous neighbour than one that is in full 
strength and vigour. Moldavia and Valachia are open as well as rich provinces, and 
he who is Master of the first, may possess them both as soon as he can march over 
them. The Inhabitants are all of the greekish Religion, and look upon the Czarina as 
their natural Protectress, as those of the Banat of Temeswar. The German Valackia, 
Servia and Sclavonia are all zealous Professors of the same Religion, and not in the 
most easy situation as to their civil government. If a powerfull Prince was in 
possession of the neighbouring Provinces it would be impossible to keep the people 
from revolting or deserting their Country. I may deceive myself but these Notions 
have so far possessed me that if the Czarina should advance towards the Danube, I 
shall expect to see a very sudden change in the sentiments of the Courts of Vienna 
and Petersburg towards each other.￿ (Letter addressed to the Duke of Newcastle 
from Constantinople on 16 May 1736 ￿ underlining mine.)
7 
 
The image conveyed is that of Habsburg authorities faced with the portentous 
centrifugal tendencies of the Orthodox peoples, prone to gravitating towards Russia 
for support and, as was to happen one decade later, even for permanent residence. 
Vienna￿s fears of Russian influence over its own peoples became reality after the 
dissolution of the Tisza-Maros confinium (1741), when a considerable number of 
former frontiersmen migrated to Russia to form what was to become the New Serbia 
settlement.
8 This demographic haemorrhage was doubly detrimental as it depleted 
the Habsburg lands of valuable taxpayers and, at the same time, padded out Russia￿s 
population and, implicitly, its financial and military power. In his dispatches to the 
Russian Czarina Elizabeth, Mikhail Bestuzhev, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna,   100
strongly advocated Serbian migration from Austrian lands, highlighting the 
advantages this might bring to Russian geopolitics:  
 
￿A large-scale migration of Orthodox Serbs promised Russia immediate defence 
benefits in the Ukraine as well as long-term strategic gains in the Balkans: 
emigration would rekindle the Petrine tradition of support for the Balkan Orthodox 
and ￿might in time bear exceptionally good fruit.￿￿
9 
   
A set of documents of a different nature and finality, which testifies to the 
same view of the autochthonous population as unreliable, are the official reports 
dispatched by General Moritz Graf von Lacy and the counsellor of the 
Hofkommission, Anton Koczian, to the Habsburg central authorities and occasioned 
by the setting up of the Military Border in south-eastern Banat starting from 1768. In 
a letter to the Emperor dated 26 October 1768, General Lacy expounds on the 
necessity of reinforcing the Banat border, points to the inadequacy of its defence 
system, and depicts the land and its inhabitants.  
 
 ￿The border along Turkish Wallachia stretches from the village of Marga, or the 
dividing line between Transylvania and the Banat, to Orsova, or the Danube, for 14 
‰  miles, and is, at the moment, guarded only by the local militia Captain Peter 
Vanza and his 27 so-called Plajashi, who are subordinated to the Banat 
Administration.￿
∗ 10 
 
￿small barracks for infantry and cavalry have been set up in the small market towns 
of Caransebes and Mehadia, lying further back, to which have been moved a 
company of the Garrison Regiment and a squadron of De Ville cuirassiers, in 
Caransebes, and 134 soldiers of the said Garrison Regiment, in Mehadia. 
However, these German infantry and cavalry are by no means useful for guarding 
that mountain border with Wallachia, so that they were not transferred there, but 
                                                 
∗  ￿Die Gr￿nze l￿ngst der T￿rkischen Wallachey erstrecket sich von dem Dorf Marga, oder der 
Siebenb￿rgisch-Banatischen Gr￿nitz-Scheidung bis gegen Orsova, oder die Donau auf 14 ‰ Meilen, 
und ist derzeit lediglich dem unter der Landes-Administration stehenden Land-Miliz Capitain Peter 
Vanza und denen ihme untergebenen 27 sogenannte Plajaschen anvertrauet￿.   101
instead those in Mehadia were sent to the Danube Cordon and those in Caransebes 
[are] without service and use; consequently, the mountain border is exposed to 
secret crossings from Wallachia, attacks by thieves, smuggling of forbidden wares, 
actions against sanitary norms, and many more, as the villages lying immediately 
behind these mountains in the valley from Caransebes to Mehadia are inhabited by 
very few Serbs and Germans and predominantly by Wallachen, a people who in 
times of peace are inclined towards a community with the Turkish Wallachen and 
whose loyalty in times of war is very fickle.￿
∗∗ 11 
 
On the other hand, Anton Koczian advised against the planned colonization 
of the region with German settlers given, primarily, the high costs of such an 
undertaking but also in view of the advantages of retaining the local population in 
place:  
  
￿this nation would only with great reluctance forsake their birth place, the healthy 
air, the best of waters, the astounding number of fruit trees, which their forefathers 
planted, and the richly wooded mountains, and exchange all these with a region 
where they would find unwholesome air, foul water, and no tree or wood, where, 
moreover, the old Wallachen would have to go without the Sliwowitza, a drink they 
have been used to since they were young, because they would not live long enough 
to see the newly planted trees bear fruit again. 
Such a change in their life circumstances would affect these people tremendously 
and one worries that many of them will die before their time because of the above-
mentioned natural causes or will emigrate.￿
∗∗∗ 12 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿zwar in dem r￿ckw￿rts liegenden Markt-Flecken Caransebes und Mehadia kleine Casernen f￿r 
Infanterie, und Cavallerie errichtet, worinn man in Caransebes eine Compagnie vom Garnisons 
Regiment und eine Escadron von De Ville Cuira￿iers, dann in Mehadia 134. Mann der besagten 
Garnisons-Regiments verleget stande. 
      Jedoch zu Bewachung dortiger Gr￿nitz-Geb￿rge gegen die Wallachey ist diese Mannschaft von 
Teutscher Infanterie, oder Cavallerie keinerdings brauchbahr auch zu diesem Ende dahin nicht 
verleget worden, sondern jene zu Mehadia ist zu dem hierunter bemelten Donau Cordon gewiedmet, 
jene hingegen zu Caransebes ganz ohne Dienst, und Nutzen, folgbhar das vorliegende Gr￿nitz-Geb￿rg 
selbsten geheimen Einschleichungen aus der Wallachey, R￿uber Einf￿llen, Einschw￿rzungen 
Verbottener Waaren, und Sanit￿ts widrigen Vermischungen um so mehr exponiret, als die n￿chst 
hinter diesem Geb￿rg in dem Thal von Caransebes gegen Mehadia angelegte D￿rfer bis auf sehr 
wenige H￿user von Raitzen und Te￿schen mit lauter Wallachen, folgl. mit einem solchen Volck 
besezet seynd, welches in Friedens-Zeiten zur Gemeinschaft mit den t￿rkischen Wallachen geneigt, 
auch in Kriegs-Zeiten in seiner Treue sehr wankelm￿thig ist.￿ (underlining mine) 
∗∗∗  ￿so wird diese Nation ihre Geburt-st￿tte, die gesunde Luft, das beste Wasser, die erstaundliche 
Menge von Obstb￿umen, die ihre Vor￿ltern gepflanzet haben und die Waldreichen Gebirge nicht 
anders als mit der gr￿￿ten Empfindlichkeit verlassen und mit einer solchen Gegend verwechseln, wo   102
 
Moreover, transplantation to another region would bring little benefit to the state as 
the population was not skilled in agriculture but lived mostly off cattle raising and 
fruit.
∗ 13  
For all the humanitarian concern that seems to emanate from Koczian￿s 
report (such as the fear that the transmutation of the population might result in many 
of them dying), the rationale behind this exposition of reasons against colonization 
is, fundamentally, a mercantilist one. Although the Wallachen were considered fickle 
(wankelm￿tig) in their loyalty, as Lacy put it, they were, nevertheless, a hardy lot, 
much better suited to the climate and hardships of the region than the colonists. Their 
frugal life style, moreover, meant that the state would incur less expense with them 
than with an alien population brought from inside the Empire. Holding on to the 
Wallachen of south-eastern Banat was, moreover, a way of retaining valuable 
taxpayers, who would otherwise, as Koczian points out, emigrate and reinforce the 
demographical potential of foreign powers. General Lacy￿s characterization is itself 
a sample of pragmatic thought, concentrating on the tendencies of the population as 
far the Habsburg authorities were concerned. ￿A community with the Turkish 
Wallachen￿ signified a porous border and, therefore, the possibility of smuggling as 
well as the risk of demographic depletion through emigration. The wankelm￿tig 
epithet harks back to the latest Turkish war, when the Habsburg troops had to both 
fight the enemy and bring to heel the local population. The Military Border in the 
                                                                                                                                         
sie eine ungesunde Luft, ein eben so ￿bel [beschaffenes] Wasser, und keinen Baum noch Holz finden 
wird, woselbst die alten Wallachen die Sliwowitza als ein Getr￿nk, auf das in von Jugend an gew￿hnt 
sind, werden entbehren m￿ssen, indem sie die zu pflantzen [kommenden] B￿umer nicht mehr tragbar 
erleben werden. 
Eine solche gro￿e Ver￿nderung der Lebens Umst￿nde m￿ste an diese Leute gewaltig 
w￿rken, und es steht zu besorgen, da￿ viele derselben Theils als obigen nat￿rlichen Ursachen vor der 
Zeit sterben, oder [...] emigrieren werden.￿ 
 
∗  ￿Der Feldbau ist dermal ihrer geringste Besch￿ftigung, weil sie aus der Viehzucht und aus dem Obst 
ihrer gr￿￿ten Nutzen ziehen.￿   103
Banat was organized against this social background of a reportedly unreliable, if 
financially useful, autochthonous population. 
  
Another genre of writings that contribute to creating an external image of the 
Wallachen in the Banat of Temeswar are the so-called Landesbeschreibungen, or 
descriptions of the land, commissioned by the Habsburg authorities with a view to 
the more effective administration of the newly acquired territory. This is the case of 
Jakob Ehrler￿s study Das Bannat von Ursprung bis jetzo, published in Temeswar in 
1774.
14 To such official writings can be added the very fashionable epistolary 
travelogues, which were the product of industrious and enthusiastic literati (as in the 
case of the polymath Francesco Griselini and his influential historical-geographical 
study of the Banat
15) or they could be the travel notes of nondescript Austrian 
authors, who were eager to see their name in print (such as the shoemaker Johann 
Kaspar Steube
16).  
As Costin Feneşan points out in the preface to the 2000 bilingual edition of 
Ehrler￿s book, ￿the first attempts at sketching out a history of the Banat were made, 
with very few exceptions, by high-ranking representatives of the Habsburg 
bureaucracy in Temeswar.￿
17 An inspector with the Imperial Administration of the 
Banat based in Temeswar, Jakob Ehrler draws up his Landesbeschreibung with a 
very definite goal in mind: the work would serve as a source of information for the 
newly appointed Governor of the Banat, Baron Pompeo von Brigido, and function as 
a starting point for ￿a planned administrative reform￿ of the province.
18 Thus, the 
bulk of it consists in a painstaking description of each one of the Banat counties in 
terms ethnic composition of population, economic structure and land typology.   104
Francesco Griselini￿s 1780 essay on the political and natural history of the 
Temeswarer Banat (Versuch einer politischen und nat￿rlichen Geschichte des 
Temeswarer Banats in Briefen) follows the same pattern of Landesbeschreibung but 
differs from the punctilious work of the Habsburg clerk in both scope and impact. 
This is the work of a scholar animated by the spirit of eighteenth-century 
dilettantism, enthusiastic about historical relics and Latin inscriptions, living out his 
classical formation in a remote Habsburg province. The pragmatic element, however, 
is not lacking: according to Feneşan, Griselini brought his agricultural knowledge to 
bear on the reforms implemented by the Banat administration with a view to 
modernizing the culture of rice and white mulberry.
19 
Although no proof has, to date, been discovered that Ehrler ever met 
Griselini, their works evince a number of similarities, which could be explained 
either by such a meeting or by the wide circulation of their common ideas at the 
time. The most important of these refers to the distinction both Ehrler and Griselini 
make between the name of the population as given by the authorities and that they 
themselves used: ￿In their language they call themselves Rumani, that is, Romans￿, 
points out Ehrler. With Griselini, the same observation is more than a mere 
ethnographic remark and comes integrated in a historiographical discussion on the 
origins of the Wallachen. The Italian author devotes a section of his work to the 
various hypotheses put forth in Latin texts (among which that of the eighteenth-
century Hungarian historian SzentivÆnyi, who maintained that the Vlachs originated 
south of the Danube). Griselini refrains from siding with any of the reviewed authors 
and confines himself to pointing out the only piece of hard evidence in this 
historiographical puzzle:  
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 ￿I will not judge mere hypotheses. One thing is certain: these people never refer to 
themselves by this name [i.e. Vlach]. They call themselves rumunj or rumanesch, 
that is to say, romuli or Romans, and their language is proof enough of their Roman 
origin.￿
∗ 20 
 
The discrepancy between the in-group and out-group names given to the 
community surfaces in Ehrler￿s work in similar terms:  
 
￿The Wallachen form the majority of the population. In their own language they call 
themselves Rumani, that is Romans, and they are truly the remains of the already 
mentioned colony transferred here by Emperor Ulpius Traianus. Their language has 
the greatest similarity to Latin, just as their clothes, customs, and food resemble the 
ancient Roman ones.￿
∗∗ 21 
 
Both Ehrler and Griselini mention the Roman past of the province, the latter, 
in particular, taking a passionate interest in the archaeological traces of the Roman 
legions, which were beginning to be unearthed across the Banat starting from the 
middle of the eighteenth century. I shall dwell on this topic at more length in Chapter 
Six.  
Another important aspect of these two works is their reception and 
circulation. In this respect, they are paradoxically different and yet similar. The 
similarity lies in their capacity for influencing public opinion. Both writings had an 
impact on their contemporaries. The difference lies in the manner in which this 
impact was achieved. The more successful of the two was indisputably Griselini, 
whose book ran into several editions (two of which were in German) and who, 
                                                 
∗  ￿Ich will unter Muthmassungen nicht entscheiden. Soviel ist gewis, da￿ die Nation selbst sich nie 
diesen Namen giebt: sie nennen sich Rumunj oder Rumagnesch, d.h. Romuli oder Romani, und 
beweisen es genug durch ihre Sprache das sie r￿mischer Abkunft sind.￿ 
 
∗∗  ￿Die Walachen machen gr￿￿ten Teil der Bewohner aus. Sie nennen sich in ihrer Sprache Rumani, 
da￿ ist R￿mer, und diese sind eigentlich die ￿berbleibsel der schon obererw￿hnten von dem Kayser 
Ulpio Traiano hieher ￿bersetzten Kolonie. Ihre Sprache hat die gr￿￿te Gemeinschaft mit der 
Lateinischen, wie dann auch ihre Kleidung, Gebr￿uche und Speisen [...] noch viele ￿bereinstimmung 
mit der altr￿mischen haben.￿   106
following his being received at the Court by Empress Maria Theresa herself, was to 
dedicate the Italian edition to her.
22 One can speculate that part of the success of the 
book was due to the topicality of the Banat in Viennese imperial affairs, given that 
between 1778 and 1779 the civil part of the province was retroceded to Hungary, the 
Empress, thus, making good on a promise made at the 1741 Landtag.
23 
Ehrler￿s ideas, on the other hand, gained currency in a less flamboyant way. 
As mentioned above, his work was from the very beginning to have an impact on 
administrative policies as it provided a necessary survey of the province. Apart from 
this, according to Feneşan, Ehrler published anonymously sections of his work in the 
local periodical Temeswarer Nachrichten. The fragment Feneşan discovered to be 
identical was the one concerning the Roman conquest of Dacia and referring to a 
Latin inscription to be found in Caransebes. 
I am making a point of highlighting the circulation/reception of these works 
and their implicit impact because this constitutes their main element of novelty. The 
information they bring before the reader and, in particular, the clear distinction 
between  Wallachen, the name given to the community, and Rumani, the name 
actually used by the community in reference to itself, as well as the Roman descent 
of this population, were by no means new at the time and, as Hurdubeţiu points out, 
had been a leitmotif of Western scholarship for several centuries. Thus, a certain 
Giovanandrea Gromo, who had served in the army of John Sigismund ZÆpolya and 
had come into contact with Transylvanian Wallachen, wrote about his experiences 
sometime around 1564-1565 in the following terms: ￿They claim to be descendants 
of the Roman colony [￿] so that even to this day they speak a language similar to   107
the ancient Roman one.￿
∗ 24 The Transylvanian Saxon historiographer Johannes Lebel 
argued in his 1559 book ￿De opido Thalmus￿ that the fact that the Transylvanian 
Wallachen called themselves ￿romuini￿ was proof enough of their awareness of their 
Roman descent.
25 Taking his cue from Antonio Bonfini, Leonhard Uncius, the Court 
poet of King Stephen BÆthory, emphasized the Wallach origin of the Corvinus 
family and the Roman and Dacian descent of the Wallachen.
26 The Magyarized 
Transylvanian Saxon Kaspar Helth (Heltai GÆspÆr) opted in his 1575 Magyar 
Kr￿nika for the name RomÆnusok instead of OlÆhok, pointing out that the former 
was the one the community itself used.
27  
The difference between these scholarly documents and the Habsburg land 
descriptions lies in their impact, the former having a relatively confined sphere of 
circulation and, thus, little bearing on official policies, while the latter enjoyed broad 
circulation deriving from their administrative function.    
Another contemporary testimony of the socio-ethnographic realities of the 
late-eighteenth-century Banat is provided by an author very different in social and 
professional background from both Ehrler and Griselini: Johann Kaspar Steube. 
According to Feneşan, who in turn takes his information from the prefacer of the 
modern German edition of Steube￿s work Wanderschaften und Schicksale (1791), 
the author was a butcher￿s son, born in Gotha (Saxony), who became a shoemaker 
apprentice and then a Corporal in the guard regiment serving the Queen of Sweden. 
He moved from place to place, defected, worked on a Dutch ship, ended up in India, 
then returned to Europe and Italy, got enlisted in the Habsburg Ried Regiment in 
Cremona. He sought a cure for his gout at the Baths of Mehadia, where he had asked 
                                                 
∗  ￿Fanno professione d￿essere discesi da colonia Romana [￿] cosi ancora usano lingua assomigliante 
all￿antica Romana.￿   108
to be transferred.
28 It is in this context that he became familiar with the population 
and customs of the Banat.  
Two are the points I would like to dwell on in this brief review of his work. 
One refers to the Roman origin of the Wallachen in the Banat, an observation which 
had by then become a clichØ of descriptions of the region and which shows not only 
empirical evidence but also a certain amount of intertextual contamination (the 
influence of works such as Griselini￿s on subsequent travel accounts cannot be 
gainsaid):  
 
￿The inhabitants of the whole of Banat are very mixed, Wallachen,  Raitzen, 
Neubanater [Roma], Germans, Italians, and French. Even the Spaniards have built a 
village which they have named Neu-Biscaja. The Wallachen are by far [ohne 
Vergleichung] the most numerous. They are the descendants of the Roman colonists 
settled in the Banat during Trajan￿s rule. This is proved by their Slav name of 
Wallachen, which means Italian, as well as by the name they call themselves by, that 
of Rumugni and Rumugneski.￿
29  
 
The second, more important, point made by Steube, offering an insight into 
the community￿s perception of chronology and their way of relating themselves to 
past events, is the manner in which the individuals inferred their own age by 
reference to a series of episodes in the collective memory of the community:  
 
￿As their priests keep no birth records, the Wallachen never know how old they are. 
Therefore, if one asks an elderly Wallach how old he is, he will answer as follows: I 
was already a boy driving the cattle when the Turks were still masters of TemesvÆr, 
or, when they were digging the Canal, I was old enough to get married.￿
30 
 
The same remark is to be found in Ehrler￿s book under the title of Banat curiosities 
(Banatische Merkw￿rdigkeiten):  
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￿The nationalist
31 cannot tell you how old he is. He approximates his age starting 
either from the time when Prince Eugene entered the country or when this or that 
battle took place or even when Temeswar or Belgrade were conquered and lost 
again.￿
∗ 32  
 
As concerns religion, Steube depicts an image which was to circulate widely 
in official reports as well as travelogues, that of a population staunch in their 
devotion to the old faith and deeply superstitious:  
 
￿As to religion, the Wallachen are Christians and follow the Greek liturgy. There are 
among them some Catholics as well as a significant number of Greek-United, but, 
despite the efforts made by the missionaries, the proselytes are few and number-wise 
they bear no comparison with the non-uniates. [￿] The Wallachen share the 
superstitions of the ordinary people in the Hungarian Kingdom, being afraid of 
Vampiren. Moreover, the Wallachen believe a great misfortune will befall them if a 
woman were to cross their path. That is why the Wallach woman never walks in 
front of a man, even if he happens to be a twelve- or fourteen-year boy, but will 
always wait until she can walk behind him.￿
33  
 
The works presented so far fall into the category of informative studies, 
aimed at either acquainting the authorities with the state of affairs in the land (the 
case of Ehrler) or regaling and, at the same time, informing the learned public 
(Grisellini and Steube). Their role in shaping official perceptions of the 
autochthonous population in the Banat can be assessed judging by their function or, 
alternatively, by the number of editions they ran into. Relevant for this imagological 
analysis are also the travel notes occasioned by the Hofreisen, or imperial visits, to 
the Banat as well as the contemporary accounts of these journeys. In the latter half of 
the eighteenth century Joseph II made five such journeys
34 to the Banat driven by the 
same peripatetic fervour which, according to B.A. Riedesel, the Prussian minister in 
                                                 
∗  ￿Zudeme wei￿ nicht einmal der Nationalist erst anzugeben wie alt er ist. Die Bestimmung seines 
Alters f￿ngt entweder von da an, da der Prinz Eugen ins Land gekommen, entweder sie diese or jene 
Bataille ware oder gar wie Temeswar oder Belgrad eingenommen und wieder ￿bergeben worden.￿   110
Vienna, had become a standing joke with Joseph￿s enemies, who derisively pointed 
out that the Emperor governed his state out of a stagecoach.
35 Mitrofanov lists these 
journeys among the most powerful cultural influences on the Habsburg Monarch:  
 
￿Joseph￿s various journeys had a great influence on him. They were his favourite 
pastime and seldom did a year go by without him either visiting one of his remote 
provinces or going abroad.￿
∗ 36 
 
The first of these four visits was undertaken in 1768 while Joseph was still a 
co-regent and his impressions of the Banat were searing in their criticism, the young 
Emperor depicting ￿un villain tableau des administrations et des places qui y 
existent.￿
37 According to Dan and Feneşan, a second trip followed soon after (in 
1770), about which little is known:  
 
￿it seems that, being dissatisfied with the slow progress of the changes ordered on 
his first journey, the Emperor insisted on returning to the Banat without any warning 
so as to get objective information and to be able to take the necessary measures to 
put things right.￿
∗∗ 38 
 
The third imperial journey resulted in an extensive journal, entitled ￿Journal 
der Reise Seiner Majest￿t des Kaisers durch Ungarn, Bannat, Siebenb￿rgen und 
Marmaross im Jahre 1773￿. In the Banat, the Emperor was interested in the state of 
the troops and the progress they made, or failed to make, since his last visit, as well 
as in the administrative and the economic problems of the place. In Mehadia, he 
talked via Dolmetscher (interpreter) to the frontiersmen of the newly established 
wallachisches battalion under the command of Colonel Papilla. The latter￿s report to 
                                                 
∗  ￿Gro￿en Einflu￿ ￿bten auf Joseph die vielfachen Reisen aus, die er unternahm; sie waren sein 
liebster Zeitvertreib und selten verging ein Jahr, ohne das er entweder eine seiner entlegenen 
Provinzen oder das Ausland besucht h￿tte.￿  
 
∗∗  ￿Se pare că, nemulţumit de evoluţia lentă a transformărilor ordonate cu ocazia primei vizite, 
￿mpăratul a ţinut să revină inopinat ￿n Banat, spre a se informa c￿t mai obiectiv şi a putea elabora 
măsurile de ￿ndreptare a situaţiei.￿   111
Joseph II bears the imprint of the negative view of the Wallachen that predominated 
at the time: ￿One should not be too lenient with the Wallachen, but should be 
permanently strict to them, otherwise they get out of hand.￿
∗∗∗ 39 
In Cronica Banatului (1825-1827), Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg, who, according 
to his own testimony, acted as interpreter for Joseph II in 1773 (for more 
information, see the capsule biography in the Appendix section), provides a more 
detailed account of the Emperor￿s visit to the Banat. He recounts the encounter 
between Joseph II and the intractable population of the Almăj Valley in southern 
Banat (the new Border segment was added starting from 1774). The people are 
shown as being adamant against militarization.
40 The already militarized villages, on 
the other hand, enjoyed the boon of imperial favour and secured from the Emperor 
the promise of bigger plots of land and better weaponry.
41 But the militarization of 
the region seems to have been no guarantee of docile behaviour on the part of the 
Border inhabitants: having heard that the Emperor was about to come, the people 
from a number of villages fled to the woods. According to Stoica de Haţeg, this 
circumstance sparked off an exchange between the Emperor￿s companions (General 
Lacy and Lieutenant Schlegel), which corroborates the assumptions put forth in the 
already quoted reports sent by Lacy and Koczian to the central imperial authorities: 
 
￿Seeing that the Emperor was displeased, Lacy said to him: ￿Your Imperial Majesty, 
this unfaithful people should be removed from the country or entirely rooted out and 
in their stead should be brought faithful Christians, [￿] good workers, accustomed 
to the mountains.￿ [￿] Upon which, Lieutenant Schlegel, in his capacity as 
Papilla￿s head engineer, said to Lacy: ￿Your Excellency has uttered divine truth that 
the people from Styria, Tirol, and Kraina work in the mountains and are accustomed 
to them; but in order to bring them here, one has to build them houses and give them 
utensils, cattle, and wagons. And, since they are used to eating well and sleeping on 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Mit den Wallachen m￿sse man ￿berhaupt nicht sehr gut seyen, und ihnen best￿ndigen Ernst 
zeigen, ansonsten sie einem ￿ber den Kopf gleich die Hand gewinneten.￿   112
soft pillows, one will have to build strong houses for them up in the mountains, 
make them straw beds, and give them all sorts of victuals. [￿] Whereas these past 
two years I have seen what these poor and simple Romanians take with them when 
stationed on the cordon: whether summer or winter, they have the same thing, maize 
flour bound up in a sheep￿s stomach. [￿] And for sleeping, they have no cover but 
their woollen cap and in the winter they sleep outside by the fire.￿￿
∗ 42 
 
The reviewed testimonies show that, depending on the writer and his degree 
of acquaintance with the land and people, the Wallachen were perceived as volatile 
and prone to fleeing, and, as such, to be replaced by other, more reliable inhabitants 
of the Empire, or, conversely, as a highly useful lot, whose rudimentary, 
undemanding life style outweighed their lack of staunch allegiance, in that the 
Aerarium (the Treasury) would incur fewer expenses than those involved in the 
colonization of the region. 
 
4.2. The Illyrians  
Before embarking on an explanation of the significance of the words Illyrian 
and Illyrian nation within the framework of the Habsburg Empire, I shall proceed to 
examine the concept by briefly pointing out the various meanings attached to it 
across time and disciplines.
43 Ancient history and classical studies use the term 
Illyria and Illyrians to describe the region lying east of the Adriatic and its Indo-
European population. Under the Romans the fluid territory of the Illyrian kingdom 
acquired stable borders and was known as Illyricum starting from the second century 
                                                 
∗  ￿Lasţi văz￿ndu-l supărat, ￿i zise: ￿Majestate ￿npărate, acest neam necredincios trebuie preste hotar 
afară scos sau tot a-l tăia şi ￿n locul lor pe-aicea creştini credincioşi [￿] bine lucrători, dedaţi cu 
munţii, a aduce. [￿] La aceasta, oberlaitnantul Şlegl, ca bau-directorul Papilii, cătră Lasţi zisă: 
Exelenţia voastră cuv￿nt ￿ngeresc arătarăţi şi-i sf￿nt adevăr, că ştaerii, tirolii, crainerii ￿n munţi lucră, 
unde-s dedaţi; iară aduc￿ndu-i aicea, case a le face, vase, vite, cară ş.a. a le da! Şi fiind ei dedaţi bine a 
m￿nca, ￿n peăne moi a dormi, pentru ei trebuie ￿n v￿rful munţilor case bune a zidi, paturi saci cu pae, 
tot falu de vase de bucate a le da [￿] Iară aceşti beţi rum￿ni proşti, ￿n doi ani am vazut ce iau la 
comandă, vara sau iarna ￿ntr-un chip: făină de cucuruzi ￿ntr-un foale de oae legată [￿] Iară de dormit, 
￿n loc de căpeneag au cuşmă de l￿nă şi iarna la foc şi afară dorm.￿   113
BC.
44 As the Oxford English Dictionary points out, the literary use of the term 
Illyrian is derived from this initial ancient history sense and as such designates 
entities ￿pertaining to the regions lying along the East Coast of the Adriatic.￿ A more 
specialised usage is offered by linguistics, where Illyrian refers to ￿the group of 
ancient dialects represented by modern Albanian￿ as well as to ￿a division of the 
eastern branch of the Slavonic languages￿ (hence the distinction between Russian, 
Bulgarian, and Illyrian).
45  
The semantic metamorphosis of the term, which came to designate different 
political entities at different points in time, has already been highlighted by various 
authors. Thus, in the mid nineteenth century, Hippolyte Desprez counts at least three 
Illyrias: the ancient Roman province, ￿a French Illyria, which had been planned by 
Napoleon since the Treaty of Campio Formio￿, and, finally, ￿an Illyria that has no 
official existence, imagined by patriots with a view to uniting in one single moral 
entity the populations of Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, 
Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.￿
46 The last part of Desprez￿s triptych 
makes reference to the Illyrian Movement of the 1830s and 1840s, the school of 
thought advocating South Slav unity, whose main promoter was the Croatian scholar 
Ljudevit Gaj. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century an Italian author, Mateo Giulio 
Bartoli, offered a more rigorous explanation of the Illyrian avatars. The perspective 
is comprehensive and takes into account the official historical usage of the term:  
 
￿Very different spatial and temporal borders were ascribed to the concept of Illyria 
as the name of a state or a province: the ancient Illyrian Kingdom, then, during   114
117Roman times, the province, the tax district, and the prefecture Illyricum, and 
finally the Napoleonic Provinces illyriennes and the Austrian Kingdom of Illyria.￿
∗ 47 
 
As Bartoli goes on to point out, after the Roman institutionalization of the 
name, during the Middle Ages it gradually fell into oblivion dwindling to a mere 
literary reference circulated in ecclesiastical writings. After a hiatus of several 
centuries, the term acquired once again political meaning under Napoleon against a 
background of neoclassicist flurry.
48 One last political entity bearing the name of 
Illyria, which the previous author had failed to take into account, was the short-lived 
Kingdom of Illyria, which came into being within the Habsburg Monarchy in the 
first half of the nineteenth century: ￿Austria then took over the Napoleonic 
designation and changed its borders so that its Kingdom of Illyria (1816-1848) was 
comprised of the latter two, and least Illyrian, provinces.￿
49 
Of particular relevance for the semantic evolution of the word Illyrian is a 
mid-seventeenth-century papal document which clarifies the term in an attempt to 
stem the flow of contention surrounding a fifteenth-century donation. Around 1453 
the hospice of Saint Hieronymus in Rome was founded on the basis of a papal 
donation (wurde gestiftet) with a view to taking care of ￿pauperum heremitarum 
Dalmatiae seu Illiricae nationis￿. According to Bartoli,  
 
￿after repeated disputes over the interpretation of the name ￿Illiricae￿, the Sancta 
Rota of 24 April 1656 issued the definitive judgment that as provinces of the Illyrian 
nation were and are to be understood Dalmatia or Illyricum, of which Croatia, 
Bosnia and Slavonia are a part, wholly excluded are Carinthia, Styria and Carniola, 
                                                 
∗  ￿Recht verschiedene ￿rtliche und zeitliche Grenzen werden dem Begriffe Illyrien als Namen eines 
Staats- oder eines Provinzial-verbandes zugeschrieben: die alten illyrischen Reiche, dann, in 
r￿mischer Zeit, die Provinz, der Steuerbezirk und die Prefektur Illyricum, endlich die napoleonischen 
Provinces illyriennes und das ￿sterreichische K￿nigreich Illyrien.￿   115
and only [people] originating in the said four regions, Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Slavonia can be admitted￿
∗∗ 50 
 
When considered from the perspective of Habsburg history, the above-
mentioned accounts evince one major blind spot: in between the Roman and the 
Napoleonic times the term Illyrian resurfaced once again as a political designation, 
this time referring to the Orthodox immigrants from Turkish lands within the 
Habsburg Empire. This usage was, as we shall see further on, different from the 
ancient historical, classicist one preserved by humanistic writings and almost 
disjunctive with the seventeenth-century ecclesiastical acceptation as highlighted by 
Bartoli. 
I am, thus, making a distinction between, on the one hand, the ancient 
historical meaning of Illyrian(s), which will have been a familiar enough name in 
cultured circles given its close association with Roman history (and, derived from 
this, the loose learned usage of the same term in reference to regions and peoples 
east of the Adriatic) and, on the other hand, the politicized or politically specific 
meaning of Illyrian as it surfaced within the Habsburg Monarchy during the 
eighteenth century. It is the latter meaning of this polysemous term that will form the 
object of my analysis in what follows and against which the name Wallachen will be 
measured. 
But who were the Habsburg Illyrians? The following brief historical outline 
will seek to clarify this notion. On 6 April 1690 Emperor Leopold I issued the so-
called Invitatorium addressed to the Patriarch of the Serbs Arsenije Črnojević.
51 This 
episode, together with the Great Serb Migration of later the same year, has been 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿nach wiederholten Streitigkeiten bei der Interpretirung des Namens ￿Illiricae￿ gab die Sancta Rota 
am 24. April 1656 ￿deffinitiuam sententiam [￿] Provinciam nationis Illyricae fuisse et esse ac 
intelligi debere Dalmatiam siue Illyricum, cuius partes sunt Croatia, Bosnia et Slauonia, exclusis 
penitus Carinthia, Styria et Carniola et oriundos ex dictis quatuor regionibus, Dalmatiae, Croatiae, 
Bosniae et Slauoniae tantum admitti posse.￿￿   116
associated with the issuance of privileges to the Illyrian nation within the Habsburg 
Monarchy. This is how R.W. Seton-Watson describes the event and its aftermath:  
 
￿On April 6, 1690, Leopold I issued a memorable proclamation to the Christian 
population of the Balkan Peninsula, urging them to rise against their oppressors and 
promising them Imperial protection, the free exercise of their religion and the 
privilege of electing their own voivode. As a result of these summons, the Patriarch 
of Ipek, Arsen Crnojević, with 36,000 Serb families migrated to Hungary and 
occupied the now desolate territory between the Theiss and the Danube. The 
imperial charters of August 21, 1690, and August 20, 1691, assured to Leopold￿s 
new subjects their full recognition as a nation.￿
52 
 
However, as Noel Malcolm points out, the imperial address was not an 
invitation to Serbian emigration to Hungary but, quite the contrary, it specified that 
the people should not desert their home and hearth as well as being ￿an exhortation￿ 
to the Patriarch to ￿rouse his people to rebel against the Turks￿.
53 The letter as such 
was addressed to Arsenjie the ￿Patriarch of the Rascians￿, Rascian being the name 
which commonly designated the Serbian ØmigrØs who had fled from Turkish 
territories north of the Danube and, ￿in seventeenth-century Austrian usage [￿] the 
Serbs who lived in Habsburg territory￿.
54 The privileges bestowed following the 
migration were, moreover, nominally assigned to the Rascians, that is, to the Serbs. 
The Latin text of the charter testifies to this singling out: ￿Toti denique communitati 
eiusdem graeci Ritus et Nationis Rascianorum￿.
55 The promises and dispensations 
enshrined in the Leopoldian charters were generous,
56 but only to a very small extent 
were they to be applied. 
Although these imperial privileges did not at any point use the name Illyrian, 
either as a synonym for Rascian or as an umbrella term for the Orthodox people, 
they did, nevertheless, constitute the legal matrix for a new political nation in the 
Habsburg Empire, the so-called Illyrian nation, which, by the middle of the   117
eighteenth century, had come to designate the ethnically heterogeneous Orthodox 
inhabitants of the Empire. Thus, according to Johann Christoph von Bartenstein 
(1689-1767),
57 Vice-Chancellor under Maria Theresa and President of the Illyrische 
Hofdeputation (the Illyrian Aulic Council), the imperial administrative body 
regulating matters related to the Orthodox subjects of the Empire,  
 
￿under the name of Illyrian nation are to be understood, according to the privileges 
bestowed in 1691 by the gloriously remembered Emperor Leopold I, primarily three 
peoples: the Rascians, the Wallachen, and the Ruthenes, who are in certain respects 
very different from one another, but who are all of them Greeks and for the most 
part non-united.￿
∗∗∗ 58 
 
Although it is by no means clear how the transition took place from the 
￿graeci ritus et Rascianorum Nationem￿ of the Leopoldian privileges to the Illyrische 
Nation of Theresian times, Bartenstein￿s 1761 study Kurzer Bericht von der 
Beschaffenheit der in k.k. Erblanden zerstreuten zahlreichen Illyrischen Nation 
throws some light on the vagueness of the name Illyrian, which the author himself 
would be instrumental in fixing into a new political entity, as he contributed to the 
setting up of the Illyrian Aulic Council, whose first president he was. The 
importance of his study lies not so much in the effort proper of defining and 
clarifying the political entity of Illyrian nation, as in its finality: the book served, on 
the one hand, as a source of official information influencing Habsburg policy at the 
highest level, and, on the other hand, as a parenetic-type of writing targeted at 
educating the Crown Prince, whose private tutor Bartenstein was:  
 
￿Since the relationship and the evolution of those matters concerning the said nation 
are thoroughly known but to a few, and the number of the souls comprised in this 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Unter dem Namen der illyrischen Nation werden in den von [...] Kaiser Leopold Majest￿t 
glorw￿rdigsten Andenkens ihr im Jahre 1691 ertheilten Privilegien vornehmlich dreierlei V￿lker, als: 
Raizen, Wallachen und Ruthener, verstanden, die zwar in einigen St￿cken sehr vom einander 
unterschieden, doch alle insgesamt Griechen, und meistens nicht unirt sind.￿   118
nation has increased in the imperial hereditary kingdoms and countries, exceeding 
one and a half million and nearing two million, I have, therefore, undertaken the not 
unnecessary task of teaching the Great Prince, who will, in his time, rule over them, 
and that of putting together in a systematic order numerous documents I 
painstakingly read through.￿
∗ 59 
 
Bartenstein￿s study, moreover, represents the effort at regrouping on the part 
of the Habsburg authorities faced with Serbian discontent at the repeated 
infringement of their chartered privileges.
60 Consequently, Bartenstein maps the 
legal precedents of the Leopoldian privileges tracing them back to the tax 
exemptions granted by the Hungarian kings to the Orthodox peoples who had fled 
from Turkish lands and sought protection in the Kingdom of Hungary.
61 From a 
terminological point of view, this historical-legalistic excursus reveals the source of 
Bartenstein￿s postulated division of the Illyrian nation into Rascians, Wallachen, and 
Ruthenes. This is a triad carried over from medieval Hungarian Diet articles, as 
shown, for instance, by the enumeration included in the 45
th Article issued by the 
1495 Diet under King Wladislaw II: ￿Quod a modo de Caetero, ab ipsis Rascianis, 
Ruthenis, Wallachis et aliis Schismaticis, in ￿quibuscunque terris christianorum 
residentibus,￿ nullae penitus decimae exigantur.￿
62 
Despite Bartenstein￿s postulation of the Illyrian nation as comprising both the 
Wallachen and the Ruthenes, in lay matters this composite nation did not exist. The 
setting up of the Military Border regiments in southern Banat testifies to the 
tendency of equating Illyrian with Serbian or Rascian. Hence the distinction between 
an Illyrisches regiment (including the Serbian settlements in south-eastern Banat) 
                                                 
∗  ￿Weil aber der Zusammenhang und Verlauf  dessen, was besagte Nation betrifft, nur Wenigen 
gr￿ndlich bekannt ist, und die Anzahl der darunter begriffenen Seelen in gesammten k.k. 
Erbk￿nigreichen und Landen so hoch angewachsen, da￿ sie anderthalb Millionen ￿bersteigen und von 
zwei Millionen nicht viel auslassen d￿rfte: so habe ich keine unn￿tze Arbeit zu unternehmen 
vermeinet, wenn ich zum Unterrichte des gro￿en F￿rsten, der sie zu seiner Zeit zu beherrschen haben 
wird, und theils aus den m￿hsam durchgegangenen vielen Schriften bewu￿t ist, in einer 
systematischen Ordnung zusammentragen w￿rde.￿   119
and a Wallachisches Battalion (covering the Mehadia-Caransebes area, which was 
predominantly Romanian), or, subsequent to their merger, the dual name of 
Wallachisch-Illyrisches Regiment.  
Moreover, even from an ecclesiastical point of view Bartenstein￿s triad of 
peoples was not altogether watertight. Although equally named Wallachen, the 
Orthodox population of Transylvania was not included in the Illyrian nation and, as 
such, did not benefit from the Illyrian privileges.
63 As Bartenstein pointed out, unlike 
their Transylvanian counterpart, the Wallachen of the Temeswarer Banat were useful 
imperial subjects not only because they were economical (￿they need little because 
of their many fasts￿), but also because ￿they are not burdened with any estates￿, that 
is, not subject to the nobility.
∗∗ 64 As for the Ruthenes in Bukovina (which, at the time 
when Barteinstein was writing his tract, was not part of the Empire), the Illyrian 
Privileges were never extended to include them.
65 
 
Given the apparently fuzzy boundaries of the word nation in this context, a 
clear distinction should be made between its modern and the pre-modern meaning. In 
this case nation is used in its pre-modern, legalistic sense, as a set of rights and 
privileges and the beneficiaries thereof. The so-called natio hungarica or the Polish 
nation of early modern times had the same limited meaning of membership to a set 
of privileges which had nothing to do with ethnic boundaries.
66 That this is also the 
case with the Illyrian nation is shown by the attempts made by the Transylvanian 
Orthodox, in reaction to the Union, to subordinate themselves to the Metropolitan of 
Karlowitz and, thus, to partake of the Illyrian privileges.
67 This goes to show that the 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿haupts￿chlich aus zwei Ursachen, n￿mlich, weil sie eines Theils von wegen der vielen Fasten sehr 
wenig brauchen, und es andern Theils bei ihnen auf Behandlung der St￿nde nicht ankommt, der 
Landesf￿rst von ihnen, wenn sie Deutschen untergeben werden, und sich ihre Gowohnheiten 
einigerma￿en gef￿gt wird, gr￿￿ern Nutzen, als von andern Unterthanen, zu ziehen vermag.￿   120
Illyrian nation as conceived of within the framework of the Habsburg Empire 
referred to a collection of primarily religious privileges (the political stipulations of 
the Leopoldine charters were, as mentioned above, never put into effect) bestowed 
on the Serbs and extended to all the other Orthodox communities of the Empire (bar 
the Transylvanian Orthodox), who were hierarchically subordinate to the 
Metropolitan See of Karlowitz. As Prodan points out,  
 
￿the decree of December 18, 1703, issued by Leopold I, recognized the jurisdiction 
of Metropolitan Arsenie Cernoievici per Hungarium, Dalmatiam, Liccam, 
Corbaviam, Transylvaniam,
68 aliasque finitimas Partes et Provincias Nostras￿. [￿] 
On August 25, 1735, Vichentie Ioanovici called himself archbishop and 
metropolitan of ￿all the Christian people, under the aegis of the all-enlightened and 
unconquerable Roman Emperor￿.
69 
 
Under these circumstances, Keith Hitchins￿s formulation comes across as the 
most apposite description of the nature of the Illyrian privileges: ￿In the Habsburg 
Empire the Serbian Church was granted extensive privileges by Leopold I in 1691.￿
70 
Thus, it was not so much the ￿nation￿, as we understand it nowadays, as the Church 
that received these privileges. 
In secular matters, however, the term Illyrian was unambiguously used to 
refer to the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire as opposed to other ethnic groups. 
Ecclesiastically speaking, Serbs, Wallachen, and Ruthenes were all Illyrians, that is, 
subject to the Serbian religious hierarchy and in this capacity entitled to the Illyrian 
privileges. As laymen, they remained ethnically distinct. 
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4.3. The Romanians 
In the Habsburg Monarchy the substitution of the name Wallach by that of 
Romanian has its roots in the early-eighteenth-century Uniate terminological 
innovations. The need to dissociate the Transylvanian Uniate population from those 
who continued to adhere to Orthodoxy led to the introduction, for clarifying 
purposes, of the phrase ￿Romano-Valachus￿. This double name was resorted to, as 
Keith Hitchins points out, so as to individualize the Uniates among, on the one hand, 
the other nations of Transylvania, and, on the other hand, the pool of Oriental 
Orthodoxy.
71 However, this dissociation gradually acquired ethnic connotations in 
the sense that the religious group it thus demarcated was seen to be coterminous with 
the ethnic community:  
 
￿Uniate intellectuals looked upon their church as a Romanian national institution 
[￿] and upon the union of the church as a reaffirmation of their Roman origins.￿
72  
 
What started out as a conjunction of two elements (Romano-, as in the 
Roman Catholic Church, and Valachus, the name of the Orthodox population in 
Transylvania), gradually transformed into a disjunctive phrase in the philological and 
historical works of the Transylvanian Uniate scholars, with the first element accruing 
an increasingly more patent association with the origins of the population rather than 
their ecclesiastical affiliation.
73 The titles of Samuil Micu￿s books best illustrate this 
tendency of sidelining and, eventually, shedding the term ￿valachus￿ and retaining 
only the first part of the initial Uniate tandem: Historia daco-romanorum sive 
valachorum, Elementa linguae Daco-Romanae sive Valachicae (1780). Moreover, 
the growing number of translations into Romanian did away with the alien and, 
within a Transylvanian context in particular, negatively connoted term Valachus and 
gave currency to the in-group name.   122
In the Banat the educational reforms of the latter half of the eighteenth 
century had a similar effect of giving the name rum￿n a quasi-official status in the 
sense of an appellation used in reference to the language of the population which 
constituted the target of textbooks and teaching material translated into Romanian. 
Thus, as early as 1769, a Romanian primer with Latin characters was published in 
Vienna under the title Bucoavna pentru deprinderea pruncilor la cetanie ￿n limba 
rum￿nească cu slovele ceale bătr￿ne rum￿neşti (Alphabet book for accustoming 
children to read in Romanian with the old Romanian letters)
74 a s  p a r t  o f  a n  
eventually abortive undertaking by Daniel Lazarini, a jurist in TemesvÆr, who was 
commissioned by the Imperial Court to draw up ￿an ABC cum reader for the 
Orthodox children.￿
75 This initial project was followed by other more successful 
ones, which resulted, after 1790, in a flurry of Romanian translations of primarily 
church books but also ￿books of fables, manuals of craftsmanship and agriculture, 
and elementary schoolbooks and grammars￿.
76 By 1831 Constantin Diaconovici-
Loga, the director of the national schools in the Banat Military Border, was 
publishing a religious translation entitled Viiata Domnului nostru Iisus Hristos 
Mantuitoriului lumii: Pentru indreptarea cresterii Tinerilor catra faptele ceale bune 
si ale Crestinatatii, using throughout the name roman and the corresponding 
adjective romanesc without any further clarification of the type employed by the 
Transylvanian Uniate writers from the previous generation (i.e. the above-mentioned 
explanatory disjunction). In the educational sphere, where translations formed the 
essential scaffolding of the tuition process, the in-group name had, thus, become 
institutionalized. In all other matters, administrative, military and legal, the term 
Wallach/-en was still in use.   123
In addition to this and following the Transylvanian Uniate model, a series of 
philological and historical writings by Banat authors began to appear starting from 
the end of the eighteenth century, such as Paul Iorgovici￿s Observaţii de limbă 
rum￿nească (1799), Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg￿s  Cronica Banatului (1825-27), 
Damaschin Bojincă￿s Anticile rom￿nilor (1832-33), and Eftimie Murgu￿s polemical, 
historical and linguistic, tracts, to mention just some of the more memorable 
publications. These, too, added to the budding literature in Romanian and imparted 
further prominence to the term Romanian at the expense of the centuries-old 
Wallach.  
It was not until 1848 that the process of name shunting, which had already 
been under way for half a century, was officially sanctioned in domains other than 
the cultural-educational, that is to say, the in-group name began to percolate official 
discourse outside the autochthonous sphere of cultural politics. Within a military 
context, the initiative came from the Transylvanian Border Regiments and was 
propagated to the Banat as confirmed by an 1848 report from the General Command 
in TemesvÆr to the Imperial War Council in Vienna:  
 
 ￿The General Command in TemesvÆr reports to the Imperial War Council that, as 
the Romanian Border Regiments in Transylvania introduced in their correspondence 
the name of Romanian, instead of Wallachen, Banat Border Regiment ￿ the 
Command has accepted for the Border Regiment No. 13 the name of Romanian 
Banat Border Regiment and hereby asks for the superior sanction of the War 
Council.￿
∗∗∗ 77 
 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Comandamentul general Timişoara raportează Consiliului de Război Aulic că regimentele de 
grăniceri rom￿ni din Transilvania introducand ￿n corespondenţa lor denumirea de Regiment de 
Graniţă rom￿no-bănăţean ￿n loc de valaho-bănăţean ￿ Comandamentul a acceptat pentru Regimentul 
de Graniţă Nr. 13 denumirea de Regiment de Graniţă rom￿n-bănăţean şi cere aprobarea superioară a 
Consiliului de Război.￿   124
Approval was soon given so that, after a syncope of one year caused by the 
turmoils of 1848-49, the K.K. Milit￿r Schematismus, the annual roll of the Habsburg 
army, lists for the year 1850 a Romanen-Banater Grenz Infanterie Regiment together 
with the corresponding Romanen Siebenb￿rgische Milit￿r Gr￿nz Infanterie 
Regimenten. 
On a religious level, the gradual assertion of the name Romanian corresponds 
to a movement of dissociation of the emergent Banat intelligentsia from the Illyrian 
block, that is, from Serbian ecclesiastical hegemony. Habsburg educational reforms 
led to a nationalization of tuition in the sense of the introduction of national 
languages in schools. The process reverberated in the religious sphere, where it gave 
rise to demands that Old Church Slavonic should be replaced with the vernacular in 
religious service and that the Romanian Orthodox population should, moreover, be 
subordinated to a Romanian ecclesiastical hierarchy.  
Fledgling claims to national recognition were often framed in reaction to 
Serbian religious domination and in this respect George Bariţiu￿s remark in Parţi 
alese din istoria Transilvaniei can be seen as indicative of the animosity towards 
Serbian hegemony that reigned among a number of Romanian intellectuals in the 
Habsburg Monarchy:  
 
￿the most cruel and burdensome slavery over the Romanian inhabitants of the Banat 
counties is owing to Serbian dominance, as was acknowledged and stated by Joseph 
II himself.￿
∗ 78  
 
                                                 
∗  ￿ca sclavia spirituala cea mai cruda si mai apasatore din tote domnise preste romanii locuitori in 
comitatele Banatului din causa predomnirei serbesci, dupa cum recunoscuse si enuntase insusi Iosif 
II.￿   125
Eftimie Murgu, one of the leading Romanian intellectuals of the Banat and an active, 
if controversial, actor in the 1848-1849 events, was himself an advocate of 
Romanian emancipation from Serbian hegemony.  
However, the anti-Serbian reaction was by no means generalized and, 
therefore, the nineteenth-century claims for national recognition (I am using national 
in the strict Habsburg sense of a ethnic minority endowed with certain cultural and 
political rights) on the part of the Banat Romanians should be conceived of, rather, 
as both a result of, and a reaction to, Serbian religious preeminence. It was under the 
protective umbrella of the Illyrian privileges that educational reforms, which would 
give an important boost to culture in the vernacular, were implemented so as to 
include the Romanian population of the Banat and it was in response to the newly 
perceived Serbian religious dominance that the budding Romanian religious and 
cultural life was to further develop. The long-term consequence of this process was 
that, with ever-growing national self-awareness on both sides, the Serbs and the 
Romanians of the Banat were to part ways as the nineteenth century wore on. One by 
one the labels used in reference to the population of the Banat (Wallachen, in secular 
matters, and Illyrians, in religious) were gradually superseded by the in-group name 
of Romanian. The affirmation of this term corresponded to a change of cultural and 
political status of the community within the framework of the Habsburg Empire and 
created the premiss for new developments and further claims.    126
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Chapter 5. The Romanian Military Elite of the Banat Military 
Border 
 
In the nineteenth century, amidst the conceptions and preconceptions of the social 
and historical background delineated in previous chapters, a Romanian military elite 
gradually emerged out of the Banat Military Border. The present chapter maps this 
process of elite formation and comprises two sections. The first focuses on the 
economic factors and educational system that led to the creation of such a military 
elite. The second part is an analysis of official records, which traces the various 
paths to the rank of general and examines the mechanism of promotion, dwelling on 
the most important skills that recommended these officers as the grey matter of the 
military establishment. 
The set of questions to which the chapter will provide an answer are the 
following: what was the environment that shaped the personality and cultural and 
political inclinations of the young men born in the Romanian segment of the Banat 
Military Border who would in later years become generals in the Austro-Hungarian 
army? What were the reasons for taking up a military career? What were the 
professional trajectories leading up to the rank of general and how difficult was the 
system of promotion?  
 
Terminological clarifications 
For the purposes of this thesis I shall confine the concept of military elite to 
the Romanian officers who reached the rank of general within the Austro-Hungarian 
army. The notion of elite is defined here in a double sense: in reference to the   130
Habsburg military hierarchy, it designates the highly skilled, decorated, and, in some 
cases, even knighted Romanian officers promoted to important military positions as 
part of the Austro-Hungarian military apparatus; in relation to the Romanian 
community out of which these military emerged, the notion of elite refers to the 
educated and politically aware officers, who, on numerous occasions, became the 
mouthpiece of the community before the authorities and promoters of cultural and 
even economic reform within the selfsame community. The high-ranking Romanian 
officers born in the Banat Military Border were thus, at one and the same time, an 
elite in respect to their ethnic group as well as an elite of the imperial army, i.e. part 
of the Habsburg officer corps. 
While by no means trying to detract from the merits of these officers, one 
should, however, be aware of the considerable distinction between the several types 
of generalcy existent in the imperial army and the hierarchical relationship holding 
between them. Romanian historiography on the subject uses the term general to 
indicate the rank of these officers without qualifying it or explaining the officer￿s 
actual position in the chain of command. More often than not, general is employed 
as a laudatory term rather than in a strictly military sense. According to Michael 
Hochedlinger, ￿the highest rank for general officers in the Habsburg army￿ was that 
of Field Marshal (Feldmarschall, FM). This was followed by the Feldzeugmeister 
(FZM), which was on a par with General der Infanterie and General der Cavallerie 
(GdC). The third-highest rank was that of Feldmarschalleutnant (FML). The lowest 
rank for general officers in the Habsburg army was that of Generalmajor (GM).
1 
Moreover, one should also be aware of the difference between effective ranks and 
honorary ones, the latter being devoid of actual commanding powers and 
responsibilities and bestowed on after retirement. To indicate this, the rank is   131
followed by abridgments such as Ad hon. (Ad honores) or T.u.Ch. (Titel und 
Charakter).    
 
5.1. Military Education and Elite Formation 
As pointed out in the Introductory Chapter, the Military Border communities 
were administratively and economically geared towards discharging the fundamental 
function of the establishment, that of providing military service and securing the 
south-eastern confines of the Empire. The 1807 Constitution spelt out the essentially 
feudal character of the contract between the Grenzer and the Emperor:  
 
￿All territories of the Military Border remain steadfast in their primary function of 
doing military service within and without the Empire. The frontiersmen are 
accordingly in duty bound to the Emperor and King to do military service in times 
of peace and during encampment, inside the country and abroad, in accordance with 
the high commands, and to help with the upkeep of the Border. For this reason they 
have land in their possession for them and their descendants to use as inheritance.￿
 ∗ 2 
 
Consequently, the main occupation of the Border inhabitants remained that of 
soldier-cum-farmer within the framework of the Hauskommunion or communal 
household. This ensured the subsistence of numerous families with little land as well 
as that of families with too much land and few work hands, in either case these 
functioning as a source of soldiers. According to the constitution, there were three 
categories of men: fit for military service, partially fit, and unfit. Not all fit men 
(dienstf￿hig) were recruited for military service. Some remained at home to work the 
land and see to the wellbeing of their family. In times of war, all men were 
                                                 
∗  ￿Toate ţinuturile graniţii militariceşti răm￿n nesmintite ￿n chemarea lor cea mai dinainte spre 
slujbele ostăşeşti dinlăuntru şi dinafară. Grănicerii după chemarea acesta sunt ￿ndatoriţi Cesaro-
Crăieştii Măriri a face toată slujba militărească ￿n vreme de pace şi de tabără, ￿n ţară şi afară de ţară, 
după ￿ndreptarea prea￿naltelor porunci, şi a ajuta ￿ntru cele de lipsă spre ţinerea graniţii dinlăuntru. 
Pentru aceea, stăp￿nesc păm￿nturile sale cele pre drept pentru sine şi pentru următorii lor, ca o 
adevărată moştenire folositoare.￿   132
mobilized while the families providing soldiers received various tax exemptions.
3 
Exceptional cases aside, the Border recruitment policy was a trade-off between 
military imperatives and economic necessity, the two being mutually dependent and, 
as such, mutually sustaining.  
The 1807 Constitution did allow for the practice of other professions but only 
to the extent that they did not impinge on the main occupation of the frontiersmen 
(that of tilling the land and providing military service). Engaging in crafts and 
commerce was possible in one￿s spare time.
4 When these secondary activities came 
to monopolize one￿s entire activity, they became subject to official regimental 
approval and to a series of limitations:  
 
￿Not all frontiersmen can become small merchants. The general commander 
consents to the opening of a new shop only by appropriate people, who possess 
sufficient wealth, and only in accordance with the consumers￿ needs. To this end, he 
always secures the approval of the regimental commander￿.
∗∗ 5 
 
As concerns the cultural-educational aspect, the 1807 Constitution relegated 
this branch of activity, together with the crafts and commerce, to the sphere of 
￿exceptional occupations￿, which were dependent on high official approval and 
considered incompatible with ￿wielding the weapon and the plough￿.
6 This affected 
access to higher education, the only exceptions being made in the case of those who 
wished to study theology.  
This state of affairs endured until 1850, when, in the wake of the social and 
political upheaval of 1848-1849, the old Military Border Constitution was amended. 
As previously mentioned, the groundbreaking alteration consisted in the 
transformation of the nature of landholding. What used to be usufruct property by 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Nu orice grănicer poate deveni mic comerciant. Comandantul general nu ￿ncuviinţează deschiderea 
unei noui prăvălii dec￿t persoanelor capabile, cu avere corespunzătoare şi numai ￿n măsura nevoilor 
reale ale consumatorilor. Spre acest scop, ia totdeauna şi avizul comandantului de regiment.￿   133
virtue of the feudal contract (land in exchange for military service) became now full 
and absolute land ownership and the previous servitudes in the form of labour dues 
to the state were abolished.  
The disappearance of the service contract put an end to the strictures imposed 
on education and professions. This meant that the frontiersmen were from now on 
free to choose their career in life. Education remained, however, strongly oriented 
towards military formation and dominated by military schools. As Antoniu 
Marchescu points out, 
 
  ￿public education was greatly valued under the military regime. Primary school 
attendance became mandatory as early as 1829, while in Hungary it was introduced 
only in 1869. Military education was the principal goal of the schools. They had, 
therefore, a pronounced military character. Each commune was entitled to a local 
school in the native language of its inhabitants. The local national school was 
followed by the trivial school
7 in the company headquarters town, with German as 
the language of tuition. The best three students in the commune went on to attend 
the trivial school and afterwards the superior school, which trained them to become 
non-commissioned officers. The mathematical school, located in the regimental 
headquarters town, prepared officers.￿
8 
 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, Liviu Smeu described the official system of 
coercion and incentives which was in place to insure the effective running of the 
Banat Military Border schools. Thus, on Sundays and on holidays, teenagers under 
eighteen had to attend special classes for grown-ups held by the priest, who read to 
them imperial circulars with news from around the Empire and beyond, and then 
catechized them on it.
9 School attendance and pupils￿ morality were closely 
supervised by the regimental command. According to an order given by the 
Caransebes command in 1838, company commanders had to inspect the school 
every eight days.
10 Smeu found documentary evidence of the existence of classes for   134
deaf-mutes, their first attestation going back to 1838-39. In 1848 the regimental 
command sent to the Bozovici company three copies of a methodology book for 
teaching to deaf-mutes.
11  
The enthusiasm with the reformist educational system in the Military Border 
that comes across in Smeu￿s study should not, however, go unqualified. The sources 
used are official documents, which, while a good index of administrative policies 
and of the imperial discourse of the time, cannot entirely convey the extent to which 
these regulations were actually put into practice or their effect on the population. The 
quality and accuracy of the information purveyed via school and church is itself open 
to debate. The author exemplifies one of his points with a piece of news about the 
coalition against France, which is, in fact, a justification of the war against France 
rather than an analysis of the international context.
12  
A comparison with the situation in the Second Transylvanian Romanian 
Border Regiment in Năsăud shows that the strict supervision of the education 
process was a common feature of the Military Border school system. Additionally, 
extant reports on school attendance dating back to the 1850s indicate that, rather than 
being uniform, attendance and school performance was mixed, in the sense that 
complaints about the poor level of attendance in village schools coexisted with 
requests for admission into the Ober-schule  or  Gymnasium, and even with 
applications for admission into the Wiener-Neustadt Military Academy.
13 
In what follows I shall map the progress of Romanian Banat Border generals 
from their earliest education to the apogee of their military career. The stress will be 
placed on origins, family precedent, and the institutional structures in which they 
were integrated.   135
Between the setting up of the Banat Border Regiment and the 1850 relaxation 
of impositions on the choice of profession, the only channel of social and economic 
advancement remained the military career. The occupational constrictions legislated 
by the 1807 Constitution resulted in a professional Hobson￿s choice, which shaped 
the social dynamics of the Military Border in a decisive way. The almost one 
hundred years￿ institutional pressure led to the creation of an evolutionary military 
family tradition among the frontiersmen, which becomes apparent in the 
biographical profiles of later generals as recorded in their lists of characterization 
(Qualificationslisten).  
My observations are based on a selection of ten such military records, having 
taken as a starting point for my investigation Antoniu Marchescu￿s list of Romanian 
generals originating from the Banat Military Border.
14 A short note of caution should 
be made at this point. One of the problems in identifying these military records, 
which are, for the most part, to be found in the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna in 
alphabetical order, is the Romanian spelling used by Marchescu and other Romanian 
authors, who more often than not alter the names in disregard of the fact that, up 
until 1918, official records would have employed a German or Hungarian style of 
spelling. In his Liste aller aus der ￿sterreichisch-ungarischen Armee 
hervorgegangenen Offiziere, die 1930/1931 in der rum￿nischen Armee noch aktiv 
waren, Franz Kuschniriuk draws attention to this tendency towards Romanianizing 
names:  
 
￿Once included into the Romanian army yearbook, a number of names were 
orthographically changed. First names are, for the most part, Romanianized and   136
sometimes replaced by Romanian equivalents (for instance, Rudolf became Radu). 
It should be verified if family names have been altered as well.￿
∗ 15 
 
An additional, if lesser, problem is posed by the sometimes incomplete 
statement of these generals￿ names. Marchescu, for instance, occasionally indicates 
only the surname without the first name, which, in the case of very common names 
or relatives, can become an element of confusion.  
A comparison of Marchescu￿s list of generals with the Verzeichnis der 
Generale in the Kriegsarchiv and the actual records in the Qualificationslisten 
holding shows that, of the fifteen generals mentioned by Marchescu, ten are both 
listed in the Verzeichnis and have military records in the Qualificationslisten Bestand 
(Aron Bihoy, Trajan Bacsila, Ladislaus Cena, Nikolaus Cena, Trajan Doda, 
Alexander Guran, Johann Jovesko, Alexander Lupu, Theodor Seracsin, Michael 
Trapsia), four are merely mentioned in the Verzeichnis  (Ienache Ion, Nikolaus 
Logoschan, Daniel Materinga, Michael Schandru), one does not figure at all in either 
the general index or the Qualificationslisten (Muica), while one of the generals listed 
as active in the Romanian army had also been a general in the Austro-Hungarian 
army (Georg Domaschnian).  
As can be seen in the chart under Appendix One, the great majority of the 
future generals were sons of officers (Offizierssohn) or of common frontiersmen 
(Sohn eines Grenzers). The only exceptions are Alexander Lupu, a townsman￿s son, 
born in Lugoj, outside the Military Border proper, and Georg Domaschnian, the son 
of a tax official from Mehadia. All the others follow in the footsteps of their parents. 
An evolution within the military hierarchy is visible in these Qualificationslisten, 
                                                 
∗  ￿Bei der Aufnahme in das rum￿nische Armeejahrbuch sind verschiedene Namen in rum￿nischer 
Schreibweise ge￿ndert. Die Vornamen sind meistens romanisiert, wenn nicht durch rum￿nische 
Vornamen ersetzt. (Bsp.: Rudolf = Radu). Festgestellt werden mu￿, ob nicht auch Familiennamen 
romanisiert wurden.￿   137
given that upon the setting up of the Banat Military Border the officers were initially 
foreigners. By comparison, this mid-nineteenth-century generation of Romanian 
military already had at its back a family tradition, which, as the century went on, 
included increasingly higher military echelons. The ten officers listed would take 
this progression further, ascending, by the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the 
twentieth century, to the first two ranks of general (Generalmajor and 
Feldmarschalleutnant). 
The first level of education was received in the local village, where national 
schools functioned maintained and staffed at the expense of the local community 
while the infrastructure was provided by the state, as stipulated in the Military 
Border Constitution.
16 Thus, article 135 of the 1807 Constitution devolved part of 
the robot dues to the national schools, that is, part of the community work went into 
￿the renovation and mending of national schools, [￿] and providing them with 
firewood￿.
17 Given the close supervision of education, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, school attendance was higher in the Military Border than in the civil part of 
the province, with an important number of people being able to read and write as 
well as speak German.
18  
The evolution of the local national schools (scholae vernacularae seu 
nationales) was closely connected with imperial policies regarding the Illyrian 
nation. National schools began to be systematically organized in the Banat during the 
governorship of Clary von Aldringen (1769-1774) at the initiative of the Illyrische 
Hofdeputation, the administrative body regulating matters concerning the Illyrian 
nation.
19 The imperial Normal-Patent issued on 20 May 1771 included stipulations 
regarding primary education in the Banat and was predicated on the recognition that 
￿the Illyrian nation does not have enough schools of its own, in which to learn what   138
they owe to God, to the Monarch, and to their fellow men.￿ As a consequence, the 
Church and political administration should see to it that ￿the youth are not deprived 
of education.￿
20 
This development was synchronized with the general education reform in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, which materialized in a 1774 act, Allgemeine Schulordnung, 
applicable to German schools and the Military Border, and the Regulae directivae 
(1774) and Schulpatent (1776), which targeted the Illyrian schools in the civil part of 
the Banat. The so-called Ratio educationis totiusque rei literariae per Regnum 
Ungariae et Provincias eidem adnexas (1777), that is, the set of regulations 
concerning education in the Kingdom of Hungary and the annexed counties of 
SzatmÆr (Satu Mare), Bihar (Bihor) and Arad, would be applied to all schools in 
these regions and, starting from 1779, to the civil part of the Banat as well, until 
1868.
21 
As their name indicates, national schools used Romanian (Serbian, 
respectively, in the Serbian communities of the Banat Military Border) as the 
language of tuition. The subjects taught were, during the first grade, religion, 
reading, writing, and arithmetic, using Cyrillic primers, and during the second grade, 
religion, biblical history, reading out of the psalter, book of hours and primer, 
citizens￿ duties, calligraphy, and arithmetic.
22 This predominantly religious 
education was strictly Orthodox, which imparted to the school both a national and 
confessional character.  
Eligibility to attend the next level of education, i.e. the trivial school, was 
dependent on good results and behaviour as well as on a good knowledge of 
German, which will have been acquired in the national school or, in some cases, at 
home. As Liviu Smeu points out, David and Trajan Doda (the latter being a future   139
general in the Austro-Hungarian army) will have learnt German both in school and at 
home as their father was an ensign (F￿hnrich) in the Border Regiment.
23 Trivial 
schools functioned in the communes and towns that constituted company 
headquarters, that is, at Orşova, Mehadia, and Bozovici. They consisted of three 
grades and all of the them taught in German.
24  
A short comparative note in regard to the use of German in school and its 
social impact on the Romanian population of the Banat is necessary at this point. 
Although this linguistic imposition might easily be termed Germanization, its 
rationale and impact on the population were completely different from those of 
subsequent Hungarian linguistic policies. Two are the main dissimilarities: the 
backdrop against which these respective language policies were enacted and their 
finality. Firstly, the Habsburg educational system in German was trailblazing and, as 
such, did not oust or radically alter an already existing autochthonous institutional 
structure. The later, Hungarian linguistic policies no longer functioned within a 
tabula-rasa territory, but sought to change an already consolidated educational 
system and, thus, ran against the grain of organic developments, which were by then 
already under way. Secondly, the Habsburg school system of German language 
aimed at centralization, which did not entail assimilation or the suppression of ethnic 
identity (hence the introduction of national schools); the late-nineteenth-, early-
twentieth-century Hungarian school system aimed at cultural levelling in a context in 
which national identity within the Empire had developed beyond the point where it 
could tolerate such impositions.  
In the Military Border this contrast comes across even more patently. 
German being the language of command and each communal family having to 
provide the troop with a soldier, it follows that at least one person in every family   140
possessed some knowledge of German. The cultural shock of studying in a foreign 
language was not as great as it would be for students at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Military Border students were phased into the new language, 
while their counterparts decades later would experience the full blow of a new 
linguistically alien environment. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Petru 
R￿mneanţu wrote:  
 
￿Here [i.e. at the new school] we had to write our timetable in a new language. I 
couldn￿t speak a word of Hungarian. Apponyi￿s law of education was to be put into 
effect that very year. When the teacher dictated the timetable, I listened, looked on, 
and sighed like a neophyte overwhelmed by the mysteries of the temple.￿
∗ 25 
 
As pointed out by R.W. Seton-Watson, the Romanians were not the only nationality 
facing this problem. ￿A deliberate Government policy,￿ Seton-Watson was writing in 
1908, ￿deprives over two million Slovaks of all means of culture and progress, and 
insists that they shall either learn Magyar or nothing.￿
26 As will be shown in Chapter 
Eight, the the Border generals had their own take on these policies of Magyarization. 
 
Additionally, in the regimental headquarter towns there were capital schools 
in German, which ran for four years, as well as mathematical military schools, which 
trained non-commissioned officers (Unteroffiziere).
27 The most important school in 
the Romanian segment of the Banat Military Border was the mathematical school in 
Caransebes. Aron Bihoy, Alexander Lupu, Johann Iovesko, and Demeter Cenna are 
listed as having attended it. Trajan Doda returned to Caransebes in later years as a 
teacher for this school.  
                                                 
∗  ￿Aci trebuia să-mi scriu programul şcolar ￿ntr-o limbă nouă. Nu ştiam un cuv￿nt din limba maghiară. 
Legea şcolară a lui Apponyi ￿n Gai urma să fie impusă ￿n practică abia ￿n acel an. La dictarea orarului 
de către dirigintele clasei, ascultam, priveam, dar mai mult suspinam ca neofitul, copleşit de misterele 
templului.￿   141
These schools represented the capillary level of the Habsburg system of 
military education, which followed a tripartite structure. The first level was that of 
Milit￿r Unter-Erziehungsh￿user (later known as Milit￿r Unterrealschulen), which 
prepared students for the Milit￿r Ober-Erziehungsh￿user (Milit￿r Oberrealschulen), 
followed by the Schul-Compagnien (known as Kadettenschulen from 1866), which 
trained non-commissioned officers or Unteroffiziere.
28 
These institutions, whose names and location varied greatly during the 
nineteenth century, constituted a recruitment pool for the military academies, which 
trained officers. The Military Academy at Wiener-Neustadt furnished lieutenants to 
the infantry, cavalry, and riflemen units (J￿ger). The Artillery Academy at M￿hrisch 
Weisskirchen prepared officers for artillery and sapper units as well as for the 
railways and telegraph regiments (das Eisenbahn- und Telegraphenregiment).
29  
The more famous of the two, the Wiener-Neust￿dter Akademie or 
Theresianische Milit￿r-Akademie, was founded by Maria Theresa in 1752. Joseph 
II￿s donation letter [Stiftsbrief] of 1786 stipulated that, of the four hundred places 
available, three hundred and four were to be kept for  
 
￿those officers￿ sons whose fathers had served faithfully as superior officers, taking 
into account particularly the orphans and children of worthy parents or of parents 
who did military service in regions where there are no possibilities of education for 
their children.￿
∗ 30  
 
The institution was famed not just for its founder but also for the elite corps 
of officers it formed. Alan Sked depicts a picture of lavish life style (four-course 
dinners) redoubled by strict rules encouraging segregation from family and the outer 
                                                 
∗  ￿304 Pl￿tze ￿f￿r solche Officierss￿hne vorgesehen waren, deren V￿ter as Oberofficiere mit 
Zufriedenheit ihrer Vorgesetzen gedient hatten, wobei erstlich auf Waisen, zweitens auf Kinder von 
besonders verdienstlichen Eltern oder solchen, die in L￿ndern oder Gegenden ihre Dienstleistung 
verrichten, wo sie keine Gelegenheit hatten, f￿r den Unterricht ihrer Kinder zu sorgen, Bedacht 
genommen wurde.￿￿   142
world: ￿the Wiener-Neustadt pupils could not have been more restricted had they 
been members of an Austrian leper colony￿.
31 Dorothea Gerard, a turn-of-the-century 
English writer married to an Austro-Hungarian officer, pointed out in her 1916 book 
The Austrian Officer at Work and Play: ￿Here everything was forbidden which was 
not specifically allowed￿.
32 The pupils entered the Academy at the age of ten or 
eleven and graduated ten years later.
33 The Wiener-Neust￿dter officer was easily 
recognizable in society and found it, at times, difficult to integrate. Theoretically 
superior to other officers, he was more often than not socially inadequate after years 
of secluded military tuition.
34 
While this may have been the case with some academy graduates, the 
institution proved an unexpected opportunity for professional and social 
advancement for pupils of lesser extraction. As Michael Hochedlinger emphasizes, 
 
￿the Military Academy did not serve to discipline the nobility, unlike the Prussian 
cadet schools, but primarily provided a welcome opportunity for impecunious 
subaltern officers who had risen from the ranks to have their sons educated at public 
expense and then commissioned into some regiment, again without having to pay for 
it.￿
35 
 
  The previously quoted Josephinian stipulation had laid the tentative 
foundation for, if not entirely meritocratic, at least socially broader, access to higher 
education. The condition for being accepted on one of the free places in the academy 
was that the prospective student (Milit￿r-Z￿gling) should be the son or orphan of an 
officer or civil servant who could prove that he had served for at least twenty years. 
Remaining places were allotted to candidates who benefited from state or private 
grants (Milit￿r-Stiftling) and to the sons of civilians who were able to pay an annual 
fee of 400 to 800 florins (Zahl-Z￿gling).
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As apparent in the appended chart (pp. 312-316), a third of the listed 
Romanian officers graduated from the Wiener-Neust￿dter Akademie (Trajan Doda, 
Alexander Guran, Teodor Seracsin, Trajan Bacsila, and Georg Domaschnian), while 
Michael Trapsia and Ladislaus Cenna were graduates of the Artillery Academy. This 
could be ascribed primarily to the military tradition existent in Banat Grenzer 
families (mentioned earlier on in this chapter), a tradition which felicitously 
dovetailed with the requirements of the military academy for non-fee-paying access.  
Although the Wiener Neustadt institution was the more famous of the two 
military academies, it promoted military proficiency to a lesser extent than did the 
technical academy. As Erwin Schuster points out, the latter was a Fachanstalt (a 
special-skills institution), whose admission criteria were not social, as in the case of 
the former, but rather meritocratic. Eligibility on skills criteria thus ensured a 
socially broader number of students in the technical academy in contrast to the 
restrictive system of admission of the Theresianische Milit￿r-Akademie, which 
accommodated only the sons of impoverished nobility and of imperial officers and 
clerks.
37 
The technical military academy had its roots in the 1717 Ingenieur Akademie, 
which underwent several metamorphoses during the nineteenth century. In 1851 it 
became a Genieakademie, based in Klosterbruck near Znaim. 1852 saw the setting 
up of an Artillery Academy at Olm￿tz, which would be transferred to M￿hrisch 
Wei￿kirchen in 1858, then merged with the technical academy in 1869 and moved to 
Vienna. In 1904 the technical academy moved to M￿dling and was divided into two 
sections, artillery and engineers.
38 It is important to map these institutional 
transformations in order to understand why Michael Trapsia, for instance, is listed as 
a graduate of the Artillery Academy in Olm￿tz while Demeter and Ladislaus Cenna   144
were equally Artillery Academy graduates but from the M￿hrisch Wei￿kirchen 
institution. The two different locations do not point to two different academies but 
rather to distinct phases in the life of the same institution.  
Not all officers￿ sons could enter the military academies, the number of 
places available being extremely small. The so-called cadet schools 
(Cadetenschulen), up until 1866 known as Schulcompagnien and after 1875 as 
Infanterieschulen, made up for this shortage.
39 By comparison with the academies, 
these were less restrictive, more down-to-earth and concentrated to a greater extent 
on practical, rather than theoretical, subjects.
40 By 1889 there were infantry cadet 
schools in Lobzow near Krakow, in Liebenau near Graz, in Budapest, Pressburg, 
TemesvÆr, Prague, in Karthaus near Br￿nn, in Hermannstadt, Carlstadt, Innsbruck, 
and Trieste. In addition to these, there functioned a cavalry cadet school in 
Wei￿kirchen (Moravia), an artillery cadet school in Vienna, and a Pionnier-
Cadettenschule in Hainburg, which also trained officers for the railway and 
telegraph regiments.
41  
The third level of military tuition was represented by the Kriegsschule and 
the higher-education artillery and engineer courses (die h￿here Artillerie- und Genie-
Curse), targeted at officers who had already served for three years with outstanding 
results.
42 These schools of higher military education and specialization (Fort- und 
Fachbildungsanstalten) contributed to the erosion of the aristocratic system of 
promotion in the Habsburg army.
43 They were a means of advancement along 
meritocratic lines and, in the case of the Kriegsschule, a ￿gateway to high 
command￿:
44 
 
  ￿Graduation from the Kriegsschule and completion of these courses leads to 
promotion to the rank of Stabsofficier for various weapons, respectively to the same   145
rank in the branch of intendants, which is equivalent to regular promotion from the 
9
th to the 8
th rank without any examination.￿
∗ 45  
 
Highly skilled and professionally versatile officers were employed by the 
Generalstab, or General Staff, which had, by the nineteenth century, evolved into a 
vital military institution in charge of the strategic, tactical, and administrative 
organization of the army. During peace time, its officers were used in the General 
Staff bureaux: das  Bureau f￿r Personal- und ￿konomische Angelegenheiten (the 
Bureau for Personal and Economic Matters), das  Bureau f￿r operative und 
besondere Generalstabsarbeiten (the Bureau for Operative and special General Staff 
tasks), Landesbeschreibungsbureau f￿r Evidenzhaltung fremder Heere (Land Survey 
Bureau for the Monitoring of Foreign Armies), das Eisenbahn- und Telegraphen 
Bureau (the railways and telegraph bureau). General Staff officers could also be 
appointed to work with higher commands and military authorities, used as military 
school commanders and teachers and, sometimes, as military plenipotentiaries and 
attachØs abroad.
46 As Allmayer-Beck pointed out, the St￿bler or General Staff 
officers formed a special elite
47 within the elite that the officer corps was. As we 
shall see further on, the great majority of the Romanian officers under consideration 
worked for the General Staff.  
 
  5.2. Paths to generalcy 
An overview of the appended personal data chart and of the more detailed 
lists of characterization (Qualificationslisten) shows that there was no single path to 
generalcy, nor was there any one institutional solution for advancement. As 
                                                 
∗  ￿Mit der Absolvierung der Curse, beziehungsweise der Kriegsschule ist die Bef￿higung zur 
Vorr￿ckung in die Stabsofficierscharge der verschiedenen Waffen und in die gleiche Rangsstufe der 
Intendantursbeamtenbranche in der Weise erlangt, dass die seinerzeitige Bef￿rderung aus der IX. 
Rangsclasse in die VIII. ohne besondere Pr￿fung erfolgen kann.￿   146
previously mentioned, military family tradition in the Banat Border led to an 
important number of Romanian students meeting the entrance requirements for the 
Wiener Neustadt Academy. While the honour of being received into such a 
prestigious institution was undoubtedly considerable, graduation from it did not 
automatically guarantee celerity of promotion to the highest echelons of command.  
Trajan Doda, the oldest of the generals under consideration, entered military 
service in 1842 as Unterlieutenant 1. Classe, having graduated from the Military 
Academy in Wiener Neustadt with outstanding results.
48 The 1848 and 1850 issues 
of the Milit￿r-Schematismus reveal a very rapid instance of promotion from 
Unterlieutenant in 1848 to Hauptmann 1. Classe in 1850. This represented wartime 
advancement for military merits demonstrated during 1848 in Italy and the 1848-49 
battles in Transylvania and the Banat. As a consequence, Doda received the Milit￿r 
Verdienst Kreuz (MVK) in 1849. Subsequent promotion proved, however, less rapid. 
Although at times recommended for special promotion (au￿ertourliche 
Bef￿rderung), as for instance from Hauptmann to Major, for ￿good behaviour in the 
line of duty, very good military skills, and, in particular, for his efficiency 
(T￿chtigkeit)￿,
49 one comes across the odd note drawing attention to an undeservedly 
protracted wait for promotion:  
 
￿It is regrettable that the most recent list of advancements stopped precisely at him 
so that he remains the oldest Major. He would have deserved exceptional treatment 
in view of his outstanding services in Dalmatia during the last war. (Ladislaus Nagy, 
FML - Vienna, 31 October 1859)￿
∗∗ 50 
 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿ Es ist zu bedauern, das die j￿ngste Avancements-einstellung gerade bei ihm abtheilt und er 
dadurch der ￿lteste Major blieb. Er h￿tte f￿r seine ausgezeichnete Dienstleistung in Dalmatien 
w￿hrend der abgelaufenen Kriegsepoche auch eine ausnahmsweise Ber￿cksichtigung verdient. (Wien 
am 31 Oktober 1859, Ladislaus Nagy, FML)￿ 
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Another graduate from the Wiener Neustadt academy, Alexander Guran 
followed a similar path, entering the army as Unterlieutenant 2. Classe in September 
1843 and ranking first among the graduates of the higher course of the military 
academy.
51 He reached the rank of Hauptmann in roughly the same number of years 
as Doda (seven years), covering the next levels of the military hierarchy at a 
comparable pace, if with a slight difference to his advantage with every promotion: 
seven years from Hauptmann to Major, six years to Oberst, and slightly longer than 
Doda from Oberst to General Major (eight years instead of five). Unlike Doda, who 
retired in 1872, Guran went on to be promoted to Feldmarschalleutnant (FML), a 
rank he held until his retirement in 1879.  
Both Doda and Guran and, as we shall see in the following military profiles, 
the majority of the other generals, qualified and acted as General Staff officers. 
Doda￿s pedagogical and organizational skills recommended him for administrative 
positions: 
 
￿He is suitable for a position of adjutant with the General Staff and for any other 
administrative posts. He also possesses the necessary ability to form a new troop or 
to improve the state of a disarrayed one.￿
∗ 52 
 
The time he served in the Banat Military Border Infantry Regiment no. 13 as 
well as the three years spent as a teacher at the military school in Caransebes were 
instrumental in providing him with ￿good knowledge of military economy and 
Border administration￿,
53 which he would put to good use after his retirement in his 
capacity as president of Comunitatea de Avere, the administrative unit that emerged 
                                                 
∗  ￿Ist zur h￿heren Adjutantur, f￿r den General Staab, und zu jeder administrativen Stellung geeignet, 
und hat auch die Angemessenkeit zur Errichtung eines neuen, oder Verbesserung eines in seinem 
Zustande herabgekommenen Truppen K￿rpers verwendet zu werden. ￿￿   148
in lieu of the Banat Romanian Border regiment following the dissolution of the 
Military Border. 
Guran, on the other hand, made a career based on his cartographical and 
orientation skills, discharging General Staff functions as well as taking active part in 
the military survey initiated in the Dual Monarchy in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. He was one of the commanders of the Kriegsschule and, starting from 1876, 
director of the Military Geographical Institute in Vienna. He was decorated with the 
Knight Cross of the Imperial Leopold Order (Ritterkreuz des K.K. Leopold-Ordens) 
for ￿outstanding services as head of the Fifth Division (Vorstand der 5. Abtheilung) 
in the Reichs-Kriegs-Ministerium￿.
54 
Theodor Seracsin graduated from the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy 
and entered the army as Unterlieutenant 2. Classe in 1854, one generation later than 
Doda and Guran.
55 If Doda￿s progress from Unterlieutenant to Hauptmann had been 
telescoped by the 1848-49 events and Guran￿s promotion followed at a similar pace, 
it took Seracsin almost twelve years to make it to Hauptmann. As well as endowing 
him with additional specialized military skills, his two-year attendance of the 
Kriegsschule also facilitated his promotion to the next rank. His ascension further up 
the military ladder took place in much the same way as Doda￿s and Guran￿s. Just 
like the latter, he made it to Feldmarschalleutnant, a rank he held for two years until 
his retirement in 1894.   
The promotion lag accumulated throughout his career seems to have led to a 
physical impossibility of further promotion beyond the rank of Feldmarschalleutnant 
and into the upper echelons of the general rank bracket. Thus, the Hauptbericht for 
the year 1893 describes him as an ￿experienced (diensterfahrener) general who has 
started to grow old￿ while to the formulaic question at the end of each report whether   149
he be suitable for his present position and for further promotion (Ob der 
Beschriebene seiner gegenw￿rtigen Stellung entspricht; ob er und f￿r welchen 
h￿heren Posten, oder f￿r welches h￿here Commando, dann ob er f￿r eine h￿here 
Charge geeignet ist), the 1893 answer was that ￿he is suitable as Infantry Troop 
Division Commander￿ but that ￿for another position he does not possess the 
necessary aptitude and will be too old anyway when his turn for promotion comes￿ 
(Entspricht als Infanterie Truppen Divisions Kommandant gut; f￿r ein h￿heres 
Kommando, hat er nicht die Eignung, w￿re auch bis die Reihe an ihn k￿me zu alt).
56  
Trajan Bacsila was the orphaned son of an Oberlieutenant and, as such, 
entitled to a free place initially in the Milit￿r-Unterrealsschule at G￿ns and, 
subsequently, in the Wiener Neustadt Academy.
57 Once in the Austro-Hungarian 
army he used the existent institutional props for further promotion: he attended the 
Kriegsschule between 1893 and 1895, while in 1906 he sat and passed the 
examination which secured him promotion to the rank of Major for the General 
Staff.
58 It thus took him ten years to become a Hauptmann 2. Classe and nine years 
to reach the rank of Major. By the end of the First World War he had been promoted 
to Generalmajor and retired in this capacity in 1919. 
Georg Domaschnian was by far the most copiously praised officer to emerge 
from the Banat Military Border, according to extant Qualificationslisten.
59  The 
orphaned son of a tax official from Mehadia, he qualified for entry into the Military 
Academy at Wiener Neustadt, which he graduated in 1890 from with very good 
results. He went on to accumulate further qualifications (Infanterie Equitation 
course, attendance of the Kriegsschule), as well as a string of medals and 
distinctions. In 1913 he was appointed head of the Fifth Division of the War 
Ministry in Vienna, which was in charge of matters relating to the General Staff,   150
Operations, and Railways (Generalstab, Operativer Dienst, 
Eisenbahnangelegenheiten
60). It is in this capacity that, as we shall see later in the 
thesis, he would write to his superiors in defence of FML Nikolaus Cena, another 
Banat Border general and a native of Mehadia, just like Domaschnian. 
That personal merit and subsequent skill acquisition and not so much 
attendance of the Wiener Neustadt Academy were the essential ingredients for 
reaching the rank of general becomes evident in the professional evolution of Georg 
Doda, Trajan Doda￿s brother.
61 He benefited from the same military education as 
Traian Doda and graduated from the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy with good 
results but made it only to the rank of Major,
62 a rank he was promoted to ad 
honores in 1876.
63 Another Wiener-Neustadt graduate, Daniel Doda, a lieutenant￿s 
son born in Petnik in the Banat, did not advance beyond the rank of captain 
(Hauptmann 2. Classe).
64 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the second institutional springboard to 
the rank of officer was the Artillery Academy at M￿hrisch Weisskirchen. Michael 
Trapsia,
65 Demeter and Ladislaus Cenna graduated from it. 
According to Liviu Groza, Trapsia attended between 1850 and 1852 the 
regimental school at Kaschau in northern Hungary. The purpose of this school was, 
in Trapsia￿s quoted words, ￿educating the offspring of former soldiers￿ and 
￿subsequently, also receiving officers￿ sons who had not been fortunate enough to be 
admitted into the Military Academy at Wiener-Neustadt.￿
66 Although a good student 
and proposed for admission to the Academy, Trapsia was finally denied access on 
the ground that his application ￿was not in accordance with the lists of proposal￿ and 
had to settle for the Flotillenschule (flotilla school) in Klosterneuburg near Vienna, a 
Schulcompagnie which functioned between 1852 and 1856.
67 According to the   151
personal notes Liviu Groza claims Trapsia left behind, the subjects studied at the 
naval school were: 
 
￿mathematics, history, trigonometry, mechanics, physics, geometry, stylistics, 
Italian, naval service, sapper service, artillery, infantry regulation, interior service 
regulation, war theory, and administration. As practical exercises: weapon wielding, 
cannon instruction, front instruction, gymnastics, fencing, swimming, weapon firing, 
and flash signalling.￿
68  
 
His excellent results in the Flotillenschule, as recorded by his 
Qualificationsliste,
69 earned him a place in the Artillery Academy. In 1855 he 
entered the army as Vice-Corporal in the Artillery Academy and graduated four 
years later the second of his class. It took him seven years to cover the ranks between 
Lieutenant 2. Classe and Hauptmann 1. Classe. Of note within this time span was his 
attendance of the Kriegsschule ￿mit recht gutem Erfolge￿ between 1861 and 1863, 
which propelled him to the rank of Oberlieutenant. He reached the rank of Major in 
seven years, that of Oberst in five years, and after another six years he was promoted 
to General Major.   
For the most part, his record of promotion shows his superiors￿ positive 
evaluation of his military skills and merits, hence the frequent recommendation for 
￿au￿ertourliche Bef￿rderung￿. As these Qualificationslisten were peer-reviewed, in 
the sense that the original report had to be countersigned by the writer￿s military 
peers or, in some cases, by his superiors, one sometimes comes across differences of 
opinion as regards promotion and characterization. Thus, in an 1880 note, GM 
Leopold von Hofmann, Artillery Director, states that Oberst Trapsia ￿does not 
always observe the necessary tact towards his superiors and is prone to antagonism￿ 
(Beobachtet gegen Vorgesetzte nicht immer den n￿thigen Takt. Ist zum Widerspruch 
geeignet).
70 This is counterpoised by a superior￿s annotation in the following terms:   152
 
￿it seems to me that the change from promotion in the second category, for which 
his ability has already been acknowledged, to regular promotion is so exceptional 
that it should be thoroughly justified by the Artillery Director and the commanding 
generals.￿
∗ 71 
 
This episode is not singular and one encounters written evidence of such 
clashes of personality in other officers￿ records as well. Trajan Doda, for instance, 
was similarly admonished in an 1866 Qualificationsliste. The writer not having yet 
had the opportunity to ascertain Doda￿s military abilities, as the latter had been 
freshly transferred, falls back on input from a peer, FZM Baron Alleman, who, while 
praising Doda￿s professional proficiency, adds that: 
 
￿apart from his numerous valuable traits I have had occasion to note in particular a 
certain too persistent clinging to his own views, which is perhaps to be traced back 
to his many years spent in chancelleries.￿
∗∗ 72 
 
The characterization list for the following year, however, clears Doda of this 
accusation as follows: 
 
￿As regards the note of His Excellence FZM Baron Alleman, included in the 
previous Individual Description, to the effect that he perceived ￿a certain too 
persistent clinging to his own views on Oberst Doda￿s part￿: Since he started his 
service with the General Command, he has given no more occasion for a similar 
characterization and, upon voicing his own dutiful and honest opinions, Oberst 
                                                 
∗  ￿die Herabminderung der ihm zuerkannt gewesenen Eignung zur Bef￿rderung nach 2. Kathegorie zu 
jener in der Rangstour erscheint mir jedoch so auffallend, da￿ dies seitens des Artillerie-Direktors und 
des kommandirenden Generalen ausf￿hrlicher begr￿ndet werden sollte.￿ 
 
∗∗  ￿ Au￿er den vielen sch￿tzenswerthen Eigenschaften habe ich n￿mlich bei dem Genannten ein 
zuweilen zu starres Festhalten an seinen Ansichten zu bemerken Gelegenheit gehabt, wozu vielleicht 
dessen vielj￿hrige Verwendung in den Kanzeleien den Grund gelegt hat.￿ 
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Doda has always willingly subordinated these to the somewhat opposed views of his 
superiors.￿
∗∗∗ 73  
 
As we shall see further on, divergences of opinion between referees could 
occur even higher up the hierarchical ladder as in the case of Ladislaus Cenna. Born 
in 1844, the son of an imperial army lieutenant, Cenna followed the typical triptych 
of a military career: the Obererziehungsschule in Kamenitz (1856-1860), the 
Artillerie-Schul Compagnie in Krakow (1860-1862), and the Artillery Academy in 
M￿hrisch-Wei￿kirchen (1862-1865). He acquired further specialized skills by 
completing the higher artillery course and later on the Regiments-Equitation.
74 
The 1902 Hauptbericht characterizing Feldmarschalleutnant Cenna reveals a 
certain tug of war between the referees over the general￿s suitability for promotion. 
Whereas one of them makes a point of repeating that Cenna had not been tested for 
any higher posts and was, as such, unsuitable for further promotion (￿F￿r einen 
h￿heren Posten nicht erprobt, daher auch f￿r die h￿here Charge nicht geeignet￿), 
his peer, on the other hand, chooses to highlight Cenna￿s military skills and 
experience in the field of artillery as well as his suitability for various positions, 
concluding that he is fit for promotion.
∗ 75  
This disagreement perpetuates itself into the following year, the supplement 
to the Hauptbericht for 1903 testifying to it. Whereas the first referee persists in his 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿In Bezug auf die, in der vorherigen Individual Beschreibung enthaltene, einer Zuschrift Sr. Ex. 
des Herr FZM B. Allemann entnommene Bemerkung ￿bei Oberst Doda ein zuweilen zu starres 
Festhalten an seinen Ansichten wahrgenommen zu haben￿. Hat sich seit dessen Dienstleistung beim 
Generalkommando kein Anla￿ wiederholter Wahrnehmung ergeben, und es hat der H[err] Oberst bei 
pflichtgem￿￿er, freim￿thiger Vertretung seiner eigenen Anschauungen diese stets bereitwillig der 
etwa entgegengesetzten h￿heren Ansicht unterordnet.￿ 
 
∗  ￿Ist ein vorz￿glicher Artillerie-Offizier und mit gediegenem milit￿rischen und artillerischen Wissen. 
Entspricht in seiner Stellung in vollem Ma￿e und besitzt auch die Eignung f￿r das Kommando einer 
Infanterie-Brigade, eventuall jenes einer Infanterie-Truppen-Division. Er w￿re aber mit R￿cksicht auf 
seine reiche artillerische Erfahrung in der Artillerie belassen. Ist f￿r die Bef￿rderung geeignet. 
Alfred Ritter v. Krapatschek, FZM, Gen. Artill. Inspect.￿ 
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opposition to promotion, repeating verbatim his characterization from the previous 
year, the second referee sticks to his initial recommendation and further expounds on 
Cenna￿s qualities and suitability for promotion. Cenna was not promoted beyond the 
rank of Feldmarschalleutnant. He would, however, by virtue of the second referee￿s 
recommendation, be appointed General-Artillerie-Inspector.
76  
Just as in the case of the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy, the Artillery 
Academy was in itself no guarantee of access to the rank bracket of generalcy. As 
IstvÆn DeÆk pointed out in his 1985 conference paper ￿Education, Training, and 
Ideology of the Habsburg Army Officers￿ Corps, 1848-1914￿, graduates from the 
same school ￿could have quite different careers. One might still be a lieutenant in his 
regiment when his lucky comrade had already attained staff officer￿s rank in 
another￿.
77 While DeÆk highlights the arbitrary element of luck in the process of 
promotion, there is, however, evidence that nuances this view. Demeter Cenna, for 
instance, although a graduate of the Artillery Academy just like Ladislaus Cenna and 
others who went on to become generals, does not appear to have gone beyond the 
rank of Hauptmann 1. Classe, according to his extant Qualificationsliste in the 
Kriegsarchiv.
78 The stumbling block and, implicitly, the promotion deterrent seems 
to have been his failure to pass the examinations of the Kriegsschule, which he 
attended between 1862 and 1864 without good results (￿hat in dieser nicht 
entsprochen￿).
79 In this case, the failure to be promoted is attributable to lack of 
intellectual ability rather than bad luck. 
Conversely, there were generals who did not graduate from either of the two 
academies and, for all this, outdid, as regards promotion, some of the academy 
graduates. One was Alexander Lupu, a townsman￿s son, who started out as a fee-
paying student at the mathematical school in Caransebes, went on to become a cadet   155
(Gemeiner) in the Romanian Banat Border Regiment No. 13 and by 1895 was being 
promoted to Oberst.  
Aron Bihoy followed a similar path. The son of an imperial officer, he 
attended the Normal- and Ober-Schule in Wei￿kirchen in the Banat and, later, the 
mathematical school in Caransebes. Just like Lupu, he only acquired his GM rank ad 
honores upon his retirement in 1892. In both cases, the lack of academic military 
training was subsequently compensated by ￿further education￿ (￿sp￿ter absolvirte 
Schulen u.dgl.￿), primarily the attendance of the Stabsofficiers-Curs.   
Nikolaus Cena, one of the few Romanian officers who made it to the rank of 
Feldmarschalleutnant in the k.u.k. army, started his career by attending the military 
engineer school (Pionierschule) in Tulln and ascended the military hierarchy by 
means of further qualifications, in particular the General Staff officer course.
80 
I decided not to dwell on the personal characterization available in the 
Qualificationslisten as, given its repetitive, formulaic nature, it provides little insight 
into the officers￿ character. With very few exceptions and modulations, they are all 
invariably ￿proper￿ in their attitude to superiors, and ￿just and well-meaning￿, if 
sometimes ￿strict￿, to their subordinates. The characterizing adjectives, rather 
devalued through endless repetition, are more relevant for an analysis of the military 
jargon of the time and convey the official picture of what an imperial officer should 
be rather than what he actually was.  
I will, however, make an exception in the case of Georg Domaschnian, 
whose superlative Qualificationsliste for the First World War years seems to me to 
go beyond the level of perfunctory, formulaic praise and to show the exceptional 
abilities of a perfectly integrated officer. The 1918 referees present him as a person 
of distinguished, chivalrous character, noble-minded and enthusiastic, full of ideals;   156
generous and of a lucid and broad mind; quick on the uptake and accurate, with 
sharp judgment and rapid decisions. According to his Qualificationsliste, he 
possessed all the characteristics of an exceptional troop leader: courageous, cold-
blooded, and decisive. One of the referees proposes him for the position of 
Commander of the prestigious Kriegsschule, while the others subscribe to the 
superlative praise: ￿A complete man￿, ￿an exceptional general￿.
∗∗ 81 Two years before, 
in 1916, Generaloberst Krobatin was concluding Domaschnian￿s characterization 
describing him as ￿one of the most outstanding officers, in character and spirit, that I 
have ever met in my long military career.￿
∗∗∗ 82 
From the above-quoted Qualificationslisten it becomes apparent that, by 
virtue of their military training, these officers became wielders of what Heinz 
Hartmann called ￿functional authority￿, that is, authority ￿based on special 
knowledge and skill (Fachwissen)￿, which is ￿achieved and not ascribed￿,
83 that is to 
say, arrived at meritocratically. And, indeed, a closer look at the Kenntnisse and 
Geschicklichkeiten sections of the Qualificationslisten reveals an impressive record 
(even by today￿s standards) of specialized skills and abilities, which recommended 
such officers as the grey matter of the military establishment. 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Kurze Beschreibung betreffs Charakter, militarischer Eigenschaften, Verhalten im Gefechte, 
besondere Waffentaten und T￿tigkeiten: Vornehmer, ritterlicher, edeldenkender Charakter, mit festen 
Willen; begeisteter, von Idealen erf￿llter Soldat; klarer, weitblickender Kopf, gro￿z￿gig; mit rascher 
richtiger Auffassung, mit scharfem Urtheil und schnellem Entschlu￿. Durch seine umfassende 
milit￿rische Durchbildung, seine nie erlahmende verantwortungsfreudige Selbstt￿tigkeit, seine 
vorz￿glichen Nerven, seine treue selbstlose Anh￿nglichkeit, ist er von nie versagende Nutzen seiner 
Vorgesetzten in jeder Beziehung. Tapfer, kaltbl￿tig und entschlossen, Besitzer aller Eigenschaften 
eines vorz￿glichen Truppenf￿hrers. [...]verm￿ge seiner tiefen umfangreichen milit￿rischen 
Kenntnisse, seiner [Konstanz] in der Durchf￿hrung der gefa￿ten Entschl￿sse, seiner vor dem Feinde 
gl￿nzenden Bew￿hrung, vor allem aber seiner schneller Auffassung des Soldatenstandes und seines 
warmf￿llenden Herzens, w￿re er nach Beendigung des Krieges als Kommandant der Kriegsschule in 
Ansicht zu nehmen. [...] 
Begutachtung: Energisch, zielbewu￿t, f￿rsorglich mit umfassenden Wissen und K￿nnen! Sehr 
leistungsf￿hig. Ganz hervorragender Armeegeneralstabs Chef! Zum Division￿r vorz￿glich geeignet! 
Fp. 623, 8./3. 1918  Richard M￿ller FML 
Generalstabschef der k.u.k Heeresgruppe FM. Freiherr von Conrad 
Vollkommen einverstanden, ein vorz￿glicher General. 8.3.1918   Conrad von H￿tzendorf   FM￿  
∗∗∗  ￿einer der hervorragendsten Offiziere, nach Karakter und Geist, die mir im Verlaufe meiner langen 
Dienstzeit bekannt geworden sind.￿   157
As concerns their communicational abilities, the great majority of them were 
at least tri-lingual (German, Romanian, and another language, which could be 
French or the language of the regiment where they served, Italian, Serbian, or 
Hungarian), while some could master up to six foreign languages in addition to their 
mother tongue (according to his Qualificationsliste, Alexander Guran could speak 
German, Romanian, Serbian, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, and French). Admittedly, 
not all foreign languages will have been spoken and written with the same degree of 
proficiency. In some cases, they would be only ￿zum Dienstgebrauch gen￿gend￿, 
sufficient for military service purposes, (the characterization of Ladislaus Cenna￿s 
command of Serbian or Georg Domaschnian￿s Italian) or even ￿notd￿rftig￿, scanty 
(used in reference to Trajan Bacsila￿s Hungarian). Notwithstanding this, the 
importance of their multilingualism lay in the professional versatility it imparted, 
which rendered them particularly valuable for the military system. 
In addition to the regular military skills acquired in the academy and in 
higher military education institutions, the General Staff skills listed in the 
Qualificationslisten (cartography, triangulation, reconnaissance, land survey) 
constituted another important asset. They are, on the one hand, indicative of good 
mathematical and technical training and, on the other hand, offer a detailed picture of 
the extent to which these officers travelled and the cosmopolitan outlook that must 
have accompanied this geographical and, implicitly, cultural awareness. Whether 
billeted or on General Staff journeys or as participants in military survey operations, 
these officers came to be closely acquainted with most of the Austrian lands, parts of 
Hungary, Italy and Bohemia, while reconnaissance and cartography missions led 
them to Transylvania, Bukovina, Maramures, and the Romanian Principalities. Their 
knowledge of Romanian inferably recommended them for missions in Romanian-  158
speaking lands. Michael Trapsia, for instance, was credited with knowledge of the 
Banat, Bukovina, and Western Transylvania, as well as Venice, parts of Hungary, 
Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, the western part of Istria, Florence, Genoa, Turin, Milan, 
Vienna, Olm￿tz, Lemberg, parts of Upper Austria, and eastern Bohemia.
84 
According to official records, Alexander Guran became familiar with Lombardy-
Venice and Istria due to war operations, with the upper regions of Italy through 
various postings and marches, with Hungary and Wallachia through cartography, 
with northern Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia during land survey missions, with 
the Banat, Upper and Lower Austria, Tuscany, and Galicia through various 
journeys.
85 Theodor Seracsin knew Galicia and Bukovina, a large part of Hungary 
and the Banat through prolonged postings, Vienna and its surroundings as well as 
parts of the Austrian lands as a military student and via cartography exercises, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland due to the 1864 war, parts of Croatia and Slavonia 
and the upper Military Border through military mapping conducted between 1867 
and 1868, as well as the Banat Military Border as a native of the region and through 
travels.
86 
In the present chapter I made a point of delineating each of these officers￿ 
military profiles, educational trajectories and, in particular, their skills and 
qualifications. By placing these officers within an institutional context, one can 
better understand their status as members of the military community as well as their 
status within the Monarchy. Their schooling and promotion record constitutes 
evidence that they were part of an elite corps in the imperial (later Austro-
Hungarian) army. Moreover, professional success or the lack thereof will become a 
potential factor in the discussion of their loyalties and in assessing some of these   159
officers￿ option (not) to join the Romanian army in 1877-1878, a point which will be 
analysed in the last but one chapter of the present thesis.   160
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Chapter 6.  Military Elite Status within a Social-Cultural Context 
  
While the previous chapter focused systematically on official characterizations with 
a view to highlighting career trajectories and professional skills, the present chapter 
is devoted to a more eclectic presentation of the social and cultural environment 
within which these officers moved, concentrating primarily on those elements that 
reinforced their elite status, prestige, and exceptionalism. For the sake of coherence, 
the presentation follows a pattern of concentric circles: it starts at the local level, 
where it diachronically examines the military symbolism of the Romanian Border 
communities and, in particular, the Roman slogans on their military flags; it then 
moves on to the cosmopolitan level and shows how these officers￿ peripatetic life 
style facilitated contact with the Romanian intelligentsia in the Empire; it concludes 
with a section on the k.u.k. officer status and esprit de corps, which reconstitutes the 
professional milieu of the Banat Border generals and clarifies how the next three 
chapters fit in with the general literature on the Habsburg officer corps and what the 
contribution of the present thesis will be in relation to it. 
 
6.1. Romanian Military Border Symbolism 
The strategic function of the Military Border within the Habsburg Empire ensured a 
special status for its inhabitants: the Grenzer or frontiersmen were not only valuable 
tax payers and defenders of the southern and eastern reaches of the Empire but also a 
ready-trained and ready-to-mobilize military force that the House of Habsburg could 
rely on in their external and internal wars. The value of this militarized population 
lay, therefore, in their dependability deriving from staunch allegiance to the   164
Emperor. As a consequence, the Military Border system was geared towards 
securing the good will and loyalty of the frontiersmen by recourse to policies of 
privilege and exemption (land in exchange for military service, tax reduction, and 
wartime indemnities). Part and parcel of this process of allegiance formation was the 
military symbolism and ￿emotive imagery￿
1 that developed and was used as a 
binding medium between the ethnically variegated Grenzer and their Habsburg 
monarch. 
A considerable number of Romanian studies
2 point to an instrumentalization 
of the Roman past, seen as a means wielded by Habsburg authorities to secure the 
loyalty of the Romanian population of the Habsburg Empire and, in particular, that 
of the Military Border. As regards this postulated intersection of two sets of claims 
to Roman descent (Habsburg and Romanian), there have been few attempts to 
substantiate it and none whatsoever to give it exhaustive coverage. The assumption 
is predicated on the implicit belief that the Roman past to which the Habsburgs 
looked back and that which the Romanians claimed for themselves was one and the 
same and, as such, qualified as an element of historical and symbolic commonality 
between the two.  
A closer look at the Roman appendage in the imperial title (Holy Roman 
Emperor), a dignity the Habsburgs held almost uninterruptedly since 1438,
3 will, 
however, show its fundamentally different nature when compared to the Romanians￿ 
invoked Roman past. As Marie Tanner points out, Habsburg claims to Roman roots 
were part of a broader, essentially fanciful, genealogical project aimed at buttressing 
imperial prestige and dating back to the reign of Rudolf I.
4 Moreover, the Roman 
was not the only genealogical strand in the Habsburg panoply. Thus, Maximilian I 
(1563-1576) was able to equally authoritatively claim direct kin to    165
 
￿Jewish kings and prophets, Greek and Egyptian demigods, Roman divinities and 
Christian saints, Trojan heroes and their historical progeny among the Frankish 
emperors; thus, Saturn and Osiris, Hector and Priam, Noah and Christ, Clovis and 
Charlemagne sprout from various branches of the Hapsburg family tree￿.
5  
 
As John Gagliardo explains, the office of Holy Roman Emperor was least 
dependent on such symbolism as  
 
￿the dignity of the position, as well as its functions, required a candidate to possess 
high noble status, but also that he govern directly a dynastic state or territory with 
sufficient resources as to confer weight and power in the execution of imperial 
tasks￿.
6  
 
The imperial dignity can, therefore, be viewed as one which was the 
crowning recognition of power and influence and not the source of it. It was the fact 
that power preceded, instead of exclusively devolving from, the imperial title that 
ensured the functionality of the Empire and the authority of the Emperor even after 
the Peace of Westphalia.
7 In this context, claims to a Roman descent, whether going 
back to Constantine, the Anicier dynasty, or to Charlemagne, were mere rhetorical 
props in a show of already acquired power. 
Whereas with the Habsburgs the Roman past was an almost ornamental 
element among the host that formed the trappings of dynastic power, with their 
Romanian subjects it constituted the vital core of their gradually coalescing political 
identity and, as such, had a strong polemic and demonstrative value. As pointed out 
in Chapter Four, representatives of the Romanian Uniate clergy in Transylvania 
asserted this Roman past, initially, as a justification of the Union with the Catholic 
Church and, subsequently, as a historical trump card meant to secure political 
recognition for the Romanian nation. Thus, the Roman past invoked was not a   166
dynastic one but rather a reiteration of a scholarly leitmotif, which was given 
currency by Italian Renaissance humanists, who pointed out that the Vlachs were the 
descendants of the Roman colony set up in conquered Dacia by Emperor Trajan.  
By the second half of the eighteenth century, when the Romanian Border 
regiments were organized in the Banat and in Transylvania, the Roman descent of 
the autochthonous population had become a clichØ replicating itself from one author 
to another with little variation, testifying to a certain intertextual quality of statistical 
and travel literature of the time. That the imperial authorities were indeed aware of 
the Roman past of the region is attested to by Francesco Griselini in his chapter 
￿Ueber die Walachen, die im Bannat wohnen￿. The Italian scholar divides his 
archaeological subject matter into two: relics which were still to be seen at the time 
(￿welchem in dieser Gegend zurzeit noch gesehen werden￿) and those which were no 
longer in place. The latter, Griselini explains, were for the most part discovered in 
1736, when General Andreas Hamilton, the Governor of the province, had the 
Roman baths at Mehadia refurbished on imperial order and some of the more 
spectacular Roman relics shipped over to Vienna, ￿where, side by side with others 
brought from Transylvania, they serve as adornments of the antechamber and 
staircase leading to the imperial public library.￿
∗ 8  
A Habsburg map from the time of the 1737-39 war against the Turks entitled 
Plan des Donau-Stroms zwischen Bellegrad und Orsova worauf die an Selbe 
liegende dermaliche wehrhafte Festungen auch alle Schl￿￿er und Rudera angemerkt 
seyndt (sic) punctiliously transcribes the Roman inscriptions on both banks of the 
                                                 
∗  ￿Ich muss jedoch, eh[e] ich auf die Alterth￿mer komme, welche in dieser Gegend zurzeit noch 
gesehen werden, erst diejenigen beschreiben, welche sie nicht mehr besitzt. Diese wurden 
gr￿stentheils im Jahre 1736 gefunden, da der General Andreas Hamilton, damaliger Gouverneur der 
Provinz, diese B￿der auf Befehl Karls VI. wiederherstellen lie￿, und die gesagten Alterth￿mer nach 
Wien schickte, wo sie nebst einigen andern aus Siebenb￿rgen gekommenen zur Zierde des Vorsaals 
und der Treppe dienen, welche zur K.K. ￿ffentlichen Bibliothek f￿hren.￿   167
river, with particular emphasis on Tabula Traiana.
9 One assumes that such 
archaeological notations will have served as landmarks as well as historical curios. 
Griselini￿s interest in old Roman inscriptions shows that at the time the 
literati, at least, were aware of the military past of the region and could gloss on 
tegular inscriptions.
10 It is Griselini who mentions the famous Roman legion Gemina 
XIII, traces its change of name to Antoniana, after Emperor Antonius Pius, and 
remarks that it was stationed in Dacia.
11 In his exposition on Roman inscriptions 
Griselini makes references to Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli and Caryophilus. The 
former referred in his Danubius Pannonico-Mysicus to ancient inscriptions such as 
the one extracted from the ruins of Mehadia castle. The fortress was subsequently 
mentioned by Moritz Graf von Lacy, who, while inspecting the strategic potential of 
the Orsova-Marga route in the Banat, mentioned in a 1768 report that the 
fortifications at Mehadia had been pulled down in accordance with the stipulations 
of ￿the last peace treaty￿ (i.e. the Treaty of Belgrade of 1739).
12 Caryophilus was the 
author of a thesis titled De termis Herculanis nuper in Dacia detectis (1737), which 
records the fact that in 1736 seven statues of Hercules had been dug up and sent to 
Vienna.
13 
According to Traian Simu, the first systematic archaeological discoveries (as 
opposed to the more or less accidental unearthing of Roman statues at the baths of 
Mehadia), as well as the first Habsburg reports on the topic date back to 1792-
1793.
14 Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg is credited with having discovered the Roman 
castrum Praetorium in 1829.
15 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Nikolaus 
Cena, a retired k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant and a native of Mehadia, continued the 
work of archaeological exploration of the ruins and the material he gathered formed 
the starting point for the local museum bearing his name.
16 His archaeological   168
preoccupations would render him suspect with the local Hungarian authorities in the 
summer of 1914. His detention and the intricacies of his case will be analysed in 
Chapter Eight. 
Although awareness of ancient relics and inscriptions was widely spread 
among the Habsburgs (and not only) at the end of the eighteenth and throughout the 
nineteenth century (as archaeological research became more systematic), there is 
little evidence to suggest that the ancient Roman paraphernalia actually influenced 
official policy. One document belonging to the Hofkriegsrath holding in the 
Viennese archives and dated 1783 contains a section on the healing baths of Mehadia 
and their modernization. The report deals exclusively with pragmatic matters such as 
the annual tax levied for the maintenance of the baths, whose ￿utility￿ had already 
been proved. The Habsburg author proceeds, sensibly enough, to highlight the need 
for building bridges. He concludes by recommending that such bridges should, for 
the sake of durability, be built in brick.
17 This is essentially a no-nonsense, down-to-
earth approach which most likely will have characterized Habsburg interactions with 
places steeped in history and their inhabitants. 
The only official sphere where the Roman legacy was consciously capitalized 
on was the military sphere. It is the extant military slogans harking back to a glorious 
Roman past as used within the Romanian Border Regiments (in both the Banat and 
Transylvania) that seem to bear out the instrumentalization thesis mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. ￿Virtus romana rediviva￿, ￿Avere si sange pentru imperatul 
nostru￿ (Our wealth and blood for our Emperor), ￿A lui Romul vitejie ￿ntre noi, 
Rom￿ni, să fie￿ (Romanians, may Rome￿s bravery be among us) are examples of 
martial slogans used in the Transylavanian Border Regiment in Bistriţa-Năsăud (the 
first two) and the Banat Border Regiment with its headquarters in Caransebes (the   169
third slogan), and preserved in the form of inscriptions on military flags. Archduke 
Charles (Erzherzog Karl) (1771-1847), the great reformer of what had, by then, 
become the Austrian army, drew attention to the importance of military flags in the 
1808 Dienstreglement:  
 
￿The flag or the standard is ￿sacred for a soldier, it is the glorious pledge of the faith 
put by the state in its warriors￿ valour [...] and the cover under which they must win 
or die [￿] its preservation is inextricably bound with the glory of the troop￿￿
∗ 18  
 
The Archduke stresses the two fundamental dimensions of military flag 
symbolism: religious and secular. The first one derives from the original apotropaic 
function of the flag, that of protecting the soldiers in battle by displaying the image 
of a beneficent deity:  
 
￿The earliest flags and standards were almost always religious in nature [￿] the 
authority of the flag or standard was initially derived from the power of these 
religious connections.￿
19 
 
In time the reverence commanded by religious symbolism mutated into secular 
allegiance, with flags becoming ￿the symbol of the regiment￿s duty to sovereign and 
country, of the men￿s duty to the regiment.￿
20 If reverence to religious and/or secular 
authorities defines the external significance of a military flag, there is, however, an 
even more important, internal function, that of providing cohesion and generating 
collective memory. Sir Charles Napier alluded to this aspect in the following terms:  
 
￿apart from representing authority and unity of purpose, the flags of regiments came 
to embody the memory of the men who had come before, the war history and 
                                                 
∗  ￿die Fahne (bzw. die Standarte) ist ￿das Heiligtum eines Soldaten, das r￿hmliche Pfand des 
Vertrauens, welches der Staat in die Tapferkeit seiner Krieger setzt, [￿] und das Panier, unter 
welchem sie siegen oder sterben m￿ssen [￿] mit ihrer Erhaltung ist der Ruhm der Truppe 
unzertrennlich verbunden.￿￿   170
traditions of the regiment. [￿] To allow such a flag to be captured was to dishonour 
the regiment and all the men who had gone before.￿
21 
 
In this context, the flag represents more than a rallying point in battle (its initial 
function, according to Wise, was to distinguish the forces of the two sides and 
provide rallying points in confused fighting); it becomes a symbolic axis around 
which a powerful sense of community is built as well as a sense of ancestry and 
honorable descent. It binds together the community and gives it a purpose and 
direction.  
As Anton Dolleczek pointed out at the end of the nineteenth century, a 
number of exceptions were made to the 1868 Circular-Verordnung, which stipulated 
that each regiment should have one flag only, in reverence to historical and 
emotional ￿reminiscences￿ associated with certain regimental flags.
22 In the case of 
the Military Border regiments, the flags and the accompanying inscriptions were 
emblematic not just of the soldiers who went to battle but of the entire community 
which formed the pool of recruitment. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the hypotheses put forth by 
Liviu Groza to the effect that the number 13 in the title of the Banat Border 
Regiment constitutes a reference to the Roman Legion XIII Gemina hinges on two 
pieces of evidence: 1) the great number of tiles and bricks bearing the stamp of this 
legion to be found across the territory of the Banat Military Border; and 2) the 
inscription on a military flag ribbon invoking Rome￿s bravery as an incentive to 
brave conduct in battle for the Banat frontiersmen (a picture of which is to be found 
in Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck￿s Die K.(u.)K. Armee 1848-1918
23). In default 
of more substantial supporting documents, the former, archeological, argument is 
tenuous because bricks bearing the stamp of the XIII Gemina could be found in other   171
places in the Banat as well as in Transylvania, where the legion was actually 
stationed (that is, at Apulum). The latter, heraldic, piece of evidence is the more 
intriguing of the two in terms of origin and chronology. 
The above-mentioned slogans were embroidered on appendices to the flag 
proper called streamers. As Jelena Boro￿ak-Marijanović explains in her book on 
Croatian flags,  
 
￿during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so written documents record, it 
became the custom at ￿the consecration of the flag￿, when there was a new flag or to 
celebrate a regimental anniversary or when a regiment returned from war, to add 
decorative streamers to the flag staff. [￿] These streamers had a ￿godmother￿ who 
was usually the wife of some famous officer or often even from the royal house or 
the families of the nobility or outstanding citizens. [￿] In the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century the ￿godmother￿ would embroider the streamer. From the 
beginning of the nineteenth century we have streamers embroidered by Franijca 
Dra￿ković, nØe Kulmer, wife of Janko Dra￿ković, one of the leaders of the Revival 
movement, and Francisca Novosel, nØe Vrhovec. In the stormy year of 1848, 
streamers were embroidered by Sidonia Rubido Erd￿dy and Sofia Jelačić.￿
24 
 
Thus, while the flags were made and distributed by a central Commission, which 
￿drew up regulations for the design of infantry and cavalry flags on the basis of 
sketches from the Military Council￿,
25 the streamers were, more often than not, a 
local, personalized regimental input, functioning as annotations to the main 
symbolism of the flag.  
Late nineteenth-century Austrian literature on the subject points to a much 
longer tradition than indicated by Boro￿ak-Marijanović. The oldest flags of the 
Habsburg army were embroidered by ladies,
26 p o s s i b l y  a s  p a r t  o f  a  m e d i e v a l  
chivalric tradition. In time, however, as the standing army came into being, the 
making of the flags and the techniques involved in it became the office of carpenters 
(Zimmerleute).
27 As a series of eighteenth-century decrees considerably reduced the   172
number of flags, the old tradition of lady-hand embroidery, which had fallen into 
obsolescence, was revived in the form of resplendent flag ribbons (Fahnen- und 
Standarten-b￿nder) donated to the regiments by gentlewomen and other high-society 
figures and immortalizing in gold and silver embroidery momentous historical and 
military episodes. Each regiment thus had several such flag ribbons, which served to 
embellish the flag proper on special, festive occasions.
28 The act of donation 
customarily accompanied the consecration of the flag (Fahnenweihe) and the flag 
ribbon as such was a religiously sanctioned accoutrement. The personalities who 
bestowed this honorary ribbon on the regiment were known as godparents of the flag 
(Fahnenpaten). More often than not, it was a woman figure that embroidered the flag 
ribbon and acted as a godmother (Fahnenpatin).  
The languages in which these inscriptions were written map the linguistic 
evolution in administration from Latin (most of the slogans during the Thirty Years 
War), to German in the eighteenth century and all the other languages of the Empire 
throughout the nineteenth century. It is worth mentioning at this point that Latin 
inscriptions and Roman symbolism were quite common in the eighteenth century 
and by no means confined to Romanian flags. Thus, the standard belonging to the 
hussar troop of the Karlovac Border Regiment and dated 1746-1749 displayed on the 
reverse a ￿medallion showing a set of Roman military trophies (signa and vexilla, 
shields, and lances with the inscriptions ￿IOVIA/NI￿) and the motto 
￿RETRACTATA NITESCUNT￿￿.
29 The fact that the inscription on the flag ribbon 
of the Banat Romanian Border Regiment is in Romanian may indicate that it 
appeared later, sometime during the nineteenth century.  
In what follows I shall dwell on the military flag slogans belonging to the 
Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment. Although the officers under   173
discussion in the present thesis originated from the Banat Border Regiment and not 
from Transylvania, the lack of sources on Banat flags and their history prevents me 
from advancing hypotheses as to their origins. In order to make up for this dearth of 
sources for the Banat I will examine the cognate Transylvanian case as the closest 
analogy that could be drawn with the Banat. This is partly because there is much 
more literature available on the Transylvania Border Regiments than there is on the 
Banat regiment and partly because the extant archival material in the former case is 
more substantial. 
The military slogan of the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment 
as embroidered on the ornamental streamer attached to the regimental flag, that is, 
Virtus Romana Rediviva (Roman Virtue Revived), not only served its immediate 
military purpose of incentivizing the troop and creating prestige sentiments,
30 to use 
Weber￿s words, but went beyond the military sphere. After the early dissolution of 
the Transylvanian Border in 1851, many of the military assets remained in 
possession of the demilitarized community and transformed into cultural capital. 
This is the case of the uniform fund (￿fondul de mondire￿), which comprised both 
state and community contributions towards the acquisition of military uniforms. 
After 1851 this money was turned into deeds and kept by the state, while the 5% 
interest yielded was allocated to the frontiersmen￿s descendents as scholarships.
31 In 
much the same way, the military slogan Virtus Romana Rediviva turned into a 
cultural and political watchword and gave the name to an active cultural association. 
For the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment there are two 
contemporary attempts at glossing the origin of the flag streamer and of the military 
slogan Virtus Romana Rediviva. The first is the explanation provided by Francisc 
Mihailes, a captain in the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment, in his   174
memoirs ￿Amintiri din anii 1848-49￿, currently kept in the Bistriţa-Năsăud branch of 
the Romanian National Archives.
32 The author￿s reference to the juxtaposition of the 
regimental slogan to the Romanian tricolour flag (￿the Romanian flag (standard) 
consisting of three colours (blue, red, white), on which was embroidered in golden 
letters the inscription from our military flags, Roman Virtue Reborn￿
∗ ), occasions an 
explanatory footnote which answers, at least in part, some of the questions raised 
earlier in this chapter: 
 
￿I have previously mentioned in other places that Empress Maria Theresa, being the 
godmother of our flag, sent to the Second Romanian Regiment a ribbon [with the 
inscription] ￿[Ai￿] Virtus romana redivivat￿￿, which was displayed on the 
regimental flag on all state occasions￿
∗∗ 33 
 
The second explanation is to be found in Captain Karl Klein￿s 1867 Military 
History of the k.k. National Romanian Transylvanian Border Infantry Regiment no. 
17.
34 The author, born in Bukovina, of evangelical faith, set about writing his work 
in the wake of the 1848-1849 revolution, during which an important part of the 
Năsăud regimental archive was destroyed. According to Adrian Onofreiu, the 
authorities initiated a campaign of document collection from local priests and retired 
officers in an attempt to provide material for such a history of the regiment.
35 Klein￿s 
reference to martial symbolism in the regiment highlights the importance of the 
Latin slogan Virtus Romana Rediviva and tells a slightly different story than that of 
Captain Mihailes: 
 
                                                 
∗  ￿stegul (stendartul) de 3 culori rumanescu (albastru, rosu, alb) pe care era brodita cu lettere de auru 
Inscriptiunea de pe standartele noastre militare Virtutea Romana reinviata￿. 
∗∗  ￿am comentat mai ante in alte locuri, ca ￿mpărăteasa Maria Theresia fiidu nanasia standartului 
nostru Regimentului II rumanescu i trimasa [bandana] ￿[Ai ....?] Virtus romana redivivat￿, care se 
purta la tote parasile solemne pe standartu regimentului.￿ 
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￿Following the high order of Her Imperial Majesty, Queen Maria Theresia, the 
Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Infantry Regiment received the symbol 
Virtus Romana Rediviva. This symbol was written on the flags of the two infantry 
battalions as well as on the flag of the National Military Institute in Năsăud and was 
etched on all official seals of the regiment. On the left side of the imperial eagle 
were written in big Latin characters the following words ￿Virtus Romana￿ and on 
the right side, ￿Rediviva￿. The slogan of the first infantry battalion was ￿Pro 
imperatore, honor et gloria￿, and that of the second battalion, ￿Perpetua fides￿. 
These slogans were embroidered in golden letters on the flag ribbon.￿
∗ 36 
 
Mihailes￿s and Klein￿s accounts corroborate each other in that both maintain 
that the source of the Latin slogan of the 2
nd Transylvanian Border Regiment was 
imperial and that Maria Theresa herself, either as godmother of the flag (according 
to Mihailes) or as issuer of a special order (in Klein￿s version), was involved in this. 
Although not explicitly based on ascertainable archival sources (which, in 
itself, is understandable since the authors of these accounts were contemporaneous 
with the events recounted), both explanations provide, for all this, valuable insight 
into the perceived relationship between the Romanian Grenzer and the Imperial 
Hause. Irrespective of whether or not Maria Theresa herself commissioned the 
embroidered ornamental inscription on the flag ribbon or issued the above-
mentioned order, the very circulation of this information among the frontiersmen 
testifies to the collective perception of their special relationship with the monarch. 
Mihailes￿s explanatory footnote, in particular, reveals a myth the Romanian Grenzer 
lived by. Of no less importance is the association between imperial patronage and 
                                                 
∗  ￿Urmare a prea￿naltului ordin al Majestaţii Sale ￿mpărăreşti, regina Maria Theresia, Regimentul 
grăniceresc de infanterie al II-lea naţional rom￿n transilvănean a primit următorul simbol: Virtus 
Romana Rediviva. Acest simbol era scris at￿t pe drapelele celor două batalioane de infanterie c￿t şi pe 
drapelul Institutului militar naţional năsăudean şi era gravat pe toate sigiliile oficiale ale regimentului. 
La st￿nga vulturului crăiesc stăteau scrise cu litere mari romane următoarele cuvinte: ￿Virtus 
Romana￿, iar la dreapta ￿Rediviva￿. Deviza ￿nt￿iului batalion de infanterie era ￿Pro Imperatore, honor 
et gloria￿, iar cea a celui  
de-al doilea batalion: ￿Perpetua fides￿. Aceste devize erau scrise cu litere de aur pe eşarfa drapelului.￿  
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national pride implicit in the act of donation or, in Klein￿s account, in the imperial 
order. Both of them envisage the Habsburg Empress as promoter of an awareness of 
Roman descent among her militarized Romanian subjects. 
As regards the location of the military flags and their ribbons, we have it 
from Dolleczek that, following the dissolution of the Border Regiments in 1873, a 
Circular-Verordnung was passed which stipulated that their flags were to be donated 
to the church in the town where the regimental headquarters used to be.
37 I am not 
aware of any such flags or flag ribbons being preserved in Caransebes or in Năsăud. 
The only mention of such extant military paraphernalia is, as pointed out above, to 
be found in Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, who references them to the 
Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna. 
 
 
 
6.2. The wider circle of a peripatetic military career 
In 1826, the Orthodox priest of Mehadia, Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg, a widely-travelled 
man by virtue of his position and linguistic skills, expressed his regret at not being 
able to follow a military career:  
 
￿As I mentioned to you, I went off with three armies, but never entered Berlin, or 
Holland, or Constantinople. Whereas your parents, uncles, cousins, and relatives 
who were field soldiers saw not only Austria, Bavaria, the German lands, the 
Netherlands, the Rhine River, Switzerland, Saxony, all of Italy, but they also saw 
France and outdid me by much. In the big armies, those who could read and write 
German became superior officers and majors, whereas I remained what I was 
before.￿
∗∗ 38 
 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Eu vă spuşii că ￿n 3 oşti am plecat, ￿nsă nici ￿n Berlin, nici Holandu, nici ￿n Ţarigradu n-am ￿ntrat. 
Iară părinţii voştri, unchi, veri, neamuri ce-au fost ￿n sus ￿n feldsoldaţi pe franţozi, ei nu numai că 
Estraihul, Baieru, Ţara Nemţească, Niderlandu, apa Rainii, Şvaiţu, Sacsonia, toată Italia, ce şi Franţia 
au văzut şi cu mult m-au ￿ntrecut. ˛n care greăle oştiri, cei ce au ştiut a ceti şi a scri nemţeăşte, 
oberofiţiri şi maiori au ajuns, iară eu, cum am fost, tot aşa s￿nt.￿   177
As highlighted by Linda Colley, the impact of this peripatetic lifestyle on a 
soldier￿s outlook should be more closely studied especially when it comes to a 
discussion of loyalties and patriotism.
39 In her book Britons. Forging the Nation 
1707-1837, Colley addresses the question of a soldier￿s growing awareness of 
national identity acquired via military postings. She maps the psychological 
evolution from the atomized parochialism of secluded village life, where bringing in 
the crops took precedence over patriotic calls for joining the army, to the final 
realization of ￿what he was [￿] by contact with what he was not￿, acquired during 
wars abroad. Thus, Joseph Mayett, a Buckinghamshire militia man, wrote in his 
autobiography in reference to his return from Ireland in October 1814: ￿On the 23
rd 
we landed Safe on old England shore.￿ Colley reads into this remark a budding sense 
of belonging to a wider, national community. She, moreover, stresses the importance 
of soldiery as ￿political education in the widest sense￿.
40 
The case of the Romanian officers in the k.(u.)k. army, while evincing a 
number of similarities with that of Colley￿s English soldiers, differs, however, from 
the latter in its complex configuration. The Romanian officers were part of a 
multinational army in duty bound to the Habsburg Emperor, protecting the 
boundaries of a multinational empire, which would never have been perceived as the 
￿old Austrian shore￿ (although, as we shall see in Chapters Seven and Eight, loyalty 
to the Empire as a whole, or Reichsgef￿hl, was cherished by most of the Border 
generals analysed). The psychological evolution captured by Colley becomes, 
nevertheless, relevant when considering these officers￿ return to their native land 
(the Banat, in their case) or their contact with Romanian-inhabited lands, and also 
prompts further questions such as: what was the impact of military journeys and 
reconnaissance trips into the Romanian-speaking lands outside the boundaries of the   178
Monarchy upon these officers￿ allegiance and sense of identity? And, conversely, 
what was the impact of the close contact with other ethnic groups within the 
Monarchy and their display of self-awareness?  
Regarding the latter question, one wonders if the 1906 testimony of Mihai 
Teliman, a Romanian folklorist from Bukovina, could be extrapolated to the case of 
the Romanian officers in the imperial army: 
 
￿Did I have national consciousness? [￿] I did not; I only had my heart. Having been 
brought up under foreign influences completely opposed to the Romanian spirit, I 
only had my memories of my parental home.￿
∗  
 
Following his visit to the Czech colony in Vienna, he was to note: 
 
￿We are foreigners and among foreigners one learns how to be oneself. [￿] it was 
then that I received the baptism of national consciousness [￿] and was resurrected 
from the dead. What the Czechs had sown in my impressionable heart, ￿Rom￿nia 
jună￿ brought to fruition.￿
∗∗ 41 
 
The above quote brings the discussion to the paradoxical role played by 
imperial cultural centres (Vienna, in particular, but not only) in catalysing and, in 
some cases, even engendering a sense of national identity by bringing together 
Romanian students and intellectuals from all Romanian-inhabited lands. The 
Viennese literary society Rom￿nia jună (Young Romania) was instrumental in 
creating just such a Romanian rØpublique des lettres, which explicitly aimed at 
transcending political boundaries. Officially founded in 1871, the social-literary 
academic society Rom￿nia jună resulted from the fusion of two previous, and for a 
while inimical, cultural societies, Societatea literară ştiinţifică, set up in 1864, and 
                                                 
∗  ￿Aveam conştiinţă naţională? [...] Nu; inimă numai. Crescut sub influenţe diametral opuse geniului 
rom￿nesc, ￿mi rămaseră numai amintirile casei părinteşti.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Suntem străini şi ￿ntre străini ￿nveţi să fii al tău [...] Şi atunci am primit şi eu botezul conştiinţei 
naţionale [...] Şi am ￿nviat din morţi. Ceea ce Cehii au sădit ￿n impresionabila mea inimă, a cultivat 
￿Rom￿nia jună￿ mai departe.￿   179
Rom￿nia, founded in 1868. It included among its honorary members prominent 
figures of Romanian cultural life such as Vasile Alecsandri, Vincenţiu Babeş, 
George Bariţiu, Timotei Cipariu, B.P. Hasdeu, Ion Creangă, the Barons Hurmuzachi, 
Titu Maiorescu, A. Treboniu-Laurian, A. Mocsony, and others.
42  
The importance of the society comes across in contemporary testimonies. As 
Teliman pointed out, ￿it was only during the meetings of Rom￿nia jună that many 
young Romanians who had arrived in Vienna learned to speak Romanian and started 
to feel they were Romanian￿.
43 In almost identical terms, Iuliu Moisil, a native of the 
former Military Border regiment in Năsăud, Transylvania, and after 1879 a student 
in Vienna and member of the society, emphasized that ￿here [at Rom￿nia jună] many 
young men, who had had to attend foreign schools, learned to speak, write and feel 
Romanian, and made friends for life￿.
44 According to Ioan Slavici, the University of 
Vienna was a point of interaction for Romanian students from all Romanian-
inhabited lands, while Rom￿nia jună, whose first president Slavici was, represented 
a forum for the much debated question of cultural unity.
45 
The relevance of Rom￿nia jună for the study of Romanian military elites in 
the Austro-Hungarian army may not become immediately apparent, as none of the 
future generals under discussion completed their education in Vienna at the time, so 
they would not have featured among the members of the society or the students who 
attended its meetings. The point I am trying to make is that a closer look at the 
cultural activities of Rom￿nia jună and the networks it created shows that at least 
some of these Romanian officers were, even while still active in the Austro-
Hungarian army, involved, more often than not indirectly, with Romanian cultural 
politics. Thus, in 1896, Feldmarschalleutnant Seracsin is listed as having attended 
the religious service dedicated to the departed members of the society and   180
occasioned by the jubilee celebrating twenty-five years since its foundation.
46 
Twelve years later, in 1908, General Alexander Lupu gave a speech at the festive 
meeting of Rom￿nia jună  in remembrance of the Romanian composer Ciprian 
Porumbescu, who had died at an early age twenty-five years before.
47 In the annual 
report of the society for the year 1891, Aurelia Trapsia-Kron, General Trapsia￿s 
wife, figures among the honorary members.
48 Such instances of involvement in 
Romanian cultural events are all the more significant as these generals were 
constrained in their actions by their military status, which required that for each and 
every personal initiative they had to obtain official permission. 
Another point of convergence between military life in the Austro-Hungarian 
army and Romanian cultural politics is to be found at the religious level. Romanian 
regiments in Vienna brought from Transylvania or Hungary would celebrate the 
New Year and the Christian holidays in the so-called Garnisonskirche, each 
confession having its own priest.
49 This garrison church service preceded the setting 
up of a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna, which was achieved in 1907 owing to 
the efforts of one of the above-mentioned generals, Alexander Lupu. Up until the 
early twentieth century, the Romanian Orthodox community in Vienna shared a 
church with the Greeks on the basis of a late-eighteenth-century imperial privilege. 
The subsequent reiteration of this privilege put a strain on Romanian-Greek religious 
relations as it increasingly gave precedence to the Greek element at the expense of 
the Romanian one in hierarchical matters.
50 The first steps towards creating the legal 
framework and renting a place for a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna were 
taken between 1905 and 1907 by the then Colonel Lupu. Another two generals from 
the former Banat Military Border, Michael Sandru and Daniel Materinga, were in 
attendance at the consacration of the chapel in January 1907.
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Regarding the first of the two questions posed earlier in this section (what 
was the impact on these officers￿ allegiance of the military journeys conducted for 
reconnaissance and cartographical purposes in Romanian-speaking lands inside and 
outside the boundaries of the Monarchy?), it is possible to reconstitute, on the basis 
of  Qualificationslisten information, the extent to which these officers came into 
contact with a Romanian cultural environment.  
There are those among them who started out or served at one point in their 
military career in the Romanian Banat Border Regiment no. 13 (Trajan Doda, 
Alexander Lupu, Theodor Seracsin, and Johann Jovesko). Others, although they left 
the Banat at an early age and served in other regiments, came into contact with 
Romanian-inhabited lands during military postings and missions. This was the case 
of Michael Trapsia, who was sent in 1878 on a military diplomatic mission as part of 
the border regulation commission between Austria-Hungary and Romania on the 
Prut river (￿im September in milit￿risch-diplomatischer Mission bei der 
Grenzregulirungs Commission zwischen ￿streich-Ungarn und Rum￿nien am 
Pruth￿).
52 According to Liviu Groza, Trapsia￿s posting in Hermannstadt (Sibiu) as 
artillery director was the occasion for a fruitful collaboration with George Bariţiu. 
The two translated together an artillery textbook titled Instrucţiunea de artilerie 
pentru tunarii bateriilor de c￿mp and kept in touch even after Trapsia￿s transfer.
53 
Alexander Guran, on the other hand, participated as a captain in the 1856 
cartography mission in Wallachia.
54 Between 1901 and 1904 Trajan Bacsila 
conducted reconnaissance missions in the Carpathians, in Transylvania, parts of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, as a General Staff officer in the Russian section of the 
Landesbeschreibungsbureau.
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Another category is formed by those officers who, after retirement, chose to 
return to the Banat and occupied various positions in the local administration. Thus, 
following his transfer to Ruhestand in 1876, Major Georg Doda came back to his 
native place, Mehadia, and held the function of Commander of the Military Spa at 
Herculane until his death in 1882.
56 As will be enlarged on in the next chapter, 
Trajan Doda returned to the Banat and became the first president of Comunitatea de 
Avere, a Hungarian MP as well as a strong militant for Romanian political and 
cultural rights. Not unlike Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg, Feldmarschalleutnant Nikolaus 
Cena retired to his native village and put together an important collection of 
archaeological artefacts from Mehadia and its surroundings as well as gathered 
documentary information from the Viennese archives relative to the past of the 
region, which he subsequently donated to the local museum.
57 
 
6.3 Esprit de Corps 
The image of the k.(u.)k. officer corps presented by English- and German-language 
scholarship is that of a German-dominated military community (comprising 80% 
German speakers, according to Allmayer-Beck and DeÆk, and 75% according to 
Kiszling - although scholars such as Alan Sked question the accuracy of these 
percentages).
58 The corps was increasingly constituted along meritocratic lines 
starting with the second half of the nineteenth century,
59 drawing its military elites 
from the imperial academies at Wiener Neustadt and M￿dling, and marked by a 
strong sense of identity (Standesgef￿hl).
60 Various authors have pointed out the 
social gulf between the officer class and the rest of society, and argued that the 
officers in general perceived politics as ￿an unclean business￿ (unsauberes 
Gesch￿ft).
61 The average k.(u.)k. officer is, moreover, credited with staunch loyalty 
to the Monarchy (Reichsgef￿hl/Reichspatriotismus).   183
  Austrian and German scholarship on various aspects of the Habsburg army 
is, as was to be expected, more substantial than its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. On the 
early modern period of the Habsburg army the most informative English-language 
work is that of the Austrian historian Michael Hochendlinger, Austria￿s Wars of 
Emergence, already quoted in the course of this thesis. A comprehensive review 
focusing on research conducted to date on the early modern elites of the Habsburg 
army is to be found in Hochedlinger￿s Des Kaisers Generale: Bibliographische und 
quellenkundliche Anmerkungen zur Forschung milit￿rischer Eliten in der 
fr￿hneuzeitlichen Habsburgermonarchie.
62 A major project was launched in 2004 by 
the Kriegsarchiv and the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna, together with the 
German historian Dr. Antonio Schmidt-Brentano. The aim of the project is that of 
producing a biographical lexicon comprising detailed information on the life and 
career of Habsburg generals between 1618 and 1815.  
In English-language scholarship Alan Sked provides a history of the imperial 
army for the period 1815 to 1848. For the purposes of this thesis, of particular 
interest is his description of the Akademiker, the graduates of the two military 
academies, and their social environment. This was briefly mentioned in Chapter 
Five. His presentation of the Grenzer in 1848-49 concentrates for the most part on 
the South-Slav troops and their questioned reliability.
63  
IstvÆn DeÆk￿s Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the 
Habsburg Officer Corps covers the period between 1848 and 1918 and presents the 
ideal image of the officer corps as ￿the nerve centre and spiritual essence of the 
army￿, for whom ￿service to the monarch was the basic commitment, overruling all 
other considerations￿.
64 DeÆk stresses the extraordinary cohesion of the officer corps 
as well as the nationality blindness informing promotion. When referring to the   184
officers originating from the Military Border, DeÆk mentions, just like Sked before 
him, only the Serbs and the Croats. Drawing on memoirs and collections of 
anecdotes, the author points out that ￿the average Grenzer officer was content to 
remain in his own regiment and lacked the ambition needed for a great career￿. In 
contrast, he also makes reference to the great number of South-Slav military 
dynasties and generals of Croatian and Serbian origin.
65 
None of these writings, however, account for officers belonging to the other 
nationalities of the Empire (Poles, Ruthenes, Romanians, Slovenes, etc.). This can be 
attributed to the nature of these studies, conceived as broad synopses of the imperial 
army, and, as Dr Hochedlinger pointed out in his presentation of the challenges of 
research on early modern Habsburg military elites, also to the atomization of existing 
secondary literature along national lines.
66 Given this bibliographical context, the 
present thesis contributes to English-language scholarship a multiple case study, 
which focuses on one of the non-German nationalities of the Empire and engages 
with the notion of a multinational Habsburg army from the point of view of a fringe 
elite group, the Romanian Banat Border officers. 
While Austrian authors such as Allmayer-Beck draw attention to the fact that 
the image of the a-political k.u.k officer was by and large a piece of fiction,
67 there is 
surprisingly little historical literature in English or in German that goes beyond this 
fiction, that shows, in other words, how the various nationalities making up this 
multiethnic army actually related to it, to the Monarchy as a whole, to their own 
nation, and how they negotiated and seesawed between their civil and military status. 
If they were indeed politically aware, what was their political orientation?; how did 
they act on it?; did it affect their military status?    185
One of the few studies that engages with the question of the officers￿ 
involvement in politics is Antonio Schmidt-Brentano￿s Die Armee in ￿sterreich. 
Milit￿r, Staat und Gesellschaft 1848-1867, which examines Austrian military 
reactions to the constitutional framework of the Monarchy and to the emergence of 
the parliamentary system. The author points out the scarcity of personal testimonies 
indicative of military attitudes to the metamorphosis of the structure of 
government.
68 Relying on extant documentary evidence, Schmidt-Brentano shows 
that, although active officers were debarred from any political involvement, once 
retired they were allowed participation in constitutional processes, such as elections, 
out of a conviction that ￿their keeping away from politics would unnecessarily 
weaken the conservative element.￿
69 
Another study dealing with the relationship between military and civilian 
authorities is Christoph F￿hr￿s Das k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik 
in ￿sterreich (1914-1917), although, as the title indicates, the book covers only the 
interaction between the k.u.k. high command and the Austrian government, with 
only passing remarks on the situation in Hungary, more often than not presented as 
having a Sonderstellung by comparison with Cisleithania. 
Given the configuration of bibliography on the Habsburg officer corps as 
delineated above, the following chapters will contribute new evidence of the 
interplay between military and civil status by concentrating on extant testimonies of 
the Banat Border generals of Romanian origin.    186
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Chapter 7:  Professions of Allegiance (I):  
Generalmajor Trajan Doda 
  
While Chapter Five examined, on the basis of official military records, the 
formation of a Romanian generalcy stratum originating from the Banat Military 
Border, and Chapter Six set the social and cultural scene on which these generals 
acted, this and the following chapters will focus on the extant testimonies of four of 
these generals in an attempt to explain where their loyalties lay and, source 
permitting, what they understood by the much circulated concept of nation and 
if/how they acted on it. The initial number of fifteen generals listed by Antoniu 
Marchescu in his history of the Banat Military Border had to be narrowed down to 
Trajan Doda, Michael von Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu on account 
of the scarcity of reliable documentary sources. It is these generals and their extra-
military activity that will form the subject of chapters seven and eight. Particular 
emphasis will be given to expressions of allegiance or any actions on their part 
conducive to an inference of the nature of that allegiance. Sporadic and, for the most 
part, incidental information is available on other Banat Border generals as will 
become apparent in this and the following chapters. 
The entire seventh chapter is given over to Trajan Doda and this for several 
reasons: he is the first k.k. officer of Romanian origin from the Banat Military 
Border to reach the rank of General (in his case, Generalmajor); he is, moreover, the 
only one of these Generals to become an MP in the Hungarian Parliament; last but 
not least, and, to a certain extent, deriving from the first two reasons, there is much 
more archival and journalistic material available on Doda than on any other Banat   190
Border general. As we shall see further on, the availability of material is 
proportionate with the degree of involvement in cultural politics of these generals 
and the controversial character of this involvement. It is my methodological option 
to dwell on moments of crisis, which I view as occasions for stating one￿s identity 
and spelling out one￿s position within the Empire and vis-￿-vis the controversial 
issues of the day.  
 
FZM B. Diettrich, a former director of the Wiener Neustadt Academy, was 
reminiscing around the year 1864 about his Romanian students from the Military 
Border. He particularly recalled one incident involving a young Romanian corporal, 
who, although serious and conscientious, could also be very restless:  
 
￿One day through his vivacity and mobility he incurred the wrath of the 
commanding Director of the Institution, who rebuked him in a harsh tone of voice: 
￿Sie unb￿ndiger wilder Kroat!￿ (You unruly and savage Croat!). On this, the small 
corporal stood to attention before his superior and, looking him straight in the eyes, 
replied: ￿Ich bin weder wild, noch Kroat!￿ (I am neither a savage, nor a Croat!). 
Such audacity gave pause to the commander, who, before finding something to say, 
saw the midget salute and withdraw in regular step with all gravity.￿
∗ 1  
 
The corporal that B. Diettrich remembered was Trajan Doda, who, by the 
time this story was recounted to Vincenţiu Babeş, had become a Colonel and a local 
Commander in Venice. This anecdote, extracted from a couple of extant draft pages 
of Vincenţiu Babeş￿s autobiographical notes to be found in the National Archives in 
                                                 
∗  ￿O dată prin vivacitatea şi mobilitatea sa escesivă a scos din fire pe Directorele comandante al 
Institutului, carele deci ￿n răstite l￿a apostrofat ￿croatule salbatic şi nestarnic!￿ (￿Sie unb￿ndiger 
wilder Kroat!￿). La aceste cuvinte, micul caporal s￿a pus ￿n postură ￿naintea mai marelui şi fix￿ndu-l 
ager i-a răspuns: ￿Ich bin weder wild, noch Kroat!￿ (￿Nici nu sun selbatic, nici Croat!￿). 
Comandantele a stat ￿ncremenit d￿atata cutesanţă şi p￿nă se g￿ndia, că ce să-i dicu, piticul a salutat şi 
￿n pas regulamentar s-a retras cu tota gravitatea.￿   191
Bucharest, will serve as a preface to my analysis of Doda￿s sense of allegiance as 
apparent primarily in his parliamentary activity.  
Following his retirement from the Austro-Hungarian army in 1872 as 
Generalmajor, Trajan Doda returned to Caransebes in the, by now, former
2 Military 
Border Regiment district and became the first president of Comunitatea de Avere, 
the new administrative unit formed in the wake of the Military Border dissolution in 
the Banat.
3 Apart from his administrative and cultural duties, and his initiatives in 
this capacity, between 1874 and 1887 he was actively involved in Hungarian politics 
as an MP for the Caransebes electoral district, one of the largest of its kind
4 in 
Hungary.
5 Doda￿s political career between 1874 and 1887 has been little 
documented, secondary literature, itself scant, focusing primarily on the end of his 
involvement with Hungarian politics and the scandal surrounding it.  
Prefiguratively, Doda￿s entrance onto the Hungarian political stage was 
marked, in a less virulent form than was his exit in 1887, by controversy and 
accusations. Antoniu Marchescu presents Doda as a candidate of the national party 
in the early 1874 elections for the Hungarian Parliament and provides a full 
translation of Doda￿s account of the speech he gave in front of a voters￿ assembly in 
December 1873.
6 Apart from the reiteration of a rather unusual question to his 
audience (￿in what capacity are you all gathered here, as ordinary voters or on behalf 
of a party?￿) and the fact that the General himself provided a written account of the 
meeting, which constituted Marchescu￿s source, there is no indication that this was 
anything more than the usual electoral meeting (for an English translation of Doda￿s 
account of the meeting, see the first appendix to Chapter Seven). 
The first four points in the General￿s programme contained his profession of 
allegiance to the Emperor and King and his devotion to preserving the ￿integrity of   192
the fatherland￿, while recognizing the Ausgleich and all the laws sanctioned by the 
Emperor. In contrast, his support for the government as a Member of Parliament was 
presented as conditional upon it furthering the good of the people. Central to Doda￿s 
programme was the nationality law, which he deemed ￿insufficient and unjust￿ and 
in need of modification ￿so that everyone should find in it the guarantee of their 
national existence and development.￿ The new law should, in Doda￿s view, ensure 
￿equality of rights for all nationalities￿ and, in particular, the right of all nationalities 
to education in their own language. This ￿nationalization￿, understood in a linguistic 
sense, should, moreover, be extended to the ￿authorities with whom the people come 
into contact￿, meaning that ￿the people should communicate in their national 
language with the communal authorities as well as with the districts and counties, 
with all legal authorities and with the Ministries.￿ 
An extant document
7 in the Kriegsministerium Pr￿sidium holding of the 
Kriegsarchiv in Vienna discloses the saga behind this seemingly non-descript 
electoral episode as well as explaining why the General insisted on learning in what 
capacity the voters had gathered there and the reason behind his keeping a verbatim 
record of the meeting. The KM Pr￿s document is a report, dated 26 January 1874, 
submitted by Doda to the Military Command in TemesvÆr and forwarded by the 
latter to the War Ministry in Vienna. The report contains Doda￿s justification as 
requested by the TemesvÆr military authorities following the publication of an article 
in Neue TemesvÆrer Zeitung calling into question the General￿s honourable character 
and conduct during the electoral campaign.
8 The article was one of a series of 
incriminatory pieces, which accused Doda of having deceived the governmental 
party by leading them to believe he would act as their candidate in the forthcoming 
elections.    193
According to Doda (see my transliteration of the German original of his 
report as Appendix 2.2), local supporters of the governmental party attempted to 
recruit him as their candidate in October 1873, at a time when he had already 
accepted to run for Parliament as a national party candidate. Moreover, Doda points 
out, the governmental party had already chosen their candidate in the person of a 
certain Ladislaus Szende, who had made public his electoral programme in 
November 1873. Doda repeatedly stresses that, although various notables of 
Caransebes representing the governmental party visited him and asked him for an 
electoral programme, he received no official offer of candidacy from them and also 
signified to them he had no intention of presenting a programme. Doda goes on to 
mention that he had been campaigning on behalf of the national party ever since they 
chose him for their candidate and, as his past was for them the best of programmes 
(￿meine Vergangenheit f￿r sie das sch￿nste Programm w￿re￿), he did not proceed to 
elaborating one.  
It is not clear to what extent the continued insistence of the governmental 
party that Doda should announce a programme on their behalf was the result of 
strategic planning. Doda interprets it as an attempt to recruit him in order to garner 
votes and, thus, improve their weak power base in Caransebes. The motivation he 
received from the local governmental party was their intention to achieve a fusion of 
the two parties (national and governmental) by choosing Doda as their joint 
candidate (￿hiedurch zwischen der Regierungspartei und der nationalen oder 
Volkspartei eine Vereinigung in meiner Person als dem gemeinschaftlichen 
Candidaten herbeizuf￿hren￿).
9 It is in this context that Doda decided to make known 
his electoral programme at the voters￿ assembly of 8 December 1873 and it is on   194
account of these informal discussions with various members of the Regierungspartei 
that he insisted that the assembled voters should state their political affiliation. 
Rumours set into circulation after the assembly led Doda to have an account 
of the meeting printed and distributed among his electors. The anonymous authors of 
the incriminatory article published in Neue  TemesvÆrer Zeitung claimed that the 
printed minutes of the meeting did not correspond to the speech Doda gave at the 
time, in particular, as regards his attack on the law of nationalities. This accusation, 
as pointed out earlier, alerted the military authorities in TemesvÆr, who asked Doda 
to provide an explanation, which they duly forwarded on to Vienna. The TemesvÆr 
Command did not consider it necessary for this explanation to appear in print and 
confined themselves to showing that Doda as an MP could clarify the matter in one 
of the parliamentary debates.
10 
I have chosen to dwell on this initial episode in Doda￿s political career not 
only because it derives from new archival information, which is not to be found in 
any of the secondary sources consulted, but also because it highlights a number of 
aspects that are relevant for my further analysis. Firstly, it casts light on Doda￿s 
relationship with both the military and civil authorities and shows that, although he 
was a retired general, he was still very much part of the imperial army and, therefore, 
liable to account for his acts as a civilian before his ￿milit￿rischen Standesgenossen￿ 
(his military peers). Similarly, Doda￿s notification of his election to Parliament sent 
to the TemesvÆr and Viennese military authorities shows he himself felt in duty 
bound to communicate the change in his political status and to add that his domicile 
had remained the same.
11 
As we shall see in the next chapter as well, in particular in Cena￿s case, these 
generals￿ retirement did not signify their exiting military jurisdiction or foregoing   195
military status and prestige. I am making a point of stressing the preservation of this 
relationship into the Ruhestande in order to counteract assumptions in Romanian 
secondary literature to the effect that these generals were no longer bound to the 
military establishment after their retirement and that, as such, they could engage 
more overtly in national projects and even irredentist fraternization.
12 
Secondly, the episode highlights the importance of the notion of Ehre, or 
honour, in both Doda￿s political discourse and in his interaction with the authorities, 
military or civil. Thus, although in presenting his programme he spoke in the name 
of the non-Hungarian peoples with a view to an amelioration of the nationalities law, 
which he denounced as unjust, he also emphasized his loyalty to the Monarch and 
his military past as a defender of the ￿Fatherland￿. In his report to the TemesvÆr 
Command, he refuted the accusations published in Neue TemesvÆrer Zeitung as a 
man of honour and as a soldier, for whom honour was the most prized possession, 
which, in his own words, was not for sale even for millions (￿zwar behaupte ich die￿ 
als Ehrenmann, als Soldat, dem die Ehre das theureste Gut ist und welcher selbst um 
Millionen nicht feil ist￿).
13 
Moreover, the fusion between military honour and probity, on the one hand, 
and the courage of supporting the national cause, which can be detected in Doda￿s 
refutation of the accusations levelled against him, will, as we shall see in this and the 
following chapter, become a discursive leitmotif with these generals. Defending the 
nationality issue is not perceived as a centrifugal, irredentist tendency. On the 
contrary, it is presented as an occasion to denounce a social and political ill plaguing 
the Monarchy and as an attempt to heal it for the sake of the Monarchy and of the 
peoples in it: 
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￿I called the Nationality Law unjust because I believe it to be so and I have the 
courage, too, to thus voice my conviction. If all laws were good and just, then there 
would soon reign eternal peace instead of perpetual war.￿
∗  
14 
  
Thirdly, and, as we shall see in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis, 
by no means less importantly, these persistent attempts at enlisting Doda￿s electoral 
support by the governmental party as well as his successful courting by the national 
party are evidence to the general￿s great popularity and electoral appeal in the 
region. He was a native of the former Military Border, with whom the common 
Grenzer could identify; he was also a decorated imperial general and, as such, part of 
a cultured, meritocratic elite, who could appeal to and, indeed, had connections 
among the intelligentsia; by virtue of his military status, he was perceived as a figure 
of authority and a direct link to the Emperor; finally, he had once before secured the 
vote of confidence of his community when he was elected President of Comunitatea 
de Avere. 
This was the symbolical capital with which the general was invested. 
Evidence suggests that, for all his reputation, his effective political influence was 
limited. Thus, in 1882 he headed a committee commissioned by the Banat ex-Border 
communes to set up a high school in Caransebes, which was to be sponsored with 
funds that the community was entitled to after the dissolution of the Border. Ten 
years later, the application for approval to the Minister of Public Instruction was still 
without an answer, as the authors of the 1892 tract The Romanian Question in 
Transylvania and Hungary pointed out.
15  
                                                 
∗  ￿Ich nannte das Nationalit￿ten-Gesetz ein ungerechtes schon deshalb, weil ich es als solches halte 
und auch den Muth habe, es als das zu bezeichnen, was es nach meiner ￿berzeugung ist. ￿ 
W￿ren alle Gesetze gut und gerecht; so w￿rde bald ewiger Fried statt des ewigen Kampfes herrschen.￿ 
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The most important and controversial episode of Doda￿s political career took 
place in the context of the 1887 elections for the Hungarian Parliament. Doda 
secured a parliamentary seat as the national representative of the Caransebes 
electoral district. According to Antoniu Marchescu, the seven other Romanians 
elected to the Hungarian Parliament that year were governmental candidates.
16 
Consequently, Doda emerged as the sole Romanian national representative and, in 
protest, refused to hand in his credentials. He justified his attitude in a letter of 10 
October 1887 to the Speaker, or President, of the Chamber of Deputies, TamÆs 
PØchy, as a form of protest against the fraudulent way in which the government had 
handled the elections. The validation of only one national representative of the 
Romanians in Hungary in the 1887 elections constituted the nadir of political under-
representation of Romanians in Hungarian politics since the setting up of the modern 
constitutional system in 1848. In protest, Doda withheld his credentials and refused 
to participate in the parliamentary proceedings, at the same time refusing to give up 
his parliamentary seat.
17 
Doda￿s political stance and its singularity can be better understood if 
considered within the context of Hungarian politics post 1867 and, in particular, that 
of Hungarian electoral practice. Notoriously admonished in the Hungarian 
governmental daily Pester Lloyd as an instance of Babel-like confusion 
(babylonische Verworrenheit zum Gesetz erhoben), the Electoral Law of 1874 was a 
refurbishment of the 1848 law and a highly interpretable and intricate act of 
Parliament.
18 As such, it granted franchise to a small percentage of the total 
population of Hungary on a complex basis of property, taxation, and ancient rights,
19 
and, far from drawing clear boundaries between electors and non-electors, lent itself 
to discretionary interpretation and enforcement so that ￿its stipulations made it   198
possible for even a moderately astute copyist to either contest or demonstrate the 
right to vote of any given person in Hungary￿ (Pester Lloyd, No. 177, 24 July 1894 
as quoted by Brote
20).  
In addition to the legislated confusion regarding criteria for designating 
franchise holders, a number of other factors contributed to an erratic and, as such, 
manipulable voting process. One of them was the demarcation of electoral districts, 
which, given the lack of any legal stipulation, fell to the lot of administrative 
authorities and gave rise to chronic gerrymandering. Thus, the number of voters 
varied between 158 (AbrudbÆnya) and 6,009 (Homonna) for one electoral district, 
notwithstanding the fact that each of them could only send one representative to 
Parliament. The boundaries of electoral districts were tailored so that in each of them 
pro-governmental voters constituted a majority. Eugen Brote shows how a number 
of twelve non-Romanian districts, together amounting to 5,161 voters, still fell short 
of the voter number of the Caransebes district, with a majority of Romanian 
population (5,275 voters), so that the former could elect twelve representatives while 
the latter, only one.
21  
As Andrew Janos points out, administrative bureaucracy had become, by the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, a powerful instrument for ￿making the 
elections and perpetuating the Liberal majority￿ with the result that ￿some 160 
constituencies, inhabited mainly by Slovaks and Romanians, turned into ￿rotten 
boroughs￿ under bureaucratic tutelage￿ returning with ￿monotonous regularity 
candidates of the incumbent party￿.
22 Within this context, a frequently used strategy 
of manipulation was the location of the polling station at the periphery of an 
electoral district or as far away from the non-Hungarian voters or non-governmental 
sympathizers as possible in an attempt to foster absenteeism.
23    199
The response to this political situation on the part of Romanian intelligentsia 
in Transylvania and Hungary was polarized between two types of attitude: a 
passivist and an activist one. By virtue of the distinct electoral law valid in 
Transylvania, Romanian political participation was reduced to a minimum, which 
triggered among Romanian intellectuals the scandalized refusal to take part in 
parliamentary elections. Voices, such as that of the Metropolitan Andrei Şaguna, 
pleading for a continuation of the active constitutional struggle, did not succeed in 
swaying this predominant mood, being associated with the propaganda made by 
public servants in the pay of the government.
∗ 24  
By his double refusal (to hand in his credentials and to give up his 
parliamentary seat) Doda boycotted not so much the elections to Parliament as their 
result. His stance combined the passivist with the activist line of action: he entered 
the electoral process and emerged a winner and only then did he withdraw from 
further political participation. His obstruction to the system was, therefore, more 
efficient than the complete passivism of his Transylvanian co-nationals and more 
conspicuous too. As an elected MP he placed himself in a position where he made 
himself heard in that his abstention became a procedural issue, which had to be dealt 
with by the Speaker. In less academic terms, he became a thorn in the side of 
Parliament. This complex attitude on Doda￿s part was in keeping with the promise 
he had made to his electorate in his 1873 programme, where he gave assurance that 
he would not withdraw his candidacy of his own accord but only if he should be 
constrained to it by a superior power or will.  
                                                 
∗  ￿din ￿mprejurarea că pentru politica de activitate a lui Şaguna făceau propagandă mai ales 
funcţionarii publici, aflători ￿n serviciul guvernului unguresc, s-a născut părerea că politica lui Şaguna 
e politica guvernului unguresc.￿   200
As mentioned earlier, Doda justified his position to the Speaker in a letter 
dated 10 October 1887, which appeared in the press.
25 A second letter was sent to his 
voters in the Caransebes electoral district on 12 October 1887, which occasioned a 
reiteration of his allegiance to Throne and nation in the following terms:  
 
￿In the unbelievable case, which I am not even going to consider, that you should 
not approve of my action, I would like to state from the very beginning that a 
possible reproach from you would not move me in my conviction that I am, thus, 
faithfully and honourably fulfilling my duty to the Throne and to my nation; you 
would only prove to your nation that you are not its worthy sons, your electoral 
district being now called upon to defend the national honour. If you approve of my 
step, and I am fully persuaded that you do, then remember that a long and difficult 
battle lies ahead of you; today we are no longer talking about a seat or a vote in the 
Hungarian Parliament or about some minor national linguistic or political 
concessions ￿ for these are mere trifles today given the critical situation we are in; 
today the cause of the entire Romanian nation and, indeed, the honour itself of the 
Romanian people are at stake, a people who was ousted from the constitutional fight 
through machinations and violence and who found one last refuge in your electoral 
district.￿
26  
 
An order sent on 29 November 1887 by the Deputy Lord Lieutenant (Rom. 
Vice-comite, Hun. alispÆn) of the Krass￿-Sz￿rØny County to the Mayor of 
Caransebes charts this event at a local level and asks for vigilance against all anti-
state and illegal actions in anticipation of the voters￿ assembly to be held in 
Caransebes on 1 December that year. The account contained in this order refers to 
the second letter Doda wrote to the Speaker in response to the latter￿s demand that he 
submit his credentials within fifteen days. The account testifies to the strong base of 
support Doda enjoyed in Caransebes and, interestingly enough, to the cohesion of 
political purpose of other former k.k. officers, who are shown to endorse Doda￿s 
action: 
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￿We were informed that the letter MP Traian Doda of Caransebeş addressed for the 
second time to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and which was signed 
by several members of the ecclesiastic consistory [consistoriu] of Caransebeş as 
well as by several retired k.k. officers, was printed and distributed to the population 
side by side with the manifesto addressed to the voters. 
In this manifesto the voters of the Caransebeş electoral district are summoned to the 
conference that will be held on the first of December in Caransebeş, where points of 
view will be considered and ways in which to support Doda￿s mandate, to which 
conference they are all urged to be present.￿
∗ 27 
 
Romanian officers, whether active or in retirement, lending support to 
national claims was not a novelty and, as Zenovie P￿clişanu shows, the pattern dates 
back to the late eighteenth-century petitionary movement among the Transylvanian 
Uniate clergy which culminated with the Supplex Libellus Valachorum. P￿clişanu 
stresses the importance of an earlier petition drawn up by Ioan Para and Petru Maior 
(which was to be submitted to Emperor Leopold II) and considers it revelatory of the 
emergence of a new social element in the realm of Romanian politics: the officer 
class (Rom. ofiţerimea). Thus, one of the copies of this petition was signed by twelve 
officers from the two Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiments, while the text 
proper of the petition dwelt at some length on the military contribution of the 
Transylvanian Romanians as frontiersmen and as the bulk of the regular militia 
forces.
28 The military argument seems to acquire here almost as much weight as the 
historical one traditionally used in support of the claim that the Romanian population 
be recognized as a fourth political nation in Transylvania. From a rhetorical point of 
view, the invocation of loyal military service was (perceived, at least, as) a more 
                                                 
∗  ￿Ni s-a adus la cunoştinţă că scrisoarea deputatului ￿n Adunarea Naţională, Traian Doda din 
Caransebeş, adresată pentru a doua oară preşedintelui Adunării reprezentanţilor şi semnată de mai 
mulţi membri ai consistoriului ecleziastic din Caransebeş şi de mai mulţi ofiţeri cezaro-crăieşti ￿n 
retragere, a fost difuzată populaţiei sub formă de tipăritură alături de manifestul adresat alegătorilor.  
˛n acest manifest alegătorii din circumscripţia electorală Caransebeş sunt chemaţi la conferinţa 
stabilită pentru ziua de 1 decembrie la Caransebeş la care se vor dezbate modalităţile şi punctele de 
vedere pentru susţinerea mandatului lui Doda.￿   202
effective argument with the imperial authorities: imperial officers guarding the 
boundaries of the Empire and, implicitly, protecting its integrity, could hardly be 
suspected of seditious intentions. Thus, national claims allied with military 
arguments stood a better chance of finding a sympathetic ear.  
Almost a century later, this rhetorical pattern had not lost its viability and 
was still being used to refute accusations of irredentism and rebellious intentions. 
Thus, in 1878, in conclusion to the Sibiu (Hermannstadt) electoral conference, 
George Bariţiu highlighted the importance of the Romanians in the Dual Monarchy 
as ￿a people whose sons form whole regiments of brave and loyal soldiers in His 
Majesty￿s army, a people amounting to three millions, whose hard work contributes 
tens of millions to the state treasury annually￿.
∗∗ 29  
With Doda this type of justification by invoking military loyalty ceases to be 
a mere trope and becomes a pro-domo-sua argument. Thus, the general asserted his 
allegiance to the state and monarch and reiterated it in both his capacity as a general 
and as an MP. As his case was referred to the Incompatibility Commission (Rom. 
comisia de incompatibilitate) of the Hungarian Parliament, Doda declined its 
summons holding that his initial position and justification as addressed to the 
Speaker had not changed and exhorted the Commission to analyse this case ￿from 
the point of view of higher reasons of state￿. In this context, he viewed his own 
abstention as ￿the greatest favour￿ he could have done to his fatherland as an MP 
under such circumstances.
30  
Doda￿s initial statement of loyalty and his military prestige lent authority to 
his political stance. The above-mentioned voters￿ assembly, which took place, as 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿un popor ai cărui fii supremul beliduce are sub stindardul armatei sale corpuri ￿ntregi de ostaşi 
bravi şi credincioşi, un popor de trei milioane, din a cărui sudoare cruntă se varsă pe fiecare an zeci de 
milioane ￿n tezaurul statului￿.   203
anticipated, on the first of December 1887 in Caransebes, confirmed once more the 
electorate￿s support for Doda, who thanked them for their loyalty and drew their 
attention to the critical situation the Romanians were in: 
 
￿My purpose was to wake the Romanians up and also to get our complaints to reach 
the highest places, so that His Majesty can see that our discontent is great indeed 
and our suffering has increased so that we cannot bear it any more, for if I, as a 
general who has bled for Throne and Fatherland, am forced to do this, then 
something must be rotten in our Empire and measures must be taken to mend the 
ill.￿
∗ 31 
 
This is the narrative one gleans from secondary literature and from Doda￿s 
official statements. An exploration of the Mocsonyi family archive in the Bucharest 
National Archives brings to light new snippets of evidence concerning Doda￿s post-
electoral stance (for a brief history of the Mocsonyis see the capsule biography in the 
appendix section). I thus came across what at first sight seemed to be one of Doda￿s 
letters, in which he justified his political attitude to a friend and asked him to hand in 
his official justification to the Emperor (for the full transcription of the German 
original, see Annex 2.3.): 
 
￿I take full responsibility before the world for this step of mine and, at the same 
time, I consider it my military duty as His Majesty￿s devoted soldier to make this act 
of mine known to him.  
I am therefore asking you, dear friend, to submit to His Majesty￿s attention my 
declaration (enclosed here in German translation), which I sent to the Hungarian 
Parliament and which contains the specific motives behind this step of mine.￿
∗∗  
32 
                                                 
∗  ￿Scopul meu a fost să deştept pe Rom￿ni şi totodată, ca vaietele noastre să străbată p￿nă la locurile 
cele mai ￿nalte, ca să vadă şi Majestatea Sa, că nemulţumirea noastră este mare şi că suferinţele 
noastre au ajuns de nu le mai putem suporta, pentrucă, dacă eu, ca general, care am s￿ngerat pentru 
tron şi patrie, sunt silit să fac aceasta, atunci trebuie să fie ceva putred ￿n ￿mpărăţia noastră şi trebuie 
luate mijloace spre sanarea răului.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Zwar nehme ich die volle Verantwortung f￿r diesen meinen Schritt vor der ganzen Welt auf mich, 
dennoch halte ich es, als der stets treu ergebene Soldat Sr. M., f￿r meine milit￿rischen Pflicht diesen 
meinen Act zur allerh￿ch￿ten Kenntni￿ zu bringen.   204
 
 The letter as such is neither signed nor dated and puzzles one through its 
rough draft appearance (various sentences are crossed out and reformulated). Its 
contents, however, bear a striking resemblance to Doda￿s official statement as 
submitted to the Hungarian Parliament and published in several newspapers and, 
particularly, to the letter addressed to his electors. One comes across similar phrases 
such as ￿passive abstention￿ (passive Renitenz), unnatural/abnormal political 
relations (die Widernat￿rlichkeit unserer politischen Verh￿ltnisse/abnormen 
Verh￿ltnisse). Added to this, there is the unique combination of elements which 
leads one to think of Doda as the author (the writer has been newly re-elected as an 
MP for the Caransebes district, he is protesting against the unjust political system in 
Hungary, he is refusing to give up his mandate and, at the same time, will not 
participate in parliamentary activity). The decisive argument in favour of the 
assumption that this is, indeed, a Doda letter is, however, the invocation of military 
duty and the unequivocal reference to himself as ￿His Majesty￿s constantly loyal 
soldier￿. Thus, if in the wake of the Doda scandal, his line of protest was replicated 
by the second Caransebes MP, Mihail Popoviciu, with the same result, that is, the 
eventual cancellation of his mandate, he could not have written such a letter because 
he was a priest (Rom. protoprezbiter) and not a soldier. The third candidate, Lajos 
MocsÆry, a Hungarian journalist and politician, submitted his credentials and took 
part in the parliamentary proceedings.
33 
However, a number of manuscript tracts in draft form on Hungarian politics 
and the nationality problem,
34 written in virtually the same hand, point to Alexandru 
Mocsonyi as the author of both these and the ￿Doda￿ letter. Additionally, rough 
                                                                                                                                         
Ich bitte dich daher, lieber Freund, meine in deutscher ￿bersetzung hier angebogene Declaration, 
welche ich an den ungr. Reichstag gerichtet habe u. welche die bestimmenden Motive dieses meines 
Schrittes enthaltet, Sr. M. in meinen Namen behufs allergn￿digster Einsichtsnahme vorzulegen.￿   205
drafts of Doda￿s letter to his electors as well as of his declaration to the Hungarian 
Parliament, to be found in the Vincenţiu Babeş personal archive in Cluj, are also 
written in Mocsonyi￿s hand and headed by ￿D￿dÆs Declaration an den Reichstag 
von 1887￿, which would have been an odd title to put in if Doda himself had been 
the author of the draft.  
A brief reference to the Doda episode in Teodor Botiş￿s monograph of the 
Mocsonyi family confirms the above inferences: 
 
￿When the general was brought to trial for the contents of his letter to the Speaker of 
Parliament, Alexandru Mocsonyi, who was the author of the letter and the one 
who had inspired the general￿s attitude, felt in duty bound to express his opinion 
and published a judicious article in Luminătorul, a Timişoara newspaper￿.
∗ 35 
 
This piece of information does not figure in secondary bibliography on 
Trajan Doda and the very auctorial reversal it suggests is symptomatic of one of the 
major shortcomings of existing literature on Romanian generals such as Doda: they 
are described in isolation with little attempt to relate their actions to the wider 
historical context or to focus on their relationship with other members of the 
Romanian intelligentsia in Hungary and in the Regat. The fact that Alexandru 
Mocsonyi was behind the Doda protest does not necessarily detract from the 
general￿s merits but it does point to an orchestrated effort, which brought together a 
lawyer￿s expertise (that is, Mocsonyi￿s) and an imperial general￿s prestige and 
popularity, rather than to a quixotic individual initiative. 
The origin of this blind spot lies in the deterministic bibliographical chain 
that informs our knowledge of Doda and his actions. Authors such as Liviu Groza 
fall back on Marchescu￿s history of the Banat Border, which draws its material from 
                                                 
∗  ￿C￿nd generalul a fost dat ￿n judecată pentru conţinutul scrisorii sale către preşedintele Camerii, 
Alexandru Mocsonyi ￿ care era autorul scrisorii şi inspiratorul ţinutei generalului ￿ a ţinut de datoria 
sa să-şi spună cuv￿ntul, public￿nd ￿n ziarul ￿Luminătorul￿ din Timişoara, un judicios articol￿.   206
Teodor V. Păcăţian￿s massive opus Cartea de aur sau luptele politice naţionale ale 
rom￿nilor sub Coroana ungară (The Golden Book or the national political struggles 
of the Romanians under the Hungarian Crown),
36 which, in turn, relies exclusively 
on published material (the minutes of the Hungarian Parliament, articles printed in 
the main Romanian and Hungarian newspapers, official statements etc.). Păcăţian 
reproduces Alexandru Mocsonyi￿s article from Luminătoriul, in which the latter 
defended General Doda against the charge of incitement. As this article, however, 
makes no reference to Mocsonyi￿s own involvement with this action, Păcăţian and 
all the subsequent literature drawing on his work inevitably portray Doda as the sole 
initiator of this political stance. 
A letter from Vincenţiu Babeş to Ioan Slavici dated 3/15 October 1887 
reveals not only that other Romanian intellectuals were involved in this political 
move but also that this had been a well-planned project, which was meant to solve 
the problem of political under-representation in a more effective way than the 
hitherto applied policy of passivity and petitionarism: 
 
￿The Doda combination was mentioned as early as last autumn, when I was already 
predicting that the grand vizier [i.e. Tisza ￿ editor￿s note] would go to any lengths to 
exclude me and even Truţă from the Diet. Last summer that combination was 
effectively planned out at Herculane by Doda and Mr Ales. Mocioni. 
I thought of this during the Sibiu Conference and I would have been pained indeed if 
a decision in favour of passivity had rendered impossible this brilliant action. Entre 
nous, the action will not be over with the letters to the Diet and the message to the 
voters; there will also be an attempt to put these documents before the Monarch￿s 
eyes via His Majesty￿s military chancellery through Baron Popp. Should this 
succeed, then there will be no more need for protracted memoranda on the part of 
the Sibiu Committee.￿
∗∗ 37 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Combinaţiunea cu Doda, ￿n principiu, ￿ncă din toamna trecută s-a atins, atunci c￿nd eu deja 
prevedeam că marele vezir n-are să cruţe nimic pentru a mă eschide pe mine şi chiar pe Truţă din 
dietă. Astă vară apoi acea combinaţiune a fost ￿n mod practic regulată ￿n Băile Herculane ￿ntre Doda 
şi dl. Ales. Mocioni.   207
 
In light of this testimony, the addressee of the unsigned draft letter in the 
Mocsonyi personal archive in Bucharest might well be the said Baron Popp, the 
￿dear friend￿, as referred to in the letter, who was urged to submit to the Emperor 
Doda￿s political justification.  
The outcome of the protest was the eventual cancellation of Doda￿s mandate 
and the organization of new elections for the Caransebes district. The letter of 12 
October 1887 addressed by Doda to his voters came to constitute the grounds for his 
impeachment under the charge of incitement against the Hungarian race.
38 This was 
consequent upon a new addition to the Penal Code of 1878 (§ 172 Strafgesetz 1878), 
which criminalized incitement through the press against class, nationality, and 
religion, and rendered it punishable by up to two years￿ imprisonment.
39 An attack of 
apoplexy
40 prevented Doda from showing up in court and the sentence was passed in 
contumaciam without allowing his defence lawyer to plead his case. The sentence 
(two years imprisonment and 1,000 Florins fine) was annulled following medical 
investigation of Doda￿s condition by a forensic doctor but the trial remained open.  
On 11 July 1889 Doda sent a petition to the Emperor asking for intercession 
and pleading his innocence of the charges brought against him. His expressed 
incredulity regarding the accusation of hate mongering rests on the same type of 
rhetoric mentioned earlier:  
 
￿An imperial general inciting to hatred against a nationality! I, who have always 
upheld the principle that only brotherly communion and the collaboration of all 
                                                                                                                                         
Eu aveam acestea ￿n vedere pe timpul conferinţei din Sibiu şi de aceea tare m-ar fi durut dacă un 
conclus pentru pasivitate generală ne făcea imposibilă această eclatantă manifestaţiune. Şi ￿ntre noi fie 
zis, lucrul n-are să fie terminat prin literile cătră dietă şi apelul cătră alegători; are să mai urmeze o 
￿ncercare d-a pune aceste acte, prin cancelaria militară a Maiestăţii Sale, respectiv baronul Popp, de-a 
dreptul naintea ochilor monarhului. De va succede, apoi nu ne mai trebuiesc memorande anevoioase 
din partea Comitetului din Sibiu.￿   208
peoples that make up Austria-Hungary can preserve this monarchy! I should laugh 
at such an allegation if its consequences were not so terribly sad.￿
∗ 41 
 
Unlike other supporters of Romanian national rights (Ioan Slavici, ￿who had 
reproduced Doda￿s address in Tribuna, and had commented on it as a sign of 
national awakening￿,
42 and subsequently the signatories of the 1892 Memorandum, 
to mention only the most prominent of them
43), who were imprisoned for similar 
accusations, Doda was cleared of the charges in December 1889. However, opinions 
as to the source of this decision vary. Marchescu merely quotes the official decision 
of the Arad tribunal (procurorul din Arad),
44 Seton-Watson and Bodea present this 
denouement as an instance of ￿reprieve by imperial order￿
45 and Liviu Groza holds 
that it was imperial ￿caution￿ that prompted the cancellation of the sentence passed 
by the Royal Tribunal of Arad.
46 There are at least two arguments against this 
assumption. Firstly, the very formulation of the Arad tribunal notification sent to 
Doda on 3 December 1889 seems to indicate that the Emperor merely rubberstamped 
a decision which was essentially made by the Hungarian Royal Ministry:  
 
￿His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, having given His approval, in the High 
Resolution of 7 September, on the decision of 14 July 1889 by the Royal Hungarian 
Ministry to discontinue the trial against the sender of this petition under the charges 
of press offence, the said royal tribunal withdraws its charges in the said press trial. 
                                                 
∗  ￿Un general ￿mpărătesc să agiteze la ură ￿mpotriva unei naţionalităţi! Eu, care susţin cu tărie 
principiul, că numai frăţeasca ￿mpreunare şi conlucrare a tuturor popoarelor, cari constituiesc Austro-
Ungaria, pot să conserve monarhia aceasta! Ar trebui să r￿d de asemenea afirmare, dacă lucrurile nu 
ar avea nişte urmări at￿t de grozav de triste.￿ 
 
The German text of the petition was published in Tribuna, No. 286, 15/27 December, p. 1141: ￿Ein 
kaiserlicher General soll zum Hasse gegen eine Nationalit￿t reizen? Ich, der ich den Glaubenssatz 
festhalte, dass nur die eintr￿chtige Zusammenhalten und Wirken aller ￿sterreich-Ungarn bildenden 
V￿lker diese Monarchie erhalten k￿nnen! Die genannte Behauptung w￿re zum Lachen, wenn der 
Gegenstand nicht so furchtbar traurige Folgen h￿tte!￿  
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The retired imperial royal general Traian Doda is hereby notified of this decision. 
Arad, 3 December 1889, Parecz Gy￿rgy, Royal Prosecutor￿.
∗∗ 47 
 
Secondly, further doubt as to the reasons behind this decision is cast by an 
1889 issue of Tribuna, which argues that the decision of the Hungarian Ministry in 
Budapest preceded any imperial intercession:  
 
￿General Traian Doda￿s petition was dated 11 July 1889. It was sent by post to 
Vienna to His Majesty our Emperor and King. However, as early as 14 July 1889 
the Hungarian Royal Ministry in Budapest decided to propose to the Crown the 
discontinuation of the trial through an act of imperial grace. Moreover, at the same 
time, Dr Vasile Lucaciu
48 was acquitted by the Sătmar [SzatmÆr] tribunal.￿
∗∗∗  
(Tribuna, No. 288, 17/29 December 1889, p. 1149) 
 
I am insisting on this legal issue because its clarification casts light on the 
relationship between Doda as an imperial general and the Monarch. If the Emperor 
was indeed the one who ordered the cancellation of the trial against Doda, this would 
go to show that the direct relationship between Emperor and his army extended into 
the civilian sphere and overrode Hungarian jurisdiction. Conversely, if the Emperor 
merely seconded a decision already made by the Hungarian Ministry, then this 
would give the lie to existing literature on the Doda case, which claims that the trial 
was brought to an end by imperial intercession or reprieve.
49 Nevertheless, a 
decision by the Hungarian authorities would be equally singular given the 
unpropitious context set by the 1879 Penal Code
50 and the ensuing spate of 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Majestatea Sa imperială şi regală apostolică, ￿ndur￿ndu-se a lua, prin prea￿nalta hotăr￿re dela 7 
Septembrie, cu aprobare la cunoştinţă hotăr￿rea dela 14 Iulie 1889 a Ministerului reg.ung. de a se sista 
procedura pusă ￿n curgere ￿n contra prezentatorului acestei petiţiuni, pentru delict de presă, subscrisa 
procuratură regească ￿şi retrage acuza ￿n respectivul proces de presă. Despre ce generalul ces. şi reg. 
￿n pensiune Traian Doda e ￿ncunoştinţat prin prezenta deciziune. Arad, 3 December 1889, Parecz 
Gy￿rgy, Royal Prosecutor.￿ 
∗∗∗   ￿Petiţiunea domnului general Traian Doda e datată dela 11 iulie 1889. Ea a fost trimisă prin poştă 
la Viena, Maiestăţii Sale Imperatului şi Regelui Nostru. Cu toate acestea ￿ncă la 14 iulie 1889 
ministerul reg-ung. ia ￿n Budapesta hotăr￿rea de a-i propune Coroanei sistarea prin act de graţie a 
procesului. Ba tot atunci e achitat şi dl. Dr. Vasile Lucaciu de tribunalul Sătmar.￿   210
prosecutions to which the non-Magyar press was subjected. Three years later, in 
1892, the Committee of the Romanian National Party (PNR) were not admitted to an 
audience with the Emperor and their ill-fated Memorandum triggered ￿the usual 
charge of incitement￿ and ￿a total of thirty-one years two months￿ imprisonment￿ for 
the leaders of PNR.
51 
As pointed out by the above-quoted Tribuna columnist, the source of the 
decision was a matter of speculation even at the time it was taken and, interestingly 
enough, it was perceived as a sign of conciliation, or Vers￿hnung, on the part of the 
Hungarian authorities, irrespective of the motives that might have lain behind it: 
 
￿We will not look into the reasons of state by virtue of which this spirit of 
conciliation arose in the Budapest circles. We shall only confine ourselves to 
acknowledge with contentment that it has arisen, and to confess that we feel in duty 
bound to take it into consideration.￿ (Tribuna, No. 288, 17/29 December 1889, p. 
1149)
∗  
 
A  Konferenz Protokoll of 26 December 1887, from the MKSM Bestand 
(Milit￿r Kanzlei Seiner Majest￿t des Kaisers) of the Viennese War Archives, shows 
that the legal action against Doda was brought to the Emperor￿s attention as early as 
1887, if only as a cursory note on the military agenda to be discussed by the monarch 
and his Field Marshals.
52 As becomes apparent from the entries in the MKSM 
indices and the Anmerkung section in the Pensionsprotokolle,
53 the practice of 
recording and tabulating information on officers and generals even after their 
retirement was a current one. Thus, the arrest of Nikolaus Cena in 1914 is duly 
recorded in the MKSM Namen-Register per 1914, although he retired in 1904. 
                                                 
∗  ￿Nu vom cerceta şi nici nu avem să cercetăm, care sunt rezoanele de stat ￿n virtutea cărora s-a 
produs ￿n cercurile de la Budapesta acest spirit de conciliaţiune, ci ne mărginim a recunoaşte cu 
mulţumire că el s-a produs, şi a mărturisi că ne simţim angajaţi a ţine seamă de el.￿   211
The records in the Kabinettskanzlei archive of the Haus-, Hof-, und 
Staatsarchiv seem to confirm the chronological sequence of the events as presented 
in the quoted Tribuna article. The Vortrag of the Hungarian Minister of Justice, 
Desider SzilÆgyi, dated 27 October 1889,
54 acknowledges receipt of Doda￿s petition 
to the Emperor bearing the latter￿s signature (￿das A[ller] h[￿chsten] signirte 
Gesuch￿, ￿das der A.h. Signatur gew￿rdigte Majest￿ts-Gesuch￿) but makes a point of 
showing that the Hungarian Ministry had already made the decision to discontinue 
the trial against Doda by the time the said petition reached them: 
  
￿Given that Your Imperial and Apostolic Royal Majesty￿s humble Hungarian 
Ministry had, on the 14
th of July of the current year, decreed, even before the receipt 
of the mentioned petition for pardon, on the grounds stipulated below, following 
urgent consultation, that the necessary steps should be taken to discontinue the 
pending trial against the petitioner, I saw no necessity for the present case to be 
referred to the subordinate organs of justice, which is the usual procedure for 
petitions for grace, and I allow myself as a result to make the following humble 
report on the basis of the penal facts hereto reverently attached.￿
55 (underlining 
mine)  
 
After a presentation of the evolution of the Doda trial and the eventual 
annulment of the sentence of 17 September 1888, SzilÆgyi goes on to list the 
Ministry￿s reasons that led to the decision of a discontinuation of the trial against 
Doda: 
 
 ￿In view of the fact that, because almost two years have passed since the publication 
of the open letter, which constituted the grounds for the first legal action, the matter 
has all but passed into oblivion, and given that its revival does not seem to serve any 
purpose [zweckm￿βig] from a political point of view, even less so as the 
controversial open letter had no important impact as a result; furthermore, in 
consideration that Trajan Doda, who is moreover of an advanced age, is gravely ill 
having suffered a stroke, - the Hungarian Ministry concluded in its meeting of the   212
14
th of July of the current year that the necessary steps should be taken towards the 
discontinuation of the trial against Trajan Doda.￿
56 
 
Unless the Hungarian authorities went to such lengths as to forge the 
Protokolle of their own Ministry by pre-dating them, the minutes of the Hungarian 
Ministry Conference, which took place on the 14
 July 1889 under the presidency of 
Count Tisza, seem to confirm that the decision of dropping the charges against Doda 
was, indeed, made before receipt of the latter￿s Gnadengesuch bearing the imperial 
signature. Thus, point four on the Ministry Conference agenda ran as follows: 
 
￿Mr Prime Minister posed the question whether the press lawsuit against Trajan 
Doda, which was initiated following the decision of the Ministerrat [Council of 
Ministers] of the 2
nd of January 1888, should continue or not, given the fact that the 
legal action so far was annulled on account of a procedural error on the part of the 
Royal Curia.  
Given that, since the publication of the open letter on account of which the lawsuit 
was initiated, almost two years have passed and the letter itself has all but fallen into 
oblivion and its negative effects were not at all felt; given that Trajan Doda, who is 
really ill, would most probably fail to appear before Court in the case of the 
appointment of a new trial, and he would have to be brought in by force, which, in 
view of his condition, is likely to give the appearance of an unmotivated political 
persecution; in view, moreover, that the success to be achieved would not match the 
moral disadvantages, which, in case the trial proceeds, would be detrimental to the 
authority of state power, and it would not be convenient to offer the opportunity to 
elements inimical to the state to take advantage of the precariousness of penal 
regulations in press affairs ￿ in view of all these, the Council of Ministers has 
decided to bring into discussion the continuation of the trial￿.
57 
 
SzilÆgyi￿s report communicates the ministerial decision and the rationale 
behind it, at the same time laying particular stress on the reluctance (on SzilÆgyi￿s 
part, at least) with which this step was taken, as becomes apparent in the following 
paragraph: 
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￿I cannot leave unmentioned the regrettable fact that it was only by taking advantage 
of the flaws of our press lawsuit that Trajan Doda succeeded in invalidating the 
factually substantiated verdict of the jury given against him ￿ and in his humbly 
submitted petition he totally unjustly accuses the Arad jury court not only of bias but 
also of deliberate antipathy; and, although in the present state of the matter there is 
still a legal ground on which, following a new trial, his condemnation would 
certainly be achieved just as it was achieved in the first, entirely lawful and norm-
abiding, trial, I, however, since I am not willing to encourage by means of, 
otherwise deserved, severity his unveiled and offensive attempts aimed at political 
martyrdom, allow myself, on the basis of this decision of the Council of Ministers, 
to present this humble petition.￿ 
58 [to the effect that the Emperor gives his approval 
for the discontinuation of the trial]   
(for the full contents of the report see the transcription of the original document in 
Annex 2.4.) 
 
To conclude this ample diversion into the intricacies of the Doda trial, 
evidence suggests that, indeed, the Hungarian Ministry decision preceded imperial 
intercession and also that it was not so much Doda￿s petition as the Hungarian 
authorities￿ perception that a continuation of the trial would not be politically 
convenient for them that brought to an end the legal action against Doda. There are, 
however, a number of incongruities in the dates that appear in various sources. As 
can be seen above, Marchescu￿s quotation of the notification of the Arad tribunal 
mentions that the imperial sanction to the Hungarian Ministry decision was given on 
7
 September, whereas the SzilÆgyi report in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv asking 
for such an approval is dated 27
 October. While it is quite tempting to read into these 
incongruities an instance of a subtle imperial intervention, there is, however, no 
evidence that I am aware of to support such an assumption. 
What Doda himself thought of the outcome of the trial and of the effect of his 
petition fails to come across in the only extant letter in which he touches upon the 
subject. The letter, which is part of the Vincenţiu Babeş personal archive to be found   214
in the Cluj National Archives, was addressed to the editor of the TemesvÆr 
newspaper Luminătoriul in reaction to an article which maintained that Doda owed 
his freedom to imperial pardon and that he had submitted his petition under the 
influence of ￿cowardly, opportunistic people￿ (see the full text of the letter in 
Appendix 2.5). Unfortunately for us, Doda took offence at the article and, 
consequently, made short shrift of the explanation to the editor, the result being a 
thickening of the plot, rather than a clarification of what (he thought) actually 
happened: 
 
￿In issue 89 of Luminătoriul you put in a note under the rubric ￿Reviews and news￿ 
that the press trial launched against me was discontinued entirely by means of 
Imperial pardon. The news that appeared in foreign newspapers regarding this 
matter is not accurate. 
You then go on: 
￿We have the information, which is wholly credible, that General Doda, being egged 
on by cowardly and opportunistic people, of whom he cannot rid himself, submitted 
his petition to His Majesty, the Monarch, and as a consequence of this petition they 
put a complete stop to this press trial.￿ 
I have no intention of starting a polemic against your information, wholly credible 
as it is, for I have never sought justification except before my own conscience; that 
is why I write these lines to you only. 
The Romanian jubilee has already suffered enough because of the quarrelling 
between its leaders. [￿]  
I am not in the habit of doing things, for which not me but others, least of all 
cowardly, opportunistic people, should be held responsible. The incentive you have 
given me is not such as to put me in the right state of mind to reveal to you the true 
story and content of my petition to His Majesty. [￿] 
I am already an old man, who has gone through even more difficult trials and whose 
deeds and character cannot be put on a piece of paper, but I confess to you that I 
have never served anyone else￿s interests.-￿
59 
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The two episodes I have selected for my evaluation of Doda￿s loyalties 
suggest that his allegiance went explicitly and actively to his own nation, while 
lending support to the other nationalities. He does not actually gloss the terms nation 
and nationality, but there is no trace of any irredentist attitude when he defends the 
rights of the Romanian nation. He engages in politics within the legal framework of 
the Monarchy and protests against what he views as social injustice in the name of 
his dynastic and professional loyalty to Emperor and Fatherland. His approach to 
politics mirrors his military skills as recorded in his Qualificationsliste: his 1853 
referee highlighted his particular ability to set up a new troop or to improve the 
condition of one that had fallen into disarray.
60 In politics he seems to display the 
same tendency towards ameliorating, restoring, and better organizing, this time, 
Hungarian national politics and this for the benefit of the Monarchy as a whole. His 
actions are constructive and, by his own admission, aimed at keeping together the 
Monarchy by purging it of the ills that plague it.    216
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Chapter 8: Professions of Allegiance (II): 
GM Michael von Trapsia, FML Nikolaus Cena,  
GM Alexander Lupu 
 
  While the previous chapter was devoted exclusively to GM Trajan Doda, 
owing primarily to his popularity and controversial political actions, which resulted 
in a wealth of information available from various sources, the present chapter is 
given over to three other Banat Border generals for whom there is available 
documentary evidence to support an analysis of personal allegiance: Michael Ritter 
von Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu. The first one belongs to the same 
generation as Doda, whereas the last two achieve promotion to the rank of general in 
the early twentieth century, that is, one generation later, and they survive the breakup 
of the Monarchy. This chapter division was dictated by reasons of space and material 
availability but also, as will become apparent in what follows, by the commonalities 
of attitude and outlook that the generals under discussion evince.  
If in the case of Trajan Doda, extant sources indicative of allegiance and 
sense of identity take, for the most part, the form of official statements, with General 
Michael von Trapsia one finds oneself in the frustrating situation of knowing of the 
existence of extensive autobiographical notes and, yet, not being able to access them. 
Thus, Liviu Groza￿s 1995 book on Trapsia￿s life and activity was written on the 
basis of the general￿s autobiographical notes, which, according to the prefacer, were 
inherited by the general￿s nephew, Aurel Moaca, who had selected and brought them 
to Caransebes. When asked as to the whereabouts of these notes, the author told me 
he had access to them for consultation only, after which the family destroyed them.    219
There is a twofold problem with these autobiographical notes as quoted by 
Groza. Firstly, they are not rendered in their entirety but fragmentarily and, more 
often than not, the selection is made with a view to highlighting Dickensian episodes 
(such as punishment in school), while important episodes narrating momentous 
encounters such as that between Trapsia and Avram Iancu are paraphrased in an 
anecdotal style. Secondly, the fact that one cannot access the original documents 
casts a permanent epistemic doubt on their very existence and on the reliability of 
the author￿s quotations. Consequently, the following account will concentrate mostly 
on extant archival evidence and press coverage and only occasionally (and with a 
hefty pinch of salt) make reference to these autobiographical notes. 
I shall, therefore, start my analysis with an entry from an 1893 military 
record (Unterabtheilungs-Grundbuchblatt) for Michael Trapsia, which testifies to a 
change of name spelling following his submission of his christening certificate: 
￿instead of Trapscha, the name is to be written Trapsia in accordance with Romanian 
orthography, retaining, however, the earlier pronunciation.￿
∗ 1 There is no indication 
as to the reasons of this request made by the then Captain Trapsia so that one can 
only speculate that either there was some pragmatic rationale that made it imperative 
for Trapsia to revert to the original spelling of his name or he was conscious and 
proud enough of his Romanian descent to go to the trouble of submitting an official 
request and producing evidence in support of it. In what follows I shall try to argue 
that, in default of any corroborating information, the latter hypothesis is the more 
likely of the two in view of Trapsia￿s involvement with Romanian cultural politics in 
the Empire.  
                                                 
∗  ￿1870: Namens￿nderung, Laut No. 520 ex. 1869 deposirt. vorgelegtem Taufscheine statt Trapscha 
ist nach der rom￿nischen Orthografie Trapsia jedoch mit der fr￿heren Aussprache zu schreiben.￿    220
As pointed out in the previous chapter, Trapsia was an outstanding graduate 
of the Artillery Academy, whose military career culminated with the rank of General 
Major in 1885 after having been elevated to Ritterstand in 1882. His marriage to 
Aurelia Kron in 1869, although childless, was financially and culturally beneficial. 
According to the 1890 Qualificationsliste,
2 his wife possessed wealth (Seine Gattin 
besitzt Verm￿gen) and took an interest in Romanian culture, as confirmed by the 
membership list of Rom￿nia jună, the Romanian cultural society in Vienna 
mentioned in Chapter Six. 
The following analysis of the nature of Trapsia￿s allegiance and sense of 
identity will take the form of a triptych, which constitutes both a chronological 
sequence and a division according to three types of documents available: 
correspondence, testament, and posthumous works.  
The first documentable episode relevant for this analysis took place in 1878 
in the context of an abortive attempt on the part of Vincenţiu Babeş and other 
Romanian intellectuals to raise money for a new Romanian periodical.
3 This 
initiative was rendered necessary by the discontinuation of the weekly Albina, a 
Romanian newspaper published in Vienna and then in Pest, which appeared between 
1866 and 1876 with the financial support of the Mocsonyi family and which was an 
important promoter of Romanian culture.
4 Vincenţiu Babeş￿s correspondence as 
published by George Cipăianu et al. constitutes evidence of the close collaboration in 
this project between Babeş and Trajan Doda. The latter used his network of 
connections to secure sponsorship for the new journal and referred Babeş to 
Oberstlieutenant Trapsia in Vienna as a potential shareholder and someone who 
could help find other sponsors. Trapsia￿s answer to this request came promptly and, 
as becomes apparent in the following letter, cautiously:    221
 
 
 
￿Vienna, 15 January 1878 
It is with great pleasure that I learnt from the illustrious General Doda the news and 
the challenge of setting up a national paper to replace Albina and I salute this 
patriotic initiative in the hope that it will become reality and will thrive for the 
public good. 
I too would like to buy a share and I hereby lay down 100 Florins for it. 
I would take the liberty to make a suggestion that the shares should not be nominal, 
just as they are in any other enterprise, and that the shareholders should not be 
named in public. 
Pray do not take it amiss if I make one further suggestion. The name of the paper 
seems to me too conspicuous and, in my opinion and Mr Grigoroviţă￿s, it would be 
more sensible to give it a more indifferent name such as The Future, Life, The Day, 
Justice, The Awakening, Progress, etc. 
The above-named gentleman and Mr Nicolaevici promised to buy a share each and 
they will be sure to contact you. 
I take this opportunity to assure you, honourable Gentleman, of my highest esteem 
for you and, together with my wife, I am sending our best wishes to you and your 
family. 
Yours, 
Trapsia, Lieutenant Colonel.￿
∗ 5 
 
The note of caution is common to both Trapsia and Doda, the latter also 
objecting to the proposed title of the paper and making suggestions for other possible 
                                                 
∗  ￿Cu mare plăcere luai aminte de la il. Domnul G[eneral] D[oda] ￿nştiinţarea şi provocarea despre 
￿nfiinţarea unei foi naţionale care să suplinească Albina şi salutez ￿ntreprinderea patriotică cu speranţa 
ca să se realizeze şi să sporească spre binele public. 
Şi eu iau o acţiune şi depun de alăture 100 florini pentru d￿nsa. 
De mi-ar fi iertat a face o observare apoi aş propune ca acţiunile să se facă fără nume personal pe ele, 
cum se fac la orice altă ￿ntreprindere, şi acţionarii să fie nenumiţi ￿n public. 
Mă rog a nu-mi lua ￿n nume de rău o altă observare. Numele foii-mi pare prea bătător la ochi şi după 
părerea mea şi a domnului Grigoroviţă ar fi mai consult a da un nume mai indiferent. De exemplu 
Viitorul, Viaţa, Ziua, Dreptatea, Deşteptarea, Progresul etc. 
Domnul sus-numit şi dl. Nicolaevici mi-a promis a lua c￿te o acţiune şi se va adresa sigur către 
Domnia ta. 
Cu ocaziunea aceasta, mult onorate Domnule, te asigur stimei mele distinse şi esprim cu soţia mea 
felicitările noastre cele mai bune pentru Domnia ta şi pentru familia Domniei tale. 
Al Dumitale devotat,  
Trapsia V[ice] C[olonel].￿   222
titles.
6 Despite the collective efforts, the necessary funds could not be raised and the 
project eventually fell through.
7  
Further involvement with Romanian cultural politics was occasioned by 
Trapsia￿s transfer to Hermannstadt as artillery director in 1882. Here he collaborated 
with George Bariţiu for the Romanian translation of a military textbook Instrucţiune 
de artilerie pentru tunarii bateriilor de c￿mp (Artillery Textbook for Field Battery 
Cannoneers), which was published in Vienna in 1884. This occurred in continuation 
of Trapsia￿s publication record in the military domain as attested to by his 1877 
Qualificationsliste, which briefly mentioned his publishing ￿several interesting and 
instructive military-science articles.￿
∗ 8  
Extant documents testify to a close relationship between Oberst Trapsia and 
George Bariţiu. The former expressed his consideration for the latter in deferential 
terms in a letter
9 dated 3
 June 1892 in celebration of Bariţiu￿s eightieth anniversary. 
Following Bariţiu￿s death, Trapsia contributed to the newly established ￿Fond 
Bariţiu￿, out of which prizes would be awarded to Romanian literary works and new 
places would be created in the Astra-sponsored school for girls in Hermannstadt.
10 In 
the note which accompanied his postal contribution of 100 Florins, Trapsia hailed 
the initiative as ￿a noble and great idea￿, and eulogized Bariţiu as ￿the morning star 
of the Romanian nation￿.
∗∗ 11 
His most substantial contribution was a testamentary one, namely his bequest 
of 5,000 Florins towards a fund for the setting up of a Romanian confessional school 
for girls in Caransebes. In his testament he insisted that the language of tuition 
should be exclusively Romanian and that the curriculum should include, in addition 
                                                 
∗  ￿Hat mehrere interessante and lehrreiche milit￿r-wissenschaftliche Aufs￿tze ver￿ffentlicht.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Fell L. von Trapsia, Graz Rechbauer St., tremete 100 Fl pentru fondul ￿George Bariţiu￿, ce ￿n 
Luminătorul # 35, 24/5 1893 e anunciet ca se va str￿nge un fond sub nume ￿George Bariţiu￿, e o idee 
nobilă şi maretia. Luceferul naţiunii rom￿ne se numai pera, ci sa fie etern. Din Lumina lui nascăse 
raze spre tota naţiunea. Graz 26/5 1893.￿   223
to practical subjects, natural sciences, history, geography, as well as Romanian 
national literature classes. He stressed that his donation was meant as an inspirational 
act, whereby he set an example and urged other ￿nation-loving Romanians￿ to 
contribute to this project. The donation was presented as ￿the most ardent wish of a 
faithful son of the Romanian nation￿ (einen sehnlichsten Wunsch als treuer Sohn der 
rum￿nischen Nation),
12 a formulation echoed in his posthumous book of aphorisms, 
which is described as ￿the last greeting of a faithful fatherland-loving son of his 
people￿ (der letzte Gruss eines von Vaterlandsliebe begeisterten treuen Sohnes 
seines Volkes).
13 
The full transcription of Trapsia￿s testament has been attached to the present 
thesis in Appendix 3.1. Although the quotes I am using in this chapter are from the 
original German document, a copy of which is to be found in the Steierm￿rkisches 
Landesarchiv in Graz, my starting point in locating the document was the Romanian 
translation provided by Liviu Groza in his 1995 book. Given that this translation was 
not referenced, I considered it necessary to locate the original document before using 
information from it. After transliterating and translating the German original, I was 
able to conclude that Groza￿s translation was an accurate one and could be relied on 
for citation purposes. 
There are two other, ascertainable, sources for Trapsia￿s perception of nation 
and his political views. The first one, and the more substantial of the two, is the 
above-mentioned, (partly) bilingual, collection of aphorisms, Aforisme, cugetări şi 
reflecsiuni/ Aphorismen, Gedanken und Reflexionen (Aphorisms, thoughts and 
reflections), published in TemesvÆr after the general￿s death in 1896 and signed 
M.v.T. (Michael von Trapsia). Snippets of this apothegmatic work are quoted by 
both Marchescu and Groza but neither give any indication as to its whereabouts,   224
although the latter does provide additional editorial information (place and year of 
publication).
14 As I discovered during my research in the Astra Library in Sibiu 
(Hermannstadt), a copy of this book is to be found there.  
With very few exceptions, Trapsia￿s aphorisms do not go beyond the level of 
philosophical generality. Notes regarding state and nationality are scattered among 
parenetic advice and moral enunciations. Interestingly enough, although the book 
was used by Marchescu and Groza, it was only for quoting what, by comparison 
with the rest of the book, seems to be the least revealing aphorisms, while Trapsia￿s 
stronger reactions to the Magyarization policies, for instance, or his political 
thoughts are completely omitted. The explanation for this could be that Marchescu, 
given the scope of his work, never intended to give anything more than a brief 
overview of Trapsia￿s literary output, hence the cursory quotes from both his 
collection of aphorisms and his poems. With Groza, the explanation is twofold. 
Firstly, as a retired colonel, he naturally took more interest in the military aphorisms. 
Secondly, and this derives from the partially bilingual character of the 1896 book, 
the fragments referring to enforced Magyarization in Caransebes are only available 
in German, a language that, by his own admission, Groza does not speak. The book 
of aphorisms is intriguing in this respect, in that some of the Romanian sections have 
no German counterpart and, conversely, for some of the German fragments there is 
no Romanian translation. 
Trapsia￿s political philosophy has strong contractarian overtones (that is, it 
deals primarily with the issue of political legitimacy) and revolves around two 
concepts: that of State and that of Nation or Volk. It is interesting to note that one can 
find no trace of Kaisertreue or any expression, however perfunctory, of an 
acknowledgment of imperial authority. The contractarian streak of Trapsia￿s   225
aphorisms comes across in a number of passages stressing the importance of the 
existence of a legal relationship (Rechtsverh￿ltnis) regulating interaction between all 
parts of society: ￿Where two people have to live together, there should already exist 
a legal relationship between them, all the more so between families, peoples, and 
states.￿
∗ 15 
The equity of these legal relationships and their preservation is, in Trapsia￿s 
view, the raison d￿Œtre of a state:  
 
￿The acknowledgement and observance of human rights is the first condition for a 
civilized state [￿] The right to self-determination, equality before the law, the 
observance of customs and traditions, as well as the right to education in one￿s own 
language, to trade in it, to be judged in it ￿ are the most essential elements of human 
rights. So liberty, equality, fraternity.￿
∗∗ 16 
 
Trapsia￿s strongest enunciations are for the most part generic such as the 
following: ￿The protection of life and goods (both spiritual and material) is the first 
duty of a state. A state that does not fulfil this duty has no right to existence￿,
17 a 
sententia which repeats itself later in the book in a slightly altered form: ￿A state 
which does not have the welfare of its peoples for its aim has no right to 
existence.￿
∗∗∗ 18 
These philosophical statements are interspersed with more concrete, 
autobiographical notes in which Trapsia takes a stance against Magyarization: 
 
                                                 
∗  ￿Wo zwei Menschen beisammen wohnen sollen muss schon ein Rechtsverh￿ltnis bestehen, 
umsomehr zwischen Familien, V￿lkern und Staaten.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Die Anerkennung und Achtung der Menschenrechte ist die erste Bedingung f￿r einen Culturstaat. 
[...] Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht, die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetze, die Achtung der Sitten und 
Gebr￿uche; dazu geh￿rt insbesondere das Recht in seiner Sprache sich auszubilden, im Handel und 
Wandel sie anzuwenden, in ihr gerichtet zu werden, - sind die wesentlichsten Elemente der 
Menschenrechte. Also Freiheit, Gleichheit, Br￿derlichkeit.￿ 
∗∗∗  ￿Der Schutz des Lebens und der G￿ter (geistig und materiell) ist die erste Pflicht des Staates. Ein 
Staat, der diese Pflicht nicht erf￿llt, hat keine Existenzberechtigung. [...] Ein Staat, der nicht die 
Wohlfahrt der V￿lker zum Zwecke hat, hat keine Existenzberechtigung.￿ 
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￿7/10 1884   
In Caransebes, a place where there are no Hungarian inhabitants, a boy was locked 
up for an hour because, when he was telling a story in Hungarian, he used the future 
instead of the past tense. The mind revolts itself before such abuse.￿
19 
￿17/10 1887 
When I was in Caransebes, my nine-year-old niece Adriana sang to me a very pretty 
song in Hungarian. I asked her if she understood the lyrics. She answered, smiling 
ashamed, that she did not. Well, haven￿t they explained it to you? said I, and the 
answer was again ￿No￿! This fact filled me with the deepest sadness. This was then 
Hungarian culture! There will come a time when the curse of this affair will erupt 
with a vengeance and will destroy this spectre, which has delivered a whole 
generation to ignorance.￿
∗ 20 
 
My purpose in quoting these paragraphs is not so much to hold them as 
emblematic for what was actually happening in the schools of Caransebes at the 
time, as to highlight Trapsia￿s perception of Hungarian culture as an instrument of 
alienation and exclusion, an idea which is reinforced throughout the book by a 
number of other notations such as ￿In a land in which one does not know the 
language one remains always a stranger￿ (In einem Lande, in welchem man die 
Sprache nicht kennt, bleibt man stets fremd) and ￿They who build on the ignorance 
of a people are always mistaken and lead themselves and the others to ruin￿ (Wer auf 
die Unwissenheit eines Volkes baut, irrt stets und f￿hrt sich und andere ins 
Verderben.)
21 What Trapsia seems to resent is not Hungarian culture per se (and the 
consequent development of bilingualism ￿ he was after all himself the product of 
                                                 
∗  ￿Im Jahre 1884 7/10: In Caransebes, ein Ort, der keinen magyarischen Einwohner z￿hlt, wurde ein 
Knabe, weil in der Geschichte die er magyarisch hersagen soll, ein Zeitwort statt in der vergangenen 
Zeit in der Zukunftsform setzte, eine Stunde eingesperrt. Der Verstand b￿umt sich beim Wahrnehmen 
solcher Missbr￿uche.￿ 
￿17/10 1887 
Als ich in Caransebes war, sang mir meine 9-j￿hrige Nichte Adriana ein recht h￿bsches Liedchen mit 
ungarischem Text vor; ich frug sie, ob sie den Text verst￿nde; da antwortete sie besch￿mt l￿chelnd: 
Nein! Ja, hat man Dir dies nicht erkl￿rt, sagte ich und die Antwort war wieder nein! Mit tiefster 
Trauer erf￿llte mich diese Thatsache, und das soll magyarische Cultur sein! M￿ge nicht einst der 
Fluch ￿ber diesen Vorgang in Wuth ausbrechen und zertr￿mmere dieses Truggebilde, welches eine 
ganze Generation der Unwissenheit ￿berliefert.￿ 
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such a system, i.e. the German-language school system), but rather the violent 
imposition of it and the concomitant suppression of national identity 
(Entnationalisirung): 
 
￿The violent destruction of culture is unbelievable and yet true in nineteenth-century 
Central Europe. Hungarians have destroyed the schools of the non-Hungarians in 
Hungary and taught the people to disobey the law.￿
22 
￿Violent de-nationalization is the result of brutality, which will have the saddest of 
consequences. The subordination of nations can only be brought about through 
peaceful work. General culture builds points of attraction and contact. Violence 
repels and engenders opposition.￿
∗ 23 
 
These judgments are borne out by later memoirs such as the early-twentieth-
century autobiographical notes of Petru R￿mneanţu and Petru Nemoianu, who tell a 
similar story of the sense of exclusion experienced by Romanian students in 
Hungarian schools. An illustration of Trapsia￿s notion that violence repels and 
engenders opposition is to be found in Petru Nemoianu￿s account of his school days 
and of the context in which he first heard of Avram Iancu. He particularly recalled 
one of his teachers, who 
 
￿whenever he asked me to say the Hungarian history lesson, he would also ask me if 
I did not want to ￿wash my hands in Hungarian blood as Avram Iancu did￿. He 
repeated this question with such insistence on every occasion that we had to find out 
who Avram Iancu was, what role he played in the history of Transylvania, and what 
cause he fought for.￿
∗∗ 24  
                                                 
∗  ￿Mit Gewalt Cultur zerst￿ren ist im 19. Jahrhundert in Mittel-Europa unglaublich und doch wahr. 
Magyaren zerst￿rten die guten Schulen der Nicht-magyaren in Ungarn und lehrten dem Volke die 
Nichtachtung der Gesetze.￿  
￿Gewaltsame Entnationalisirung ist ein Auswuchs der Brutalit￿t, die die traurigsten Folgen nach sich 
ziehen wird. 
Die Unterordnung der Nationen kann nur durch friedliche Arbeit erreicht werden. 
Die allgemeine Cultur bildet die Anziehungs- und Ber￿hrungspunkte. Die Gewalt st￿sst ab und 
erzeugt Widerstand.￿ 
∗∗  ￿De c￿te ori mă chema să spun lecţia din istoria Ungariei, mă ￿ntreba dacă nu cumva şi eu vreau 
￿să-mi spăl m￿inile ￿n s￿nge unguresc ca Avram Iancu￿? ˛ntrebarea o repeta cu at￿ta stăruinţă cu   228
 
As comes across in R.W. Seton-Watson￿s comments, which were quoted in 
Chapter Five, the same sense of exclusion will have been experienced by Slovaks as 
well, who, in Seton-Watson￿s words, stood before a choice between education in 
Hungarian or no education at all. 
A certain mixture of relativism and essentialism characterizes Trapsia￿s 
conception of nation. On the one hand, he points out that ￿every century has its ideas 
over which it enthuses and fanaticizes￿, and ￿at present it is the nationality idea that 
is ruling.￿
∗ 25 On the other hand, he exhorts: ￿Never forget the love of your nation. 
The renegade will come to no good￿; or ￿united in the love of nation, the nation 
becomes immortal￿; ￿honour the worthy ancestors of your nation, for this way you 
are honouring yourselves￿.
26 There is not sufficient evidence in the collection of 
aphorisms to conclude whether Trapsia used the terms nation and nationality 
interchangeably or, on the contrary, he viewed the former as an ethnic group, as a 
community of language, and the latter as a political designation, the product of 
nineteenth-century developments. From the available sententiae it becomes clear, 
however, that his basic allegiance goes to his nation or people, for which ￿language 
is the most precious thing￿ (Einem Volke ist das theuerste seine Sprache), while, as a 
soldier, it is his duty to die for ￿justice, liberty, and the independence of one￿s 
fatherland￿.
27 Once again, the generic character of these thoughts leaves the concept 
of fatherland undefined and open to interpretation. 
Of particular relevance to the relationship between the military and the state 
as perceived by Trapsia are a couple of passages under the heading ￿˜ltere 
                                                                                                                                         
fiecare prilej ￿nc￿t am fost nevoiţi să ne informăm cine a fost Avram Iancu, ce rol a jucat ￿n istoria 
Ardealului şi pentru ce cauză a luptat.￿ 
∗  ￿Jedes Jahrhundert hat seine Ideen, f￿r die es sich begeistert, fanatisirt. Gegenw￿rtig herrscht die 
Nationalit￿ts-Idee.￿ 
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Gedanken￿, which, although retaining the same level of generality that characterizes 
most of the collection, present the army as a barometer of the state and postulate a 
causal relation between equity of rights within a state and the performance of its 
army in war. Trapsia predicates this relation on Rechtsgef￿hl (sense of justice) and 
views it as forming the basis of a state￿s legitimacy and of a soldier￿s honour, or 
Ehre:   
￿In a state where the general sense of justice is nurtured so as to achieve the earlier 
mentioned valuable equality, this is also transmitted onto the soldiers and differs 
only in a more careful cultivation of honour ￿ this palladium of the soldier class. ￿ If 
this direction does not predominate in the state, then the shadows of this tendency 
are cast on the soldier class as well and destroy their sense of justice. [...]  
The more rampant the destruction of the sense of justice, the more fade the living 
conditions of the state, its armies are all the more easily defeated, and with their 
defeat the state is shattered. [￿] 12 o￿clock at night, 21./1. 1878. A difficult 
day.￿
∗∗ 28 
 
The cited passages provide a counterpoint to the problem pointed out by J.C. 
Allmayer-Beck in his evaluation of the k.u.k army in the fifth volume of the 
Habsburgermonachie series, Die Bewaffnete Macht. Allmayer-Beck emphasizes the 
incongruity within the Habsburg Monarchy between ￿the dynastic and, thus, 
supranational state conception (Staatsgedanken)￿ and the increasingly multinational 
state structure. In this context, ￿solutions had to be found in order to diminish or, if 
possible, even prevent the repercussions of this multinational state structure onto the 
supranational army.￿
29 The solutions Allmayer-Beck goes on to mention (boosting 
Reichspatriotismus through military schools, stationing troops of one ethnicity in 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿In einem Staate, wo das allgemeine Rechtsgef￿hl zur Erreichung des eben fr￿her erw￿hnten und 
w￿rdigen Gleichgewichtes gepflegt wird, ￿bertr￿gt es sich auch auf den Soldaten und unterscheidet 
sich bei diesem nur durch die sorgf￿ltigere Pflege der Ehre ￿ diesem Palladium des Soldatenstandes. ￿ 
Herrscht aber nicht diese Richtung im Staate ￿berhaupt, so fallen auch die Schlagschatten dieser 
Tendenz auf den Soldatenstand und vernichten das Rechtsgef￿hl in demselben. [￿] Je mehr die 
Vernichtung des Rechtsgef￿hls um sich greift, desto mehr schwindet die Lebensbedingung des 
Staates, desto leichter werden dessen Armeen geschlagen und mit ihrer Niederlage der Staat 
zertr￿mmert. [...] 12 Uhr nach Mitternacht 21./1. 1878. ein schwerer Tag.￿   230
parts of the Monarchy of a different ethnicity) show that, rather than going to the 
roots of the problem (the nationality problem), attempts at remedying the ill were 
confined to removing the symptoms. In contrast, what Trapsia suggested, perhaps 
idealistically so, was the necessity to engage with the question of rights and justice in 
the civil and political sphere. The resolution of this problem would, in his view, 
solve the military problem deriving from a diminished legitimacy of the state and the 
consequent disaffection of its soldiers. 
The second vehicle of self-expression for Trapsia was his poetry, which was 
never published during his life time, nor is there any evidence, unlike in the case of 
the aphorisms, that he wished it to be published after his death. A couple of his 
poems appeared in print a quarter of a century after his death in Foaia Diecezană no. 
1/1926 and nos. 44-46/1926,
30 on the initiative of his nephew, Aurel Moaca. 
According to his explanatory note prefacing the poems, Moaca ￿went through the 
contents of the private library, correspondence, and writings of the late General 
Trapsia￿ and came across two poems which he submitted for publication as evidence 
of the general￿s national sentiments.
31 Although they were never intended for 
publication, the two poems are fairly subdued in tone. They communicate a mixture 
of feelings of pride in being Romanian, protest against injustice, and a determination 
to fight against it to the death. There is no clear political reference and no definition 
of the enemy. The poem published in issue no. 44-45 of Foaia Diecezană was 
occasioned by the centennial of the 1784 peasant uprising and presents the three 
leaders, Horea, Cloşca, and Crişan, as heroes and martyrs for liberty.
32 
It should be added, moreover, that Trapsia￿s collection of aphorisms contains 
a number of short poems, all of them in German, with no Romanian counterpart, 
which seems to indicate that they were originally written in German. Although for   231
the most part composed in the low-key Romantic style of the time, one comes across 
the occasional politically charged stanza such as the following:  
 
￿Earthly Fate dictated, 
that the Austrian Double Eagle 
Should unfold its wings equally 
over its multitude of peoples. 
Then brother holds out the hand to sister, 
And stronger than ever is our Fatherland! 
Then warmth and air is everywhere 
and our Fatherland is happier than ever.￿
∗∗∗ 33   
 
These lines follow the previously quoted passages about the introduction of 
the Hungarian language in Caransebes. I have chosen to reproduce and dwell on 
them because of their potential explanatory value as regards Trapsia￿s conception of 
￿State￿.  As we have seen earlier on in the chapter, he repeatedly referred to state 
legitimacy and loyalty to the state. One was never sure, however, whether he meant 
by this Hungary or the Dual Monarchy as a whole. These lines of poetry seem to 
indicate that his notion of state and Fatherland referred to the latter, that is, to the 
Oesterreich Doppel-Aar. Judging by this evidence, one can characterize Trapsia￿s 
sense of loyalty as ￿Reichsgef￿hl￿ or ￿Reichspatriotismus￿, to use Allmayer-Beck￿s 
terms.  Although in his analysis, Allmayer-Beck dwells on the German element as 
predominant in the Habsburg officer corps and, in connection to this, he holds that 
￿Reichspatriotismus and Reichsgef￿hl, at least in the case of the active officers of the 
common army, were not entirely devoid of national elements￿, meaning that ￿the 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Das Erden Schicksal walte,  
Dass Oesterreich Doppel-Aar 
Die Fl￿gel gleich entfalte 
Ueber seine V￿lkerschaar. 
Dann reicht Bruder der Schwester die Hand, 
Und kr￿ftig wie nie, ist unser Vaterland! 
Dann streicht W￿rme und Luft ￿berall 
Und gl￿cklich wie nie ist unser Vaterland.￿   232
Reich was predominantly seen with German eyes￿,
34 his statement remains valid in 
the case of non-German officers too. Both Doda￿s and Trapsia￿s testimonies suggest 
that allegiance to the Monarchy did not come into conflict with allegiance to one￿s 
nation, that the two were, indeed, organically interlinked.  
 
One generation later, another general originating from the former Banat 
Military Border, Nikolaus Cena, would wax more outspoken than his predecessors, 
according to the testimony of one of his contemporaries, Coriolan Buracu. The latter, 
an Orthodox priest in Mehadia and a friend of Cena￿s, had access to the general￿s 
autobiography and drew upon it in presenting the main highlights of Cena￿s military 
career. Cena was born on 21 November 1844 in Mehadia and, as a descendant of a 
Grenzer family, embarked on a military career. His father, Nestor Cena, had been an 
Oberlieutenant in the Romanian Banat Border regiment and had fought in Italy 
during 1848-49. The son, Nikolaus Cena, attended the military school in Caransebes, 
then the pioneer school in Tulln, and saw action during the 1866 war against Prussia.  
His career is characteristic for the new type of promotion system along 
meritocratic lines. In times of peace (which is what the latter half of the nineteenth 
century mostly offered), as a valuable military technician and specialized officer, he 
held several positions as a teacher and commander of various military schools: the 
Cadettenschule in TemesvÆr, Karlstadt, Karthaus (K￿nigsfeld bei Br￿nn), and 
Kamenitz. His didactic and organizational activity earned him imperial recognition 
and decorations, as recorded in his Qualificationsliste. Of lowly extraction and 
without being eligible for a state-sponsored place in one of the military academies, 
Cena climbed the military hierarchy by virtue of his intellectual abilities and was 
received into the ranks of the service nobility upon bestowal of the Ritterkreuz des   233
Franz-Joseph Ordens in 1896. He retired in 1904 as a Feldmarschalleutnant, the 
highest rank attained by a Romanian in the Austro-Hungarian army.
35 
Coriolan Buracu makes a strong case for the general￿s sense of allegiance to 
his nation recounting emblematic episodes,
36 which he does not actually reference, 
and which, one can only infer, he must have either extracted from the said 
autobiography or learnt from the general himself. Judging from the episode, where, 
on Cena￿s leaving his home, his mother gave him a letter written in the Cyrillic 
alphabet, which upon subsequent perusal turned out to be Andrei Mureşanu￿s 
Deşteaptă-te, Rom￿ne, one can argue that, in this case at least, the sense of national 
awareness and pride was partly acquired at home and later built on. This creates a 
contrast to the perception highlighted in the previous chapter by certain authors to 
the effect that young Romanians usually developed a sense of national identity only 
when they went abroad and congregated with members of such cultural societies as 
Rom￿nia jună in Vienna. While this may have been the case with young Romanians 
from other Romanian-inhabited lands, it appears that frontiersmen￿s sons from the 
Banat, such as Trajan Doda and Nikolaus Cena, were aware of their national/ethnic 
identity before fame and social advancement put them in a position to interact with 
prominent Romanian intellectuals.  
That community identity was much better defined in the Border can be 
attributed, as pointed out by several authors and as theorized by Linda Colley, to the 
functional intensification of information circulation in this territory and, especially, 
to the early contact with the Other via military campaigns abroad. Coriolan Buracu 
maintains that General Cena would always refer to himself as a Romanian 
frontiersman (Rom. rom￿n grănicer) and that he insisted on marching his troops to   234
the music of Deşteaptă-te, Rom￿ne, which, as Buracu shows, was what earned him 
his sobriquet ￿the Daco-Roman￿.
37 
As Buracu reminisces, Cena￿s justification for returning to his native village 
was his wish to retire there ￿where my parents￿ house is, where they were buried, in 
the midst of the Romanian people ￿ trying to make myself useful to them￿.
38 In 
addition to this, Buracu remembers that Cena used to sit in on the religion classes, 
the only ones held in Romanian, and would give books and money as a prize to the 
most meritorious of students. He was, moreover, a member of Romanian cultural 
institutions such as Astra and Fondul de teatru roman, and an active supporter and 
organizer of the local Romanian Orthodox Church as a member and then president of 
the parochial council in Mehadia.
39  
Cena￿s most durable legacy to his community was his pioneering 
archaeological work on the Roman ruins near Mehadia. The first attestation of these 
ruins was made by Luigi Ferdinando, Count of Marsigli, in 1690. He was followed 
by other scholars, among whom, in the early nineteenth century, Nicolae Stoica de 
Haţeg, and other historians and scholars.
40 The first systematic archaeological 
excavations took place in 1909-1910 and were conducted by the retired General 
Cena.  
His endeavours resulted in an article published in the journal of the Academy 
of Sciences in Vienna (Anzeiger, Jahrgang 1911, Nr. XII, der phil.-hist. Klasse d. 
Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien). The article communicates to 
the Academy the discovery and deciphering of an inscription, defaced by damnatio 
memoriae, dedicated to the mother of the Emperor Severus Alexander, which was 
unearthed by the porta praetoria (or main gateway) of the Roman fortress near 
Mehadia. The final section of the contribution offers strategic and tactical comments   235
on the rationale for building the Roman fortress in that particular location. I am 
dwelling on this archaeological article for two reasons: firstly, as a confirmation of 
Cena￿s reported preoccupations with the Roman past of the region and his 
knowledgeable, if amateurish, awareness of the ancient history of the place; and 
secondly, and more importantly from my point of view, as proof of the transfer of 
skills which fostered Cena￿s interest and made possible his archaeological 
interaction with the Roman past. The technical and mathematical skills acquired in 
the pioneer school at Tulln turned into archaeological instruments of measuring and 
accurate description, as the article shows, while his extrapolated military strategic 
knowledge led him to observations regarding Roman engineering works such as the 
bridge at Turnu-Severin and the defence role of fortresses built on the main 
thoroughfares.
41  
While this contribution is considered dated and amateurish by the standards 
of today￿s archaeological scholarship, Cena￿s important merit was, according to 
Macrea et al., that of putting together a comprehensive collection of the artifacts and 
inscriptions discovered at the archaeological site near Mehadia.
42 As Buracu 
remembers, this private collection attracted numerous Romanian and foreign 
intellectuals and, after 1918, became a place of ￿pilgrimage￿, to use Buracu￿s term, 
for notable Romanian scholars such as Dimitrie Onciul and Vasile P￿rvan, as well as 
for military, teachers, and students. The height of this was reached in June 1920 
when Prime Minister Averescu and his ministers came to visit Cena￿s collection.
43 
The collection was finally donated to the history museum bearing the general￿s name 
in Băile Herculane, after a series of requests from various other museums including 
the Military Museum in Bucharest.
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It was his passion for archaeology and the Roman past of Mehadia as well as 
his connections in particular with Romanian military that led to suspicion and his 
eventual arrest under the accusation of espionage and agitation on 26 July 1914. 
There is very little information available in secondary literature on Cena￿s arrest and 
his release one month later and it is to be had once again from Coriolan Buracu￿s 
recollections. As my research in the Kriegsarchiv yielded an unexpected wealth of 
official information on this trial, I shall dwell on it at some length and this for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the archival material found in the Kriegsministerium 
Pr￿sidium and Kriegs￿berwachungsamt holdings throws light on the relationship 
between Cena as a Feldmarschalleutnant, the Austrian military authorities, and the 
Hungarian civil authorities, and, in this context, on the standing and the play of 
assumptions, expectations, and reactions of Cena as a high-ranking k.u.k. officer 
involved in an espionage investigation riddled with irregularities. Secondly, these 
documents corroborate Buracu￿s testimony and thus raise its status from memoir 
literature purveying essentially unverifiable information to a reliable source, quite 
accurate in its quotation of dates, places, and institutions. And thirdly, the trial 
documents are important in that they provide new data on Cena￿s activities and 
contacts. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Coriolan Buracu￿s account of Cena￿s 
arrest is based on the latter￿s autobiography, out of which Buracu quotes the 
following passage: 
￿At 10 am two ordinary gendarmes came to my house and declared I was being 
arrested. Thinking I did not hear well, I asked them what they wanted. A sergeant 
replied, ￿You are under arrest, come with me.￿ I was astonished: I was being arrested 
by two ordinary gendarmes, instead of officers as required by regulations. I asked to 
see the order of arrest. They showed it to me. There was nothing else for me to do 
than to obey. I told them to wait until I changed my general￿s uniform and put on   237
civilian clothes. While I was changing, I dictated to my nephew, who happened to 
be there, telegrams to Corps 7 in TemesvÆr, to the War Ministry in Vienna, and to 
the HonvØd Ministry in Budapest, asking for intervention. These telegrams never 
reached their destination.￿
45 
 
The above episode occurred on 26 July 1914, two days before Austria-
Hungary declared war on Serbia, at a time when partial mobilization had been 
decreed in Austria-Hungary following the rejected terms of the ultimatum given to 
Serbia in the wake of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
46 In this context, as the 
Hungarian Minister of Justice Balogh pointed out in a report to Krobatin, the Austro-
Hungarian War Minister, numerous people considered political suspects and placed 
under surveillance (politisch verd￿chtige und unter Beobachtung stehende Personen) 
were arrested during mobilization and as many as eight hundred were prosecuted.
47 
By September 1914, almost two months after the partial mobilization in Orsova, 
during which Cena and others were arrested, requests for intercession were still 
circulating on behalf of some of the detainees.
48 Thus, Cena￿s detention was not an 
isolated, exceptional case, but rather part of an over-zealous rush for prosecution, 
which lumped together citizens of various categories (see the Besch￿ftigung column 
in the list of suspects of the Border Police in Orsova
49) and various nationalities 
(Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Jews, Turks, Serbs).
50 
What set apart Cena￿s case was his prominent position as a retired and 
several times decorated k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant (which, as correspondence 
shows, entitled him to being addressed ￿Your Excellence￿) as well as his advanced 
age (at 70 he was the oldest detainee on the Orsova Border Police list of suspects). 
He considered his arrest by mere gendarmes and his being treated as a common 
criminal to be an abuse and an insult. Moreover, as pointed out in one of the KM   238
Pr￿s documents, his hasty arrest had been effected during peacetime as, strictly 
speaking, war was declared two days later.
51 
Cena￿s detention as recounted by Buracu provides no details about who 
performed the arrest, what the actual accusations and grounds for suspicion were, 
who eventually released Cena and why. One learns only that on 26 July 1914 Cena 
was detained and escorted by ￿Count Tisza￿s gendarmes￿ to the Border Police station 
in Orsova, and handed over the following day to the Caransebes Tribunal, where he 
was registered as an inmate of the Caransebes prison. On 24 August they offered to 
release him provided he agreed to leave Hungary. Cena took the offer and went to 
Vienna. He is, moreover, said to have been helped by Colonel Georg Domaschnian, 
another of the high-ranking Romanian officers originating from the former Military 
Border and, like Cena, a native of Mehadia.
52  
Documents in the Kriegsarchiv tell, if not a completely different, then at least 
a much more complex and complete story involving not only the gendarmerie in 
Orsova but also the War Ministry in Vienna and the civil authorities in Budapest. 
The earliest notification of Cena￿s arrest is to be found in the 
Kriegs￿berwachungsamt archive and it is one of the telegrams Cena dictated to his 
nephew on 26 July, which, contrary to what Cena himself thought, did reach the 
Kriegsministerium in Vienna and was registered by the Kriegs￿berwachungsamt on 
30 July.
53 This is the image the k.u.k. military authorities had of the sender as 
becomes apparent in the short description scribbled on the back of the telegram: 
 ￿Cena Nikolai EKO-R3, FJO-R, MKV 
Retired FMLt, permanent address Mehadia; 
Short man in pince-nez, corpulent, speaks fast, keeps himself to himself, 
German-Croatian￿
∗∗ 54 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Cena Nikolai EKO-R3, FJO-R, MKV 
Tit.-Charge Pens. Fmlt., st￿nd. Aufenth. Mehadia   239
 
And this is what they thought had happened to him as the pencilled note appended to 
the telegram shows: 
 
￿FMLt d. R. Cena 
Message from the representative of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior 
On 25/7 at night FMLt d.R. Cena was arrested by the local Gendarmerie Command 
on the order of the Stationskommando in UjvidØk being suspected of espionage. On 
27 July he was allowed to return to his native place on the promise that he would 
remain there.￿
∗ 55  
 
This contradicts Cena￿s testimony, according to which he spent almost a 
month in prison and was only released on 24 August. The following two documents 
in the Kriegs￿berwachungsamt archive relative to the Cena case are evidence to a 
certain communicational syncope between Vienna and Budapest. Thus, on 15 
August 1914 a telegram from Ottokar Graf Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador in Bucharest, drew attention to the harmful effects of local press 
allegations that General Cena had been shot or imprisoned and urged for an official 
Dementi of these rumours. One of the notes scribbled at the bottom of Czernin￿s 
deciphered telegram points out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed 
that General Cena was free (sich auf freiem Fu￿ befindet), although they were not 
apprised of his current whereabouts.
56 
A document dated 29 August 1914 addressed to the Hungarian Prime 
Minister shows that the War Ministry in Vienna had not known anything about 
Cena￿s one-month arrest before Cena was released and himself informed them upon 
                                                                                                                                         
Kl. Mann im Zwicker, corpulent, rasch sprechend, verschleiert, deutsch-kroatisch￿ 
∗  ￿FMLt d. R. Cena 
Mitteilg des Vertreters des ung. Min. d. Inn. 
Am 25/7 nachts wurde FMLt d.R. Nikolaus Cena ￿ber Befehl des Stationskmdos in UjvidØk als der 
Spionage verd￿chtig, durch das dortige Gendarmerie-Fl￿gel Kdo verhaftet. Am 27 Juli wurde er ￿ber 
ehrenw￿rtliche Verpflichtung, in seine Gemeinde abzureisen und sich dort aufzuhalten freigelassen.￿   240
his arrival in Vienna. In the same document the Viennese War Ministry (the act 
bears the signature of War Minister Krobatin, among others) ask for explanations 
and express their surprise at the treatment received by FML Cena while under arrest 
as well as at the fact that the detention took place without the knowledge of the War 
Ministry and, as it appeared to them, without that of Count Tisza. In addition, they 
were surprised that the release had been made in the name of the War Ministry.
57  
The said document was consequent upon a declaration given on the same day 
by FML Cena to the Kriegs￿berwachungsamt, in which he recounted that on 24 
August, after almost one-month imprisonment, the State Prosecutor (Staatsanwalt) 
spoke to him as if on behalf of the Kriegsministerium and made him a proposal of 
release which was conditional on his agreeing to leave the country within three days 
(see Annex 3.2./I for the full Protokoll).
58 It was the clash between Cena￿s 
declaration and the information the War Ministry had received up until then that set 
the bureaucratic machine in motion and resulted in several detailed reports from the 
State Prosecutor in Caransebes, from Tisza and the Hungarian Minister of Justice, 
which essentially bear out Cena￿s testimony and also flesh out the body of 
accusations brought against him, which eventually proved too tenuous to lead to 
condemnation.  
Three were the main grounds of suspicion against Cena as communicated by 
the State Prosecutor in Caransebes.
59 Firstly, he was placed under suspicion for 
taking numerous photographs of Mehadia and its surroundings, in particular of 
railways, bridges, tunnels, and ruins, some of which subsequently ended up in the 
hands of a certain Romanian officer by the name of Jon Rosu and of others suspected 
of espionage. Secondly, he had old maps of Mehadia copied from the archive of the 
District Tribunal (k. Bezirksgericht) in Orsova. Thirdly, earlier that summer he had   241
received the visit of two Romanian generals from the Regat. Cena defended himself 
against the first two accusations by maintaining he was gathering material for a 
history of his native village Mehadia and intended to use the photographs and maps 
for illustration purposes. As to the visit of the two Romanian generals, by his own 
admission this had taken place on 12 July that year and he presented it as nothing 
more than a H￿flichkeitsbesuch (a courtesy call). Of the two generals, Mujka and 
Musztecza, Cena had met the former in 1911 in Romania when Mujka was still a 
Colonel, while the latter was a new acquaintance. The State Prosecutor￿s report 
records part of the dialogue between General Musztecza and Cena, as recounted by 
Cena: 
 
￿During the conversation he strongly rejected General Musztecza￿s assertion that the 
Romanian army was better than the Austrian-Hungarian; when General Musztecza 
said ￿Things could turn out in such a way that Romania might find itself involved in 
a war against Austria-Hungary￿, Cena replied, ￿I would be sorry about that, but you 
would find us on the other side￿.￿
∗∗ 60 
 
While one is inevitably wary of such a reported conversation, given that Cena 
communicated it to the prosecutor in an attempt to defend himself against 
accusations of espionage, it, nevertheless, goes to show that he did have contacts 
among high-ranking Romanian military and that the subject of the Romanian army 
and of side-taking during a possible war did come up during this courtesy visit. 
Given the lack of any corroborating information (letters or personal testimony that 
might provide the reader with insight into Cena￿s attitude regarding a possible war 
against Romania), the statement ￿you would find us on the other side￿ should be 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿W￿hrend des Gespr￿ches wies er die Behauptung des Generals Musztecza, dass die rum￿nische 
Armee besser ist wie die ￿st.ung mit heftigen Widerspruch zur￿ck, als dieser General Musztecza 
sagte ￿es k￿nnen sich die Verh￿ltnisse so gestalten, dass Rum￿nien mit ￿sterreich-Ungarn in einen 
Krieg verwickelt wird￿, drauf hat er erwidert ￿Es w￿rde mir sehr leid thun, aber da werdet Ihr uns 
gegen￿ber finden.￿￿   242
taken at face value (whether it was uttered out of conviction, or military duty, or just 
as an expression of historical fatality). 
The documents on the Cena case available in the holdings of the 
Kriegsarchiv consist of Hungarian reports in the original and in German translation. 
However, a number of originals were not translated, probably because they repeated 
information already present in the translated material. One of these reports presents 
the stages of the investigation and dwells on the interrogation of Cena (see Annex 
3.2./III for the full text of the document in Hungarian and English). The additional 
information provided by this report is important for the purposes of the present thesis 
as it conveys the scope of Cena￿s activities (thus, corroborating the only extant 
secondary source, that is, Coriolan Buracu￿s recollections) and the manner in which 
he became acquainted with Romanian fellow officers. In his official statement to the 
Caransebes tribunal, Cena mentions his contribution to the 1911 issue of the 
yearbook published by the Viennese Academy of Sciences as well as his intended 
book titled Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde 
Mehadia (Images from the past and present of Mehadia). The wealth of maps found 
in his house is explained by his military profession and also by his position as 
president of the Orthodox parish committee and his involvement in the management 
and administration of Mehadia. Cena relates how he met the then Colonel Mujka 
when he was in Romania attending a military parade in celebration of the King.
∗ 61 
Coriolan Buracu mentioned in his book that Cena had attended a military parade in 
Romania on 10 May 1910, so unless 1911 is a typographical error in the Hungarian 
                                                 
∗  ￿1911 Øvben a RomÆniÆban a kirÆly tiszteletØre rendezett katonai ￿nnepsØgre elment s ott magas 
rangœ tisztekkel ￿ k￿zt￿k egy Mujka nevű romÆn kir. ezredessel ￿ is megismerkedett.￿ 
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report and what was meant instead was 1910, this shows a certain frequency of his 
attendance at this annual event.  
Interestingly, according to the same report, Cena reiterated his reliability by 
invoking his 1878 military intelligence mission to Oltenia on the orders of the then 
FML Scudier, the Commander of TemesvÆr. As we shall see in the next chapter, this 
information is borne out by Cena￿s Qualificationsliste, which does mention an 
undercover mission in Oltenia at the time of the Russo-Turkish war.
∗∗ 62 
As Cena￿s complaint to the Viennese military authorities was accompanied 
by a demand for satisfaction and, thus, the question of responsibility came up, both 
Tisza￿s and Balogh￿s reports
63 to War Minister Krobatin have a justificatory tone 
and pin the blame on the local military authorities and the state policing system 
introduced by the Austrian central authorities. Both Tisza and Balogh present 
themselves as the intercessory civil authority that put an end to Cena￿s detention. 
Tisza, moreover, reproaches Vienna with ￿dieses ganze System von Espionage und 
Geheimpolizistentums￿.
64 He was to send a similar note of warning to the 
Milit￿rkanzlei in September 1914, in which he exhorted that arrests should be made 
only on the basis of strong evidence, otherwise they ran the risk of making enemies 
out of loyal citizens.
∗ 65 
The stance of the Austrian military authorities in Vienna regarding the 
question of satisfaction and responsibility was itself mixed. This comes across in the 
annotated reports circulated within the War Ministry. While mitigating 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿megbizhat￿sÆgÆra felhozza, hogy 1878 Øvben mint főhadnagy az akkori altÆbornagy SkudiØ Æltal 
az orosz-romÆn-t￿r￿k harcztØrre kØm gyanÆnt kik￿ldetett.￿ 
∗  ￿Es sind vielfache Klagen eingelaufen, da￿ in letzterer Zeit neuerlich zahlreiche Verhaftungen von 
angeblich politisch Verd￿chtigen oder Unzuverl￿￿lichen in allen Teilen der Monarchie stattgefunden 
haben, Verhaftungen, welche fast lediglich auf Veranlassung oder ￿ber Anforderung milit￿rischer 
Kommandos und Beh￿rden erfolgen. Ich befehle, da￿ alle milit￿rischen Stellen strengstens 
angewiesen werden, derartige Ma￿nahmen nur auf Grund schwerwiegender Verdachtsmomente zu 
veranlassen. Ich will nicht, da￿ durch unberechtigte Verhaftungen auch loyale Elemente in eine 
staatssch￿dliche Richtung getrieben werden.￿   244
circumstances are invoked in justification of the rash decision to arrest a k.u.k. 
Feldmarschalleutnant (mobilization conditions, impending war as well as Cena￿s 
own lack of caution leading to suspicion
66), the referees are unanimous that 
satisfaction should be given by the Kriegsministerium, although the culprit is 
variously pinpointed as the Orsova Landwehr Commander or the head of General 
Staff of the 7
th Army Corps in TemesvÆr. Oberst Georg Domaschnian of the 5
th 
Division in the War Ministry contributed his own personal testimony on Cena￿s 
upright character and urged that amends should be made to Cena in vindication to 
the officer class, whose image had been affected by Cena￿s ill treatment at the hands 
of the civil authorities. He appeals to the solidarity of the officer corps and, in so 
doing, echoes Crown Prince Rudolf￿s 1887 reference to Austro-Hungarian soldiers 
￿as the first and most distinguished class￿ in society (￿Wir, Soldaten, als der erste 
und vornehmste Stand￿
67): 
 
￿I feel in duty bound to inform you that I have known FMLt Cena since I was a 
child, that I respect and consider him a model officer, who is held in high regard by 
everyone in his community ￿ Hungarian chauvinists excepted. If sufficient 
satisfaction is not granted to FMLt Cena, this would give the impression that the 
officer in general ￿ the first class in the Monarchy ￿ has been abandoned to the 
whims of the civil administration, which could have detrimental effects on the loyal 
population of the former Border.￿
∗∗∗ 68 
 
Although something of an inconsistency becomes apparent in Domaschnian￿s 
argument (he holds the military authorities in Orsova responsible for the 
mistreatment of Cena and, yet, he warns against the risk that the officer class might 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Ich f￿hle mich verpflichtet zu melden, da￿ ich Seine Exzellenz den Feldmarschalleutnant CENA 
aus meiner Jungendzeit her kenne, achte und als Vorbild eines Offiziers sch￿tze, der in seiner Heimat 
bei jedermann ￿ magyarische Chauvinisten ausgenommen ￿ in hohem Ansehen steht. Wird dem 
Feldmarschalleutnant CENA keine ausreichende Genugtuung zuteil, so wird dies den Eindruck 
machen, da￿ der Offizier in allgemeinen ￿ der erste Stand im Reiche ￿ der Willk￿r der 
Zivilverwaltung ausgesetzt ist, was bei der loyalen Bev￿lkerung in der ehemaligen Grenze die 
b￿sesten Folgen zeitigen k￿nnte.￿   245
be perceived by the local population as being at the mercy of civil authorities), this 
final remark on Cena as a member of the officer class highlights the composite 
nature of these generals￿ identity. Thus, as a Hungarian citizen of Romanian 
nationality, Cena is subject to Hungarian jurisdiction and comes under suspicion 
because of his activities and his contacts with Romanian citizens. It is in this 
capacity that he is imprisoned. On the other hand, he is a retired general in the 
imperial army and this status creates at least the expectation of a certain treatment 
and of certain procedures (if not an actual implementation of these), which set him 
apart from ordinary suspects. Moreover, his military rank entitles him to an appeal to 
the authorities in Vienna, that is, circumventing Hungarian institutions and also, by 
virtue of his military status, achieving that they are held responsible for any 
procedural irregularities.  
Although the arrest of Cena and his investigation under the accusation of 
espionage did not result in a trial, the retired general insisted, nevertheless, on being 
vindicated before his peers by asking for an investigation by a military Ehrenrat,
69 a 
council of honour, before which he would have the possibility to refute the 
accusations and clear his name of the moral blemish that he incurred by association 
with espionage. In his plea to the Kriegsministerium he reiterated his loyal service to 
Emperor and Fatherland and his wish to end his life as an honourable man, free of 
the shade of ignominy.
∗ 70  
This insistence on having his name cleared as well as a number of other 
details to be found in his KM reports and in Buracu￿s quotations (as, for instance, his 
outrage at being arrested by mere gendarmes, his taking offence at being forced to 
                                                 
∗  ￿Ich habe dem Vaterlande und meinem Kaiser durch 41 Jahre treu, ehrlich, in vollen Ehren und 
verdienstvoll gedient und will mein Leben auch als Ehrenmann, nicht aber mit dem Schatten der 
Schande befleckt, beschlie￿en.￿   246
travel in a third-class car, rubbing shoulders with the dregs of society, instead of a 
first-class car, in which he was probably accustomed to travelling and for which he 
was willing to pay, and his imprisonment alongside common criminals), point to 
another possible line of interpretation of this investigation. While Buracu presents it 
in terms of ethnic conflict, what comes across in these reports, however, is that for 
Cena the arrest was not so much an ethnically connoted act as a social affront and a 
demotion from his exalted civil and military status: as a Feldmarschalleutnant, he 
knew very few superiors and he was addressed in official correspondence as ￿Eure 
Excellenz￿.
71 In his report to the General Staff of the 7
th Army Corps in TemesvÆr, 
asking for a military assessment of the evidence brought against Cena, the Royal 
Chief Prosecutor in TemesvÆr stressed the urgency with which a reply was expected 
￿given Cena￿s exalted social status and the fact that he was under preliminary 
arrest.￿
∗∗ 72 
Evidence of Cena￿s strong awareness of his military status as well as of his 
ethnic background comes across in the scanty extant correspondence between him 
and Valeriu Branişte. In the context of the 1909 electoral battle for the Hungarian 
Parliament, Cena proudly declines his identity as follows: 
 
￿I am a soldier, an officer and, God willing, in a future war once again a commander 
of troops; above all, I am a true Romanian, I do not run like a coward before a fight. 
Had our ancestors always fled like cowards from the battlefield, then would our 
nation still be worthy to exist? Would Johann Hunyady have become, without us 
Romanians, the famous man who is celebrated nowadays?￿
∗ 73 
 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Figyelemmel Csena Mikl￿s magas tÆrsadalmi ÆllÆsÆra Øs arra, hogy előzetes letart￿ztatÆsban van: 
kØrem a vØlemØnynek s￿rgős k￿zlØsØt.￿ 
∗  ￿Ich bin Soldat, Offizier, in einem k￿nftigen Kriege ￿ so Gott will ￿ wieder Truppenf￿hrer, vor 
allem bin ich echter Rom￿ne, ich fliehe nicht wie ein Feigling vor einem Kampf. Wenn unsere 
Vorfahren vom Kampffelde stets feige geflohen w￿ren, w￿re da unsere Nation noch wert zu 
existieren? W￿re ohne uns Rom￿nen Hunyady Johann jener ber￿hmte Mann geworden als der er 
heute gefeiert wird?￿   247
Cena￿s self-references are predominantly military and his comments on 
political or ecclesiastical elections frequently contain martial allusions or 
comparisons with the military. This particular style and the appeal to honour and the 
value of the given word are reminiscent of Doda￿s stance in the Hungarian elections 
two decades before. His view of politics, however, bears out Allmayer-Beck￿s 
characterization of the average k.u.k. officer as disdainful of politics and 
politicians:
74 
 
￿For I am no politician, but a soldier, who always expresses his thoughts openly and 
frankly to everyone, unconcerned that they might be pleasant or unpleasant to A or 
Z.￿
∗∗ 75 
￿Should an officer sin against the good name of his class as Dr Barbu has sinned 
against his, he would very shortly be forced to step down. Such people do not know 
the significance of their own class nor do they know how to honour it, and therefore 
would be well advised to choose another profession.￿
∗∗∗ 76   
 
An interesting take on the need for Romanians to learn Hungarian is to be 
found in Cena￿s letter to Branişte of 15 December 1909, which provides a 
counterpart to Trapsia￿s earlier views on Magyarization. If with Trapsia deficient 
knowledge of Hungarian was seen as an obstacle to integration and social 
advancement, with Cena, the necessity of mastering Hungarian becomes all the more 
pressing as he envisages it as a weapon for fighting against Hungarian hegemony: 
 
￿We are no friends of the Hungarian parliamentary parties, but supporters of the 
National Party. We wish that the Romanian nation be recognized as a political 
entity, but are not so obtuse as to want that no Romanian should learn the Hungarian 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿denn ich bin kein Politiker, sondern ein Soldat, der stets offen und ehrlich seine Gedanken gegen 
Jedermann ausspricht, unbek￿mmert dar￿ber, ob es dem A oder Z angenehm ist oder nicht.￿ 
∗∗∗  ￿Wenn ein Offizier sich an dem Ansehen seines Standes so vers￿ndigen w￿rde wie Dr. Barbu sich 
an dem seinigen vers￿ndigt hat, so w￿rde der betreffende Offizier in k￿rzester Zeit gezwungen 
werden, den K￿nigsweg auszuziehen. Solche Leute kennen die Bedeutung ihres eigenen Standes 
nicht, wissen auch nicht wie sie demselben gerecht werden sollen, und sollen daher lieber sich einen 
anderen Beruf w￿hlen.￿    248
language. On the contrary, we wish that they should learn and master this language 
even better than most Hungarians themselves and, this way, acquire a weapon so as 
to beat the Hungarians on their own ground, so as to increase our sources of income 
and thereby strengthen our welfare and financial power, so that we are well 
equipped when the crucial hour comes.￿
∗ 77 
 
The correspondence with Valeriu Branişte also testifies to Cena￿s 
involvement with the Orthodox episcopal election in Caransebes in 1909, where he 
acted as a member of the electoral commission (Rom. Comisia de scrutin). His 
support went to the Banateer Iosif Olariu, who eventually lost to Miron Cristea, the 
future Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church after 1918. Cena￿s relations to 
the Orthodox Church and, as we shall see further on, Lupu￿s as well point to a 
commonality of purpose of the political and the ecclesiastical representatives. While 
this symbiosis between Orthodoxy and national politics had its roots in a historical 
precedent, that is, the preservation of the Orthodox faith of both the Serbian and the 
Romanian communities in the Banat by virtue of the Habsburg construct of the 
Illyrian Nation, contemporary circumstances such as the Magyarization policies led 
to a continued conflation between religion and nationality in the Banat. As pointed 
out above, the only subject given in the vernacular was religion. Thus, religion 
became, in this context, the sole vehicle for the dissemination of national culture. 
 
Generalmajor Alexandru Lupu, another of the Banat Border generals on 
Marchescu￿s list, although born not in the Military Border proper, but in Lugoj 
(northern Banat), pursued in the first decade of the twentieth century an intense 
                                                 
∗  ￿Denn wir sind keine Freunde der magyarischen Parliamentsparteien, sondern Anh￿nger der 
Nationalpartei. Wir wollen die roum￿nische Nation als politisches Individuum anerkannt wissen, sind 
aber nicht so verbohrt zu wollen, das kein Rom￿ne die magyarische Sprache lernen soll, im Gegenteil, 
dass sie diese Sprache noch besser lernen und beherrschen sollen, als die meisten Magyaren selbst, 
um damit eine Waffe zu Gewinnen, die Magyaren auf ihrem ureignen Boden zu schlagen, um die 
Zahl der eigenen Erwerbsquellen zu vermehren und damit unseren Wohlstand, unsere finanzielle 
Kraft zu st￿rken, auf das wir in der Stunde der Entscheidung ger￿stet dastehen￿.   249
activity with a view to setting up a Romanian Church in Vienna, where he had 
settled after his retirement.  His military career was very similar to that of a 
frontiersman￿s son, working his way up the military hierarchy from the rank and file. 
According to his Qualificationsliste, he spent the first eight years in the Romanian 
Banat Border Regiment No. 13 and it took him almost twenty years to reach the rank 
of captain (Hauptmann), another nine to Major, and eight years to Oberst. In 1896 
he retired and twelve years later he received his GM rank as Titel und Charakter.
 78  
Lupu￿s national allegiance manifested itself through active involvement with 
the Romanian Orthodox community in Vienna. He recorded in his autobiographical 
notes his endeavours towards setting up a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna:  
  
￿After ascertaining that the parishioners [credincioşii] of the Viennese Greek-
Orthodox churches, namely the Greek, Russian, and Serbian church, spoke 
Romanian more than any other language, I decided to draw up a list of all the 
Romanians in Vienna. In 1898 I extracted all the Romanian addresses from the 
Lehmann dictionary; I then sent the young people from Rom￿nia jună throughout 
Vienna to verify the Romanian identity of these families. I personally went to 
Catholic monasteries to find out how many Romanian girls there were there; I then 
requested from the Schulrat the name of all the Romanian Greek-Orthodox female 
students enrolled at secondary and national [poporale] schools in Vienna.￿
∗ 79 
 
As becomes apparent in the above quote, Romanian identity is, in Lupu￿s 
view, defined by the use of the Romanian language, while the preservation of this 
can only be achieved through the continued practice of Orthodoxy (hence his 
expressed concern that Romanian girls were being educated as Catholics). It would 
                                                 
∗  ￿După ce m-am convins că credincioşii din bisericile greco-ortodoxe vieneze şi anume: din cea 
grecească, din cea rusească şi din cea s￿rbească, vorbesc mai mult rom￿neşte dec￿t ￿n alte limbi, am 
hotăr￿t a compune o listă a rom￿nilor din loc (Viena). ˛n decursul anului 1898, am făcut un extras din 
dicţionarul ￿Lehmann￿, care cuprindea toate adresele rom￿neşti, apoi am trimis tinerii de la ￿Rom￿nia 
jună￿ prin toate districtele Vienei, ca să se convingă despre identitatea rom￿nească a familiilor. Am 
intrat personal prin m￿năstirile catolice şi mă convingeam c￿te fetiţe rom￿ne se aflau ￿n ele; mai 
departe, am cerut ￿ntr-o petiţie de la Schulrat să-mi facă cunoscut numele elevelor greco-orientale 
rom￿ne de la şcolile medii şi poporale din Viena.￿    250
be interesting to know (although it is highly unlikely that one can still find evidence 
in this sense) what criteria for establishing Romanian identity were employed by the 
young people of Rom￿nia jună who carried out the informal census Lupu had 
entrusted them with: native language, place of birth, religion, professed identity, or 
all four? The census constituted a preliminary to setting up a Romanian Orthodox 
Society in Vienna, which aimed at building, initially, a Romanian chapel (in 8 
L￿welstra￿e) and, later on, a parish church.
80  
These endeavours to create a Romanian church and, thus, bind together the 
Romanian community in Vienna and preserve its identity take the form of an 
integrationist assertion of national identity. Thus, the new society (Asociaţia rom￿nă 
greco-orientală jubiliar imperială pentru zidirea bisericii şi ￿ntemeierea comunităţii 
bisericeşti din Viena) added to its name the tag phrase ￿imperial jubilee￿ as a way of 
reaffirming its loyalty to the Throne and, in 1908, set itself as one of its first major 
tasks the celebration of Franz Joseph￿s sixty-year reign. Therefore, the affirmation of 
national and religious identity was presented as an implicit reaffirmation of 
Romanians￿ allegiance to the Monarch and efforts were made to dispel the suspicion 
of secessionist intentions implicit in the 1892 refusal of the Nieder￿sterreich 
authorities to allow the foundation of a Romanian colony on the grounds that ￿the 
applicants did not need a National Colony as long as they were citizens of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy￿.
81  
The solution to the problem of finding a Romanian priest for the chapel 
comes from Lupu as a former imperial colonel. In this capacity he addressed a 
request to the War Minister to the effect that the military priest Dr Virgil Ciobanu be 
allowed to perform religious service in the Romanian chapel outside his regimental 
duties.
82    251
Surprisingly, the above-quoted secondary sources fail to mention the military 
trial initiated against Lupu in early 1918. While literature on the other two Romanian 
generals involved in legal actions tends to be quite generous, in the case of Lupu the 
1918 trial constitutes a major blind spot in secondary bibliography. But for a note in 
a Pensionsprotokoll, Lupu￿s military record in the Kriegsarchiv is equally silent on 
the subject. This contrasts with the profusion of information available on the Doda 
and Cena cases, which could be traced to several holdings, Kriegsministerium 
Pr￿sidium (KA), Milit￿rkanzlei Seiner Majest￿t (KA), and Kabinettskanzlei 
(HHStA). None of these Best￿nde, however, affords any information on Lupu 
concerning this trial, although several documents are present referring to him and his 
wife as regards the latter￿s Heiratskaution.  
The  Pensionsprotokoll entry mentions a trial under the accusation of 
espionage (￿Gerichtliche Ermittlungsverfahren wegen Verdachtes der Aussp￿hung 
und Spionage￿) and two document numbers for the year 1918 introduced by M.K. / 
K.M, an acronym which refers to the Kriegs￿berwachungsamt archive
83 in the 
Kriegsarchiv. Although listed under 1918, the two documents are not to be found in 
the corresponding boxes. The K￿A Protokoll volume for 1918 lists the two 
documents but it is only in one of the entries that Lupu actually figures. More 
importantly, both documents are further referred to a Sammelakt No. 2196, which 
explains their absence from the original boxes. However, in the K￿A index for 
documents (Aktenkartons), the sought-for number is not to be found for the year 
1918, but for 1917. The Sammelakt thus located explains this apparent incongruity in 
that the trial was not originally launched against Lupu but against a certain Iorga 
Alexander Stefan and accomplices (Genossen) and it started in 1917 and carried over 
into the next year.   252
The difference between this trial and the previous two analysed in the present 
thesis is that, whereas Doda and Cena were placed under accusation by Hungarian 
authorities (the former by civil and the latter by military authorities), Lupu￿s 
indictment was initiated by Austrian military authorities. 
  
￿The k.k. military prosecutor of the k.u.k. military commander in Vienna announced 
the Evidenzburo of the k.u.k. General Staff in Vienna by means of the letter of 31 
January 1918, G.Z.A. 1942/17, that the commander in charge had ordered the 
extension of the pending trial against Alexander Stefan Jorga launched by the k.k. 
Landwehrdivisionsgerichte in Vienna according to § 144 M.St.P.O., against the 
retired Generalmajor Alexander Lupu, who is to be tried in liberty, according to § 
321 StG. respectively § 326 M.St.G., as the latter is suspected that, being privy to 
the punishable relations between Jorga and the military attachØ Styrcea, he provided 
the former with financial support through occasional money contributions and 
through the procurement of salaried positions of secretary with several Romanian 
institutions and gave to Styrcea through Jorga an ethnographic map of the Monarchy 
extracted from a military work and annotated with information on the number of 
people of Romanian nationality in the regiments. Additionally, General Lupu is 
accused that he introduced Jorga to an engineer by the name of Trimbitoi so that the 
latter should devise for Styrcea a contraption for anchoring cannon trestles on the 
basis of a mechanical principle so that this should be used in the Romanian army.￿
84 
(see full text in Appendix 3.3) 
 
The  Sammelakt contains no further information about Lupu or about the trial in 
which he was involved. As there is no reference in it to a definite document or to the 
outcome of the trial, I consulted the index of the Milit￿rgericht archive in the 
Kriegsarchiv. Far from casting light on the case, my index search resulted in a 
hundreds of pages of references to boxes of documents pertaining to the Vienna 
Military Command for the year 1918.  
What one can ascertain about Lupu post 1918 is that he did continue to reside 
in Vienna as proved by extant 1919 documents relative to his wife￿s Heiratskaution.   253
According to secondary literature,
85 he applied for Romanian citizenship, which, 
once obtained, lost him his pension as a retired Austrian general. We have it from the 
same source that he acted as a synod and congress representative (deputat sinodal şi 
congresual) of the Caransebes eparchy in Vienna until his death in 1925.
86 In my 
research I also came across evidence that Lupu and his wife were listed among the 
founding members of Astra in Lugoj.
87 
* 
The above-mentioned statements and actions of the three generals point, in 
their diversity of circumstances and purposes, to a common denominator. All of 
them acted with a view to alleviating the predicament of the Romanian nation as an 
ethnic community within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With 
Trapsia, the Nation or Volk takes centre stage and is discussed for the most part in 
relation to the State, the two of them being viewed as part of a contractual 
relationship in which Kaisertreue no longer figures. With Cena and Lupu, there is 
evidence of connections with the Regat, but it appears that the accusations of 
espionage, at least in Cena￿s case, could not be substantiated. In default of more 
information on the outcome of the Lupu trial, one can conclude that before 1918 
Lupu￿s efforts were directed towards maintaining intact the Romanian identity of his 
co-nationals in Vienna and promoted (to a certain extent, polemically so) a vision of 
nation as an integral part of the Monarchy and conflated with the practice of 
Orthodoxy. Similarly, prior to 1918 Cena￿s cultural and administrative endeavours 
were aimed at improving the condition of Mehadia parishioners and that of the 
Romanian nation in Hungary. On the other hand, one cannot disregard Buracu￿s 
testimony of the emotion with which Cena went to meet the first Romanian troops   254
after the war: ￿In the winter of 1918 he cried and devoutly kissed the flag of the 
Romanian guard, who together with the people honoured him like a martyr.￿
88 
Whether there existed an actual pull towards the Romanian Principalities, and 
later Romanian Kingdom, for these Romanian k.(u.)k. generals, either from a 
professional or an ideological point of view or both, constitutes a question that the 
next chapter will frame an answer to.    255
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Chapter 9: Romanian Border Generals 
Between the Imperial and the National Army 
 
This chapter evaluates the relationship between the Border Generals of 
Romanian origin in the Austro-Hungarian army and the Romanian military 
authorities in the United Principalities, later on the Romanian Kingdom. The 
question it sets out to answer is a twofold one: did the military authorities in 
Bucharest attempt to attract highly skilled officers of Romanian origin from the 
Austro-Hungarian army into the fledgling Romanian army and, conversely, did the 
latter represent an attraction for these military elites, either of an ideological or of a 
professional nature? The question thus formulated comes as a response to secondary 
literature describing cases of k.k. military resigning from the Austro-Hungarian army 
and joining the Romanian army, or alluding to attempts on the part of the Romanian 
authorities to recruit such officers into the young Romanian army or to enlist their 
support for the 1877-78 war effort.  
As most of the primary material presented in this chapter is the result of 
detective work starting from assumptions or quotes from secondary literature and as 
the conclusions inevitably involve a dialogue with these secondary sources, I have 
opted for a heuristic layout of the subject matter. Thus, rather than offering a 
seamless historical narrative incorporating all the information available from primary 
and secondary sources, I chose to emphasize the research process conducive to the 
final conclusions, making a point of assessing, in a separate section of the present 
chapter, the state of secondary literature on the subject and then proceeding to 
contrast it with primary source information.  
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9.1. Secondary literature and its challenges  
I shall begin by pointing out that there is no comprehensive study of this 
question in Romanian historical literature or in any other language for that matter. 
Information is, indeed, available in various books and articles but only sporadically 
and tangentially (more often than not, relegated to footnotes and endnotes). As will 
become apparent in the following brief review of secondary literature, contemporary 
authors writing about the Border generals and their involvement with the Romanian 
army do not build on each other￿s work nor do they use the same sources and, 
consequently, produce parallel and fragmentary accounts of what is essentially the 
same subject. The present chapter seeks to put together these disparate historical 
strands, confront them with new archival evidence, and, on the basis of this dialogue 
of sources, to provide an informed answer to the question stated above. 
In his history of the Banat Military Border, Antoniu Marchescu quotes, from 
a collection of documents by Grigore Popiţi, an 1868 circular of the General 
Command in TemesvÆr calling for vigilance on the part of the Banat commanders in 
the following terms: 
  
￿Reliable sources communicated to the Royal-Hungarian Ministry of the Interior 
that several Austrian Romanians, who went to Bucharest, received of late the secret 
mission of attracting into Moldo-Vlach service officers and NCOs from the k.k. 
army, especially from Transylvania, and of winning the sympathies of the Romanian 
troop for the Bucharest government. 
Given that the achievement of this goal has been attempted primarily among those 
demobilized and those on leave, the Royal-Hungarian Ministry of the Interior will 
issue the strict orders which are necessary for the Hungarian civil authorities to stop 
this action, but because such agitation could also take place among the Romanians 
in active service, we bring to your attention the Rescript of 31. l. t. No. 3855/Pres. of 
the Imperial War Ministry, and we delegate you to forestall such intentions in good   260
time and to communicate to me without delay everything you notice. Schmering, 
GM￿
∗ 1 
 
For the years between 1868 (the date of the report above) and the outbreak of 
the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, there is hardly any secondary literature that would 
enable one to conclude whether this was an isolated case or part of a recruitment 
campaign initiated either by the Romanian authorities or by various nationalist 
groups in Romania. 
There are a couple of secondary sources mentioning another such case of not 
so much recruitment as encouragement on the part of the Romanian authorities: the 
early 1870s meeting between Moise Groza, a lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian 
army on a cartographical mission in Transylvania, and General Ioan Emanoil 
Florescu, the Romanian War Minister at the time. Antoniu Marchescu, quoting 
Coriolan Buracu, mentions Moise Groza￿s meeting with General Florescu sometime 
between 1870 and 1873. Florescu is said to have appreciated his skills and 
application and to have suggested that he join the Romanian army. As a 
consequence, Unterlieutenant Groza resigned from the Austro-Hungarian army at 
the end of 1873 and enrolled in the Romanian army at the beginning of 1874 with 
the rank of lieutenant.
2 Gh. Preda and Liviu Groza maintain that the encounter took 
place during the summer of 1871, without, however, referencing this piece of 
                                                 
∗  ￿1868. XI. 4. Ordin circular No. 782/ Pres. al Comandamentului din Timişoara, trimis comandanţilor 
din Banat. 
￿Din sursă de ￿ncredere s-a comunicat Ministerului de Interne reg. ungar că mai mulţi Rom￿ni 
austriaci, cari au fost la Bucureşti, au primit ￿n ultimul timp misiunea secretă să atragă ￿n serviciul 
moldo-vlah ofiţeri şi subofiţeri din armata cesaro-crăiască, mai ales din Transilvania, şi ￿n general să 
c￿ştige simpatia trupei rom￿ne faţă de c￿rmuirea din Bucureşti. 
Dat fiind că realizarea acestui scop a fost ￿ncercată ￿n primul r￿nd printre demobilizaţi şi cei din 
concediu, Ministerul de Interne reg. ungar va da ordinele severe necesare autorităţilor civile ungare 
pentru zădărnicirea acestei acţiuni, dar pentrucă astfel de agitaţiuni se pot face şi printre Rom￿nii din 
serviciul activ, vă aducem la cunoştinţă rescriptul din 31 l.t. No. 3855/Pres. al Ministerului de 
Războiu Imperial, şi vă ￿nsărcinăm să pre￿nt￿mpinaţi din vreme ￿ncercările cu astfel de intenţii şi să-
mi comunicaţi ne￿nt￿rziat tot ce observaţi. Schmering, general de divizie.￿￿   261
information. Their version of the meeting is anecdotal and lacks bibliographical 
data.
3  
On the eve of the 1877 Russo-Turkish war, what had been mere rumour and 
suspicion on the part of the Hungarian authorities ten years before became now 
official policy of the Bucharest government. Thus, Monitoriul Rom￿niei, as quoted 
in the Hermannstadt periodical Telegraful rom￿n (25, No. 43, 2/14 June 1877, p. 
174), announced that ￿the soldiers and officers [Rom. militarii] of Romanian origin 
who served in foreign standing armies can be admitted into the Romanian army￿ 
while Der Krieg. Siebenb￿rgisch Deutsches Tagesblatt (4, No. 1042, 31 May 1877, 
p. 499) reported on Prince Carol￿s inspection of the troops at Calafat and, in this 
context, mentioned ￿the admission of officers of Romanian nationality from other 
armies as officers of the Romanian army￿.
4 In 1877 Gazeta Transilvaniei published 
under the title ￿La arme￿ an appeal to former Austro-Hungarian officers to enrol into 
the Romanian army as volunteers where, so the article promised, they would be 
received ￿with open arms￿.
5 That the Romanian army was, indeed, in need of 
manpower to be acquired by all means is apparent also in the decision of General 
Alexandru Cernat, of 13 May 1877, to accelerate the promotion of military school 
students to the rank of sublocotenent (Non-Commissioned Officer or NCO).
6  
It seems that some of those who answered this call for volunteers were young 
people from southern and northern Transylvania. Thus, Iuliu Moisil mentions the 
participants from the territory of the former second Transylvanian Border Regiment 
in Năsăud, in particular those who distinguished themselves in the battle for Plevna.
7 
In the south (corresponding to a certain extent to the former territory of the first 
Transylvanian Border Regiment), the crossing of the border by ￿numerous young   262
Romanians from Făgăraş and Sibiu￿ triggered the protests of the Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Minister, Count AndrÆssy.
8  
In his book Transilvania şi războiul pentru independenţă (1877-1878), Liviu 
Maior relates two attempts of the Romanian government at recruiting Banat 
generals. The targeted officers were Trajan Doda and Alexander Guran. A telegram 
from Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, to Vincenţiu Babeş, 
Doda￿s friend, is quoted in support of this account: Doda was offered the position of 
Chief of General Staff in the Romanian army; he accepted it; his petition to the 
Emperor was, however, rejected on the grounds that Austria-Hungary wished to 
remain neutral.
9 Maior goes on to point out that another was the actual reason for 
this refusal and that Bălăceanu explained this to Prince Carol in a report dated 20 
July 1877. Maior does not provide any quotations from this report nor does he 
actually reference it. He merely presents Doda as a very popular figure with both the 
Romanians in the Monarchy as well as with other nationalities by virtue of his 
political activity after his retirement from the army. A number of other episodes of 
Doda￿s political career are mentioned such as his refusal to participate in the 
parliamentary debates after his election to Parliament as a representative of 
Caransebes as well as his being received by the Emperor as the leader of a Banat 
delegation protesting against the gerrymandering which prevented the Romanians 
from having political representation commensurate with their numbers.
10 It is not 
clear whether the above is a paraphrase of Bălăceanu￿s report to Prince Carol or it 
represents data derived from another source.  
The same ambiguity as to the source of information conveyed plagues the 
report about Guran, who is presented as ￿easier to persuade￿ as he was at the time in 
active service and as such ￿had no other alternative￿.
11 Maior￿s 2004 book enlarges   263
slightly on this and, at the same time, changes the rationality behind Guran￿s refusal. 
Guran is said to have discontinued discussion with Bălăceanu when he heard from 
his colleague (that is, from Doda) what the outcome of the latter￿s petition had been, 
having thus realized he had no chance of success.
12  
The main problem with the information provided by Liviu Maior is that it is 
referenced to his 1873 article, which only relies on three telegrams from Bălăceanu 
to Babeş, whose originals cannot be retrieved. Maior mentioned that they were part 
of the correspondence between Bălăceanu and Vincenţiu Babeş, which at the time 
was in Professor Mihail Dan￿s possession. According to Professor George Cipăianu 
of the University Babeş-Bolyai in Cluj, who was one of Mihail Dan￿s Ph.D. students, 
the Babeş archive was donated to the National Archives in Cluj. However, no such 
correspondence from Bălăceanu to Babeş is to be found there and Professor 
Cipăianu does not remember coming across it either when he edited the 1876 volume 
of Babeş￿s received correspondence. He also added that Professor Mihail Dan had 
lent some of the documents to various scholars, who never returned them.  
Further mention of the Doda episode is to be found in Liviu Groza￿s 1999 
monographic study of General Trajan Doda, Oameni de seamă din Graniţa 
Bănăţeană. Generalul Traian Doda. Liviu Groza does not use Liviu Maior￿s 
contributions and, consequently, his account is a parallel one. Quoting one of Radu 
Rosetti￿s lectures given at the Romanian Academy on 6 December 1944, Groza 
refers to a meeting between Doda and Ion Bălăceanu at Herculane in 1877, during 
which the former received the invitation to come to Romania to lead the Romanian 
army during the war. Doda is said to have been flattered by this proposal but 
doubtful that the Emperor would approve his request to join the Romanian army. He 
instead offered strategic advice regarding the place on the Danube to be chosen by   264
the Romanian army for crossing the river. As proof of this, Groza quotes from 
Rosetti a telegram sent by Bălăceanu to Bucharest.
13 The quote is, however, 
referenced to a lecture that cannot be retrieved. The 1945 report of the general 
secretary of the Romanian Academy
14 mentions two lectures by Radu Rosseti in 
1944, one given on 22 October and another one on 8 December. There is no lecture 
on 6 December, which is the date mentioned by Groza. Assuming that this was a 
typographical error, and what was actually meant was the 8
th and not the 6
th of 
December 1944, the lecture quoted was, according to the said Academy report, 
￿Operation Projects between 1876 and 1878￿ (Proiecte de operaţiuni din anii 1876-
1878). However, this particular lecture does not appear to have been published as the 
Romanian Academy Annals for the years 1943-1944 do not include it although they 
do include Rosetti￿s previous lectures as recorded in the 1945 Report.  
Moreover, the fact that the addressee of Bălăceanu￿s telegram is not 
mentioned (was it sent to the Romanian Foreign Ministry or, being a dispatch of 
military import, to the War Minister? or to Prince Carol himself?), makes the 
document even more difficult to find. The volume of correspondence between the 
Romanian Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic agencies for the years 1876 to 1879 
contains several of Bălăceanu￿s telegrams, none of which has the above content. On 
the contrary, for the year 1877, when the meeting between him and Doda is 
supposed to have taken place, Bălăceanu was reported to be ￿gravement malade￿ and 
then on his way to Pest.
15 Whether his illness required him to also go to Herculane to 
benefit from the healing facilities of the famous spa (and thus have a pretext for 
meeting Doda) is not, however, mentioned in this body of correspondence. 
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9.2. The State of the Romanian Army 
Before moving on to answering, on the basis of extant archival evidence, the 
question whether the Romanian government was successful in recruiting for the 
1877 war, in addition to young and enthusiastic cannon fodder, also highly skilled 
officers of Romanian origin from the Austro-Hungarian army, I shall first dwell on 
the condition of the Romanian army at the time of the war and its evolution since the 
establishment of national militias in the two Romanian Principalities following the 
Treaty of Adrianople, which concluded the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish war. I 
consider the evaluation of the actual strength of the Romanian army an important 
argument when assessing the impact of such attempts of recruitment among 
Romanian officers already well advanced in the Austro-Hungarian military 
hierarchy.  
The Treaty of Adrianople having curtailed the power of the Porte, which had 
up until then vetoed the setting up of standing armies in the Principalities, national 
militias of ￿armed guards￿ came into being in the early 1830s as well as the first 
military uniforms.
16 Two officer schools appeared in the 1840s and 1850s in Jassy 
and Bucharest, and in 1859 the General Staff (Statul Major General) was created, 
followed by the unification of the two war ministries under General Ioan Emanoil 
Florescu.
17 The 1868 law of army organization structured the military system into a 
permanent army and its reserves; the dorobanţi  (local police forces) and border 
guard corps; militias; civic guard and gloatele (male population fit for military 
service).
18  
The actual capacity for combat and level of training of the fledgling 
Romanian army was a matter of debate and polemical demonstration during the 
decade preceding the 1877 war. The consolidation of a viable armed force in the   266
United Principalities served two purposes, a strategic and a political one. The former, 
and the more obvious of the two, was that of protecting the newly formed state or, as 
expressed by Prince Carol in a speech he gave in the Romanian Parliament in 1868, 
preserving its neutrality in case of an armed conflict.
19 The latter purpose was that of 
building an army as an indispensable state institution and thereby demonstrating that 
the new state could function as an independent political unit (which would later on 
contribute to justifying a claim to political independence). This was part and parcel 
of a wider process of state building, which encompassed the Church, the educational 
and landowning systems. 
The reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls in Bucharest to Freiherr von 
Beust (see capsule biography in the appendix section) and to Count AndrÆssy reflect, 
from a diplomatic point of view, the growing pains of the young Romanian army as 
well as the web of speculations surrounding this process. Thus, the 1868 consular 
reports circulate the rumour of the Romanian government￿s intentions not only of 
preserving the integrity of the new Romanian state but also that of expanding its 
territory by incorporation of Transylvania, Bukovina, the Banat, and Maramures. 
Freiherr von Eder, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bucharest at the time, presented 
the Prince and the governmental party as promoting ￿eine Ru￿land sympathisch und 
Oesterreich feindliche Richtung￿ (a direction favourable towards Russia and inimical 
towards Austria), the explanation for which was, according to von Eder, the 
Romanian government￿s reliance on Prussia for both protection against Russia and 
for the ￿realization of their utopian attempts to expand their territory at Austria￿s 
expense.￿
20  
Prussia features in von Eder￿s report not only as alleged protector of the 
Romanian Principalities but also as a military model vying with the French cultural   267
model, which had been predominant until then. In a report of 29 January 1868 he 
dwells on the discontent of the French officers placed at the disposal of the Moldo-
Vlach authorities. ￿One of the reasons for this discontent￿, comments von Eder, ￿may 
lie in the strong Prussian tendencies, which have had as a consequence the partial 
disappearance of the French culture, which existed here until recently.￿
∗ 21 As von 
Eder reports, French Bataillonschef Lamy complained that the opinions of the 
visiting French military were ignored and their mission was, as such, superfluous 
(￿berfl￿ssig). The discontented French commander depicted a Romanian army 
whose commanders did not possess either theoretical knowledge or practical 
experience, an army lacking both the necessary means and the knowledge as to what 
was needed for rendering it ready for battle.
∗∗  Moreover, Prince Carol￿s ability to 
supervise military matters was called into question by the same Commander Lamy, 
who pointed out that, although the Prince had served in the Prussian army, ￿he only 
made it to the rank of Unterlieutenant and that, judging by his knowledge, he 
belonged to those officers who busied themselves with matters other than the 
military.￿
∗∗∗ 22 
By 1874 the tone of the consular reports, as the well as the Austro-Hungarian 
consul in Bucharest, had changed. Ernst Freiherr von Haan noted in his dispatch to 
Count AndrÆssy of 28 February 1874 that ￿of late, true enthusiasm reigns here for the 
Romanian army￿, which was the one topic that managed to unite the otherwise 
                                                 
∗  ￿Einer der Gr￿nde dieser Unzufriedenheit, d￿rfte in dem hervortreten preu￿ischen Richtungen 
liegen, die ein theilweises Verschwinden des, hier noch von nicht lange bestanden habenden 
franz￿sischen Kultus, zur Folge haben.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Den Leitern des hiesigen Milit￿rwesens fehle es ebenso an theoretischen Kenntni￿en, als an 
praktischen Erfahrungen [...] Nicht blo￿ da￿ man hier das f￿r eine Armee Erforderliche nicht habe, 
wisse man nicht einmal, was eine Armee um schlagfertig zu sein bed￿rfe.￿  
∗∗∗  ￿Auf meine Frage, ob der F￿rst, der in der preu￿ischen Armee gedient, nicht in milit￿rischen 
Sachen bewandert sei, meinte Kommandant Lamy, da￿ der F￿rst in der preu￿ischen Armee es zwar 
bis zum Grade eines Unterlieutenants gebracht, da￿ er aber, nach seinen Kenntni￿en zu urtheilen, 
wahrscheinlich zu jenen Offizieren geh￿rte, die sich mit andern als Milit￿rangelegenheiten befa￿en.￿   268
constantly warring Romanian MPs: ￿All parties are at one in looking upon the 
Romanian army as the palladium of the country as well as in preparing themselves to 
declare the independence of the country by means of it.￿
∗ 23 The outcome of this 
enthusiasm was the passing by a great majority of a law stipulating the 
transformation of already existing urban fire brigades into artillery troops. 
Additionally, a credit of 8 million francs was voted for military engineering 
works.
∗∗ 24  
This and the following reports testify to a feverish concern for the 
modernization of the Romanian army, with a view to which constant demands for 
funding were pressed in Parliament.
25 Moreover, efforts were made to apprise the 
Great Powers of its organizational progress. Thus, foreign military representatives 
were invited to the military manoeuvres organized by the Romanian government in 
1874. On the eve of these manoeuvres General Florescu was at pains to describe to 
Freiherr von Calice, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bucharest (see capsule 
biography in the appendix section), the amplitude of the upcoming Romanian 
autumn military exercises, providing the latter with detailed information on the 
logistics and number of troops involved.  
 
￿At the same time I concluded from the news brought by the War Minister that, 
according to the most recent dispositions, approved of by His Majesty the Prince, 
this year￿s autumn manoeuvres (presumably following the announced visit, which 
flatters a great deal here) will have a greater amplitude than that which I was in a 
position to communicate in my earlier humble reports to your Excellence. There 
will, thus, be concentrated not merely 7,000 or 8,000 but rather around 25,000 men, 
                                                 
∗  ￿Seit einiger Zeit herrscht hier eine wahre Begeisterung f￿r die rum￿nische Armee [...] Alle 
Partheien sind darin einig in der rum￿nischen Armee den Hort des Landes zu erblicken und sich 
vorzubereiten durch sie die Selbstst￿ndigkeit des Landes zu behaupten.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Ein Gesetzentwurf durch welchen die bereits milit￿risch organisirten L￿schmannschaften in den 
St￿dten zu Artilleriemannschaft umgebildet werden sollen, und ein Credit von 8 Millionen Francs 
[inserted above: f￿r Milit￿rbauten] ￿ alles wurde im Sturme mit gro￿er Majorit￿t votirt.￿ 
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into two corps, which will manoeuvre against each other from Bucharest and 
Fokshani on the Ialomizza River and will seek to join at Ursiceni. These troops will 
consist of 39 Batallions, 38 Squadrons, and 16 Batteries, half regular, half territorial. 
Also the bridge material, with which the Romanian army has recently been 
endowed, will be used.￿
∗∗∗ 26  
   
In his report of 26 October 1874 to Count AndrÆssy, Freiherr von Haan noted 
the overall good impression the Romanian army made during these manoeuvres and 
emphasized the efforts to impress in particular the Turkish military delegation. Haan 
concluded his report by quoting the verdict of the foreign officers that 
 
￿the Romanian army is made up of the best material and is in some respects well 
trained, but lacks any tactical instruction and, therefore, can only be of military 
significance as an auxiliary troop under the leadership of a foreign army.￿
∗∗∗∗ 27 
 
In addition to issuing the invitation to the Romanian military manoeuvres, the 
Romanian War Minister Ioan Emanoil Florescu strove to obtain permission for 
Romanian officers and generals to attend the annual military exercises of the Austro-
Hungarian, Russian, and German armies, stressing the need for the young Romanian 
army to model itself on those of the neighbouring Great Powers.
∗∗∗ 28 The practice of 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Zugleich entnahm ich aus den Mittheilungen des Herrn Kriegsministers, da￿ nach den neuesten, 
von Seiner Hochheit dem F￿rsten genehmigten Bestimmungen die diesj￿hrigen Herbstman￿ver 
(vermuthlich in Folge des angekundigten Besuches, welcher hier jedenfalls sehr schmeichelt) einen 
gr￿￿eren Umfang haben werden als ich mit meinen fr￿heren ergebensten Berichten Euerer Excellenz 
zu melden dem Falle war. Es werden n￿mentlich nicht blos 7- oder 8000 sondern etwa 25,000 Mann 
concentrirt werden, und zwar in zwei Corps, welche von Bucarest und Fokschani aus an der Ialomizza 
gegen einander man￿vriren und bei Ursiceni ihre Vereinigung suchen werden. Diese Truppe wird aus 
39 Bataillons, 38 Escadronen, und 16 Baterien, zur H￿lfte regul￿r, zur H￿lfte Territorial, bestehen. 
Auch soll das neue Br￿ckenmaterial, womit die rum￿nische Armee seit Kurzem versehen ist, zur 
Anwendung kommen.￿ 
∗∗∗∗  ￿Schlie￿lich erlaube ich mir das Urtheil der fremden Offiziere ￿ber die rum￿nische Armee, dahin 
zusammenzufassen, da￿ die rum￿nische Armee aus dem besten Materialen besteht im Einzelnen ganz 
gut geschult ist, ihr aber jedweder taktische Schulung fehlt und ihr daher f￿r lange Zeit nur als 
Hilfstruppe unter fremder F￿hrung eine milit￿rische Bedeutung beigemessen werden kann.￿  
 
∗∗∗  ￿Im Vorlaufe des Gespr￿ches theilte mir General Floresco mit, da￿ seine Hoheit der F￿rst und er 
selbst ihrerseits den Wunsch hegen, da￿ es einem oder mehreren Officieren der rum￿nischen Armee 
gestattet werden m￿chte, irgend einem der gr￿￿eren Man￿ver, welche in Verlaufe dieses Jahres in der 
k.u.k. (folio 201/recto) Monarchie abgehalten werden sollen, beizuwohnen. Er ersuchte mich, da￿ ich   270
sending officers abroad for military training and for acquiring war experience was 
part and parcel of the effort of building the new army, which was in need of skilled 
commanding officers and specialized training.
29 
Contemporary accounts regarding the Romanian army are for the most part 
polemical and make it difficult for one to ascertain the actual level of training and 
capacity for combat of the Romanian army on the eve of the 1877 war. Thus, the 
image one conceives from the 1877 reports of the French diplomat FrØdØric Debains 
is that of a caricature of an army dependent on requisitions from the population, the 
result of Prince Carol￿s vanitØ and forfanteries militaires (military snobbery)
30 at a 
time of financial crisis due to administrative mismanagement: 
 
￿The reserves and soldiers of the territorial army keep arriving stripped of 
everything, some of them in tattered uniforms, others carrying a gun on one arm and 
a child on the other, most of them followed by women in tears and emaciated by the 
time they enter the towns. The cavalry of the territorial army is incapable of putting 
on a march and under my very eyes several horses collapsed with tiredness and 
could not get up anymore. There is hardly any intendance and that which does exist 
possesses no financial means.￿ (Bucarest, le 27 Avril 1877; FrØdØric Debains to Son 
Excellence Monsieur le Duc Decazes, Ministre des Affaires EtrangŁres, Paris)
∗∗ 31 
 
Austrian military reports convey a similar image of the Romanian army in 
1877. The dispatches of General Staff officer Josef Manega, affiliated with the 
                                                                                                                                         
mich in dieser Beziehung hohen Orts anfragen und ihm wom￿glich auch Orte und Umfang der in der 
k.u.k Monarchie projektirten die￿j￿hrigen Truppen-Concentrirungen bekannt geben m￿chte. Er 
motivirte seine Bitte umst￿ndlich, - haupts￿chlich betonend, wie sehr es f￿r eine kleine Armee, wie 
die rum￿nische ist, erw￿nscht sein m￿sse, sich an dem Muster jener der benachbarten Gro￿m￿chte zu 
bilden. (Freiherr von Calice to Count AndrÆssy, Bucharest 29 June 1874)￿ 
 
∗∗  ￿Les rØservistes et les hommes de l￿armØe territoriale continuent ￿ arriver dØnouØs de tout, 
quelques-uns avec des uniformes en lambeaux, d￿autres portant le fusil sur un bras et sur l￿autre un 
enfant, la plupart suivis de femmes ØplorØes et tombant de dØnuement en entrant dans les villes. La 
cavalerie de l￿armØe territoriale est incapable de fournir une marche et, sous mes yeux, plusieurs 
chevaux sont tombØs de fatigue pour ne plus se relever. L￿intendance existe ￿ peine et ne dispose 
d￿aucun moyen pØcuniaire.￿ 
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Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Bucharest, highlight the hardships plaguing the 
Romanian army and the makeshift character of its troops and provisions. 
  
￿The state of the Romanian army is the same as before. The spirits are low both in 
the higher and in the lower ranks, and their disposition is not at all warrior-like; the 
supply problems are the same as earlier, and to these of late has been added the lack 
of linen and footwear. The local War Ministry receives daily requests for clothes. In 
order to press these requests all the more emphatically, the state of the army clothing 
is depicted in such a way as is inconceivable in regular army reports. 
In order to make up for the perpetually felt lack of officers, 20 military students 
from the local Military School were prematurely [vorzeitig] enrolled as lieutenants 
in the Prince￿s army.￿ (Report No. 39 by Captain Josef Manega to the k.k. Reichs-
Kriegsministerium in Vienna, Bucharest, 11 July 1877)
 ∗∗∗ 32 
 
The supply of the troops is, as pointed out by previous sources, achieved 
mostly by requisitioning. As Manega notes, the authorities are industriously 
requisitioning goods for the Romanian army, in particular beef cattle and hay from 
Moldavia.
∗ 33 With the setting in of the cold weather, the endemic lack of clothes 
becomes dramatic:  
 
￿The state of the Romanian army is becoming increasingly worrying. The army 
suffers from everything and the fact that there have been already 100 amputations, 
as the opinci do not provide enough protection against frostbite, is telling proof in 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿Der Zustand der rum￿nischen Armee ist nach wie vor derselbe. Die Stimmung ist sowol oben wie 
unten gleich gedr￿ckt, der Geist nirgends ein kriegerischer; die Verpflegsschwierigkeiten sind 
dieselben wie fr￿her, und diesen gesellen sich neuesten Datums auch der eingetretene Mangel an 
W￿sche und Schuhwerk bei. Im hiesigen Kriegsministerium laufen t￿glich Forderungen an 
Bekleidungsst￿cken ein. Um diesen Forderungen den n￿tigen Nachdruck zu geben, werden die 
Bekleidungszust￿nde in einer Weise geschildert, wie sie in geordneteren Armeeverh￿ltnissen kaum 
denkbar sind. Um dem stets f￿hlbareren Offiziersmangel abzuhelfen, wurden 20 Z￿glinge der 
hiesigen Milit￿rschule vorzeitig als Lieutenants in die f￿rstliche Armee eingetheilt.￿ 
 
∗  ￿F￿r die rum￿nische Armee wird nach wie vor im ganzen Lande flei￿ig requirirt. Besonders 
Schlachtvieh und Heu geht viel aus der Moldau ￿ber Piatra an die Donau.￿ (Report No. 58 by Captain 
Josef Manega to the k.k. Reichs-Kriegsministerium in Vienna, Bucharest, 16 October 1877)   272
this respect.￿ (Report No. 60 by Captain Josef Manega to the k.k. Reichs-
Kriegsministerium in Vienna, Bucharest, 31 October 1877)
∗∗ 34 
 
The youth and inexperience of the army are stressed in a number of other 
reports such as those sent in from Galaţi in October and December 1877 and 
monitoring the local movement of troops:  
 
￿The squad strength of these regiments consists of 110-120 cavalry, most of them 
very young and with little riding skill. The horses are 15 ‰ to 16 hands tall and of 
good breed.￿ (Report dated 6 October 1877)
35 
￿The troop consists to a great extent of very young people, who have borne arms for 
scarcely more than a couple of months, and are equipped with Krnka rifles.￿ (Report 
dated 5 December 1877)
36 
￿Reserve battalion No. 14 has for the most part a troop which could be more 
appositely designated by the term ￿boys￿, who hardly know how to dress themselves 
[sich  adjustieren], and cannot carry the gun correctly. There is no march order 
whatsoever.￿ (Report dated 12 December 1877)
37 
∗∗∗  
 
The occasional silver lining crops up in diplomatic reports such as that of the 
General Consul Ritter von Zwiedinek, who acknowledges the good figure the 
Romanian army cut on the battlefield:  
 
￿Despite the fact, which cannot be doubted anymore, that the young Romanian army 
has behaved very well on the battlefield, the disposition of the population here is, 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Der Zustand der rum￿nischen Armee wird t￿glich besorgniserregender. Die Armee leidet an Allem 
und der Fall, da￿ bereits 100 Amputationen von erfrorenen, weil durch die Opinschen nicht gen￿gend 
gesch￿tzen Fu￿fingern vorkommen, ist hief￿r ein sprechender Beleg.￿ 
∗∗∗  ￿Die Eskadron-St￿rke dieser Regimenter bestand aus 110-120 berittenen Leuten, meist sehr junge 
und wenig geschulte Reiter. Die Pferde sind 15 ‰ bis 16 Faust hoch von guter Race.￿ (6. Oktober 
1877) 
￿Die Mannschaft besteht zum gr￿￿ten Theile aus sehr jungen Leuten, die kaum einige Monate unter 
die Waffen gestellt sein, und ist mit Krnka-Gewehren bewaffnet.￿ (5. Dezember 1877) 
￿Das Res. Baon Nr. 14 hatte zum gr￿￿ten Teil eine Mannschaft, die man richtiger mit der Benennung 
￿Buben￿ bezeichnet, die sich kaum zu adjustiren verstehen und nicht recht wissen, wie sie das 
Gewehr tragen sollen. Die Marschordnung fehlt g￿nzlich.￿ (12. Dezember 1877)    273
however, a very low one.￿ (Report No. 237, Bucharest, 16 September 1877, from 
Ritter von Zwiedinek to Graf AndrÆssy)
∗ 38 
 
A polar opposite image of the Romanian troops on the eve of the war is 
offered by Nicolae Iorga, who contrasted what he perceived as disparaging foreign 
accounts to a different, more optimistic view conceived on the basis of contemporary 
newspaper reports. Thus, quoting from Le Temps,  Le Constitutionnel, and other 
mainly French journals, Iorga depicts a well-equipped, sturdy, high-spirited army 
eager to prove itself in battle.
39  
The Romanian army was not supposed to enter the war. The Russians, 
counting on a short war and ready victory over the Ottomans, had declined 
Romanian offers of military support. The Plevna hitch in the summer of 1877 turned 
out to be an insurmountable impasse. It was at this point during the war that the 
Russians started to ask for help from the Balkan states. As the Greeks pressed too 
many territorial claims and the Serbs were unable to help, the Russians had to settle 
for the assistance of the Romanian army, whose commander, Prince Carol I, had no 
territorial claims, but merely conditioned their participation on independence of 
military command and the concrete terms of a military agreement.
40 
Literature on the Russo-Turkish war shows that the Romanian troops took 
part in the attacks against Plevna between August and December 1877 and in the 
storming and conquest of the Rahova, Vidin, and other redoubts, fighting for the 
most part on the Western front. They acquitted themselves well of their missions and 
￿rendered valuable service to their more powerful ally.￿
41 Several authors mention 
                                                 
∗  ￿Trotz der nunmehr nicht l￿nger zu bezweifelnden Thatsache, da￿ die junge Armee des Landes sich 
auf dem Schlachtfelde ganz trefflich gehalten hat, ist die Stimmung der Bev￿lkerung hier doch eine 
sehr niedergeschlagene.￿   274
instances of praise and military distinctions received from the Russian high 
command as well as eulogistic coverage in the foreign press.
42 
For all the endemic shortages and inadequacies, which constitute a leitmotif 
of contemporary foreign reports, for all the attempts on the part of the Romanian 
diplomacy to play down, or, depending on their political affiliation, to detract from, 
the importance of the constant acquisition of armament (Mavrogheny: ￿vouloir peser 
dans la lutte europØenne des puissances ce n￿est ni plus ni moins que ridicule￿
43; 
Balatchano: ￿Entretenir des idØes belliqueuses avec nos moyens, ce serait vouloir 
prendre la lune avec les dents￿
44), the fact of the matter remains that, by 1877, the 
Romanian army had come a long way in its development. In the 1830s there had 
been 3 mixed regiments (infantry and cavalry) in Wallachia, amounting to 4,673 
soldiers, and 1 mixed regiment of 1,129 men in Moldavia.
45 According to the 
History of the 1877-1878 War drawn up by a group of Romanian officers shortly 
after the war, in 1876 the permanent army was comprised of 37 Batallions, 42 
Squadrons, and 18
 Batteries, totalling 38,000 men and 120 cannons.
46 As a result of 
the same drive for modernization Romanian military authorities invested for the 
development of the artillery, in particular by purchasing Krupp cannons, initially, on 
Prince Carol￿s initiative and, subsequently, on General Florescu￿s order.
47  
General Radu Rosetti strikes, in my opinion, the right balance between 
deprecatory and eulogistic descriptions by pointing out that the Romanian army that 
went to war in 1877-78 was not a long standing organism and its evolution did not 
coincide with that of the Romanian Principalities. It was rather a new creation, 
merely forty odd years old, that is, less than a generation.
48 Thus, many of the 
problems highlighted by contemporary writers, sometimes in caricature form, were 
real. However, as the outcome of the war showed, Carol￿s urgency to build an army   275
and, subsequently, to take active part in the hostilities was not mere spear-shaking or 
snobbish conceit, but rather a steadily pursued political strategy, which would 
eventually turn Romania into an self-standing state, independent of both the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia. 
 
9.3. The Border Generals and the 1877-1878 War ￿ extant documentary evidence 
Having reviewed the information gleaned from secondary literature in the 
first section of the present chapter and assessed the state of the Romanian army up to 
and during the 1877-1878 war in the following section, I will now proceed to an 
analysis of extant archival documents in order to provide an informed answer to the 
twofold question stated at the beginning of this chapter. As already mentioned, the 
main challenge in doing so was posed by the scarcity and disparity of information 
and, not the least, by the defective bibliographical apparatus of some of the studies 
touching upon this subject.  
A copy of the 1868 document quoted by Marchescu from Grigore Popiţi is to 
be found in the Kriegsministerium Pr￿sidium holding of the War Archives in 
Vienna. The document, dated 31 October 1868, alerts the military authorities in 
Vienna that several Austrian citizens of Romanian nationality who had returned from 
Bucharest were encouraging retired or on-leave officers from the k.k. army, from 
Transylvania in particular, to enter the Moldo-Vlach army and generally attempting 
to gain the sympathy of the Romanian troop for the Bucharest government.
∗ 49  
                                                 
∗  ￿An s￿mmtliche commandierenden Gener￿le /: ad personam:/ 
Wien, am 31. Oktober 1868 
Von verl￿￿licher Seite ist dem k. ung. Ministerium des Inneren die Mittheilung geworden, da￿ 
mehrere in B￿karest gewesene ￿sterreichische Rum￿nen in letzterer Zeit die geheime Mission 
￿bernommen haben, Ober- und Unteroffiziere der k.k. Armee, besonders in Siebenb￿rgen, zum 
￿bertritte in den Dienst der moldo-walachischen Regierung zu verleiten, im Allgemeinen auch die 
Sympathie der rum￿nischen Mannschaft f￿r die Bukarester Regierung zu verbreiten. Nachdem die 
Durchf￿hrung dieses Zweckes voraussichtlich haupts￿chlich bei der verabschiedeten und beurlaubten   276
Starting from this document, I went on to check the KM Pr￿s Protokoll 
entries for the following years in order to ascertain whether this was a singular 
incident or part of a series that would suggest a steadily pursued strategy on the part 
of the Bucharest government. Thus, under the rubric Donauf￿rstenth￿mer for 1869 
are mentioned ￿Agitationen zur Gewinnung kais.-￿sterr. Soldaten/Urlauber.￿
50 The 
extant documents corresponding to this reference turned out to be a follow-up to the 
1868 alert. This time, however, the agitators were no longer Austrian citizens freshly 
returned from the Principalities, but members of a so-called Romanian action party 
(Actions-Parthei) in Bucharest, who, according to a report from the Hungarian 
Ministry of the Interior, dated 13 January 1869, ￿have taken it upon themselves to 
persuade officers of Romanian nationality as well as soldiers to resign from the k.k. 
army and enter Moldo-Vlach military service.￿
∗∗ 51 The Hungarian report goes on to 
suggest more radical measures such as the translocation of Romanian troops from 
Transylvania to Hungary and their replacement by Hungarian contingents.
∗∗∗ 52 In 
response to this report, the Austrian military authorities acknowledged the need to 
                                                                                                                                         
Mannschaft versucht werden d￿rfte, werden von Seite des k. ung. Ministeriums des Inneren behufs 
Vereitelung dieses Vorhabens die n￿thigen strengen Weisungen an die ungarischen Civilbeh￿rden 
erlassen; - da jedoch m￿glicherweise versucht werden k￿nnte derlei Agitationen auch in den Reihen 
der aktiv dienenden rum￿nischen Mannschaft Eingang zu verschaffen, so ersuche ich Eure Excellenz 
die Commandanten der betreffenden Truppen-K￿rper hievon zu verst￿ndigen und dieselbe zu 
beauftragen, die geeigneten Verf￿gungen zur Begegnung von derlei Absichten rechtzeitig zu 
erlassen.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Nach ￿mtlicher Mittheilung des k￿niglich ungarischen Ministeriums des Inneren, haben sich 
gewisse Glieder der rum￿nischen Actions Parthei zu Bukarest anheischig gemacht, die der 
rum￿nischen Nationalit￿t angeh￿rigen Offiziere sowohl als auch Mannschaftsglieder des k.k. 
gemeinsamen Heeres zum Abfalle und beziehungsweise zum ￿bertritte in das moldo-walachische 
Kriegsheer zu verleiten.￿ 
∗∗∗  ￿[ich] w￿rde in dieser Richtung zuvorderst f￿r nothwendig erachten, da￿ die aus rum￿nischen 
Elementen bestehenden Truppenk￿rper von Siebenb￿rgen, wo dieselben der Versuchung zun￿chst, 
ausgesetzt, und diese mit Hinblick auf die Stimmung der dortigen rum￿nischen Bev￿lkerung zumeist 
Anklang finden d￿rften, in geeignetere Dislokations Bezirke nach Ungarn verlegt, und in 
Siebenb￿rgen durch ￿ aus ungarischen Elementen bestehende Truppen ersetzt werden sollen.￿   277
keep an eye on and prevent all such recruiting activities but considered it 
unadvisable to proceed to a transfer of troops.
∗∗∗∗ 53  
There are no more similar entries for the following years up until 1877 in the 
KM Pr￿s protocols.  
The most intriguing and frustrating reference, but also, as we shall see further 
on, that which led eventually to some rewarding research results, was the Doda case. 
My starting point was the chapter dedicated by Liviu Groza in his 1999 monograph 
to the encounter between the Romanian agent in Vienna, Ion Bălăceanu, and Trajan 
Doda at Herculane in 1877. As I could not track down the quoted lecture by Radu 
Rosetti, which constituted Groza￿s source, nor could I infer who the addressee of the 
cited telegram was, I was not in a position to retrieve the original and, as such, had to 
take Liviu Groza￿s word for it. I managed to overcome this bibliographical impasse 
by going through all the published articles and studies of General Radu Rosetti in the 
hope that, if Groza￿s quote was indeed accurate, if poorly referenced, Rosetti will 
have repeated, and maybe even enlarged on, this information in one of his other 
writings on the 1877-78 war. The French telegram as cited by Groza does not appear 
in any of the published studies by Rosetti. However, the latter￿s 1926 book Partea 
luată de armata rom￿nă ￿n Răsboiul din 1877-1878 contains information which 
corroborates Groza￿s contribution in the form of an endnote of the following content: 
  
￿The Prince was not satisfied with the way in which the manoeuvres were executed 
today and was very critical of them (King Carol I￿s Memoirs, 4 October 1874). 
Because of this, in 1876 they sought to enlist [a obţine serviciile] Romanian officers 
from the Austro-Hungarian army who had distinguished themselves in war ￿ 
                                                 
∗∗∗∗  ￿Weitere Ma￿nahmen sowie die angeregte Translozierung der Truppenk￿rper rum￿nischer 
Nationalit￿t von Siebenb￿rgen, erscheinen jedoch schon [illegible word] in Anbetracht der Jahreszeit 
und anderw￿rtiger Umst￿nde wegen dem gegenw￿rtigen Momente nicht wohl angezeigt; jedoch 
werde ich diesen Gegenstand im Auge behalten, und nicht vers￿umen in dieser Richtung allenfalls 
n￿tige Verf￿gungen rechtzeitig zu treffen.￿   278
General Doda and Colonel Urs. (see the letters of V. Babeş, who was entrusted with 
this negotiation, one dated 21 November/ 8 December 1876 and addressed to I.C. 
Brătianu, and the other one dated 19 June/ 1 July 1877 addressed to Bălăceanu ￿ I.C. 
Brătianu Documents). The Austrian government did not grant permission (see 
Bălăceanu￿s telegram to Brătianu dated 26 April 1877 - I.C. Brătianu 
Documents).￿
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This footnote shows that the addressee of the quoted French telegram was 
I.C. Brătianu, the Liberal Prime Minister under Carol I between 1876 and 1881. 
However, the body of documents referred to as Documente I.C. Brătianu does not 
provide any indication as to the whereabouts of this archive and, given that the book 
was published in 1926, the legitimate question arose whether these documents 
survived both the war and the Communist regime. Further research led me to the 
conclusion that the I.C. Brătianu Documents were part of the Brătianu family 
archive (Fondul familial Brătianu) held in the National Archives in Bucharest. The 
following account is based on my findings in this family archive corroborated with 
information from other sources such as the published correspondence of Vincenţiu 
Babeş and Dumitru Brătianu. 
Evidence suggests that, as early as autumn 1876,
55 informal attempts were 
made by the Romanian authorities in Bucharest to secure the services of two 
Romanian high-ranking officers from the Austro-Hungarian army, that is, the retired 
Generalmajor Trajan Doda and Oberst David Urs de Margina (for the latter, see the 
capsule biography in the appendix section). Vincenţiu Babeş communicates this to 
George Bariţiu in a letter of 17/29 November 1876 deploring the tactless manner in 
which the Romanian authorities proceeded in the matter without seeking the 
cooperation of the Transylvanian Romanian intellectuals.
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By spring 1877, tentative diplomatic negotiations were under way between 
the Romanian authorities, who had in the meantime resorted to the services of 
Vincenţiu Babeş in dealing with Trajan Doda, and the Austro-Hungarian authorities. 
The latter were, thus, asked to grant permission to a k.k. general of Romanian origin 
to join Prince Carol￿s army. This becomes apparent in the letters and coded 
telegrams exchanged between Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in 
Vienna, and I.C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister. These attempts at 
obtaining a k.k. general were part of a mediated process of negotiation. Bălăceanu 
received his instructions from I.C. Brătianu, who in turn relayed information to and 
from Prince Carol. The Austro-Hungarian authorities were represented by Count 
AndrÆssy, who sounded the Emperor and conveyed his answer to Bălăceanu, the 
latter sending the message further to Brătianu and the Prince. The telegrams in the 
Brătianu family archive throw light on the Romanian end of this negotiation. The 
full text and the English translation of these telegrams are available in Appendix 4. 
The following exchanges took place against the backdrop of the Russo-
Turkish war, which started on 24 April 1877. On the 10 May 1877 Carol I signed 
Romania￿s declaration of independence and from this point on the Romanian 
government offered military collaboration to the Russians, which was refused by the 
latter till the last moment. The main source of disagreement were the terms of such a 
collaboration: whereas Romania wished to enter the war under its own separate 
military command, the Russians pointed out that Romanian help was not 
indispensible to them and would only be acceptable under Russian command.
57 The 
logic behind Romania￿s wish to enter the war was that of achieving recognition of its 
de-facto political independence by making a point of retaining military operation 
independence during the war.
58 However, independent military command   280
presupposed the existence of an experienced Chief of General Staff who could 
effectively lead the army into battle. Paradoxically, on the eve of the 1877 war, 
General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, the former War Minister and also the person who 
best knew the Romanian army as its main organizer and modernizer, was sidelined 
through political machinations and denied command during the war.
59 It is in this 
context that the telegrams and letters between Bălăceanu and Brătianu of May and 
June 1877 were written. They testify to the hopes of the Bucharest authorities of 
obtaining an experienced Romanian general and several high-ranking officers and 
the reticence and eventual refusal of the Austro-Hungarian authorities.  
 
￿8 May 1877 
AndrÆssy avoided communicating to me the Emperor￿s reply on the subject of the 
Romanian general. I gathered, however, that he was very willing to give it to us but 
that he was prevented by the certainty that our army would collaborate with the 
Russian army. No one believes anymore that the war will remain local. 
Bălăceanu.￿
60 
 
￿June 1877 
The Prince would be happy if the Emperor were to authorize Doda to come to us. 
We will offer him a very advantageous and safe position and, I repeat, we wish that 
the Austrian-Hungarian government should send an officer to the Prince￿s army in 
Oltenia. 
I.C. Brătianu￿
61 
 
￿Vienna, 14 June 1877 
Confidential  
Dear Mr President, 
 It was on the spontaneous initiative of Mr Babesiu (pronounce Babesh) that I sent 
you a telegram on the subject of General Doda. The latter had promised to be here 
last week but, as urgent matters kept him in Caransebes, he has twice postponed his 
departure. I am sending you here enclosed his latest telegram (addressed to 
Babesiu), which leads us to think that he will arrive on Saturday or Sunday. Doda 
being the Emperor￿s favourite may succeed in obtaining permission to go to   281
Romania at the risk of measures which the Hungarian government will no doubt 
take against him; but one should not think that the ministers in Vienna and Pest will 
agree to send an officer to the General Staff of the Prince. It is something that the 
Emperor cannot do without them. 
I am quite intrigued by the fact that Comte AndrÆssy would not let me know the 
Emperor￿s answer to the request which he [AndrÆssy] had so willingly taken upon 
himself to submit on our behalf (relative to a general and several high-ranking 
Romanian officers), when it would have been so easy for him to say: ￿The Emperor 
will not or cannot￿. I tried to find out the cause and learnt that ￿ although I cannot 
guarantee it ￿ they consulted Berlin, who answered by a negative shake of the head! 
If this is true, I doubt that the Emperor will allow Doda to leave.￿ 
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A letter of 19 May 1877 from Vincenţiu Babeş to Ion Bălăceanu explains the 
intermediary role played by the former in the negotiations as well as revealing the 
frictions between the Romanian intelligentsia in Transylvania and the Bucharest 
politicians. The letter, moreover, provides unexpected insight into General Doda￿s 
and Colonel Urs￿s attitude relative to the Romanian army and also their reasons for 
refusing to join it in the spring of 1877. Although a full translation of the letter is 
available in Appendix 4/2, I have opted for quoting from it at some length, given that 
it represents one of the very few personal testimonies of these officers. Most of the 
material I have analysed so far consists of official stances and statements and very 
few first-person accounts, so that an account, even if a reported one, of two of these 
officers￿ reasons for refusing to enter the Romanian army is one of the few extant 
testimonies throwing light on the nature of their loyalties. 
  
￿General Doda arrived here on Sunday morning as announced in his telegram. I 
spent the whole day with my friend and explained to him the situation, as much as 
the information I had allowed me to, and communicated to him the content of your 
valuable epistles. He listened to me with great interest and then asked for 24 hours 
of thorough deliberation in order to make a firm and serious decision. 
Last night we talked until midnight and I regret to inform you of his explanations.   282
￿It is too late. It is impossible for me to commit myself to such a momentous 
thing, full of such responsibility, on the eve of the event, ignorant of the means 
available and without having the time to examine and possibly amend or replace 
them.￿ 
Then: as our Monarchy does not recognize Romania￿s independence and, on the 
other hand, wishes to remain neutral, it cannot authorize one of its generals, [￿] 
to take part, let alone in a cardinal capacity, in Romania￿s war action.￿ 
The time was ripe, if not around 1868/69, when Doda and C. Ursu, sounded by the 
Brătianus, offered their services, but were rebuffed [reu desconsideraţi], then at 
least last autumn, when Doda, through the mediation of Senator Deşliu and 
encouraged even by the Prince [prin voia Domnitorului], was ready to go, but 
suddenly he was rejected by Mr Bratianu!...￿ 
Since then he could have familiarized himself with and even integrated into the 
Romanian army [a se familiariza şi chiar contopi cu puterile şi factorii din armata 
rom￿nă]. It is no longer possible to do that today and it would be an unforgivable 
foolishness to get involved now only to produce more confusion! 
In much fewer words Colonel Ursu from Sibiu informed me, upon my confidential 
inquiry, that, at this stage, under no circumstances should we count on him. [...] 
Having heard about the highly inappropriate attempts made here in Transylvania 
by the Bucharest leaders, I took it upon myself to recommend to Mr Brătianu 
twice to use other methods and much more caution, that is, to get them to win over 
General Doda, who was at that time burning with desire [ardea de poftă] to join 
the Romanian army and prepare it for that which we all knew was going to follow. 
But Mr Prime Minister did not answer, and General Doda found out that around 
Easter Mr Brătianu did not hesitate to commission a missionary of the Hungarian 
Government, the Hungarian MP Al. R., to hire him. Al. R. thus openly expressed 
himself before my friend D., whereas we here avoid even as much as touching 
upon such subjects.￿
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As the above quotes indicate, in the spring and early summer 1877 the 
Romanian authorities were, indeed, bidding for several high-ranking officers from 
the Austro-Hungarian army. Their first choice was, on Vincenţiu Babeş￿s suggestion, 
the retired General Doda. The novelty this Babeş letter brings is the information that 
Trajan Doda and Baron Urs de Margina were ready to join the Romanian army as 
early as 1868/69, and also that Doda offered his services once again in the autumn of   283
1876, when, according to Babeş, he was rejected by Brătianu himself. In light of the 
somewhat contradictory evidence offered by the previously mentioned November 
1876 letter from Babeş to Bariţiu, to the effect that the Romanian authorities were 
courting Doda and Ursu in autumn 1876, one can conclude that this was rather an ill-
organized attempt of the Romanians, who lacked unity of action and purposefulness 
in dealing with the two officers. 
The reference to 1868-69 as a time when both Doda and Urs de Margina 
offered their services inevitably puts one in mind of the synchronous alert among the 
(Austro-) Hungarian authorities documented by authors like Marchescu and Popiţi. 
Given that the 1868 alert seems to have been a one-off event with some 
reverberations into the next year, one wonders, in conjunction with Babeş￿s 
testimony, if the suspicions of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior were aroused 
precisely by these initial, abortive discussions between Doda and Ursu, on the one 
hand, and the Brătianus, on the other.  
Fragmentary evidence of an early initiative of attracting Romanian officers 
from the Austro-Hungarian army appears in the correspondence received by Ion C. 
Brătianu from his brother, Dumitru Brătianu. As confirmed in a letter dated 23 
September 1868, the latter had written to Prince Carol about the necessity of hiring 
several Romanian officers from Austria (￿quelques officiers distinguØs et aguerris￿
64) 
and also about the possible means of rendering the offer more attractive to them: 
 
￿Among other things I write to him [i.e. to Prince Carol] about the officers we could 
hire from Austria. I believe we absolutely need at least three or four of the most 
distinguished Romanian officers in Austria, even if this means that the Prince will 
have to secure their position until this can be regulated by Parliament and, as an 
incentive, it would be good if they could be promised a higher rank than the one   284
they held or are holding in the Austrian army. I took some steps in this respect when 
I was in Vienna.￿
∗ 65 
 
This proposal comes at a time when the organization of the Romanian army 
was in full swing and its legal framework was beginning to be articulated. Thus, 
1868 had seen the passing of the first army law. What Dumitru Brătianu alludes to is 
the lack of a legal basis for accepting and integrating officers from foreign armies 
into the Romanian army. It was only in June 1877 that this framework would be 
defined by a special law stipulating that Romanian officers who had served in 
foreign armies could be received with the same rank into Romanian military service. 
Dumitru Brătianu￿s suggestion coincides with the frictions and diplomatic 
malaise occasioned by Carol￿s introduction of Prussian officers and instructors into 
the fledgling Romanian army. As captured also by the Austro-Hungarian consular 
reports analysed in the previous section of the present chapter, the source of 
discontent were the clashes between the Prussian instructors and the members of the 
French military mission, and, at a diplomatic level, the bellicose message construed 
by countries like France and Austria-Hungary, who suspected Romania of sliding 
into the area of dominance of either Prussia or Russia. Against this backdrop of 
international rumour, Dumitru Brătianu reiterates the need for Romanian (as opposed 
to foreign) officers as a possible solution for lulling suspicions and putting an end to 
speculations.  
 
￿Dear brother, 
The news of Colonel Krenski and other Prussian officers going to Romania as 
instructors in our army has had a great impact. This measure displeases all Powers 
                                                 
∗  ￿˛ntre altele ￿i vorbescu de oficierii ce am putea angaja ￿n Austria. Credu că ar fi de ne apărată 
trebuinţă să avem măcar trei, patru din cei mai distincţi dintre oficierii roum￿ni din Austria chiar de ar 
trebui să le asigure Domnitorul posiţiunea p￿nă să se pote regula lucrul prin camere, şi spre mai mare 
￿ndemnu ar fi bine să li se promită unu gradu superioru gradului ce au ocupatu sau ce ocupă ￿n armata 
austriacă. ￿ Am lucrat ceva ￿n privirea acesta c￿ndu mă aflam la Viena.￿   285
and even our best friends criticize and deplore it. If this is true and if there is still 
time [it would be advisable? ￿ illegible word] to drop or at least postpone this 
project. All the more so as I do not see that there is any pressing need for foreign 
instructors; on the contrary, it is a weakness on our part to show the world that, just 
like the Turks, we are in perpetual need of foreign leaders. We do, indeed, need 
several experienced officers, but [let them be] Romanian, and I have shown to you 
how they could be obtained. Adding to the suspicions that are already hanging over 
us the saga of a Prussian military mission of no real necessity would be an 
unjustified and harmful bravado.￿
∗∗ 66 
 
There is no indication, either in the archive I consulted or in the documents 
and letters from Dumitru Brătianu￿s archive published by Al. Cretzianu,
67 of the 
outcome of these 1868 suggestions. It, therefore, remains unclear what the reasons 
were for the rejection of Doda and Ursu, as mentioned by Vincenţiu Babeş in his 
1877 letter to Bălăceanu. The above-mentioned Cretzianu collection of documents 
shows this to have been a long-standing concern with Dumitru Brătianu, gradually 
acquiring more definite expression. Thus, one can detect an evolution from the 1848 
letter to Paul Bataillard, in which D. Brătianu asked for support and stressed the need 
for weapons and for several superior officers with war experience;
68 to the 
anonymous  Apel către Rom￿nii ardeleni din armata austriacă, tentatively dated 
1852 and found by Cretzianu in the D. Brătianu archive, a leaflet demonizing the 
Emperor and exhorting all Romanians enrolled in the Austrian army to join the 
Romanian army for a better life;
69 to, finally, the more purposeful and clearly 
                                                 
∗∗  ￿Iubite frate, nuvela mergerii ￿n Rom￿nia a colonelului Krenski şi alţi oficieri prusiani ca instructori 
ai armatei nostre a produsu un forte mare şi forte viu effectu. Acestă măsură displace tutoru Puteriloru 
şi chiar amicii noştri cei mai buni o critică şi o depl￿nge. De este lucrul adevăratu şi de mai este timpu 
[illegible word] a face să cadă sau celu puţinu să să am￿e acelu proiectu. Cu at￿t mai cu semă că nu 
vedu uă neapărată trebuinţă de instructori streini; din contra este uă scădere pentru noi d￿a arăta lumei 
că ￿ntocmai ca turcii avem nevoe continuă de conducători streini. Ne trebuie ￿ntr￿adevăr c￿ţiva oficieri 
experimentaţi, ￿nsă rom￿ni, şi ţi￿am arătat cum se pot dob￿ndi. Pe l￿ngă prepusurile ce apăsă asupră ne 
să mai adăogăm istoriea unei misiuni militare prusiene fără uă absolută necesitate, ar fi o bravadă 
nejustificabilă, forte vătămătoare, care [damaged document ￿ lower part of the page was ripped off]￿.   286
defined 1868 suggestion of approaching several Romanian officers and ensuring the 
invitation was made as attractive as possible. 
Coming back to the 1877 diplomatic telegrams in the Brătianu archive, 
although they do not provide an explanation of the 1868 rejection of officers like 
Doda, they are, nevertheless, evidence to a poor grasp of the political and military 
situation of these officers on the part of the Romanian authorities. The very request 
for a k.k. general with a view to entering the Russo-Turkish war, which was already 
under way, and the hope that, if the Prince were to write to the Emperor, this request 
would be granted were unrealistic in themselves.
70 As will become apparent in the 
following telegrams, such an action would have signified that Austria-Hungary was 
indirectly getting involved in the war (which, if its ill-fated involvement in the 
Crimean War was anything to go by, was the last thing Austria intended to do) or 
that it was encouraging Romania￿s war initiative. Moreover, the assumption that 
Doda, being the Emperor￿s favourite, to use Bălăceanu￿s words, was, therefore, more 
likely to get imperial approval to join the Romanian army comes across as 
misinformed, at best, and reveals an ignorance of the relationship between the 
Emperor and his generals. Doda, on the other hand, seems to have been fully aware 
of both the political and the military implications of such a belated action, as Babeş￿s 
1877 letter shows. The Romanian authorities continued, however, to press their 
request in blatant disregard of the international diplomatic configuration, very much 
to the mortification of the likes of Babeş, who were aware of the impossibility of 
success of these tardy attempts (see Babeş￿s letter to Visarion Roman dated 23 June 
1877).
71 As the following telegrams show, the tone of the Bălăceanu-Brătianu 
correspondence remains optimistic: 
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￿Vienna, 29 June 1877 
His Excellence Mr Bratiano, President of the Council [of Ministers], Bucharest 
Doda arrived. I conferred with him for three long hours. I succeeded in abating his 
resentment, which is Deşliu￿s doing. The only obstacle lies in the lack of time in 
order for him to study and get to know all the workings of the machinery that we 
want to entrust him with. He will ask permission from the Emperor to come to 
Romania as a civilian. From there he will send in his resignation if he decides to 
enter the Prince￿s army. The Austrian-Hungarian government will not send an 
officer to our Quartier GØnØral because it has not recognized us as belligerents.  
Balatchano.￿  
 
 As a result, Doda reconsidered his position and asked for permission from 
the Emperor, as communicated in the French telegram quoted by Liviu Groza, a 
Romanian translation of which is to be found in the Brătianu Family Archive: 
 
￿Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Calafat 
Bucharest, 2 July 1877 
Doda will see the Emperor tomorrow, from whom he hopes to obtain a favourable 
answer. He came to see me and tell me that I should inform you that crossing the 
Danube upriver from Vidin would be an immense mistake, because in case of defeat 
we would have no other alternative than to push the army into Serbia, which would 
immediately attract the Austrian army there. According to Doda, our army should 
cross over around Bechet, thus, even if we were defeated, we would not be forced to 
cross over the Danube again, which would be bad for us. We could retreat along the 
Danube and reunite with the nearest Russian army corps. Doda recommends to the 
commanders that they should keep alert day and night to avoid surprise attacks. 
G. Cantacuzino.￿
72 
   
The name incongruity (the French telegram was signed by Bălăceanu, while 
this Romanian translation is attributed to Cantacuzino) is explained by previous 
telegrams, which show that Cantacuzino relayed telegrams from Bălăceanu to 
Brătianu.   288
The Emperor￿s answer, mediated by AndrÆssy, came at the beginning of July 
1877, spelling out the friendly but neutral attitude of Austria-Hungary as well as 
rejecting the Romanian request for Doda: 
 
￿Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova 
Vienna, 2 July 1877 
For H.H. the Prince. After receiving once again the Emperor￿s orders this morning, 
AndrÆssy asked me to directly inform your Highness of the following, on behalf of 
the Emperor: From the triple point of view of Austria￿s neutrality, as well as that of 
our financial situation and of the pretext that would be given to the Cabinets which 
are only too willing to deny the neutrality we have requested, the Emperor cannot 
advise your Highness to cross the Danube. But if the Prince considers that he owes 
to his people and his army the satisfaction of having contributed to the liberation of 
the Christians in Turkey, Austria-Hungary will not put up any obstacles, directly or 
indirectly, and will not add a soldier more to the regular garrisons in the towns 
bordering on Romania, waiting for Romania￿s independence to turn from de facto 
into de jure. Austria-Hungary will not make any distinction between us and the 
other belligerents. The Emperor asks your Highness for two things, without which 
he would be forced to desist from the amicable attitude he wishes to retain towards 
Romania to the very end: 1) that no battalion should cross the Serbian border; 2) that 
they should not pursue territorial conquests in Bulgaria. In exchange for this, the 
imperial government is entirely willing to have a certain part of Dobrogea ceded to 
your Highness in the future peace treaty. An extended version of this message via 
letter. The favourable result of the delicate negotiations on this subject is owing to 
Count AndrÆssy, whose tireless benevolence and steady sympathy towards Romania 
were proved on this occasion as well. The reasons that prevented the Emperor from 
authorizing Doda to go to the Romanian Quartier GØnØral are all political. I will 
communicate them to Mr Brătianu shortly. We can have a superior officer of equal 
value, but one whom the Romanians of Hungary will not have turned into a national 
hero. This, unfortunately, seems to be General Doda￿s case.  
Bălăceanu.￿
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Bălăceanu reiterates in his next telegram his promise to expatiate on the 
reasons given by the Emperor for his negative answer. There is, however, no such 
letter to be found in the Brătianu Family archive.   289
 
￿To his Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova 
Vienna, 3 July 1877  
Tomorrow I shall send you a telegram enlarging on the cautious reasons AndrÆssy 
gave me as grounds for the Emperor￿s refusal to allow Doda to leave. His Majesty 
did not designate another officer in his stead as this would give too much the 
impression that he encouraged us to cross the Danube, all the more so as AndrÆssy, 
who expects to be furiously interpellated, is determined to reply that he could have 
prevented us from crossing over, but that he did not even try to [missing section in 
the transcribed telegram]. The Emperor will allow any superior officer to go to 
Romania. We will not wait too long.￿
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Notwithstanding the Emperor￿s negative answer, Doda offered strategic 
advice to the Romanian authorities and continued to help with suggestions, as we 
have seen in the telegram dated 2 July 1877 and as the following telegram shows: 
 
￿His Excellence Mr Brătianu, Bucharest 
Vienna, 7 July 1877 
I pray his Highness to forgive the delay with which I am writing. My eyes are out of 
order at the moment. Doda asks me to tell you that under no circumstances are we to 
cross the Danube without a General Staff Chief with complete war experience and if 
you have to confine yourselves to taking a Russian general, he recommends 
Dragomiroff. As there are two of this name, this is the one who has written a much 
appreciated work on the 1866 Austro-Prussian war. AndrÆssy signified that, had we 
asked for a high-ranking officer less prominent than Doda, we would have got it. I 
could not find out to whom he was alluding. 
Bălăceanu￿
75 
 
Running completely against the grain of this correspondence, Bălăceanu￿s 
memoirs mention the Doda episode cursorily and tell a different story altogether. 
Bălăceanu the memoirist remembers, or rather misremembers, things as follows:  
 
￿I went to the Emperor, who saw no obstacle to Doda accepting the position offered 
by Romania, but only on condition that he resign from the Austro-Hungarian army. I 
communicated to Doda the Emperor￿s answer. To this he exclaimed: ￿Good, we   290
have a deal! But tell me, is Romania at least going to go to war against Russia?￿  - 
￿No, as it is our ally.￿ ￿ ￿What about later on?￿ ￿ ￿How can I vouch for what the 
future holds? Who is to know what will happen later?￿ ￿ ￿In this case,￿ exclaimed 
Doda, ￿I won￿t come!￿ And nothing could make him change his mind.￿
76 
 
Georgeta Filliti, the editor and translator of Bălăceanu￿s memoirs, does point 
out, however, in her prefatory notes that the text is interlarded with the biased views, 
exaggerations and, at times, wholly fantasied dialogues. Given the body of 
diplomatic correspondence quoted above, Bălăceanu￿s rendition of his talk with 
Doda might well be entirely fictional.  
A 1937 monograph adds Eugeniu Carada to the number of people involved in 
recruiting Doda for the high command of the Romanian army. The reported story of 
the Carada-Doda meeting is provided by M. Theodorian,  Carada￿s son, in the 
following terms:  
 
￿[Carada] went to Mehadia, where the spa doctor Popovici took him to Traian Doda. 
They discussed for three days. ￿[Carada] convinced himself￿, as Mr M. Theodorian 
writes, ￿that the brave general lacked some of the qualities required of a 
generalissimo. He left him and hurried back to Bucharest.￿
77 
 
If anything, these fragmentary and rather contradictory personal testimonies 
show that Doda was approached by different people sent by Brătianu at different 
points in time. The Chinese-whispers character of this information (in both 
Bălăceanu￿s and Carada￿s cases the information was filtered and edited by a member 
of the family) renders the diplomatic correspondence in the Brătianu archive all the 
more valuable as it provides a definite and comparatively more reliable sequence of 
events. 
As this correspondence indicates, by virtue of backstage discussions between 
Bălăceanu and AndrÆssy, the Romanians continued to look for another, less famous,   291
k.k. Romanian general in the same slapdash manner Vincenţiu Babeş was 
complaining about in his letter: 
 
￿Mr Bălăceanu, Diplomatic Agent of Romania, Vienna 
Bucharest, 10 July 1877 
I was in the county in inspection. This is why you did not immediately receive my 
congratulations on the benevolence that you managed to secure. As regards the 
superior officer, find out about Guran, as the other one is impossible to get, but work 
fast because we are in a hurry. The requested letter will be sent to you. 
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.￿ 
78 
 
The above-mentioned Generalmajor Alexander Guran, was, just like Doda, a 
native of the Banat Military Border and, as pointed out in Chapter Five, had a 
successful career behind him based on outstanding military skill (several times 
decorated, director of the Kriegsschule, head of the 5
th Division in the k.k. War 
Ministry). At the time of the 1877 Russo-Turkish war, he had been recently 
appointed Director of the Military Geographical Institute in Vienna, in which 
capacity he would to be promoted to the rank of Feldmarschalleutnant in 1878.
79  
His answer to the Romanian authorities￿ invitation to join the Romanian General 
Staff had been, according to Bălăceanu, negative from the very beginning and there 
was little hope of him being prevailed upon.
80 The diplomatic agent￿s persistence 
elicits a possible explanation for this flat refusal: 
 
￿Mr Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova 
Vienna, 16 July 1877 
Guran refuses categorically. Among the Romanian officers [it is a] catastrophe to be 
with the General Staff. There is only Colonel Trapsia left, who is not here. I will 
have his answer the day after tomorrow. 
Bălăceanu￿
81 (underlining mine) 
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Oberstlieutenant Michael Trapsia, the last name on Bălăceanu￿s list, was, 
according to the 1877 entry in his Qualificationsliste, conducting operative and 
special General Staff works in Burnau. The characterization list records a very active 
and busy year for Trapsia. In 1877 he participated in the great General Staff trip in 
Upper Austria (Ober￿sterreich), led the exercises of cartography and reconnaissance 
for the students of the higher artillery and engineering course, as well as functioned 
as a member of the board of examiners for the final examinations in the War 
Academy and for the examinations of the General Staff applicants for the sanitary 
troops. In September 1878 he was sent on a military diplomatic mission as part of 
the commission in charge of border regulation (Grenzregulirung) between Romania 
and Austria-Hungary.
∗ 82   
The answer expected by Bălăceanu from Trapsia is not recorded by any of 
the telegrams in the Brătianu archive. What is recorded, however, is the fact that 
Brătianu was not interested in Trapsia, who was not deemed high enough in the 
military hierarchy to be desirable. However, given Trapsia￿s experience as a 
graduate of the flotilla school at Klosterneuburg, one would have thought he would 
have been a preferred choice with the Romanian authorities, who were about to get 
involved in a war in which most of the battles would be given along, or in the 
proximity of, the Danube. Brătianu￿s hasty discarding of Trapsia as an unsuitable 
candidate goes to show once more that the Romanian authorities in Bucharest knew 
little about the people they were attempting to recruit.  
 
                                                 
∗  ￿1877:  Im Burnau f￿r operative und besondere Generalstabsarbeiten. Hat die gro￿e 
Generalstabsreise in Ober￿sterreich mitgemacht. Hat durch 2 Monate die Mappirungs- und 
Recognoscirungs ￿bungen der Frequentanten des h￿here Artillerie und Genie Courses geleitet; und 
war als Kommissions Mitglied sowohl bei den Schlu￿pr￿fungen der Kriegsschule, als auch bei den 
Pr￿fungen der Stabs Offiziers Aspiranten der Sanit￿tstruppe verwendet. [...] 
1878: Im September in milit￿risch-diplomatischer Mission bei der Grenzregulirungs Commission 
zwichen ￿streich-Ungarn und Rum￿nien am Pruth.￿   293
￿To Mr Bălăceanu, Romanian Agent in Vienna 
Piteşti, 18 July 1877 
Colonel Trapsia￿s name completely unknown here. Besides, if he cannot get 
promoted without delay, he would have no authority over our officers. Impossible to 
write a letter to the Emperor in this respect as we cannot officially ask Austria for a 
general without asking Russia as well. 
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.￿
83 
 
That the Romanian government encouraged and even tried to recruit k.k. 
Romanian officers was by no means a secret. As shown in the report of 13 June 1877 
sent by the military attachØ Captain Josef Manega to the Kriegsministerium  in 
Vienna, on 6 June the Romanian government promulgated a law article stipulating 
that Romanian officers who served in foreign armies could be received into the 
Romanian army with the same rank they held previously and with the same rights as 
enjoyed by all Romanian citizens.
∗∗∗ 84 The same Captain Manega adds that, to his 
knowledge, the names of two k.k. colonels of Romanian origin were circulated in the 
Romanian War Ministry at the time: Urs de Margina, mentioned earlier in the 
chapter in Vincenţiu Babeş￿s letter to Bălăceanu, and a certain Wilhelm Poppovics 
from the artillery.
§85 No mention is made, however, to Doda, Guran, or Trapsia, 
which indicates that these negotiations were kept secret. The same conclusion is 
                                                 
∗∗∗  ￿￿Artikel 1. W￿hrend der Dauer des gegenw￿rtigen Krieges k￿nnen die Officiere rum￿nischer 
Nationalit￿t, die in fremden regul￿ren Armeen gedient haben, in die rum￿nische Armee zugelassen 
werden und schon hiedurch an und f￿r sich, ohne andere Formalit￿t, die Rechte der rum￿nischen 
B￿rger zuerkannt erhalten; es ist gen￿gend, wenn dieselben erkl￿ren, da￿ sie auf jede fremde 
Protektion Verzicht leisten. ￿ Dieselben k￿nnen mit demselben Grade und im demselben Altersrange 
zugelassen werden, die sie in der Armee, in welcher sie dienten, erlangt hatten, in dem sie durch 
authentische Aktenst￿cke sowohl den erlangten Grad, wie auch eine gute Conduite nachweisen. ￿ 
Dieselben werden sich auch des Pensionsrechtes nach den rum￿nischen Gesetzen erfreuen. Artikel 2. 
Die Officiere, die in der rum￿nischen Armee gedient haben und in Demission sich befinden, ohne 
noch pensionirt worden zu sein, k￿nnen, w￿hrend des jetzigen Krieges, in derselben Charge und 
demselben Altersrange aufgenommen werden, die sie bei ihrer Demissionirung bekleideten. Artikel 3. 
Alle dem gegenw￿rtigen Gesetze zuwiderlaufenden Bestimmungen sind und bleiben abrogirt.￿ (Die 
Epoche, Bukarest, den 9. Juni 1977)￿ 
 
§ ￿Ich lege den Abdruck der drei, am 6. Juni sanktionirten Gesetzesartikel, betreffend die Uibernahme 
fremder Offiziere rum￿nischer Nation in rum￿nische Kriegsdienste, mit dem Beif￿gen vor, da￿ 
meines Wissens im hiesigen Kriegsministerium blos die Uibernahme des k.k. Generals [corrected: 
Oberst] Urs und eines k.k. Oberst Popovic, wie verlautet vom Geniecorps, zur Sprache kam.￿   294
supported by the conspicuous absence of any such reference in the apocryphal 
memoirs of King Carol I. 
 
By 1877 the rest of the Border officers under discussion had not attained 
generalcy and were, as such, of less interest to the Romanian authorities. On the 
basis of Qualificationsliste information, one can account for some of them at the 
time of the Russo-Turkish war. Thus, in 1877 Alexander Lupu was a field company 
commander with the rank of Hauptmann 2. Classe (Captain second class) in the 
Infantry Regiment Carl Alexander Gro￿herzog von Sachsen Weimar Eisenach No. 
64.
86 Ladislaus Cenna was a Hauptmann 2. Classe in 1877, when he was transferred 
to the Artillerie Stab ￿beim k. und k. General-Artillerie-Inspector￿.
87 The only one of 
the Romanian generals-to-be for whom there is official evidence that he was in 
Romania at the time of the war (and who, as we saw in the previous chapter, was to 
use this information to ward off accusations of espionage in 1914) was Nikolaus 
Cena, who had been sent there on a military intelligence mission. He was at the time 
an Oberlieutenant wi th th e Inf an try  Regim en t No. 64 i n Tem esv Ær. He al so h ad 
considerable teaching experience in military engineering (Pionierdienst), 
fortifications (Permanente- und Feldbefestigung), and tactics, among other subjects, 
which, apart from the fact that he was a native Romanian, may have influenced the 
decision to send him on this mission in the first place.
88 Thus, his Qualificationsliste 
mentions for the year 1878, under the rubric Verdienste im Frieden (Merits during 
Peacetime), that, 
 
￿in accordance with the order of the k.k. military command in TemesvÆr, 28/2 1878 
Pr￿s. Nr. 234, he travelled through Oltenia [kleine Wallachei] all the way to Craiova 
in civilian clothes in order to ascertain the strength of the Russian and Romanian   295
troops deployed along the southern Austrian border and reconnoitre their 
fortifications.￿
∗ 89 
 
It is only late in Cena￿s life that we find evidence of his consideration for the 
Romanian army, as testified to by Coriolan Buracu, his priest friend in Mehadia. The 
latter notes that Cena￿s ￿yearning to see the Romanian army brought him on 10 May 
1910 to Turnu-Severin, where he watched the Romanian military parade.￿ On this 
occasion he is said to have told the Romanian officers that ￿the young Romanian 
army had such a beautiful past and would have a glorious future￿.
∗∗ 90 After 1918, the 
same Buracu recounts, Cena was received into the Romanian army with the rank of 
general de divizie and decorated with the order ￿Coroana Rom￿niei ￿n gradul de 
mare ofiţer￿. He reportedly wore with great pride the Romanian military uniform and 
this decoration.
91 
 
9.5 Conclusions 
In view of the information presented in this chapter, I argue that the answer 
to the twofold question ￿Did the Romanian authorities try to recruit high-ranking 
Romanian officers from the k.k. army and, conversely, were the latter in any way 
attracted by the prospect of joining the Romanian army?￿ is affirmative and in need 
of qualification.  
Firstly, evidence from various sources points to a lack of skilled command in 
the young Romanian army. Hence the need for foreign officers as instructors, the 
repeated requests for sending officers abroad to attend military manoeuvres, the 
                                                 
∗  ￿1878 Hat zufolge Auftrages des k.k. Milit￿r-Commandos TemesvÆr 28/2 1878 Pr￿s. Nr. 234 durch 
14 Tage die kleine Wallachei bis Krajova im Civile verkleidet bereist, um die St￿rke der l￿ngst der 
￿sterreichischen S￿dgrenze aufgestellten russischen und rum￿nischen Truppen zu erkunden und die 
etwa aufgef￿hrten Befestigungen zu recognoscieren.￿ 
∗∗  ￿Dorul său de a vedea armata rom￿nă l-a dus ￿n a. 1910 (10 mai) la Turnu-Severin, ca să asiste la 
parada militară. Atunci făcuse ofiţerilor rom￿ni declaraţia profetică ￿t￿năra armată rom￿nă are un 
trecut at￿t de frumos, va avea şi un viitor glorios!￿￿   296
conclusions of foreign military guests that the Romanian troop was essentially good 
but only under foreign command, the speeding up of graduation in Romanian 
military schools to make up for an endemic dearth of officers. The presence of 
foreign officers in the Romanian army was, however, problematic as it led to 
diplomatic friction and suspicion. It turned into a polemical matter during the 
Romanian preparations for entering the war in 1877, when accepting a foreign 
commander came to mean overt involvement of one or another power in the conflict 
and was also seen to affect the status of the Principalities at the end of the war. 
Secondly, extant documents indicate that the Bucharest authorities did 
attempt to recruit Romanian officers from the Austro-Hungarian army as early as 
1868 and, more explicitly, on the eve of the 1877 war. My interpretation of the 
archival evidence put forth in the present chapter is that this was not an orchestrated, 
large-scale recruitment campaign spanning the decade before the Russo-Turkish war, 
but rather a case of nominal recruitment, which involved sounding three or four 
officers (the most prominent of them being Doda and Urs de Margina). The 1868-
1869 Hungarian documents alerting against such attempts at recruitment are too 
generic and vague for one to ascertain if more than a couple of cases actually 
occurred. The reference to Romanian members of the so-called action party in 
Bucharest seems to point to the Brătianus and their addresses to Doda and Urs. In 
default of more conclusive evidence, this remains a mere hypothesis.  
Thirdly, Doda and Urs de Margina were ready to join the Romanian army 
when sounded in 1868. Their 1877 refusal was determined by previous rejection 
followed by the belated, one can say almost opportunistic, invitation they received 
on the eve of Romania￿s entering the war in the summer of 1877. There is no 
evidence that I am aware of which throws light on the Romanian authorities￿ refusal   297
to receive the two before 1877. Doda eventually asked for and was refused 
permission from the Emperor to join the Romanian army. He submitted to his 
Emperor￿s wish while continuing to provide the Bucharest authorities with informal 
military and strategic advice. Of the two other Romanian officers who were 
contacted by the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, Guran refused categorically, 
while Trapsia was not considered to be high enough in the military hierarchy to be of 
use.  
If anything, the above quoted documents are more explicit in indicating the 
reasons why these military could NOT or would NOT join the Romanian army, 
rather than the rationale behind their wish to do so. Motivations for refusal range 
from antagonism in reaction to the attitude of the Romanian authorities, tardiness, 
realpolitik on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, to implied unwillingness 
to sacrifice one￿s career and the fastidiousness and inconsistency of the Romanian 
authorities.  
I have dedicated this chapter to an analysis of the telegrams and letters in the 
Brătianu family archive not so much because they bring radically new data in 
comparison to that available in secondary literature as because they constitute a new, 
more comprehensive source of information, which, on the one hand, links up 
previously disparate episodes and suggests a continuity between them, and, on the 
other hand, answers some of the questions set in previous studies and helps change 
modality (probably, perhaps) and hypothesis (it may be that￿) to statement of fact. 
Up to a certain point they bear out the sketchy scenario in the existing bibliography: 
Doda and Urs de Margina were invited to join the Romanian army but the Emperor 
refused to grant permission. The importance of this body of correspondence lies, 
however, in that it provides a more articulate narrative, a definite chronology, as well   298
as an element of intentionality, which is essentially missing in secondary literature 
or, if it does exist, it is the author￿s input. In particular Vincenţiu Babeş￿s letter to 
Bălăceanu is a valuable source as it, on the one hand, widens the picture beyond the 
1877 events and establishes links between seemingly disparate historical episodes 
(the 1868 Hungarian alert and the concomitant sounding of Doda and Urs by the 
Brătianus), and, on the other hand, provides the reader with (indirect) access to these 
officers￿ thoughts and attitudes as expressed not in official statements but in an 
informal discussion between friends. It, moreover, constitutes proof of the wish of 
Doda and Urs de Margina to join the Romanian army even while in active military 
service. To conclude, this archival material clarifies the course of the 1877 
negotiations for a k.k. general and offers vital information concerning the Romanian 
officers￿ actual response to this recruitment initiative.   299
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Chapter 10. Conclusions 
 
The student who conducts research in Romanian archives and libraries on an 
off-mainstream topic requires perseverance to weather loaded questions: who gave 
you this topic? What does your supervisor know about the Military Border? Why is 
he interested in this? Why go to London to do a Ph.D. on a Romanian topic? When I 
started my research and made my first inquiries after primary material regarding 
Banat Border officers, I was told there is little chance of finding anything by way of 
personal testimonies. There is such and such a scholar, I was told, who has done 
some work on inscriptions on religious books from the Banat (Valeriu Leu) and there 
is also this Colonel in Caransebeş (Liviu Groza), who has been writing on the Banat 
Border Regiment.  
My subsequent research showed that there is a wealth of official material in 
the Austrian State Archives relative to these military elites and a part of it can be 
brought to bear on an analysis of personal allegiance. Secondly, a methodical 
approach to research in Romanian archives can result in unexpected archival 
discoveries, which cast new light on old assumptions (as, for instance, the 
involvement of Border officers in the 1877-78 war presented in the previous 
chapter). Thirdly and no less importantly, the slighted and, paradoxically, frequently 
quoted contribution of writers such as Liviu Groza proved, by subsequent research 
into the subject, to be pioneering work of genuine value, despite its at times non-
academic use of sources and the division of labour underlying the research that went 
into it (see his collaboration with Trinţu Măran).    303
The present thesis has taken such secondary literature as its starting point and 
built on it to the extent that its information could be corroborated with primary 
source material. Given that this thesis worked not only with historical facts and 
dates, but also with imponderables such as identity, loyalty, allegiance, the 
epistemological question ￿How does one know about the past?￿, which inevitably 
informs all historical writing, represented the key question in approaching the main 
hypotheses formulated in the introduction. Consequently, the result has not been a 
seamless narrative, but rather the narrativized track record of a four-year research 
process, foregrounding sources (or, as the case may be, the lack thereof), 
highlighting methodological and bibliographical conundrums, and proposing ways of 
circumventing them. 
In the present thesis I have been seesawing between two tiers of historical 
information: primary sources and secondary literature. The more reliable of the two, 
and also that which forms the basis of these conclusions, is the first category of 
sources. However, without the insights from secondary bibliography, the pathways 
of research it outlined, the intriguing and sometimes erroneous assumptions it 
conveyed, I may not have discovered an important part of the archival material that 
went into this thesis. It is worth noting that there are a number of claims made in 
secondary literature for which I have not been able to find corroborating evidence in 
primary sources. Given that, as shown in the course of this thesis, authors such as 
Coriolan Buracu or Liviu Groza are not entirely unreliable, I have chosen to take an 
agnostic view of their unconfirmed, historical or anecdotal, information and mention 
it all the same, with the caveat that evidence is yet to surface which will either bear it 
out or disprove it.   304
This thesis started from the hypothesis that the Banat Military Border elites 
cherished a cultural sense of nation and national identity and sought a modus vivendi 
within the Monarchy in a centripetal movement of allegiance to the Emperor and to 
imperial authorities. The evidence deployed and examined here with a view to 
verifying this hypothesis has led me to the following conclusions: 
 
 All the Border generals for whom I was able to locate extant personal testimony 
demonstrate an unambiguous sense of allegiance to one￿s nation, which they 
conceived of as the Romanian ethnic community within the boundaries of the 
Habsburg Monarchy or, alternatively, as the political nationality represented in the 
Hungarian Parliament.  Consequent to this, they were all (culturally or/and 
politically) involved in ameliorating its condition. This was not unlike the concept of 
Romanian nation shared by a number of Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania and 
the Banat at the time, which was essentially based on an integrationist view of the 
Romanians in the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, intellectuals such as George Bariţiu, 
Ioan Slavici, and Alexandru Mocsonyi militated for the cultural unity of all 
Romanians and encouraged contacts with the Romanian Kingdom but expressly 
rejected all accusations of irredentist tendencies.
1 It is my interpretation in the 
present thesis that the Romanian Banat Border generals, by virtue of their elite status 
and their military profession, shared this view of society, according to which cultural 
unity and development were not coterminous with separate statehood. In the absence 
of soul-searching memoirs testifying to this, the question whether this was making a 
virtue out of necessity or it was an actual, deep-seated belief takes the discussion into 
the realm of psychological speculation. To paraphrase W.H. Auden￿s ironic question 
in the motto of this thesis ￿ ￿Were they free? Were they happy?￿ ￿ the question is   305
certainly not absurd, although it does show the limitations of historical research and 
the epistemological doubt accompanying all interpretation of textual traces of the 
past. 
As a parenthesis to this argument, Slavici￿s personal testimony conveys the 
ambiguity of the concept of unity. In his recollections Slavici deplored the 
accusation of irredentism and, implicitly, that of dishonesty levelled at the 
Transylvanian participants to the 1871 celebration held at Putna Monastery in 
Moldavia. He, thus, pointed out that  
 
￿there were among the Romanians a lot of people who did not doubt that we said 
one thing and thought another, and they ranked us among those who, under the mask 
of fealty, conducted a fierce irredentist propaganda.￿
∗ 2 
 
This view, however, did not exclude the contemplation of future political unity, 
which he presented as the result of an organic process of evolution from cultural to 
political unity.
3 
Conversely, in 1909 Take Ionescu, one of the Conservative politicians in the 
Romanian Kingdom, expressed in conversation with R.W. Seton-Watson a 
Realpolitik rationale for preserving the unity of Austria-Hungary and foregoing what 
he saw as the dream of all Romanians:  
 
￿There is not a single Romanian who does not dream of Greater Romania and the 
unity of the race. Those who deny this are not telling the truth, or else are merely 
giving meaningless official assurances. At the same time there is not a single man 
with a grain of commonsense in the country who does not realize that this dream can 
only be realized through the collapse of Austria-Hungary, and this would create an 
infinitely more dangerous situation for the Romanians. Unity is, therefore, an 
attractive dream, but does not lie in the interest of the Romanian people itself.￿
4  
                                                 
∗  ￿erau ￿ntre rom￿ni o mulţime de oameni, care nu se ￿ndoiau, că una g￿ndim şi alta zicem, şi ne 
puneau ￿n r￿ndul celor ce sub masca lealităţii fac cea mai ￿nd￿rjită propagandă iredentistă.￿   306
 
It is difficult to assess where, on a gradient running from complete loyalty to 
Realpolitik, the Banat Border generals￿ allegiance to the Monarchy was situated. 
Most probably, and also varying according to individual character, a sober type of 
loyalty was the case.  
 
Although reported evidence seems to suggest that some of these officers were ready 
to join the young Romanian army in the late 1860s and also that they were courted 
by the Romanian government on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the 
circumstances and reasons for the failure of these projects to materialize remain 
obscure. As such, this evidence continues to be intriguing but cannot be used as 
irrefutable proof of irredentist tendencies on the part of these officers. 
 
A corporate sense of identity and adherence to the code of honour of the k.u.k. 
officer corps becomes evident either in overt statements or, more often than not, in 
indirect allusions to military status and values. Moreover, as is apparent in the case 
of GM Trajan Doda and FML Nikolaus Cena, membership to the officer corps 
bestowed on one a double identity, civil and military, by virtue of which they could 
appeal to the imperial military authorities and thus circumvent, or apply pressure on, 
the civil authorities in case of an investigation or a trial. This also enhanced their 
elite status and their prestige in the eyes of the Romanian community as they were 
perceived to have a direct line to the Emperor and, as such, to be in a better position 
to press social or national claims. While the actual efficiency of this political strategy 
is difficult to substantiate, there is, at least in the case of Trajan Doda, conclusive 
documentary evidence of intense petitionary activity on behalf of the Banat Border 
community,
5 just as there is proof of his contemporaries￿ perception of his military   307
status as a potential trump card in the context of Romanian national politics in the 
Empire. 
 
Particularly in moments of crisis, but not only, the examined generals expressed 
allegiance to Emperor, Fatherland, and State, and a concern for the preservation of 
the Monarchy and the peaceful cohabitation of all the peoples in it. Evidence to the 
contrary exists only in the form of uncorroborated accounts in secondary literature. 
Thus, Michael Trapsia is said to have expressed in his autobiographical notes 
criticism of the attempts at germanization of the Banat Border population by the 
Habsburg authorities and of the pragmatic function of the Military Border, which 
failed to ￿create a civilization￿.
6 In Cena￿s case, Coriolan Buracu recounts the latter￿s 
emotional reception of the first Romanian gendarmes who reached the Banat after 
the end of the First World War.
7 Such reported testimonies run as an undercurrent to 
the official and personal expressions of allegiance invoked in this thesis. My 
interpretation is that, while the Monarchy lasted, the Banat Border Generals adhered 
to it and believed in it, and this did not exclude overt or veiled criticism on their part. 
 
After 1918, the elite status of those officers who survived the war and had their 
domicile in the newly enlarged Romanian state, was preserved to a certain extent, 
although it became parochial in relation to the new political centre: Cena was 
received into the Romanian army with the same rank, but did not play any leading 
role in Greater Romania (not the least of reasons being his advanced age); he was 
placed in charge of the commission for historical monuments in the Banat, whose 
presidency he gave up in 1921;
8 Georg Domaschnian, who, just like Cena, was 
received into the Romanian army with the same rank as held in the Austro-  308
Hungarian army, ran for a seat in the Romanian Parliament but failed to obtain it. As 
a contemporary article pointed out, this was allegedly due to political machinations 
on the part of one of the Romanian ministers.
9 For a short period of time, between 
March and December 1929, he was mayor of Timişoara.
10 
  Given that the present thesis focused on those Banat Border officers who 
reached the rank of general within the k.(u.)k. army and given, moreover, that by 
1918 the great majority of them had already retired, it falls outside the scope of this 
analysis to account for their life in the enlarged Romanian state or elsewhere. In 
those cases where I came across evidence of some of these generals￿ post-1918 
career, I specified this in the course of the thesis. It would be interesting to know 
how the dissolution of the k.u.k army affected those Romanian officers who were 
still active and mid-career by 1918-1919, whether they opted to remain part of the 
rump Austrian army or they changed flags and allegiance and integrated into the 
Romanian army; once there, how were they viewed by their peers and their 
superiors? All these questions, however, will have to be answered in a future study.  
The officers that formed the subject of the present thesis were the most 
socially and professionally advanced product of the Military Border in the Banat, an 
elite among their co-nationals in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as within the 
k.u.k officer corps. To this day, Doda, Trapsia, Cena, Domaschnian continue to be 
local heroes, with streets and institutions named after them in Caransebeş, Mehadia, 
and Timişoara. In the territory of the former Banat Border Regiment no. 13, Grenzer 
identity endures to this day, having survived land reform in the 1920s
11 and 
weathered the communist onslaught. 
The Border generals￿ identity evinces the sort of complexity that is easily 
oversimplified by circumscription to either a national or an imperial conceptual   309
framework. The present thesis has sought to chart the evolution of the historical 
institution that shaped their native community, the myths they lived by, and the web 
of social, political, and legal relations within which they pursued their military 
careers. More importantly, the thesis has provided an account of the intricate pattern 
of personal and professional allegiance which bound them to the Monarchy and to 
their ethnic community at a time when Greater Romanian ideas and political 
irredentism, although existent, were a distant, utopian prospect, while the social, 
political, and legal context of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the day-to-day 
tangible reality. They were not completely a-national and a-political, as some, 
though by no means all, Austrian military documents made them out to be, nor were 
they Romanians under foreign yoke in tense anticipation of the eventual reunion 
with their brethren. They were born and spent the best part of their lives (in some 
cases, their entire life) in the Habsburg, later Austro-Hungarian, Monarchy; they 
were schooled in the military institutions of the Monarchy; they swore allegiance to 
Emperor and Fatherland and acted on it; those belonging to an earlier generation 
took part in the 1848-1849 upheavals; the later generation was weaned on family 
stories of it; they lived under the Dualist system and saw the introduction of 
constitutionalism and parliamentarism; they were in contact with members of the 
Romanian intelligentsia as well as rubbed shoulders with the other nationalities of 
the Empire and witnessed their national claims. Despite the common assumption that 
k.u.k. officers were a-political or disdainful of politics or, indeed, beyond 
nationalism, the paradox remains that, as members of the military profession, they 
were in a better position than most others to comment on political and national issues 
within the Monarchy as well as on problems of foreign policy.
12 The evidence 
deployed in this thesis has shown that military status did not amount to an ivory   310
tower of blind Kaisertreue and that, while retaining loyalty, these officers were also 
involved with (more often than not, cultural) politics in the Empire. 
The militarized borderland community from which these generals originated 
developed out of the duality of being at the margin of the Empire and, yet, for 
strategic reasons, in close connection with the imperial centre.
13 The Roman past of 
the region, rediscovered and invested with new symbolic meaning in the nineteenth 
century, may not have functioned as anything more than a badge of historical 
identity, but in one respect it can be invoked when assessing these officers￿ identity. 
Theirs was a Janus-type of identity: they were integrated enough to be looking up to 
the Monarch with loyalty and fight for the preservation of the Monarchy, but, by 
virtue of their very military status, they were also aware of the greater picture, of the 
rise of nations and nation-states.   311
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1) Appendix to Chapter Five: 
Index of Banat Border Generals in the k.(u.)k. army 
 
  
Date of 
birth 
 
 
 
Name 
(German and Romanian 
spelling) 
 
 
Personal details, 
education and studies 
before entering the 
imperial army 
 
Final Rank, 
Retirement and 
date of death 
1 1822  Trajan  Doda 
(Traian Doda) 
 
 
Katholisch 
Offizierssohn ohne 
Verm￿gen. Z￿gling der 
Wiener Neust￿dter 
Akademie. Finanziell 
geordnet. 
GM 1870 
+ am 16 Juli 1895 in 
Karansebes 
 
2 1824  Alexander  Guran 
(Alexandru Guran) 
 
 
 
R￿misch-katholisch 
 
Sohn eines k.k. 
Offizieres. Hat die 
Milit￿r-Akademie zu 
Wiener-Neustadt 
frequentiert und trat als 
der Erste aus dem 
h￿heren Curse 
F.M.L. 1./5. 1878 
 
+ am 18. Mai 1888 in 
Wien 
 
 
 
 
3 1834  Aron  Bihoy 
(Aron Bihoi) 
 
griechisch-orientalisch 
Sohn eines k.k. 
Offiziers, besuchte die 
Normal- und Ober-
Schule zu Weisskirchen 
im Banate und 1848 die 
ehemalige milit￿rische 
mathematische Schule 
zu Karansebes mit 
gutem Erfolge. 
 
G.M.  
1./4. 1892 ad hon. 
 
Gest. am 7. August 
1901 in Broos (Rom. 
Orastie) 
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4  1836  Theodor Ritter v. 
Seracsin 
(Teodor Seracin) 
 
 
 
Gr. Orientalisch 
Offizierssohn, Z￿gling 
der Wr Neust￿dter 
Milit￿r Akademie, 
welche er mit Vorzug 
absolvirte 
 
F.M.L. 1./5. 1893 
 
+ am 12. April 1901 in 
Karansebes 
 
5 1838  Alexander  Lupu 
(Alexandru Lupu) 
 
 
 
griechisch-orientalisch 
 
Sohn eines B￿rgers; hat 
die mathematische 
Schule zu Karansebes 
als Zahlz￿gling mit 
Vorzug absolvirt 
 
GM 
 25./2. 1908 T. u. Ch. 
+ Wien 
 
 
 
 
 
6  1838  Michael Ritter von 
Trapsia 
(Mihail Trapşa) 
 
 
 
 
Griechisch- 
Nicht unirt 
Offizierssohn, hat die 
bestandene 
Flotillenschule zu 
Klosterneuburg mit 
vorz￿glichem Erfolge 
absolvirt. 
 
1855-1859: Artillerie 
Akademie 
 
1861-1863: 
Kriegsschule 
G.M.:  1./11.  1885   
(3./11. 1885) 
Gest. am 3. Mai 1896 
in Graz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 1844  Ladislaus  Cenna 
(Ladislau Cena) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sohn eines k.k. 
Lieutenants; 
 
Hat seine Erziehung in 
Milit￿r-Bildungs 
Anstalten erhalten; 
 
1856-1860: die 
Obererziehungsschule 
zu Kamenitz; 
FML: 1./15. 1902 
 
 
28. M￿rz 1914 
gestorben in Wien. 
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griechisch nicht unirt 
 
1860-1862: Artillerie-
schul Compagnie zu 
Krakau; 
1862-1865: die 
Artillerie-Akademie zu 
M￿hrisch-Weisskirchen 
1868-1870: der h￿here 
Artillerie Curs 
1866/7: die Regiments-
Equitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 1844  Nikolaus   
Cena 
(Nicolai/Nicolae Cena) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
griechisch-orientalisch 
Sohn eines k.k. 
Officiers; hat die 
Pionierschule zu Tulln 
mit sehr gutem Erfolge 
absolviert /: 1860-
1863:/ 
 
die Infanterie Equitation 
zu Erlau im Jahre 1872 
mit gutem Erfolge. 1889 
den Stabsofficiers-Curs 
mit entsprechendem 
Erfolge absolviert. 
 
 
FML  
T.u.Ch. 
(17.06.1908) 
 
Pens. 1.08.1904 
 
Gestorben 
14.03.1922  
9  1850  Daniel Mataringa von 
BÆnya 
(Daniel Matăr￿nga) 
  GM 
Pens. 1.1. 1913 
Pension: 13000 K 
Gestorben 22. 
April 1918 in 
Wien. 
 
10 1851  Johann  Iovesko 
(Ion Iovescu) 
 
Sohn eines Grenzers. 
Hat als Z￿gling die 
Grenz Milit￿rsschule in 
Karansebes mit 
vorz￿glichem Erfolge 
absolvirt. 
GM 
26/2 1912 T.u.Ch 
 
Pens. 1.11.1909 
 
Domicil und Evidenz   315
Beh￿rden Graz 
 
11 1852  Jenakie  John 
(Ienache Ion) 
  GM (23.12.1910) 
 
Pens. 23 Mai 1912 
 
Domicil und 
Evidenz-Beh￿rden: 
Orsova 
 
Pension: 13 000 
Kr. 
12  1852  Michael Schandru von 
KismihÆldy 
(Mihail Şandru) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FML (1.05.1911) 
 
Domizil Wien 
13  1854  Nikolaus Logoschan von 
KarÆnsebes 
(Nicolae Lugojanu) 
 
 
Katholisch 
 
  GM (1.11.1917) 
 
Pens. 1.01.1919 
 
Gestorben 
27.03.1927 
Hermannstadt 
14 1867  Trajan  Bacsila 
(Traian Băcilă) 
 
 
griechisch orientalisch 
Sohn eines k.k. 
Oberlieutenants, hat die 
Milit￿r-Unter- und 
Milit￿r-Ober-
Realschule, dann die kk 
Milit￿r-Akademie in 
Wr-Neustadt mit gutem 
Erfolge frequentirt. 
GM:  
1. VIII 1917 
 
10/6 1931 ￿ gestorben 
in Wien 
15 1868  Georg  Domaschnian 
(Gheorghe Domăşneanu) 
 
Sohn eines Steueramts-
Offizials, hat die 
Milit￿r-Unterrealschule, 
GM: 1. VIII. 1917, 
7.IX. 1917 
1. J￿n. 1919   316
 
 
 
 
Griechisch-orientalisch 
die Milit￿r-
Oberrealschule und die 
Theresianische 
Milit￿rakademie mit 
sehr gutem Erfolg 
absolviert. 
 
pensionirt 
Gestorben: 
18.9.1940, 
Timişoara 
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2) Appendices to Chapter Seven 
 
2.1. Doda￿s account of the 1873 electoral meeting 
(OeStA, KA, KM Pr￿s 1874, Aktenzahl 9 ￿ 2/2) 
 
 
Rede, 
gehalten am 26. November, 8. Dezember 1873 in einer 
Versammlung von W￿hlern des Wahlkreises Caransebes 
 
Meine Herren! 
Sie wissen warum sie versammelt sind. 
Sie wollen mich zum Deputirten f￿r den Landtag candidiren. Ist es so? 
(Ant. So ist es!) 
Und sie wollen mein politisches Glaubensbekenntniss oder mein Programm kennen? 
(Ant. Wir bitten darum.) 
Gut! Aber vor Allem habe ich eine Erkl￿rung abzugeben und eine Frage zu stellen. 
Die Erkl￿rung ist: 
Nach meiner ￿berzeugung und nach meinen constitutionellen Grunds￿tzen, 
finde ich es nicht f￿r recht, dass auch die Regierung ihre Candidaten aufstelle. 
Die Regierung kann durch ihren Einfluss und durch Mittel, die ihr zu 
Verf￿gung stehen, leicht ihren Candidaten zum Siege verhelfen und hiedurch die 
Stimme des Volkes f￿lschen; da ein durch den Einfluss und die Mittel der Regierung 
gew￿hlter Deputirter nicht der Vertreter des Volkes, sondern der Vertreter der 
Regierung ist. 
Das System des wahren Constitutionalismus fordert, dass das Volk an der 
Gesetzgebung durch seine aus freien Wahlen hervorgegangenen Vertreter Theil 
nehme, welche sonach den wahren Ausdruck des Volkswillens sein sollen.  
 
Da ich mich an den wahren, ungef￿lschten Constitutionalismus halte, so 
erkl￿re ich hiemit: dass ich eine officielle Candidatur oder jene der 
Regierungsparthei nicht annehme.   318
Dies war meine Erkl￿rung. 
Meine Frage ist: 
Sind Sie hier als Parthei, z. B. als Regierungsparthei oder nur als einfache 
W￿hler des Wahlkreises Caransebes versammelt? 
Wollen Sie mich daher als den Candidaten der Regierungsparthei oder als 
den Candidaten des Volkes aufstellen? 
(Allgemeines Schweigen.) 
Ich bitte um eine deutliche Antwort, denn meine Frage war bestimmt genug. 
(Nach dieser Aufforderung erkl￿rte Herr I. Jonasiu, dass insoweit er wisse, 
hier nicht Partheien sich versammelt haben, sondern nur einfache W￿hler des 
Kreises Caransebes, einfache W￿hler aus dem Volke, welches in diesem Wahlkreise 
eine eizige Parthei bildet, und bat mich die Candidatur zum Volksdeputirten f￿r den 
Landtag anzunehmen. 
Herr Ign. Paulovics erkl￿rte sodann ebenfalls, dass obwohl die einzelnen hier 
anwesenden W￿hler verschiedenen politischen Partheien und zwar: der Regierungs- 
und der nationalen Parthei angeh￿ren; sie hier dennoch nicht als Parthei sondern nur 
als einfache W￿hler versammelt sind, welche w￿nschen mei Programm zu h￿ren.) 
Meine Herren! Nach dem eben Geh￿rten, bitte ich wiederholt um bestimmte 
Antwort: ob die Versammlung mir die Candidatur von Seite der Regierungsparthei 
oder von Seiten des Volkes antr￿gt? 
(Die Versammlung antwortete hierauf mit Einstimmigkeit, dass sie mich 
einzig und allein nur als den Candidaten des Volkes aufstelle.) 
Weil Sie eben erkl￿rten, dass Sie mich einzig und allein nur als den 
Candidaten des Volkes aufstellen; so nehme ich unter dieser ausdr￿cklichen 
Bedingung die Candidatur an. 
Jetzt meine Herren! wollen Sie mein Programm h￿ren: 
1. Ich bin treu Sr. Majest￿t dem Kaiser und K￿nig; ich erlaube Niemanden 
daran zu zweifeln. 
2. Ich habe die Integrit￿t des Gesammtvaterlandes vertheidigt ￿ und werde 
sie auch k￿nftighin nach meinen Kr￿ften vertheidigen; 
3. Im Landtage werde ich die Regierung dann unterst￿tzen, wenn sie im 
Interesse der V￿lker arbeitet; ich werde ihr aber Opposition machen, wenn sie gegen 
dieses Interesse wirkt.   319
4. Den zwischen Oesterreich und Ungarn im Jahre 1867 geschlossenen 
Ausgleichspact erkenne ich an, gerade so wie ich auch alle in Geltung befindlichen, 
von Sr. Majest￿t sanctionirten Gesetze anerkenne. 
5. Jetzt komme ich zum wichtigsten Punkte meines Programmes zum 
Nationalit￿ten-Gesetz. 
Meine Herren! Es ist Ihnen bekannt, dass die nichtmagyarischen V￿lker mit 
ihrem jetzigen Loose nicht zufrieden sind. Ich bin ￿berzeugt, dass die Hauptursache 
ihrer Unzufriedenheit aus der Missachtung ihrer Sprache, aus dem Mangel eines 
gerechten, auf dem gleichen Rechte fassenden Nationalit￿ten-Gesetzes entspringt. 
Das jetzige Gesetz ist ungen￿gend, ungerecht und muss derart reformirt 
werden, damit im selben alle V￿lker ihre nationale Existenz und Entwicklung 
gew￿hrleistet finden. 
Dieses Gesetz muss mit einem Worte die Gleichberechtigung  aller 
Nationalit￿ten in sich fassen. 
Jede Nationalit￿t hat das Recht ihre Jugend in ihrer Muttersprache zu 
unterrichten und auszubilden. 
Demgem￿ss m￿ssen die Deutschen deutsche, die Romanen romanische, die 
Serben serbische, die Slovaken slovakische Schulen haben, mit einer Worte: alle 
Nationalit￿ten in ihrer Sprache. 
Aber der nationale Unterricht und die nationale Bildung haben sich nicht auf 
die sogenannten Volks- und B￿rgerschulen zu beschr￿nken; sondern sie m￿ssen sich 
auch auf die h￿heren Anstalten, die Universit￿ten inbegriffen, ausdehnen. 
Mit einem Worte alle Schulen m￿ssen nationale Schulen sein. 
Wenn eine Nationalit￿t nicht die Mittel zur Erhaltung dieser Schulen besitzt; 
dann ist der Staat verpflichtet die hiezu n￿thigen Mittel aus der Staatskasse zu 
geben. Denn, wenn wir gut sind, unser Hab￿ und Gut, unser Leben zur Erhaltung des 
Staates zu geben; so ist auch der Staat verpflichtet, uns, die zur Entwicklung unserer 
nationalen Cultur nothwendigen Mittel zu geben. 
Ich behaupte weiter, dass es nicht gen￿gend sei, dass die Sprache des Volkes 
in Nationalschulen gelehrt und cultivirt werde; sondern es muss diese Sprache auch 
in das ￿ffentliche Leben eingef￿hrt und im selben angewendet werden. 
Ich verlange desshalb, dass bei allen Aemtern, mit welchen das Volk in 
direkte Verbindung k￿mmt, die Sprache des betreffenden Volkes gebracht werde: in 
Folge dessen muss das Volk sowohl in der Gemeinde als auch mit den Stuhlbezirken,   320
mit den Comitaten, mit allen Gerichtsbeh￿rden und auch mit den Ministerien in 
seiner nationalen Sprache verkehren. 
Durch Vorbesagtes will ich durchaus nicht das Recht der f￿hrenden, d. i. der 
magyarischen Nation verletzen: sondern bin ich daf￿r, dass die magyarische Sprache 
die Regierungs- und die Gesetzgebungs-Sprache bleibe. 
Ich glaube, dass Jedermann diese Forderungen als gerechte anerkennen 
werde, jene Beamte vielleicht ausgenommen, welche die Sprache jenes Volkes, in 
dessen Mitte sie functioniren, - nicht erlernen wollen. ￿  
6. Meine Herren! 
Ihnen ist die traurige Lage unserer Finanzen bekannt. 
Sie wissen, dass um die ungeheueren Ausgaben und Deficite des Staates zu 
decken, wir ein Anlehen von 153 Millionen Gulden machen mussten. 
Neuesten Nachrichten zu Folge soll auch dieses Anlehen ungen￿gend sein 
und sollen wir im k￿nftigen Jahre ein noch zu bedeckendes Deficit haben. Wir haben 
keinen Credit und ohne die Staatsg￿ter, welche als Garantie des Anlehens dienen, 
h￿tten wir kein Geld bekommen. 
Es ist f￿r uns eine gebieterische Nothwendigkeit , eine Bedingung der 
Existenz, dass wir so bald als m￿glich das Gleichgewicht zwischen Einnahmen und 
Ausgaben herstellen. 
Wir haben im Lande zu viele Beamte; wir haben auch viele gut gezahlte 
Sinecuren. 
Um das erw￿hnte Gleichgewicht zu erreichen, ist es nicht gen￿gend grosse 
Reducirungen vorzunehmen, sondern wir m￿ssen den ganzen Staatshaushalt, wir 
m￿ssen das ganze Verwaltungs-System reorganisiren: denn das bisherige System 
f￿hrt uns zum Verderben, mit demselben werden wir das ersehnte Gleichgewicht 
zwischen Einnahmen und Ausgaben nie erzielen. 
Die directen Steuern sind genug dr￿ckend und k￿nnen dermalen nicht erh￿ht 
werden. 
Alle Bestrebungen der Regierung und des Landtages m￿ssen auf das 
Auffr￿hen, auf das Gl￿ck und nicht auf die Ueberlastung der V￿lker gerichtet sein. 
Wir m￿ssen ehrlich arbeiten und in allen Zweigen des ￿ffentlichen Lebens, 
so viel als nur m￿glich sparsam sein.   321
Wir m￿ssen gen￿gend verwalten und weniger Politik treiben, - denn die 
Politik beherrscht die Regierung, den Landtag und die Beamten mehr als der 
materielle, geistige und moralische Fortschritt der V￿lker. 
Ich k￿nnte noch ￿ber andere Fragen sprechen, glaube aber, dass das 
Entwickelte gen￿gt. 
Mehrere W￿hler haben mich ersucht, dass ich in keinem Falle von der 
Candidatur zur￿cktreten soll. 
Ich erkl￿re hiemit, dass ich aus von mir anh￿ngenden Ursachen nicht 
zur￿cktreten werde, - ausser das mich eine h￿here Macht oder ein h￿herer Wille 
dazu zw￿nge. 
Meine Herren! ich habe geendet.  
________________________________________ 
(Hierauf dankte Herr Paulovic f￿r das entwickelte Programm und schloss, - 
indem er der Ueberzeugung Worte lieh, dass er Jedem der Anwesenden aus dem 
Herzen spreche, mit: ￿Es lebe der Herr General Trajan Doda, unser Candidat zum 
Landtagsdeputirten.￿ 
Darauf wurde unter lebhaften Beifallsrufen der ganzen Versammlung meine 
Candidatur als Lantagsdeputirter des Volkes aus dem Severiner Comitat einstimmig 
proclamirt.) 
Meine Herren! Ich danke Ihnen f￿r das Vertrauen, welches Sie mir entgegen 
tragen, und ich versichere Sie, dass ich im Landtage nach meinen Kenntnissen und 
Kr￿ften stets f￿r das Wohl des Landes und der V￿lker arbeiten werde. 
(Hierauf l￿ste sich die Versammlung unter lebhaften Vivat-Rufen.) ￿  
Caransebes, 26. November (8. Dezember) 1873. 
Traja Doda,  
k.k. Generalmajor 
 
 
Translation: 
 
￿Gentlemen! 
You know why you have gathered here. 
You intend to offer me the MP candidacy for the Diet. Is this so?￿ 
Answer: It is so.   322
￿And you would like to know my political convictions and my programme?￿ 
Answer: Please do let us know. 
￿Very well. I shall make a statement and ask you a question. 
My statement is: 
According to my conviction and constitutional principles, I consider it unjust for the 
government to put forward its own candidates. 
The government can, through its influence and the means it possesses, help his own 
candidates to win and thereby falsify the vote of the people, for an MP elected 
through the influence and means of the government is not the representative of the 
people but that of the government. 
A genuine constitutional system requires that the people should participate in the 
process of law making through its freely elected representatives, who should thus be 
the real expression of the people￿s will.  
And as I am a supporter of genuine, unfalsified constitutionalism I declare that I will 
not accept an official candidacy or that of the governmental party. 
This has been my statement. 
 
My question is: 
Are you here gathered as a party, as, for instance, a governmental party, or as mere 
voters of the Caransebes electoral district? 
Do you want me to be a candidate of the governmental party or a candidate of the 
people? 
(General silence) 
Please give me a definite answer for my question was clear enough.￿ 
After this exhortation, Mr Ionaşiu stated that, as far as he knew, there were no parties 
gathered there, only ordinary voters from among the people, who in this district 
formed a single party, and he asked me to be the people￿s MP candidate for the Diet. 
The engineer Paulovici then added that, although some of the voters that gathered 
here do belong to various parties, that is, the governmental and the national party, 
they are nevertheless gathered here as ordinary voters, not as a party and would like 
to listen to my programme. 
￿Gentlemen! These having been said, I would like to ask you once again to give me a 
definite answer: does the assembly offer me the candidacy on behalf of the 
governmental party or on behalf of the people?￿   323
To this the assembly answers unanimously that they are offering me the candidacy 
only on behalf of the people. 
 
￿As you have declared that you are supporting my candidacy only on behalf of the 
people, I accept it on the following express conditions: 
Gentlemen, here is my programme: 
 
1.  I am faithful to His Majesty the Emperor and King and I will not 
allow anyone to doubt this. 
2.  I have defended the integrity of the fatherland and will go on 
defending it in the future to the best of my abilities. 
3.  In the Diet I will support the government if it works for the people, 
but I will be against it, if it works against these interests. 
4.  I recognize the 1867 pact concluded between Austria and Hungary 
as I do all currently valid laws which bear His Majesty￿s sanction. 
5.  I now come to the most important point of my programme, which 
is the nationality law. 
 
Gentlemen! It is well known to you that the non-Hungarian peoples are not content 
with today￿s situation. I am convinced that their main reason for discontent lies in 
the disregard for language, given the lack of a just law of nationalities based on 
equal rights. 
Today￿s law is insufficient, unjust and must be modified so that everyone should 
find in it the guarantee of their national existence and development. 
This law should essentially stipulate the equality of rights for all nationalities. 
Each nationality has the right to educate and develop its youth in their mother 
tongue. 
On this premise, the Germans should have German schools, the Romanians, 
Romanian schools, the Serbs, Serbian schools, the Slovaks, Slovakian schools, in 
short, each nationality should have schools in its language. 
 
National education and development should not, however, be confined to popular 
and civil schools, they should be extended to higher institutions, including 
universities.   324
 
In short, all schools should be national schools.  
 
If a nationality does not have the necessary means to maintain these schools, it is the 
State￿s duty to provide out of the State treasury the means they need. For if we are 
liable to contributing to the support of the State with all our wealth and our life, then 
the State is, in its turn, in duty bound to give us the necessary means for our cultural 
national development. 
I moreover consider that it is not enough that the language of the people be learnt 
and cultivated in national schools but should also be introduced and used in public 
life. 
I therefore maintain that all authorities with whom the people come into contact 
should use the language of that respective people; consequently, the people should 
communicate in their national language with the communal authorities as well as 
with the districts and counties, with all legal authorities and with the Ministries. 
I thereby mean to bring no offence to the right of the dominant nation, that is, the 
Hungarian nation, for I am in favour that Hungarian should remain and language of 
the government and legislation. 
I believe everybody recognizes the justice of these postulates with the exception of 
the civil servants, who do not want learn the language of the people in the midst of 
whom they work. 
 
Gentlemen! 
You are acquainted with our sad financial situation. 
You know that, in order to cover the huge expenses and deficits of the State, we had 
to take out a loan of 153 million florins. 
According to the latest news, not even this loan is enough and in the future we will 
have to cover a new deficit. We don￿t have any credit and without the state goods, 
which are the loan guarantee, we would not have received any money. 
It is absolutely necessary for us that we restore sooner rather than later the balance 
between expenses and incomes. 
We have too many civil servants and too many well paid positions. 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned balance, it is not enough to have personnel 
reductions; it is also necessary to reorganize public management and administration   325
as a whole; because the system which has been in place until now is leading us to the 
ruin. With it we will never be able to achieve the balance between incomes and 
expenses. 
Direct taxation is burdensome as it is and cannot be increased anymore. 
All the endeavours of the government and of the Diet should be directed towards the 
good and not the oppression of the people. 
We must work honestly and in all branches of public life we should be, as far as 
possible, less heavy-handed/ or lenient (Rom. cruţători).  
Let us engage more in administration and less in politics, for it is politics that the 
government, the Diet and the civil servants are preoccupied by rather than the 
material, spiritual and moral progress of the people. 
I could speak of other problems as well. But I think what I have said so far is 
enough. 
Several voters asked me not to withdraw my candidacy no matter what happened. 
I here declare that I will not withdraw it out of my own accord, but only if I should 
be constrained to it by a superior power or will. 
Gentlemen, I have finished.￿ 
 
On this, Mr Paulovici gives thanks for the presented programme and, expressing his 
conviction he speaks on behalf of everyone present, concludes ￿Long live General 
Traian Doda, our MP candidate for the Diet!￿ 
After this, amidst stormy applause, the whole assembly proclaimed my candidacy as 
the people￿s MP for the Diet for the Severin County. 
￿Gentlemen, I thank you for your confidence and I assure you that in the Diet I will 
always work towards the good of the country and of the peoples to the best of my 
abilities and knowledge.￿ 
The meeting came to an end amidst shouts of ￿vivat￿. 
 
Caransebes, 26 November (8 December) 1873. 
Traian Doda, 
Imperial and royal General Major. 
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2.2. Doda￿s 1874 Report to the Military Command in 
TemesvÆr  
 
OeStA, KA, Kriegsministerium Pr￿sidium, Jahr 1874, Aktenzahl 9 ￿ 2/2. 
(P.1 recto) 
 
Trajan Doda, k.k. Generalmajor des Ruhestandes 
 
An 
Das k.k. Milit￿r-Commando 
TemesvÆr 
 
Caransebes, 26. J￿nner 1874 
 
Im Auftrage Pr￿s. No. 128 vom 20. J￿nner Folge leistend und mit Bezug auf die in 
der Neuen TemesvÆrer Zeitung vom 20 J￿nner an mich gerichtete Interpellation habe 
ich die Ehre Folgendes zu berichten: 
 
 
1. Sollte es wahr sein, da￿ die zur Reichstags-Rechten sich bekennenden 
W￿hler des Caransebeser Wahlkreises mich zu allererst zum Reichstags-
Candidaten auserkoren haben; so ist mir davon nichts bekannt geworden. Die 
sogenannte Regierungsparthei hat es nicht der M￿he werth gehalten, mich 
hievon zu verst￿ndingen und mir die Candidatur anzutragen, da doch die 
Annahme oder Ablehnung (page 1 verso) derselben nur von mir abhing. 
2.  Es ist wahr, da￿ ich schon im Oktober 1873 die Candidatur angenommen 
habe und zwar auf wiederholtes Bitten der sogenannten nationalen oder 
Volksparthei. 
 
Nicht ein einziger W￿hler der Deak-Partei (denn von einer Regierungspartei, war, so 
viel mir bekannt, damals noch nicht die Rede), hat mir diese Candidatur angetragen.  
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Der hiesige B￿rgermeister Brancoviciu, welcher damals der Deak-Partei angeh￿rte, 
hat, als ich ihm vor meiner am 14. Oktober v.J. erfolgten Abfahrt nach Wien, einen 
Besuch abstattete, mich gebeten die Candidatur anzunehmen. Ich erwiederte ihm, 
da￿ ich diese schon l￿ngst angenommen habe, d.i. jene der Nationalen. 
Es ist ￿brigens hier und im ganzen Comitate bekannt, da￿ im Oktober und 
November v.J. nicht ich, sondern der Herr Ladislaus (p.2 recto) Szende der Candidat 
der Deak-Partei war. ￿ Beweis sein Programm, das er am 22. November 1873 
ver￿ffentlichte. 
3. Es ist mehr als Frechheit zu behaupten, da￿ ich erst nach einem 
6w￿chentlichen Nachdenken mich endlich entschlossen habe, mein 
Programm am 8. Dezember zu entwickeln. 
Ich bewundere den Pamphletisten, der auf einem nur ihm bekannten Wege, meine 
Gehirnth￿tigkeit controllieren konnte. 
 
Von dem Zeitpunkt der Annahme der durch die nationale Partei mir angetragenen 
Candidatur bis zum 8. Dezbr habe ich die Weltausstellung mit aller Mu￿e genossen, 
zwei Wochen im Cerna-Thale zugebracht, an alles M￿gliche nur nicht an ein 
Programm gedacht, schon deshalb (p.2 verso) nicht, weil diejenigen, welche bisher 
mich candidirten ￿ die Nationalen n￿mlich ￿ ein Programm von mir nicht verlangten, 
viel mehr mir sagten, da￿ meine Vergangenheit f￿r sie das sch￿nste Programm w￿re.  
 
4.  Wie es dazu kam, da￿ ich doch ein Programm von Rappel lie￿, will ich jetzt, 
so kurz wie m￿glich schildern. 
Ich befand mich vom 12. bis 23. Ober (Oktober?) im Herkullesbade. An eine der 
letzten Tage dieses Aufenthaltes teilte mir der Oberst Rottar mit, da￿ laut eines 
Briefes des Severiner-Obergespanns ich von der Regierungspartei in Caransebes mit 
Ungeduld erwartet werde, da￿ ich mein Programm noch nicht ver￿ffentlicht habe, da 
die Wahlen doch vor der Th￿re seien. 
Rottar ward ersucht, mich zu bewegen, da￿ ich sobald als m￿glich nach Caransebes 
zur￿ckkehre. 
 
(p.3 recto) 
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  Ich erwiderte ihm, da￿ ich es sonderbar finde, da￿ die Regierungspartei mein 
Programm kennen lernen will, da ich doch von ihrer Candidatur nichts wei￿. 
  Jetzt erfuhr ich wenigstens auf indirektem Wege, da￿ eine Regierungspartei 
existirt, die sich um mich interessirt. ￿  
  Ich ersuchte Rottar zu antworten, da￿ ich im Bade sei, da￿ ich nicht bade, 
da￿ mich die Ungeduld oder Verlegenheit (ich wei￿ nicht mehr, welches Wort ich 
gebrauchte) der Regierungspartei nicht r￿hre, da￿ ich am 23ten fr￿h mit der Post in 
Caransebes einzutreffen gedenke, jedoch nicht in Folge des erw￿hnten Briefes, 
sondern weil ich nicht l￿nger im Bade bleiben wolle. ￿  
  Ich kam am 23ten nicht mit der Post sondern mit einem Privatwagen um 8 
Uhr Abends hier an.  
(p. 3 verso) 
 Wegen ung￿nstigen Wetters hatte ich die Nachtfahrt aufgegeben. 
  In den Nachmittagsstunden dieses Tages wurde eine Wahlen-Versammlung 
abgehalten und zwar in Caransebes. ￿ 
 
Bei meinem Eintreffen fand ich auch eine Einladung zu dieser Versammlung f￿r 
mich vor, - der ich selbstverst￿ndlich nicht entsprechen konnte, da ich um jene Zeit 
wahrscheinlich noch im Teregovaer oder Slatinaer Schl￿ssel stand/stack. 
  Am anderen Tage, 9 Uhr fr￿h kam der B￿rgermeister Brancoviciu zu mir. Er 
verst￿ndigte mich von der abgehaltenen Versammlung und ihrem W￿nsche, mein 
Programm zu h￿ren.  
  Jetzt erfuhr ich zum zweiten Male, da￿ die Regierungspartei sich um mich 
interessirt, - ein Antragen der Candidatur erfolgte noch immer nicht. 
(p.4 recto) 
Dem B￿rgermeister erwiderte ich, da￿ meine bisherigen Committanten ein 
Programm nicht verlangen und ich von der DeÆk-Partei nichts wissen will. 
Vor 12 Uhr des n￿mlichen Tages kam der k￿ng. ung. Ober-fiscal Ignaz Pauloviciu 
zu mir. Ich sah und sprach ihn jetzt zum ersten Male. ￿ Nach einer Abhandlung ￿ber 
die politischen Partheien Ungarns bat auch er mich um das Programm.- 
Nachdem ich ihn gefragt, in wessen Auftrage er mit dieser Bitte gekommen, - gab er 
sich als Chef des sogenannten Central-Wahl-Actions?-Comite der Regierungspartei 
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Ich teilte ihm mit, da￿ meine Commitanten ein Programm nicht fordern, da￿ ich ihm 
ein solches auch nicht geben k￿nne, da￿ ich ￿brigens bereit w￿re, alle seine Fragen 
zu beantworten. 
Nachdem ich alle Fragen in einer Weise beantwortet hatte, die jeden Zweifel oder 
(p.4 verso) Undeutigkeit ausschlo￿, einsprach ich mich mit dem Bemerken, da￿ ich 
durch einige Tage besch￿ftigt sei und er in 3-4 Tagen wieder kommen m￿ge. Bis 
dahin werde ich sehen, was sich in der von ihm angeregten Angelegenheit thun 
lasse; es kann dann vielleicht auch ein Programm das Licht der Welt erblicken. 
Diese 3-4 Tage habe ich selbst mir anberaumt, nicht etwa um ￿ber ein Programm zu 
br￿len, sondern um Besuche mir zu ersparen, die mich in, mit der Candidatur in 
keinem Nexus stehenden Arbeiten, gest￿rt h￿tten. 
Herr Pauloviciu kam am 30. Nobr. wieder zu mir. Er entfernte sich mit demselben 
Resultate wie das 1te Mal, d.h. ohne ein Programm bekommen zu haben. 
Am folgenden Tage besuchte mich der Obergespan. Zweck seines Besuches war, die 
von der Regierungspartei durch Herrn Pauloviciu mit mir gesuchte Verst￿ndigung 
bez￿glich Bekanntgebe eines Programms (p. 5 recto) zu einem f￿r diese Partei 
g￿nstigen Resultate zu f￿hren. ￿ 
Wir schieden von einander mit der gegenseitigen Erkl￿rung, da￿ die Unterhandlung 
mit mir als abgebrochen zu betrachten und da￿ zwischen mir und der 
Regierungspartei von jetzt ab eine Demarcationslinie gezogen sei.- 
Aus Vorstehendem geht hervor, da￿ die sogenannte Regierungspartei durch den 
B￿rgermeister, den Ober-fiscal und Obergespann mein Programm kennen lernen 
wollte, ohne, da￿, wie erw￿hnt, sie mich jemals um die Candidatur gebeten oder da￿ 
ich mich darum beworben h￿tte. 
Ich will hier noch Folgendes nachtragen: Als ich dem Severiner Obergespann am 13. 
Oktbr. einen Besuch erwiderte, sagte er mir, da￿ er vernommen, da￿ die Majorit￿t 
der Bev￿lkerung des Comitats mich als ihren Candidaten aufgestellt habe.- Ich 
bejahte (p.5 verso) die￿ mit den Bemerken, da￿ ich die Candidatur bereits 
angenommen habe.- 
Die Bejahung einer Aussage wird man wohl nicht nachtr￿glich als Antrag zur 
Annahme der Candidatur seitens der Regierungspartei aufbauschen wollen. 
Am 3. oder 4. Dezbr. verst￿ndigte mich Hauptmann Popoviciu des Ruhestandes, da￿ 
der heutige Bischof, der bei der Gratulation zum 25j￿hrigen Regierungsjubil￿um Sr   330
Majest￿t in Budapest gewesen, mich an einem Nachmittage besuchen werde, da er 
mir Nachrichten aus der Hauptstadt mitzutheilen habe. 
Am 5. Dezbr ersuchte mich der Bischof, ihn um 5 Uhr Abends zu besuchen, da er 
mir den angek￿ndigten Besuch wegen Unwohlseins nicht abstatten k￿nne. 
Ich folgte die Einladung. Bei dieser Gelegenheit legte mir der Bischof ein Programm 
in romanischer und deutscher Sprache vor und (folio 6 recto) ersuchte mich es 
anzunehmen und es in Gegenwart einiger W￿hler zu entwickeln, da es nun 
einmal/einen? so Brauch w￿re. 
Ich erkl￿rte ihm, da￿ ich dieses Programm annehmen k￿nnte, da￿ es alle 
sogenannten Nationalen unterschreiben w￿rde, da￿ ich es aber doch nicht annehme. 
Sp￿ter, etwa um 6 Uhr kam der Obergespann und Herr Pauloviciu dazu. Die 
Bem￿hungen dieser 3 Herren mich zur Annahme des Programms zu bewegen, hatten 
kein anderes Resultat, als da￿ ich mich herbeilie￿ am folgenden Abend mit dem 
Obergespann und Oberfiscal wieder beim Bischof zusammen zu kommen, um die 
wiederholten Verhandlungen abzuschlie￿en. 
Aus Vorstehendem geht hervor, da￿ der Bischof den Vermittler zwischen mir und 
den Obergespann spielte, ohne darum von mir gebeten worden zu sein. 
Ich muss hier ausdr￿cklich bemerken, da￿ (p. 6 verso) ich der Einladung des 
Bischofs folgte, weil ich Nachrichten aus Budapest zu bekommen glaubte. 
H￿tte ich geahnt, da￿ ￿ um mich milit￿risch auszudr￿cken ein f￿rmlicher ￿berfall 
verabredet war ￿ so w￿re mein Besuch kurz und etiquettem￿￿ig gewesen. 
Als ich von diesem Besuche nach Hause ging, begleitete mich der bisch￿fliche 
Sekret￿r. 
Als einem Intimus des Bischofs erkl￿rte ich ihm offen, da￿ ich ￿ber seine Einladung 
sehr aufgebracht bin, nachdem ich vor einer officiellen oder der Candidatur der 
Regierungspartei nichts wissen will und ich bereits am 1ten Dezbr jede weitere 
Unterhandlung mit dem Obergespann abgebrochen habe; somit die von mir nicht 
verlangte Vermittlung des Bischofs nicht am Platz war. ￿ 
Der Sekret￿r versicherte, da￿ der Bischof die￿ nicht gewu￿t habe. 
Am n￿chsten Tage, d.i. am 6. Abends kam ich zuerst und nach einer Stunde (p.7 
recto) auch der Obergespann mit dem Oberfiscal zum Bischof. Nachdem ich erkl￿rt 
hatte, da￿ ich eine offizielle oder die Candidatur der Regierungspartei nicht 
annehme; wurde ich wiederholt gebeten einen Tag und eine Stunde zu bestimmen 
und vor einer Versammlung von W￿hlern das mir am 5ten vorgelegte oder ein   331
￿hnliches Programm zu entwickeln und hiedurch zwischen der Regierungspartei und 
der nationalen oder Volkspartei eine Vereinigung in meiner Person als dem 
gemeinschaftlichen Candidaten herbeizuf￿hren. 
Ich bestimmte hiezu die 3te Nachmittagsstunde des 8ten Dezbr und als 
Versammlungsort der Saal des Municipiums, um endlich ￿ ich kann mit Recht sagen 
￿ der Bewerbungen der Regierungspartei los zu werden.  
Das Resultat dieser Versammlung ist aus der anliegenden gedruckten Rede zu 
entnehmen. 
Ich glaube, da￿ Vorstehendes gen￿gt (p.7 verso) um zu zeigen, was mich bewogen, 
ein Programm zu entwickeln. Ich habe mich dazu bewegen lassen, um der ￿u￿erst 
kleinen Regierungspartei den ￿bergang in das nationale Lager zu erleichtern und ihn 
die B￿rde abzunehmen einen Gegencandidaten aufzustellen, der bei der Wahl 
gl￿nzend durchgefallen w￿re. 
Offen gestanden habe ich hiedurch eine Gutm￿thigkeit und Gro￿herzigkeit 
beweisen, die jetzt durch einen journalistischen Schm￿h-artikel vergolten werden. 
 
6. Was die Behauptung der Interpelanten betrifft, da￿ ich die Glaubw￿rdigkeit des 
damals in Wege der Presse ver￿ffentlichten Programms nicht in Zweifel gezogen 
habe; so muss ich hier erkl￿ren, da￿ ich nur in der ￿Albina￿ und im ￿Osten￿ mein 
Programm gelesen habe.- Andere Bl￿tter kamen mir nicht zu Gesichte. ￿ Ich konnte 
somit ihre Reproduktion meines Programms weder best￿tigen noch mi￿billigen.  
 
(p.8 recto) Die Albina hat das Programm, wenn auch in abgek￿rzter Form dem Sinn 
und zum Teile auch dem Wortlaute nach, richtig gebracht. 
 
7. Was die weitere Behauptung betrifft, da￿ Herr Pauloviciu mir aus einem Blatte 
mein Programm vorgelesen und ich selbes vollst￿ndig richtig erkl￿rt habe, da￿ mu￿ 
ich constatiren, da￿ er mir aus den Temesi Lapok einen Artikel  ￿ber meine Rede 
oder Programm aus dem Magyarische ins Deutsche m￿ndlich ￿bersetzte und da der 
Artikel im Ganzen, - wenigstens nach der mir gegebenen ￿bersetzung ￿ meinen 
Vortrag ziemlich richtig zum Ausdruck brachte; so fand ich mich nicht veranla￿t 
hier￿ber besondere Bemerkungen zu machen. -  Ich fand mich hiezu um so weniger 
veranla￿t, nachdem der Artikel den Vorgang und das Resultat der 
W￿hlerversammlung schilderte und meine Rede nicht vollst￿ndig brachten.   332
(p.8 verso) 
Es schien mir jedoch, als ob Herr Pauloviciu sich meine Rede etwas zurecht gelegt 
h￿tte. ich wollte ihm diese Freude nicht st￿ren, was ich leicht gekonnt h￿tte. ￿ ich 
brauchte ja nur ￿ da ich selber noch zu wenig magyarisch verstehe ￿ mir eine genaue 
￿bersetzung des erw￿hnten Artikels zu verschaffen. 
 
8. Die gedruckte Rede ist identisch mit der gesprochenen. 
Ich nannte das Nationalit￿ten-Gesetz ein ungerechtes schon deshalb, weil ich es als 
solches halte und auch den Muth habe, es als das zu bezeichnen, was es nach meiner 
￿berzeugung ist. ￿ 
W￿ren alle Gesetze gut und gerecht; so w￿rde bald ewiger Fried statt des ewigen 
Kampfes herrschen: -  
 
9. Was nun die eigentliche Interpellations betrifft; so erkl￿re ich hiemit: 
ad a) Erkenne ich die Druckschrift als mein (p.9 recto) geistiges Eigenthum an. Ich 
habe sie drucken und erscheinen lassen. 
ad b) Ich habe die Rede drucken und vertheilen lassen, um l￿genhafte und 
tendenzi￿se Berichte und Telegramme aus dem Lager der Regierungspartei zu 
entkr￿ften, da sie mich trotz der gegentheiligen am 8. Dezbr abgegebenen Erkl￿rung 
beharrlich zum Candidaten der Regierungspartei stempelten; offenbar in der Absicht 
um die Geister zu verwirren, die Gem￿ther meiner eigentlichen Committaten zu 
erbittern ￿berhaupt die nationale Pfalanx zu spalten. 
Die Rede sollte 8 Tage vor der Wahl versendet werden. Die Buchdruckerei des 
Herrn R. Traunfellner war jedoch mit anderen fr￿her ￿bernommenen und 
accorditen? Arbeiten besch￿ftigt; so da￿ meine Rede erst am Vortage der Wahl fertig 
werden konnte. 
ad c) Wer in der Versammlung gesunde Ohren (p.9 verso) hatte, um zu h￿ren und 
ein treues Ged￿chtni￿ besitzt, um das Geh￿rte zu behalten, mu￿ best￿tigen, da￿ 
meine gedruckte Rede identisch mit der gesprochenen sei. Ich habe nicht nur so 
gesprochen, sondern ich habe sogar mehr gesprochen, als in der gedruckten Rede 
aufgenommen anscheint. ￿ Ich habe gar Manches gesprochen und doch ausgelassen, 
weil es sich in den Schrift drastischer ausnimmt als im m￿ndlichen Vortrage.- 
Ich habe der gedruckten Rede nichts hinzugef￿gt, wohl aber von der gesprochenen 
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Was nun den Schlu￿satz der Interpellation betrifft, da mu￿t jede ehrliche Discussion 
aufh￿ren, wenn die namentlichen ￿Mehrere W￿hler der Regierungspartei￿ im 
Vorhinein erkl￿ren, da￿ meine etwaige Behauptung: ￿das Gedruckte sei wirklich 
gesprochen worden￿, nicht wahr sei. 
(p.10/recto) 
Ja wohl behaupte ich, da￿ das Gedruckte wirklich gesprochen worden ist, und zwar 
behaupte ich die￿ als Ehrenmann, als Soldat, dem die Ehre das theureste Gut ist und 
welcher selbst um Millionen nicht feil ist. 
Ich berufe mich auf die jenigen W￿hler, welcher der Versammlung vom 8. Dezbr 
beiwohnten.- Ich bin ￿berzeugt, da￿ sie soweit ihnen meine Worte noch erinnerlich, 
meine Angaben best￿tigen und jene der namenlosen ￿Mehrere W￿hler der 
Regierungspartei￿  welche nicht den moralischen Muth hatten, den Schm￿hartikel  
mit ihren Namen zu illustriren, als schamlose und bewillige Verleumdung mit 
Entr￿stung brandmarken werden. 
Die schlie￿liche Behauptung der ￿Mehrere W￿hler der Regierungspartei￿ da￿ sie 
meinen angeblichen Enth￿llungen (welche?) gegen￿ber kein Stillschweige 
beobachtet h￿tten; so mu￿ ich euer W￿rde erkl￿ren, (p.10 verso) da￿ es hintendrein 
leicht ist, den Muthigen zu spielen.-  
Die Versammlung in ihrer ￿berwiegender Majorit￿t, war von meiner Rede derart 
hingerissen, - um nicht zu sagen enthusiasmirt-, da￿ Niemand gewagt h￿tte, eine 
Einwendung gegen das von mir Entwickelte zu erhaben. 
Man sah es den biederen und ehrlichen M￿nnern an, da￿ ich ihnen aus dem Herzen 
sprach. 
Gerade die Interpellanten ￿ deren Namen bereits von Mund zu Mund gehen ￿ 
wu￿ten sehr gut, da￿ sie durch die geringste Einsprache sich selbst und ihre 
Brodherren in nicht geringe Verlegenheit st￿rzen w￿rden. ￿ Einige Worte von mir 
und ihre Partei wurde in ihre Ohnmacht zur￿ckgeschleudert. 
Nur dadurch, da￿ sie sich entschlo￿ mit der nationalen Partei in der Wahl des (p.11 
recto) Candidaten gemeinschaftliche Sache zu machen, maskirte sie ihre Schw￿che. 
￿  
Gerade mein Programm war f￿r sie die ersehnte Veranlassung, sich um mich, als den 
Candidaten des Volkes zu scharren, wie die Br￿cke auf welcher sie mit Sack und 
Pack in das nationale Lager ￿bertrat.   334
Ich will Privatissimo nicht an die gro￿e Glocke h￿ngen ￿ darf aber, um den 
nachgeborenen Muth der Interpellanten in die rechte Beleuchtung zu setzen, so viel 
erw￿hnen, da￿ zwei hohe W￿rdentr￿ger mit Bangigkeit dem Ausgange der auf ihr 
Betreiben inscenirten W￿hlerversammlung entgegen harrten, f￿rchtend, da￿ irgend 
ein Hei￿sporn durch ein unvorsichtiges Wort, die von ihnen so sehr gew￿nschte und 
angestrebte Vereiningung der Regierungs- mit der nationale Partei zu nichts machen 
w￿rde. ￿ 
Herr Pauloviciu wird sich wohl (p. 11 verso) noch erinnern, da￿ ich ihn am Abende 
des 8. Dezbr in der Wohnung des Bischofs ￿ber den Takt begl￿ckw￿nschte, den er in 
der Erwiderung auf meine Frage Kund gegeben. 
Nur diesem Takte ist zu verdanken, da￿ ich nicht in die Lage kam, Gut und Stock zu 
ergreifen, der Versammlung einen guten Abend zu w￿nschen und sie ihrem 
Schicksale zu ￿berlassen. 
Aber Herr Pauloviciu als Pr￿sident des Deak-Clubs (euphemistisch Regierungspartei 
genannt) wu￿te, was er thun mu￿te.- 
Bevor ich zu etwas Anderem schreite, mu￿ ich noch mittheilen, da￿ ich vollkommen 
vorbereitet in die Versammlung ging. Niemand wu￿te, was ich thun oder sprechen 
werde. 
Diejenigen, die mich genauer kennen, wissen gar Manches von meinem treuen 
Ged￿chtni￿e zu erz￿hlen. 
Soll ich da nicht mein eigenstes geistiges (p. 12 recto) Product getreu und jeden Falls 
am getreuesten reproduzieren k￿nnen? 
 
10. Diejenigen, welche vorstehende Aufkl￿rungen gelesen, m￿gen nun die Frage 
aufwerfen, welcher Ansage die harmlose Interpellation in der Neuen Temesvarer 
Zeitung ihre Entstehung zu verdanken habe? 
Ich will versuchen diese zu enth￿llen: Es ist allgemein bekannt, da￿ die Deak oder 
Regierungspartei bei den meisten Deputirten-Wahlen, Candidaten ihrer Partei 
aufstellt und Alles daran setzt, um diesen zum Siege zu verhelfen. 
Die Regierungs und die Deakpartei hervorgegangen, thut durch ihre Organe 
ebenfalls ihr M￿glichstes zur Unterst￿tzung der Deako-stischen oder Regierungs- 
Candidaten und zur Bek￿mpfung der Gegencandidaten. 
Dieses geschieht aus dem Triebe der Selbsterhaltung; sie will die Herrschaft, welche 
sich in ihren H￿nden befindete, auch fortan behaupten.   335
(p.12 verso) 
So war es auch im Severiner Comitat. Ich wurde von den ungeheueren Majorit￿t der 
Bev￿lkerung candidirt, w￿hrend die hiesige Deak- sp￿ter auch Regierungspartei 
genannt ihren eigenen Candidaten hatte. 
Aus welchen Elementen bestandt diese Partei? Aus Staatsbeamten oder Solchen, die 
es werden wollen, aus von der Regierung abh￿ngigen Leuten und noch aus einigen 
Bewohnern, die mehr aus Mode als aus ￿berzeugung zu dieser Partei z￿hlten ￿ im 
Ganzen kaum aus einigen Hunderten. 
Diese Partei trug mir nie die Candidatur an, schon deshalb nicht, weil sie 
nothwendiger Weise diese nur einem Deakisten geben d￿rfte.-  
Sie mu￿te noch Terr￿n gewinnen, mu￿te die Zahl ihrer Anh￿nger vermehren und 
that, bis sie sich stark genug gef￿hlt h￿tte, als wenn ich ihr Candidat werden m￿sse, 
da sie meinte und die￿ auch ausposaunte, da￿ (p.13 recto) ich als k.k. General nur 
der Regierungspartei angeh￿ren k￿nne.- 
Diese Partei vergr￿￿erte sich nicht, im Gegentheile sie schien sich verkleinern zu 
wollen durch Abfall Unabh￿ngiger. 
Als die Leiter der Regierungspartei ￿ die Regierungsorgane n￿mlich ￿ zur 
Erkenntni￿ gelangten, da￿ sie mit ihrem Candidaten gl￿nzend durchfallen werden ￿ 
(denn von 6672 eingeschriebenen W￿hlern waren ￿ber 6000 unbedingt f￿r mich) ￿ 
nahmen sie ihre Zuflucht zur Diplomatie. 
Wie ich bereits geschildert, waren ihre Bem￿hungen und Anwerbungen, mich in ihre 
Netze zu locken, vergeblich. 
Die Regierungsorgane, welche sich wahrscheinlich dem Ministerium gegen￿ber 
engagirt h￿tten, einen Deakistischen o. Regierungs-Candidaten in den Reichstag zu 
bringen, waren jetzt in arger Verlegenheit.- 
(p.13 verso) Sie wollten diese Verlegenheit und die Ohnmacht ihrer Partei gegen￿ber 
der sogennanten nationalen oder Volkspartei nicht offenkundig werden lassen, 
darum beschlossen sie die Vereinigung der Regierungs- mit der Volkspartei in der 
Person des Candidaten. 
Die von mir f￿r den 8. Dezbr anberaumte W￿hlerversammlung und das Programm, 
das ich in derselben entwickeln w￿rde, sollte diese Vereinigung bewirken und 
bewirkte sie auch?.- 
Was ich jetzt weiter sage, dar￿ber kann ich zwar keinen gerichtsordnungsm￿￿igen 
Beweis erbringen, habe aber die moralische ￿berzeugung, da￿ trotz meiner in der   336
entschiedensten und klarsten Weise abgegebenen Erkl￿rung, da￿ ich die offizielle 
oder die Candidatur der Regierungspartei nicht annehme, ich dennoch dem 
Ministerium als der Mann der Regierung, als der Regierungs Candidat bekannt 
gegeben wurde. 
(p.14 recto) Zu welchem Zweck ￿ liegt vor dem geistigen Augen Aller, die in dieser 
Sache urtheilen k￿nnen. Soweit meine moralische ￿berzeugung. 
Die l￿genhaften und tendenziosen Berichte, welche ￿ber meine Programmrede unter 
die Bew￿lkerung dieses Comitats verbreitet wurden, zwangen mich, meine Rede zu 
drucken und zu ver￿ffentlichen, um allen b￿swilligen Ausstreuungen ein Ende zu 
machen. 
Die￿ hatten die Verfasser der falschen Berichte nicht erwartet.-  
Jetzt f￿rchteten sie, da￿ die Druckschrift ihren Oberen zu Gesichte kommen und 
ihnen ￿ber den wahren Sachverhalt die Augen ￿ffnen w￿rde. 
Die￿ d￿rfte nicht geschehen; also frisch darauf los mystificirt!! Mann h￿tte ja darin 
￿bung genug ￿ und ￿bung macht den Meister. Ich will mich nicht eines 
zutreffenderen Ausdruckes bedienen. 
Da ging ein Zeitungsartikel los, dann (p. 14 verso) ein zweiter und ein dritter und 
wer wei￿ viele nachfolgten. 
Da werde ich beschuldigt, da￿ ich die Regierungspartei get￿uscht habe. Lieber 
Himmel! Wo war diese Regierungspartei in der W￿hlerversammlung am 8. Dezbr, 
vor welcher ich mein Programm entwickelte? 
Hat nicht Herr Pauloviciu, ihr Haupt und Wortf￿hrer auf meine Frage bestimmt und 
deutlich geantwortet, da￿ obwohl die Anwesenden verschiedenen Parteien 
angeh￿ren, sie dennoch nicht als Partei, sondern nur als einfache W￿hler versammelt 
sind? 
Schade, da￿ ich nicht einen Diogenes mit hatte ￿ um mir in der Auffindung dieser 
unsichtbaren Partei behilflich zu sein. 
Wie konnte ich eine Partei t￿uschen, die in der Versammlung nicht anwesend war, 
oder doch den Muth nicht hatte, sich als solche zu bekennen? 
(p.15 recto) 
Ich glaube, dieses Kunstst￿ck k￿nnte selbst ein Hegelianer nicht begreifen. 
Als ich den Verfasser dieses ersten Artikels fragte, wie er denselben schreiben 
konnte, antwortete er mir unter Entschuldigungen, da￿ er als Staatsbeamte die￿ thun 
mu￿te, um sich den R￿cken zu sichern.   337
Also um sich den R￿cken zu sichern, mu￿ er einem Zweiten an die Ehre gehen! 
Sch￿ne Moral das! Gratulire zu solcher Moral! 
Ein zweiter Artikel will imperativ/o eine gro￿e Versammlung von W￿hlern der 
Regierungspartei, um gegen die G￿ltigkeit meiner mit Acclamation bewirkten Wahl 
zu protestiren. 
Ja diese Acclamation thut ihnen weh! Man berufe diese gro￿e Versammlung, jedoch 
zu dem erw￿hnten Zwecke, z￿hle dann die H￿upter seiner Lieben und (p.15 verso) 
man wird finden, da￿ Alle fehlen! 
Was die Verfasser des dritten Artikels oder der Interpellation in der Neuen 
Temesvarer Zeitung betrifft; so k￿nnen sie nur solche Individuen sein, welche ￿ber 
die W￿hlerversammlung vom 8. Dezbr falsch berichtet habe, und nach 
Ver￿ffentlichung meiner Rede demaskirt, sich nur dadurch rein zu waschen 
glaubten, da￿ sie schamlos zur L￿ge, zur Entstellung, Verdrehung und Mi￿deutung 
der Thatsachen ihre Zuflucht nehmen. 
Es k￿nnen nur solche Biederm￿nner sein, welche nach der Gunst der Regierung oder 
einflu￿reicher Regierungsorgane haschen, welche jede Gelegenheit gierig ben￿tzen, 
um sich durch Berichte, Enth￿llungen u.d.g. (und dergleiche) selbst auf Kosten der 
Wahrheit, vermeintliche Verdienste zu sammeln. 
Ich glaube sogar, da￿ diese Biederm￿nner nicht aus eigener Initiative, sondern in 
Folge h￿herer Inspiration den Schm￿hartikel vom Rappel (last page/recto) lie￿en, 
da￿ sie zum blinden Werkzeuge sich hergaben. 
Sie wissen nicht, was sie thaten ￿ und da mir ihr Gebahren nicht gleichgiltig sein 
kann und ich die schamlosen Behauptungen schon meinen Standesgenossen 
gegen￿ber nicht mit Stillschweigen ￿bergehen kann; so m￿gen sie sich nennen, 
damit ihnen die Maske der Ehrenm￿nner, hinter welcher sie ihre wahres Antlitz 
verbergen, herunter gerissen und ihnen jene Behandlung zu Teil werde, die sie 
verdienen. 
Zum Schlu￿e erw￿hne ich noch, da￿ am 25. Okt./dm? eine Deputation hiesiger 
angesehener B￿rger ￿ Deutsche, Magyaren und Romanen ￿ bei mir war, um mir ihre 
Entr￿stung und Bedauere ￿ber den erw￿hnten Artikel auszudr￿cken, wobei sie 
betonten, da￿ echte B￿rger aus Caransebes den Artikel nicht verfa￿t haben k￿nnen.-
  
Sie gaben den Verfassern Epithete, die ich nicht wieder geben kann.   338
Ich bin seit 26. Okt/Dec/dm? krank, de￿halb habe ich meine Abreise nach Pest 
verschieben m￿ssen und konnte ich auf die Aufkl￿rung ￿ber die mir gemachten 
Anschuldigungen erst heute den 29. beendigen. 
Doda, GM 
31. J￿nner 1874 
Pr￿s. No. 188 
 
In the same set of documents there is also the following: 
 
K.K. Milit￿r-Commando zu Temesvar 
Pr￿s No. 188 
K.K. Reichs-Kriegs-Ministerium 
 
Temesvar am 31. J￿nner 1874 
Der Herr Generalmajor des Ruhestandes Trajan Doda, dessen Wahl zum Deputirten 
des Severiner Comitates ich mit hierstelligem Indorsatberichte vom 12. J￿nner l.J. 
Pr￿s No. 62 angezeigt habe, wird im angeschlossenen Blatte der neuen TemesvÆrer 
Zeitung No.15 vom 20. J￿nner l.J. von mehreren ungenannten W￿hlern der 
Regierungspartei ￿ber eine, seinen ritterlichen Charakter in Zweifel ziehende 
Handlung ￿ffentlich interpellirt. 
  Da eine solche ￿ffentliche Anschuldigung seinen milit￿rischen 
Standesgenossen nicht gleichgiltig bleiben konnte, so habe ich den gedachten Herrn 
Generalmajor mit dem Erlasse vom 20. J￿nner l.J. Pr￿s. No. 128 zur ˜u￿erung 
verhalten, und lege solche im Aufschlusse dem k.k. Reichs-Kriegsministerium vor. 
  Eine Ver￿ffentlichung der in der ˜u￿erung enhaltenen Widerlegung durch 
die Presse halte ich aus dem Grunde weder f￿r notwendig noch f￿r opportun, weil 
dem Herrn Generalmajor Doda bei seinem n￿chsten Erscheinen im ungarischen 
Abgeordneten-Hause ohnehin die passendste Gelegenheit gebothen sein wird, die 
Interpellation m￿ndlich zu beantworten.-  
 
  S c u d i e r  
  F M L  
On the end page of this report there are several notes, one of which reads: 
Videat: Milit￿rkanzlei Seiner Kais. und K￿n. Apostolischen Majest￿t.   339
2.3. Doda letter to a friend in Al. Mocsonyi￿s hand 
 
Lieber Freund!  
Dank dem constitutionellen RØgime wie es in Ungarn ge￿bt wird, bin ich durch 
meine Wiederwahl zum Reichstags-Abgeordnete f￿r den Bezirk Karansebes in der 
peinlichen Lage einer Collision meiner Pflichten gerathen. Da mir die politische, 
gleichwie die private u(nd) milit￿rische Ehrenhaftigkeit ￿ber Alles steht, habe ich 
wie nat￿rlich mit meiner Entscheidung keinen/r Augenblick gewankt, dennoch 
beruhrt es mich scheglich?/sch￿dlich?, da￿ ich ￿ wenngleich durch die 
Widernat￿rlichkeit unserer politischen Verh￿ltnisse u. durch h￿here moralische 
R￿cksichten gezwungen ￿ wi￿entlich und absichtlich einen Act pa￿iver Renitenz 
gegen ein von Sr. M. sanctionirtes Gesetz begehen mu￿te. Ich habe n￿mlich dem 
Abgeordneten Hause in Bpest schriftlich erkl￿rt, da￿ ich weder meinen Pflichten als 
Reichstags-Abgeordneter nachzukommen, noch aber auf mein Mandat zu verzichten 
gewillt bin. Zwar nehme ich die volle Verantwortung f￿r diesen meinen Schritt vor 
der ganzen Welt auf mich, dennoch halte ich es, als der stets treu ergebene Soldat Sr. 
M., f￿r meine milit￿rischen Pflicht diesen meinen Act zur allerh￿ch￿ten Kenntni￿ zu 
bringen. 
  Ich bitte dich daher, lieber Freund, meine in deutscher ￿bersetzung hier 
angebogene Declaration, welche ich an den ungr. Reichstag gerichtet habe u. welche 
die bestimmenden Motive dieses meines Schrittes enthaltet, Sr. M. in meinem 
Namen behufs allergn￿digster Einsichtsnahme vorzulegen.  
 
Note: this letter has no date, no addressee and is unsigned. It is to be found in 
Fondul Mocsonyi, II/ 4, folio 55, Bucharest National Archives, among other letters 
addressed mostly to Alexandru Mocsonyi. The letter looks like a rough draft with 
many things crossed out and reformulated.  
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2.4. SzilÆgyi￿s report on the Doda trial 
 
￿sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Karton 20 K.Z., 1889, No. 
4261/ 1889 
5 November 
Vortrag 
des ung. Justizministers 
Dr Szilagyi 
Dd 27 Oktober 1889 
No. 32111 
(document pages are not numbered) 
Folio 1/recto: 
Betreffend das Ah. [allerh￿chste] signirte Gesuch des pens. General-
Majors Trajan Doda, um Einstellung der, wegen des im Wege der 
Presse ver￿bten Vergehens der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalit￿t, - 
gegen ihn eingeleiteten strafgerichtlichen [ added above] 
Untersuchung. 
 
Der Gennante wurde mit dem Urtheile vom 17. September 1888 des Arader 
Gerichtshofes als Pre￿ Gericht, wegen des im Wege der Presse ver￿bten Vergehens 
der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalit￿t, begangen dadurch, - da￿ er in einem 
offenen, im Wege der Presse vervielf￿ltigten, unter seine W￿hler vertheilten 
Schreiben an den Pr￿sidenten des ung. Reichstags, - in welchem er die Gr￿nde der 
Nichtaus￿bung seines am 10. Oktober 1887 durch Wahl erhaltenen Abgeordneten-
Mandates in einer seine meist rum￿nischen (folio 1/verso) W￿hler gegen die 
ungarische Nation [crossed out gerichteten], h￿chst aufreizenden Weise, 
auseinandersetzt, - in contumatiam zu einer zwei j￿hrigen Staatsgef￿ngni￿ u. einer 
Geldstrafe von 1000 Fl verurtheilt. 
  Die gegen dieses Urtheil eingelegte Nulit￿tsbeschwerde, hat die Curie 
verworfen. 
  Nachdem ein pre￿gerichtliches Contumaz-Urtheil, welches auf 
Freiheitsstrafe lautet, nur nach einer neuerlichen Verhandlung, zu welcher der 
Angeklagte eventuell mittelst Brachialgewalt stellig zu machen ist, - exekutirbar?   341
erscheint, sollte in dieser Angelegenheit eine neuere Verhandlung anberaumt 
werden; jedoch hatte der Verurtheilte inzwischen die Rechtsvertigungsklage und die 
Einwendung gegen die Gerichts-Competenz erhoben, und wurde der ersteren durch 
den Arader Gerichtshof mit dem [Erkenntni￿e?] vom 16. Feber l.Jh. Folge gegeben; 
sein weiteres Begehren, aber, da￿ in Folge seines gerechtfertigten Wegbleibens von 
der Hauptverhandlung jede gerichtliche Verf￿gung f￿r unwirksam erkl￿rt werde, 
sowie auch die Einwendung gegen Gerichtes Competenz abgewiesen. 
  ￿ber seine gegen dieses Erkenntni￿ eingelegte Berufung, beziehungsweise 
Nulit￿tsbeschwerde, hat die Curie mit dem Erkenntni￿e vom 9. Mai l.Jh. das Urtheil 
vom 17. September 1888, sammt allen Rechtsfolgen cassirt u. den Arader 
Gerichtshof zur Durchf￿hrung eines neuerlichen Verfahrens angewiesen. 
(folio 2/recto) 
In Anbetracht nunmehr dessen, da￿ seit der Ver￿ffentlichung des in Rede 
stehenden offenen Schreibens beinahe 2 Jahre verstrichen sind, dieses selbst beinahe 
in Vergessenheit gerieth, keine Folge nach sich gezogen hat, und da￿ eine 
Auffrischung dieser Gelegenheit aus politischen Gr￿nden nicht zweckentsprechend 
erscheint, ferner mit R￿cksicht darauf, da￿ der bereits im hohen Alter stehende 
Angeklagter mittlerweile einen Schlaganfall erlitt, - hat das ung. Ministerium in der 
am 14. Juli l. J. abgehaltenen Ministerraths-Sitzung den Beschlu￿ gefa￿t, da￿ wegen 
Einstellung des gegen Doda eingeleiteten Strafverfahrens die n￿thigen Schritte 
eingeleitet werden und erlaubt sich der Minister diesen noch vor Einreichung des 
gedachten Gnadengesuches gefa￿ten Ministerrathsbeschlu￿ hiemit behufs das 
Genehmigung zur Ah [Allerh￿chsten] Kenntni￿ zu bringen. 
 
Erledigung und Entwurf am 6. Novermber 1889. 
 
 
Ad 4261 . 889 
Folio 1/recto: 
Allergn￿digster Herr! 
 
Der pensionirte General karansebeser Einwohner  Trajan Doda bittet in dem 
der allerh￿chsten Signatur gew￿rdigten unter ./. ehrerbietigst angeschlo￿enen 
Majest￿ts-Gesuche das, gegen denselben wegen des im Wege der Presse begangenen   342
Vergehens der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalit￿t vor dem k￿niglichen Gerichtshofe 
zu Arad als Pre￿gericht anh￿ngig gemachte Strafverfahren im Wege der 
allerh￿chsten Gnade einstellen zu lassen. 
In Anbetracht dessen, da￿ Euer Kaiserliche und Apostolische K￿nigliche 
Majest￿t, allerunterth￿nigstest ungarisches Ministerium noch vor ￿berreichung 
(Folio 1/verso) des gedachten Gnadengesuches bereits am 14ten Juli l. Jahres aus 
den unterzuf￿hrenden Gr￿nden nach eindringlicher Berathung beschlu￿m￿￿ig 
ausgesprochen hat, es seien die geeigneten Schritte zur Einstellung des gegen 
Gesuchsteller anh￿ngig gemachten Strafverfahrens zu veranlassen, sah ich die 
Nothwendigkeit der bei den Gnadengesuchen ansonst ￿blichen Verhandlung durch 
die unterstehenden Justizorgane im vorliegenden Falle nicht vorhanden, und erlaube 
mir demzufolge auf Grund der unter 2./. ehrfurchtvoll beigeschlo￿enen Strafacten 
nachstehenden allerunterth￿nigsten Vortrag zu erstatten. 
Der pensionirte General Trajan Doda, am 20. Juli 1887 von B￿rgern 
￿berwiegend rum￿nischer Zunge f￿r den karansebeser Wahlbezirk zum 
Reichstagabgeordneten  (folio2/recto) gew￿hlt, hat am 10te October 1887 an den 
Pr￿sidenten des Abgeordnetenhauses ein Schreiben gerichtet, in welchem derselbe 
erkl￿rt, einerseits da￿ er mit R￿cksicht auf die derzeitige staatspolitische Richtung an 
den Berathungen des Abgeordnetenhauses nicht Theil nehmen werde, - andererseits 
aber ￿ damit der karansebeser Wahlbezirk nicht unvertreten sei, auch seinem 
Abgeordneten-Mandate nicht entsagt. 
Da Trajan Doda dies sein Vorgehen vor seinen W￿hlern rechtfertigen wollte, 
lie￿ derselbe das an den Pr￿sidenten des Abgeordnetenhauses gerichtete Schreiben in 
rum￿nischer ￿bersetzung im Wege der Presse vervielf￿ltigen, und die￿ in 
Begleitung eines gleichfalls gedruckten offenen Briefes unter seine W￿hler 
vertheilen. 
Nachdem aber in diesen (folio 2/verso) offenen Schreiben behauptet wurde, 
es hatte/h￿tte die ungarische Nation durch Intriguen der Bem￿hung und Gewalt die 
rum￿nische Nation aus allen ihren Positionen des politischen Kampfes 
ausgeschlo￿en; nachdem weiters derselbe mit dem Nothschrei, wir bereiten uns zu 
einem gro￿en m￿hevollen Kampfe vor, die Nationalehre des rum￿nischen Volkes ist 
aufs Spiel gesetzt.- die Rum￿nen dazu aneiferte, da￿ sie den Boden der That betreten 
m￿gen, welcher ausser den Schranken des constitutionellen Kampfes gelegen ist, 
und nur Ha￿ sch￿ren kann in dem leichter zu beth￿renden Theile des rum￿nischen   343
Volkes gegen die ungarische Nationalit￿t, - wurde gegen Trajan Doda wegen des im 
§172 des Strafgesetzes normirten und in der im §171 umschriebenen Weise im Wege 
(folio 3/recto) der Presse begangenen Vergehens der Aufreizung vor dem 
k￿niglichen Gerichtshofe in Arad als Pre￿gericht das Strafverfahren eingeleitet. ￿ 
Nach geschlo￿enem Untersuchungsverfahren und nach wiederholten 
Vertagungen ist der vor das Arader Schwurgericht auf den 17. September 1888 zur 
Verhandlung vorgeladene Trajan Doda nicht erschienen; in Folge dessen hat 
denselben der k￿nigliche Gerichtshof in Arad als Pre￿gericht mit dem erw￿hnten 
Tage unter Zahl 6196 gef￿llten Contumaz Urtheile auf Grund des einhelligen 
Verdiktes der Jury wegen des Vergehens, der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalit￿t 
nach §172 des Strafgesetzes zu 2. Jahren Staatsgef￿ngni￿ und 1000 Gulden 
Geldstrafe verurtheilt.-  
Die gegen dieses Urtheil (folio 3/verso) angemeldete Nullit￿tsklage hat die 
k￿nigliche Curie mit Beschlu￿ vom 25. Oktober 1888 Zahl 9552 verworfen. 
Nach der schwurgerichtliche Verfahren normierenden Verordnung kann ein 
auf eine Freiheitsstrafe lautendes Urtheil, welches ohne Anwesenheit des 
Angeklagten gebracht worden, nur nach neuerer Verhandlung vollstreckbar werden, 
zu welcher zweiten Verhandlung der Angeklagte eventuell mit Brachialgewalt stellig 
zu machen ist.- 
Bevor diese Verhandlung im Sinne des 583. der Vorschriften ￿ber das 
Verfahrens stattgefunden hatte/h￿tte, machte Trajan Doda von der Rechtfertigung 
Gebrauch und erhob Einwendungen gegen die Gerichts-Competenz. 
Der k￿nigliche Gerichtshof zu Arad als Pre￿gericht hat (folio 4/recto) auf 
Grund der am 16ten Februar l.J. abgehaltenen protokollarischen Verhandlung mit 
Beschlu￿ vom 29te M￿rz l. Jh. [laufendem Jahre] 1, 314 das Wegbleiben des Trajan 
Doda von der f￿r den 17ten September 1888 anberaumt gewesenen 
Schwurgerichtverhandlung f￿r gerechtfertigt erkl￿rt; jedoch mit seinem Begehren, 
da￿ zufolge des gerechtfertigten Wegbleibens jede gerichtliche Verf￿gung f￿r 
unwirksam erkl￿rt werde, sowie auch mit seiner Einwendung gegen die Competenz 
wurde derselbe abgewiesen. 
￿ber die gegen diese Entscheidung eingelegte Berufung beziehentlich 
Nulit￿tsbeschwerde hat die k￿nigliche Curie mit dem am 9ten Mai l. Jh. unter Zahl 
3837 gef￿llten Beschlu￿e das am 17. September 1888 gebrachte Contumaz Urtheil 
mit seiner Folgen au￿er Wirksamkeit (folio 4/verso) gesetzt und den k￿niglichen   344
Gerichtshof zu Arad als Pre￿gericht angewiesen, ein ganz neues Verfahren gem￿￿ 
§84 der Vorschriften einzuleiten. 
Zufolge dieser Entscheidung der k￿niglichen Kurie ist daher die in Rede 
stehende Anlegenheit in jenes Stadium zur￿ckgeleitet worden, in welchem sich 
dieselbe vor der ersten Verhandlung befand.- 
In Anbetracht nunmehr dessen, da￿ nachdem seit der Ver￿ffentlichung des 
offenen Schreibens welches zur ersten Strafuntersuchung den Grund gegeben hat, 
schon beinahe zwei Jahre verflo￿en sind, - dieses beinahe schon in Vergessenheit 
gerieth, und da￿ eine Auffrischung dieser Angelegenheit aus politischen 
Gesichtspunkten nicht zweckm￿￿ig erscheint, um so weniger weil das fragliche 
offene Schreiben eine Wirkung (folio 5/recto) von Bedeutung durchaus nicht zur 
Folge hatte; ferner mit R￿cksicht darauf da￿ der ansonst auch im vorger￿ckten Alter 
stehende Trajan Doda in Folge eines Schlaganfalles mittlerweile schwer krank 
geworden, - hat das ungarische Ministerium in der am 14. Juli l.Jh. abgehaltenen 
Sitzung den Beschlu￿ gefa￿t da￿ wegen Einstellung des gegen Trajan Doda 
eingeleiteten Strafverfahrens die n￿thigen Schritte geschehen sollen.- 
Auf Grund dieses Beschlu￿es des Ministerrathes, - obgleich ich nicht 
unerw￿hnt lassen kann die bedauerliche Thatsache, da￿ es dem Trajan Doda nur 
allein durch die Ausbeutung der schwachen Seiten unseres pre￿gerichtliches 
Verfahrens gelingen konnte die Wirkung des gegen denselben factisch gebrachten 
Verdictes der Jury zu entkr￿ften (folio 5/verso), - und da￿ derselbe auch in seinem 
nun ehrerbietigst vorgelegten Gnadengesuch v￿llig unbegr￿ndet das Arader 
Schwurgericht nicht nur der Befangenheit sondern auch der absichtlichen Abneigung 
beschuldigt; und obschon auch bei dem dermaligen Stande der Sache der gesetzliche 
Grund gegeben ist auf welchen in Folge einer neueren Verhandlung dessen 
Verurtheilung sicherlich erfolgen wurde, sowie diese bei der ersten v￿llig 
gesetzlichen und vorschriftsgem￿￿en Verhandlung erfolgte: nachdem ich jedoch 
nicht Willens bin dessen unverh￿llt anz￿gliche und auf ein politisches M￿rtyrerthum 
abzielende Bestrebungen in die ansonst verdiente Waagschale der Strenge zu legen, 
erlaube ich den allerunterth￿nigsten Antrag zu stellen: 
(folio 6/recto) 
Geruhen Euer Kaiserlich und Apostolisch K￿nigliche Majest￿t die 
Geltendmachung des obgedachten Ministerrath-Beschlu￿es, das ist Fallenlassen des   345
gegen Trajan Doda anh￿ngig  gemachten Strafverfahrens allergn￿digst zur Kenntni￿ 
zu nehmen. 
Den in diesem Sinne verfa￿ten Entwurf der allerh￿chsten Entschlie￿ung 
erlaube ich mir under 3 ./. in tiefster Ehrfurcht beizulegen: 
Budapest am 27. October 1889 
Desider SzilÆgyi m. p. 
 
Entwurf der allerh￿chsten Entschliessung 
￿ber Vortrag Meines ungarischen Justizministers habe Ich den am 14ten Juli 
1889 gefa￿ten Beschlu￿ Meines ungarischen Ministeriums, da￿ das, gegen den 
karansebeser (folio 6/verso) Insassen Trajan Doda wegen des im Wege der Presse 
begangenen Vergehens der Aufreizing gegen eine Nationalit￿t anh￿ngig gemachte 
Strafverfahren fallen gelassen werde genehmigend(s) zur Kenntni￿ genommen. 
 
 
OeStA, HHStA, 12. Ungarische Ministerrats-Protokolle 1888-1889 
C.Z. XVIII 
￿bersetzung 
Folio 335/recto 
Protokoll ￿ber die am 14ten Juli 1889 in Budapest abgeschaltene Minister-
Conferenz unter dem Vorsitze des k￿nigl.ungar. Minister Pr￿sidenten Koloman von 
Tisza 
(among the Gegenw￿rtige: Desider Syilagyi, Justizminister) 
 
Folio 338/recto: 
4.  
Der Herr Ministerpr￿sident hat die Frage gestellt, ob das Pre￿-Strafverfahren 
gegen Trajan Doda, welches infolge Ministerraths-Beschlusses vom 2. J￿nner 1888 
eingeleitet wurde, angesichts dessen, als das bisherige Verfahren wegen eines 
Formfehlers seitens der k￿niglichen Curie kassirt wurde, noch weiter fortzusetzen 
sei? 
(Folio 338/verso)   346
In Anbetracht, da￿ seit dem Erscheinen jenes offenen Briefes, weswegen das 
Strafverfahren eingeleitet wurde, bereits nahezu 2 Jahre verstrichen sind und 
derselbe schon beinahe in Vergessenheit gerieth und dessen nachtheilige Wirkung 
durchaus nicht wahrzunehmen war; in Anbetracht da￿ Trajan Doda, der wirklich 
krank ist, wahrscheinlich auch im Falle der Anberaumung einer neueren 
Verhandlung vor dem Gerichte nicht erscheinen w￿rde, und seine Vorf￿hrung 
angeordnet werden m￿￿te, was mit R￿cksicht auf seinen Zustand den Anschein einer 
unmotivirten politischen Verfolgung hervorzurufen geeignet w￿re, in Anbetracht 
ferner, da￿ der erreichbare Erfolg mit den moralischen Nachtheilen in gar keinem 
Verh￿ltnisse w￿re, welche (folio 339/recto) im Falle der Fortsetzung des Proze￿es 
die Auctorit￿t der Staatsgewalt erleiden w￿rde, und es nicht zweckm￿￿ig w￿re 
Gelegenheit zu bieten, da￿ die Mangelhaftigkeit der strafrechtlichen Bestimmungen 
in Pre￿-sachen seitens der staatsfeindlichen Elemente ausgebeutet werden: hat der 
Ministerrath von der weiteren Fortsetzung des Verfahrens Umgang zu nehmen 
beschlossen.   347
2.5. Letter from Trajan Doda to Vincenţiu Babeş  
       dated 10 January 1890 
 
Caransebeş, 10. Ianuarie 1890 
 
Stimate Dle Redactor, 
In numărul 89 al Luminătoriului aduci sub rubrica ￿Chronica şi sciri￿ notiţia, că 
procesul de presă, intentat contra mea, s-a sistat cu totul pre calea graţiei Majestăţii. 
Scirile apărute ￿n foile straine despre acesta afacere nu sunt esacte. 
Mai departe susţini: 
￿Noi avem informaţiunea demnă de tot crediementul, că dl General T. Doda, 
￿mboldit şi nepăciuit? numai de unii omeni laşi şi speculanţi, de cari dl General nu se 
pote scutura, a dat rugarea sa de-a dreptul Majestăţii Sale, Monarhului, şi ￿n urma 
cărei rugari primite s-a dispus totala sistare a acestui proces de presă.￿ 
Nu am de g￿nd să intru ￿n polemic cu informaţiunea Dtale, demnă de tot 
crediementul, căci nu am căutat nici odată altă justificare dec￿t ￿naintea conscienţiei 
mele, de aceea ￿-Ţi scriu numai Dtale aceste r￿nduri. 
Jubileul roman a suferit deja destul din causa certelor intre conducătorii lui. ￿  
Dacă ar fi adevărată informaţiunea, pe care Dta credi, că este cuviincios a o publica 
asia, precum ai făcut-o, Te ￿ncredinţiez, că renunţiu la cruţiarea, de care ￿mi faci 
personal parte. ￿ Nu am datina să fac lucruri, pentru care nu eu ci alţii, şi ￿ncă omeni 
laşi şi speculanţi, se primescă respunderea. ￿ Felul de ￿ndemn, ce-mi dai, nu e de 
natura de a-mi produce dispoziţiunea sufletescă, că se-ţi descoper adevăratul istoric 
şi cuprins al adresei mele catră Maiestate. 
Fi asigurat, că vătămarea ce-mi faci, nu-ţi voiu lua-o ￿n nume de reu, căci cel ce 
crede despre mine, ca asiu fi in stare se intreprind lucruri, nu din alte cause ci nu mai 
ca se nu fiu nepaciuit de omeni laşi şi speculanţi, pe cari ￿i ascult, acela nu pote se-
mi-o dică dec￿t pote, fiindcă ￿n lunga lui esperienţă, s-a deprins a sluji, fie chiar şi 
fără voie, la informatori de acelaşi soiu. 
Eu sunt deja? un om bătr￿n, care am trecut prin ￿ncercări mult mai grele şi a cărui 
fapte şi caracter nu se pote pune pe o foie de h￿rtie, dar ￿-Ţi mărturisesc, că nici o 
dată n-am servit personelor.-  
Poftindu-Ţi un an nou ferice, rem￿n cu stimă deosebită   348
Al Dtale serv, 
Doda. 
P.S. Pardon de scrisoarea ur￿tă ￿ nu pot mai bine!! 
_________________________________________ 
Caransebes, 10
th of January 1890 
 
Dear Editor, 
 
In issue 89 of Luminătoriul you put in a note under the rubric ￿Reviews and news￿ 
that the press trial launched against me was discontinued entirely by means of 
Imperial pardon. The news that appeared in foreign newspapers regarding this matter 
is not accurate. 
You then go on: 
￿We have the information, which is wholly credible, that General Doda, being egged 
on by cowardly and opportunistic people, of whom he cannot rid himself, submitted 
his petition to His Majesty, the Monarch, and as a consequence of this petition they 
put a complete stop to this press trial.￿ 
I have no intention of starting a polemic against your information, wholly credible as 
it is, for I never sought justification except before my own conscience; that is why I 
write these lines to you only. 
The Romanian jubilee has already suffered enough because of the quarrelling 
between its leaders. 
If the information were true, which you thought fit to thus publish, then I assure you 
that I will give up all decorum that I hitherto used towards you. I am not in the habit 
of doing things, for which not me but others, least of all cowardly, opportunistic 
people, should be held responsible. The incentive you have given me is not such as 
to put me in the right mood to reveal to you the true story and content of my petition 
to His Majesty. 
Be assured that I will not hold against you the ill turn you have done me, for he who 
thinks that I am capable of doing things only so as not be disturbed by cowardly and 
opportunistic people, whom I obey, he who says that does it because in his long 
experience he has become accustomed to serving, even without knowing it, just such 
class of informers.   349
I am already an old man, who has gone through even more difficult trials and whose 
deeds and character cannot be put on a piece of paper, but I confess to you that I 
have never served anyone else￿s interests.-  
 
Wishing you a happy new year, I remain  
 
Respectfully yours, 
Doda. 
 
PS. I apologize for the unpleasant letter. I could not write it any other way!! 
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3) Appendices to Chapter Eight 
 
3.1. Trapsia￿s testament 
 
Steierm￿rkisches Landesarchiv 
Signatur: BG Graz I D 837/1896 
Bearbeiter: Dr. Elisabeth Sch￿ggl-Ernst 
 
[Page 1] 
Mein Testament 
 
Bei klarem Verstande und nach reiflicher Uiberlegung verf￿ge ich Folgendes: 
 
Ich w￿nsche im griechisch-orientalischen Friedhofe in Caransebes im 
Temescherbanate in einem eigenen Grabe ￿ also abgesondert jenem meiner Eltern ￿ 
beigesetzt zu werden. 
Das Leichenbezeugni￿ soll m￿glichst einfach sein, der milit￿rische Conduct soll in 
Caransebes beigestellt werden. 
Mein Kronorden mit der Kriegs-Decoration, den ich f￿r Verdienste in der Schlacht 
von Custozza am 24. Juni 1866 erhalten habe ist statutengem￿￿ an das Orden-Capitel 
abzuf￿hren. 
Als Erbin alles Beweglichen setze ich meine liebe Frau Aurelia ein. 
Au￿erdem soll meine Frau Aurelia erben die mir eigenth￿mlichen Hauspl￿tze 
Grundbuchs Nr. 182 und 183 in Caransebes, ferner soll von der mir eigenth￿mlichen 
H￿lfte des Platzes Nr. 176 in Caransebes circa 150 Quadratklefter zur Erweiterung 
des Platzes Nr. 182 also entschlie￿end, an der Gassenseite 8 (:acht:) Klefter lang, - 
an den Platz Nr. 182 angegliedert und ebenfalls meiner Frau geh￿ren. 
Der Rest der mir eigenth￿mlichen H￿lfte des Hausplatzes Nr. 176 dann die mir 
geh￿rige H￿lfte des Hauses und Platzes Nr. 175 in Caransebes sollen mein Neffe 
Aurel Moaca und meine [page 2] Nichte Andriana Moaca zu gleichen Theilen erben. 
Das mir geh￿rige Feld in den Teus in Caransebes vermache ich meinem Neffen 
Aurel Moaca.   351
Ich bitte meine gute Frau aus den beweglichen Gegenst￿nden meinem lieben Neffen 
Otto von Demuth ein Andenken zu ￿bergeben. 
Allen Verwandten und Freunden meinen Scheidegru￿. 
Schlie￿lich habe ich einen sehnlichsten Wunsch als treuer Sohn der rum￿nischen 
Nation zur Errichtung einer confessionellen rum￿nischen M￿dchenschule in 
Caransebes anregend beizutragen und bestimme ich hierzu 5000 Fl (: f￿nftausend 
Gulden ￿.h.:) zur Bildung eines rum￿nischen M￿dchenschulfondes. 
Die Gr￿nds￿tze f￿r die zu errichtende confessionelle rum￿nische M￿dchenschule 
sind folgende: 
1. Die M￿dchenschule soll vierclassig sein. In die erste Classe sollen nur 
M￿dchen ￿ber zehn Jahre alt, aufgenommen werden. 
2.  Der Unterricht soll auf sittlich religi￿ser Grundlage beruhen und das Ziel 
verfolgen, praktische und gen￿gende Kenntnisse aus den 
Naturwissenschaften, der Geschichte, Geographie und rum￿nischer National-
Literatur verstehende Hausfrauen heranzubilden Handarbeiten und wenn 
m￿glich Musik selbstverst￿ndlich. 
3.  die Unterrichtssprache soll nur die rum￿nische sein. Auf diese Bedingung 
lege ich einen Hauptwerth, und ersuche ich jeden seine Nation liebenden 
Rum￿nen die Erf￿llung zu fordern. 
4.  [Page 3] Zur Leitung der Schule, Bestellung der Lehrkr￿fte, Enthebung 
derselben, Aufnahme der Sch￿llerinnen, Uiberwachung der Schule etc. denn? 
Verwaltung des vom Kirchengute separat zu f￿hrenden rum￿nischen 
M￿dchenschulfondes soll die rum￿nische bisch￿fliche Synode in Caransebes 
berufen sein. Dieselbe bitte ich inst￿ndig christlich sich dieser W￿hrwaltung? 
zum Wohle der rumanischen Nation zu unterziehen. 
Ich bitte meine liebe Frau Aurelie dieses Legat von f￿nftausend Gulden ￿st.h.? 
an die rum￿nische bisch￿fliche Synode in Caransebes mit einer Abschrift dieses 
Theiles meines Testamentes zu ￿bergeben. 
Ich bin mir vollkommen bewu￿t, da￿ zur Realisirung dieser M￿dchenschule ein 
hoher Fond erforderlich ist und darum bitte ich die Synode diesen Theil meiner 
letztwilligen Anordnung angemessen zu verlautbaren, und dadurch zu Beitr￿gen 
anzuregen, in der Uiberzeugung da￿ die rum￿nische Nation noch viele treue 
S￿hne hat, welche durchdrungen sind von der Wahrheit, da￿ eine Nation nur in   352
ihrer Muttersprache sich zu entwickeln vermag und daher auch? dies unentwegt 
anstreben.  
Bis zur m￿glichen Er￿ffnung der Schule beziehungsweise Realisirung dieses 
meines sehnlichsten W￿nsches soll der Fond in einem rum￿nischen Geldinstitute 
sicher angelegt und die Zinsen zum Capital geschlagen werden. 
./. 
 
[page 4] 
Ich habe dieses mein Testament eigenh￿ndig geschrieben und unterfertigt.  
 
Graz am 3. J￿nner 1893 
Michael Ritter von Trapsia m/n 
G.M. 
Vor uns dieses Document  
als sein Testament und eigenh￿ndig unterschrieben 
Julius Ritter von Panecke m/n 
K.u.K. Oberst i. R. als Zeuge 
Leopold Ritzberger m/p Hptm als Zeuge 
Rudolf Ritter von Frie￿ m/n 
GM als Zeuge 
 
Rundgemacht Graz am 12. Mai 1896 
D Albert Beer m.p. 
 
[in a different hand] 
Diese f￿r den Verla￿act bestimmte Abschrift ist gleich dem aus einem Bogen 
bestehenden ungestempelten Originale. Graz am zw￿lften Mai achtzehnhundert 
sechs und neunzig. 
[Signature] 
Albert Beer 
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3.2. Cena investigation reports 
 
I. Declaration given by FML Nikolaus Cena to the imperial 
military authorities in Vienna 
 
Protokoll 
 
Se. Exz. FMlt. Cena gibt am 29./8. beim Kriegs￿berwachungsamte zu 
Protokoll: 
 
Ich wurde am 26./7. l.J. 10h vorm. in Mehadia von der Gendarmerie hier 
verhaftet erkl￿rt und in die dortige Gend. Kaserne abgef￿hrt. Nachm. desselben 
Tages wurde ich der Grenzpolizei in Orsova ￿berstellt, woselbst mit mir ein 
Protokoll aufgenommen und erkl￿rt wurde, da￿ meine Verhaftung wegen 
Spionageverdachtes und Agitation erfolgt sei. Mein Protest half nichts. 
Am 27./7. fr￿h wurde ich mit anderen H￿ftlingen der verschiedensten 
Gesellschaftsklassen in einem Waggon III. Kl. nach KarÆnsebes ￿berf￿hrt und der 
dortigen Staatsanwaltschaft ￿bergeben. Mein Verlangen nach Zuweisung eines 
Fahrplatzes I. Klasse (auf eigene Kosten) wurde nicht ber￿cksichtigt. ￿ber meine 
Bitte wurde mir im Gefangenhaus eine Einzelzelle zugewiesen. 
Ich wurde zweimal einvernommen; einmal in meiner eigenen Angelegenheit, 
das zweitemal als Zeuge in einer anderen. Ich wurde lediglich aufgefordert 
(p.4/verso) ￿mich zu verteidigen￿, ohne da￿ mir konkrete Anschuldigungen 
vorgehalten worden w￿ren. Infolgedessen konnte ich auch nur ganz allgemein diesen 
Anschuldigungen entgegentreten und es m￿ssen meine diesbez￿glichen Angaben im 
aufgenommenen Protokolle enthalten sein. 
Am 24./8. 11h vorm., bis zu welcher Zeit ich unausgesetzt in Einzelhaft war, 
erschien der Staatsanwalt in meiner Zelle und machte mir folgende Er￿ffnung: 
￿Das Kriegsministerium fr￿gt sich an, ob Sie gewillt sind das Land binnen 3 
Tagen zu verlassen, wenn ja, werden Sie freigelassen.￿ ￿ Ich mu￿te Ziel und Route 
meiner Reise angeben und mich mit Ehrenwort verpflichten, mit dem n￿chsten Zuge   354
(25./8. 4h 41 vorm.) abzureisen und die gew￿hlte Route (TemesvÆr, Budapest, 
Bruck, Wien) genau anzuhalten. Ich kam am 27./8. fr￿h hier an und meldete mich 
hier beim Platzkmdo. 
Ich bin hier VI. Gumpendorferstr.18.  II/13 abgestiegen. 
Nach Verlesung: 
Meine Angaben sind richtig aufgenommen: 
Nicolai Cena 
Fmlt, d.R. 
 
(p.5/recto) 
Geschlossen und gefertigt ! 
Wien, 29/8 1914 
Schleyer, Fmlt 
KÆrpÆthy Mjr 
 
A typed copy of this Protokoll is to be found in KA, K￿A 1914, Aktenzahl 4066. 
 
II. Count Tisza￿s response to the interpellation of the 
Kriegsministerium: 
 
OeStA, KA, KM Pr￿s, 1914 
Karton 1583 (40/1 ￿ 41/3) 
Aktenzahl 40 ￿ 19/5 
P.2/recto: 
6673 BIZALMAS 
_____ SajÆt  kezØbe. 
M.E.  
Seine des Herrn k.u.k. wirklichen geheimen Rathes, Feldzeugmeisters, 
k.u.k. Kriegsministers 
ALEXANDER RITTER von KROBATIN 
Excellenz 
     W I E N    355
 
EUER EXCELLENZ! 
 
Die werte Zuschrift Euer Excellenz vom 29-ten August Zahl K￿AN. 2922 
kann ich erst heute beantworten, da ich die mir bekannten Details der Angelegenheit 
des k.u.k. Feldmarschallieutenant d.R. Nikolaus Cena vorerst zusammenstellen und 
erg￿nzen wollte, um ein klares Bild dieser Angelegenheit geben zu k￿nnen. 
Wie Euer Excellenz wohl bekannt ist, war die jetzige ungarische Regierung, 
welche von diesbez￿glichen im Herbst 1912 vorgenommenen Vorarbeiten nichts 
wusste, peinlich ￿berrascht zu erfahren, dass gleich am ersten Mobilisierungstage 
massenhafte Verhaftungen angeblich politisch verd￿chtiger Personen von 
milit￿rischer Seite veranlasst wurden. Euer Excellenz werden sich darauf erinnern, 
dass ich gegen diese ganze Action von Anfang an die schwersten Bedenken hegte, 
auf das energischeste Stellung nahm, an die Intervention Seiner Majest￿t appellierte 
und dass es mir in dieser Weise gelang, ein modus vivendi herzustellen und bei 
sp￿teren Verhaftungen die Ingerenz der politischen Beh￿rden zu sichern, welche 
selbstredend mehr in der Lage sein m￿ssen, sowohl die Zuverl￿ssigkeit einzelner 
Pers￿nlichkeiten wie auch die Folgen  
        . / .  
  (p.2/verso) solcher staatspolizeilicher Massnahmen richtig beurteilen zu 
k￿nnen. 
Die ersten Verhaftungen waren jedoch schon vollzogen, und lassen ihre 
sch￿dlichen Folgen in mancher Hinsicht f￿hlen. Unter diese ersten F￿lle reiht sich 
auch die Verhaftung des k.u.k. Feldmarschallieutenant Cena. 
In der Nacht vom 25-ten auf den 26-ten Juli erging n￿mlich seitens des 
Generalstabchefs des 7. Armeecorps die telegraphische Weisung an den 
Stationscommandanten in Orsova, die in eine Liste als verd￿chtig eingetragenen 
Personen zu verhaften. noch in derselben Nacht wurde der Befehl urgiert. Hierauf 
liess der Stationscommandant den Grenzpolizeihauptmann, den Commandanten des 
Gendarmeriefl￿gels und des Oberstuhlrichters zu sich rufen, erkl￿rte ihnen, dass er 
in Folge der Mobilisierung die Verf￿gung ￿ber alle Beh￿rden ￿bernehme, und 
￿bergab einem jeden dieser drei Organe je eine Liste von Personen, welche in 
derselben Nacht zu verhaften seien.   356
Unter diesen befand sich der Feldmarschallieutenant Cena, welcher infolge 
des erhaltenen Befehles vom Gendarmeriefl￿gel-Commandanten verhaftet und mit 
den anderen an den Staatsanwalt in KarÆnsebes abgef￿hrt wurde. Dieser wurde nur 
davon instruiert, dass die Verhaftung auf Befehl des Milit￿rcommandos aus 
R￿cksichten der Sicherung des Heeres geschah, und dass die Arrestanten im 
Gef￿ngnis der Staatsanwaltschaft zu unterbringen w￿ren. 
Auf eine schriftliche Anfrage des Staatsanwaltes erhielt derselbe vom 
Stationscommandanten in Orsova am 4-ten August sub Zahl 199 die Verst￿ndigung, 
dass Nikolaus Cena als der Spionage verd￿chtig verhaftet wurde, und seine 
Inhaftierung bis zur Beendigung der in Gang gesetzten Untersuchung aus 
milit￿rischen R￿cksichten unbedingt nothwendig sei. 
(p.3/recto) 
Diese Untersuchung hat dann ergeben, dass Feldmarschallieutenant Cena 
Photographien von den Tunneln und Eisenbahnbr￿cken massenhaft herstellen liess 
und zwar von diesen letzteren aus Positionen, welche ein klares Bild der 
Construction derselben erm￿glichen, und dass derselbe in regem Verkehr mit 
rum￿nischen Offizieren stand. Auf diese und einige noch belanglosere 
Verdachtsmomente wurde Feldmarschallieutenant Cena verh￿rt und hat sich 
eingehend ge￿ussert, sodass seine Behauptung, nichts ￿ber die gegen ihn erhobenen 
Anschuldigungen erfahren zu haben, nicht der Wahrheit entspricht. 
Nach Beendigung der Untersuchung hat der Oberstaatsanwalt von TemesvÆr 
am 22-ten August beim 7. Corpscommando angefragt, inwieweit diese 
Photographien von Br￿cken und der Umstand, dass dieselben gr￿sstenteils von 
unten, aus dem Wasser aufgenommen wurden, als verd￿chtige Momente betrachtet 
werden k￿nnten. Aber bevor eine Antwort auf diese Frage h￿tte einlangen k￿nnen 
wurde Feldmarschallieutenant Cena auf meine Intervention am 24-ten August, unter 
der Bedingung seinen Aufenthalt w￿hrend dem Kriege in ￿sterreich zu nehmen, 
freigelassen. 
Wie Euer Excellenz aus diesem Tatbestand ersehen k￿nnen, ist sowohl die 
Verhaftung, wie die Verl￿ngerung der Untersuchungshaft auf directe Veranlassung 
der milit￿rischen Commanden geschehen, wobei der k￿nigl. Staatsanwalt die 
Angelegenheit nach Tunlichkeit beschleunigt und widerholt Schritte getan hat, um 
die Freilassung des Genannten zu erm￿glichen. Was aber die Intervention der 
k￿n.ung. Regierung anbetrifft, so bestand sie, wie bei allen ￿hnlichen F￿llen, so auch   357
bei diesem Fall, in einer m￿glichsten Beschleunigung des Verfahrens und endlich in 
der directen Intervention und Freilassung des Betreffenden. 
Wenn also irgend jemanden ein Vorwurf in dieser Frage (p.3/verso) treffen 
kann, so sind es keineswegs die Civilbeh￿rden des Landes und wohl auch weniger 
einzelne milit￿rische Organe, als dieses ganze System von Spionage- und 
Geheimpolizistentums, welches zu meiner peinlichen ￿berraschung in manchen 
milit￿rischen Kreisen so sehr ￿berhandgenommen hat. 
Genehmigen Euer Excellenz den Ausdruck meiner vorz￿glichen 
Hochachtung. 
 
BUDAPEST, den 4-ten September 1914 
Tisza m.p. 
A typed copy of this report is to be found in KA, K￿A (Kriegs￿berwachungsamt), 
Aktenzahl 4066. 
 
 
III. Request sent by the Royal Head Prosecutor in 
TemesvÆr to the General Staff Command of the 7th Army 
Corps in TemesvÆr concerning the Cena case. 
 
Bizalmas 
A cs. Øs kir. 7. hadtest VezØrkari OsztÆlyÆnak 
TemesvÆr 
A orsovai m.kir.hatÆrszØli rendőrsØg az orsovai katonai ÆllomÆs 
parancsnoksÆg megkeresØsØre letart￿ztatta Øs foly￿ Øvi jœlius h￿ 26-Æn bek￿sØrte a 
karÆnsebesi kir. t￿rvØnyszØki foghÆzba CSENA MIKL￿S nyugalmazott cs.Øs kir. 
altÆbornagyot azon alapon, mert kØmgyanœs, akinek a letart￿ztatÆsa a mozg￿sitÆs 
kereszt￿lvihetØse Øs hadi czØl elØrhetØsØre vÆlt sz￿ksØgessØ. 
A kØmkedØs b￿ntette miatt ellene folyamatba tett nyomozÆs a k￿vetkező 
adatokat szolgÆltatta: 
a Csena Mikl￿s mehÆdiai lakÆsÆn a hatÆrszØli rendőrsØg Æltal megtartott 
hÆzkutatÆs alkalmÆval nagy szÆmu fØnykØplemez Øs kØsz amateur fØnykØp, tovÆbbÆ   358
rendk￿v￿l sok katonai k￿nyv Øs tØrkØp talÆltatott; a fØnykØpek legnagyobb rØsze 
MehÆdia Øs k￿rnyØkØnek hidjair￿l, alagutjair￿l vannak fØnykØpezve, k￿l￿n￿sen az 
Ærvizpuszt￿tÆs utÆni megrongÆlt Ællapotban Øs œjra Øp￿lő Ællapot k￿l￿nb￿ző 
fÆzi(s)aiban. A katonai tØrkØpek azon helyek terepeit mutatjÆk, hol Csena Mikl￿s 
hosszu katonai ideje alatt szolgÆlatot teljesitett; A meglevő katonai k￿nyvek a 
nevezett tØnyleges szolgÆlata alatt lettek beszerezve; arra nØzve, hogy a fØnykØpek 
k￿lf￿ld szÆmÆra kØsz￿ltek volna, avagy szÆll￿ttattak volna, semmi nyom vagy jel 
nem talÆltatott; ezenkiv￿l talÆltatott Øs ￿nkØnt Ætadott tÆrgyak: 11 darab sajÆt rajzu 
tØrkØprØsz illetve tØrkØpvÆz, 1 darab ￿Műszaki VilÆg￿ 1910. julius 14-iki szÆma, 1 
darab k￿sz￿nő levØl a meteorologiai intØzet pecsØtjØvel ellÆtva, 1 darab az orsovai 
kir. jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgnak czimzett k￿sz￿n￿ levØl folgalmazvÆnya, 2 darab Krass￿sz￿rØny 
vÆrmegyei tØrkØp sajÆt jegyzettel bővitve, 1 darab a ￿Drapelul￿ œjsÆg 1911. 
szeptember 19-iki szÆma. 
A hÆzkutatÆsnÆl jelen volt Bacsilla MÆria ￿ gyanusitott testvØre azt adta el￿, 
hogy a 11 darab tØrkØpvÆzlatot Csena azØrt kØsz￿tette, mert ő mint egyhÆzi eln￿k az 
elszÆntott Øs a v￿z alÆ ker￿lt egyhÆzi f￿ldek telekk￿nyveit akarta rendezni, mivel a 
telekk￿nyvi betØtek rendezØse ezutÆn k￿vetkezik. 
Klein MihÆly, Steiner SÆndor, Toldi Elek, Prerau Jakob, Alscher Ludmilla 
tanuk Øs szintØn terhelltkØnt szereplő Bozsinka FÆbiusz vallomÆsaival megÆllapithat￿ 
az, hogy 
     1. foly￿ Øvi jœnius havÆban az orsovai kir. jÆrÆsbir￿sÆg vezetőjØnek utas￿tÆsÆra 
kiadattak Csena Mikl￿s altÆbornagynak ennek kØrelmØre MehÆdia k￿zsØg beter￿letØt 
ÆbrÆzol￿ eredeti jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgi telekk￿nyvi tØrkØpek, amelyket Csena Mikl￿s 
magÆhoz vØve elismervØny ellenØben elvitte Øs mintegy 14 napig magÆnÆl tartva 
visszak￿ldte, a jÆrÆsb￿r￿sÆgnÆl levő elismervØnyØt pedig Kriznyik jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgi 
dijnok Toldi Elek hivatalszolga utjÆn az orsovai ÆllomÆs parancsnoknak leendő 
kØzbesitØs vØgett Grozeszku D￿me orsovai őrmesternek adott Æt; 
                2. Csena Mikl￿s altÆbornagy mintegy 3 Øve Alscher orsovai fØnykØpØszhez 
t￿bbsz￿r vitt kØsz fØnykØp felvØteleket előh￿vÆs vØgett azzal, hogy minden lemezről 
egy kØpet kØszitsenek s azt neki k￿ldjØk el, a lemezeket pedig tartsÆk meg, mÆsrØszt 
t￿bbsz￿r vÆsÆrolt kØsz lemezeket. A lemezek legnagyobb rØszre hidakat ÆbrÆzolnak 
t￿bbfØle helyzetben, igen sok lemez az Ærviz Æltal Herkulesf￿rdő Øs Orsova k￿z￿tt 
elmosott vasuti pÆlyatestet, mÆs lemezek pedig magÆnos hÆzakat is ÆbrÆzolnak; a   359
fØnykØpØsz kØrdØsØre Csena azt a felvilÆgositÆst adta, hogy a h￿d felvØtelek azØrt 
kellenek neki, mivel ő mint pionir tiszt ezen dolgok irÆnt Ørdeklődik. 
Csena Mikl￿s altÆbornagy tagadja, hogy akÆr a tØrkØpekkel akÆr a fØnykØp 
felvØtelekkel bÆrmifØle b￿ntetendő cselekmØnyt, kØmkedØst akart volna Øs k￿vetett 
volna el; a karÆnsebesi kir. ￿gyØszsØghez irÆsban beadott vØdekezØsØben azt adja elő, 
hogy ő 1904 augusztus 1-eje ￿ta van nyugalomban Øs MehÆdiÆn semmifØle katonai 
intØzet avagy erőditmØny nincs, amelyet ő kikØmlelhetett volna, ￿rt mÆr egy a bØcsi 
tudomÆnyos akadØmia 1911 Øvi Øvk￿nyvØben megjelenő ￿￿ber den Fund einer 
r￿mischen Inschriften Basis in ad Mediam /: MehÆdia:/ der Peutinger-schen Tafel￿ 
czim￿ m￿vet; œjabban egy munkÆt akart irni ￿Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde Mehadia￿czimen Øs ezen műh￿z volt neki sz￿ksØge 
MehÆdia rØgi tØrkØpeire, amelyek utÆn mØg a temesvÆri katasteri osztÆlyban is 
kutatott; megbizhat￿sÆgÆra felhozza, hogy 1878 Øvben mint főhadnagy az akkori 
altÆbornagy SkudiØ Æltal az orosz-romÆn-t￿r￿k harcztØrre kØm gyanÆnt kik￿ldetett; a 
karÆnsebesi kir. ￿gyØszsØg előtt t￿rtØnt kihallgatÆsa alkalmÆval pedig azt adta elő, 
hogy  ő mint mehÆdiai g￿r.kel. hitk￿zsØg vezető embere a hitk￿zsØg viszonyait 
igyekezett rendbe hozni, 1911 Øvben a RomÆniÆban a kirÆly tiszteletØre rendezett 
katonai ￿nnepsØgre elment s ott magas rangu tisztekkel ￿ k￿zt￿k egy Mujka nev￿ 
romÆn kir. ezredessel ￿ is megismerkedett; foly￿ Øvi julius 12-Øn felkerestØk őt 
MehÆdiÆn a lakÆsÆn nevezett Mujka ezredes Øs Musztecza tÆbornoknak bemutat￿ 
polgÆri ruhÆba ￿lt￿z￿tt egyØnek, akik a romÆn hadsereget dicsØrtØk Øs azt mondtÆk, 
hogy lehet, hogy RomÆnia hÆboruba keveredik Ausztria-MagyaroraszÆggal, amire ő 
t.i. Csena felhÆborodva vÆlaszolta, hogy MonarchiÆnk hadseregØt nem lehet a 
romÆnnal ￿sszehasonlitani Øs hogy a romÆn katona tisztek Æltal emlitett hÆboru 
esetØn ￿nagyon sajnÆlnÆm, mert akkor benn￿nket szemtől-szembe fogtok talÆlni￿; 
azt is előadta, mØg Csena, hogy a kir.jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgi tØrkØpeket azØrt kØrte ki, mert 
ezeken a rØgi időben MehÆdiÆn lØtezett erőditmØnyek is fel voltak t￿ntetve, Øs ezeket 
szerette volna a kØsz￿lő munkÆjÆnÆl felhasznÆlni, ugyancsak ezen munkÆjÆhoz volt 
sz￿ksØge azon fØnykØpekre, amelyket maga vett fel MehÆdia k￿rnyØkØről Øs 
dolgoztatott ki az orsovai fØnykØpØszszel. 
Ezek a nyomozÆs adatai. 
Csena Mikl￿s ellenØben gyanut keltő azon k￿r￿lmØny, hogy ő 1911 Øvben 
RomÆniÆban katonai ￿nnepØlyen rØszt vett, hogy őt foly￿ Øv julius havÆban kØt 
romÆn tÆbornok felkereste Øs vele az Æltala is beismert beszØlgetØst folytatta, hogy a   360
fØnykØp felvØteleket mÆr 3 Øve tehÆt 1911 Øvben is folytatta, hogy hidakat, 
alagutakat, t￿bb k￿l￿nb￿ző nØzőpontb￿l vett fel, hogy MehÆdia tØrkØpeit foly￿ Øvi 
junius havÆban kØrte ki a jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgt￿l s hogy a romÆn tisztek Æltal t￿rtØnt 
meglÆtogatÆsa foly￿ Øvi julius első felØre esik, hogy az Æltala emlitett tervbe vett 
ujabb munkÆjÆnak Øs abban a tØrkØpek Øs fØnykØp felvØtelek felhasznÆlÆsÆnak 
tØnyØre adat nincs. 
Ezen terhelő k￿r￿lmØnyek folytÆn annak ismeretØre van sz￿ksØgem, hogy a 
Csena Mikl￿s Æltal lemÆsolt mehÆdiai rØgi telekk￿nyvi tØrkØpek s az Æltala eszk￿z￿lt 
fØnykØp felvØtelek katonai szempontb￿l mennyiben szolgÆlhatnak egy ellensØges 
Ællam előnyØre, azok megszerzØse esetØn Øs mennyiben sØrtenØ ez az Ællam ØrdekØt, a 
lefØnykØpezett tÆrgyak ￿ k￿l￿nosen figyelemmel arra, hogy egy-egy tÆrgy k￿l￿nb￿ző 
nØzőpontb￿l lett t￿bbsz￿r lefØnykØpezve ￿ az Ællam hadi ereje Øs vØdelme 
szempontjÆb￿l katonai fontossÆggal bir-e s igy ezek kikØmlelØse az Ællam Ørdekeit 
sØrti-e; fel vannak-e tØnyleg t￿ntetve MehÆdia rØgi telekk￿nyvi tØrkØpein a rØgi 
időben lØtezett erőditmØnyek Øs ezek ismerete katonai szempontb￿l szintØn 
fontosnak tekinthető-e; katonai szempontb￿l Øs az Ællam Ørdeke szempontjÆb￿l 
emlitett fØnykØp felvØtelek Øs ezekről fØnykØpek kØszitØse megengedhetőnek 
tekinthető-e; vØgeredmØnyben megÆllapithat￿-e terhelt ellenØben, hogy ő az Ællam 
hadi erejØre Øs vØdelmØre vonatkoz￿ intØzkedØseket, tÆrgyakat ￿ melyekről tudta 
vagy tudhatta, hogy titokban tartand￿k ￿ kikØmlelt s ezen cselekmØnye Æltal az Ællam 
ØrdekØt megsØrtette-e? 
A nyomozati iratok, ugy a b￿njelkØnt lefoglalt 11 mÆsolt tØrkØp, 3 nyomtatott 
tØrkØp, 98 darab fØnykØplemez, 1 darab Csena czimØre sz￿l￿ levØl, 1 darab az 
orsovai telekk￿nyvi hat￿sÆgnak sz￿l￿ levØl fogalmazvÆnya, 1 darab jegyzet /: 
MehÆdia a t￿r￿k h￿doltsÆg idejØben:/, 1 darab ￿Drapelul￿ czim￿ ujsÆg Øs 1 darab 
￿Műszaki VilÆg￿ czim￿ œjsÆg ./. alatt Ætk￿ldØse mellett tisztelettel kØrem a cs.Øs kir. 
VezØrkari OsztÆlyt, sziveskedjØk fentiekre nØzve rØszletes katonai szakØrtői 
nyilatkozatot adni, mivel pedig a lefØnykØpezett tÆrgyaknak Øs a telekk￿nyvi 
tØrkØpeken Ællit￿lag felt￿ntetett rØgi erőditmØnyek helyeinek a termØszetben val￿ 
megszemlØlØse a vØlemØny kialakulÆsÆhoz lØnyegesen d￿ntő befolyÆssal lehet: 
tisztelettel kØrem ezeknek a helyszinØn leendő megtekintØsØt, az eredeti tØrkØpeknek 
sz￿ksØg estØre az orsovai kir. jÆrÆsbir￿sÆgnÆl leendő megtekintØsØt Øs ezeknek a 
Csena Mikl￿s Æltal kØszitett mÆsolatokkal leendő ￿sszehasonlitÆsÆt avØgből, hogy a   361
mÆsolatok a rÆvezetett sajÆt megjegyzØseivel nem-e szolgÆlnak Csena ellenØben 
szintØn terhelő tÆmpontul. 
Figyelemmel Csena Mikl￿s magas tÆrsadalmi ÆllÆsÆra Øs arra, hogy előzetes 
letart￿ztatÆsban van: kØrem a vØlemØnynek s￿rgős k￿zlØsØt. 
 
TemesvÆr 1914 Øvi augusztus h￿ 22-Øn 
Dr. Gozsdu Elek 
kir. fő￿gyØsz 
KirÆlyi FőugyØszsØg 
TemesvÆrott 
 
 
 
Translation: 
(I am grateful to Ms Eszter Tarsoly for proofreading my translation.) 
 
Confidential 
To the General Staff Command of the k.u.k. 7th Army Corps in TemesvÆr 
 
On the command of the Orsova military station, the Orsova royal frontier police 
arrested Mikl￿s Csena, retired k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant, on the 26th of July, the 
current year, and committed him to the Caransebes royal tribunal prison on the 
grounds that he was suspected of espionage. His arrest was necessary for military 
reasons during mobilization. 
The investigation held on account of the charge of espionage furnished the following 
data: 
 
During the house search conducted by the border police in the Mehadia house of 
Mikl￿s Csena were found a great number of photographic plates and ready-made 
photographs as well as many military books and maps. There are many photographs 
of bridges and tunnels in Mehadia and its surroundings, in particular of those 
damaged by flooding and those in the various stages of being built. The military 
maps represent those places where Mikl￿s Csena did military service during his long 
military career. The avaliable military books were (said to have been) obtained when   362
he was in active service. No trace or sign was found that the photos were to be made 
for foreigners or that they were to be dispatched. 
 
In addition, there were found and freely handed over the following objects: 11 items 
of his own drawings of sections of maps and sketches; a copy of the 14th of July 
1910 issue of ￿Technical World￿; one thank-you letter bearing the seal of the 
meteorological institute; one thank-you letter to the Orsova royal court of law in 
draft form; two maps of Krass￿sz￿rØny county, with his own annotations; one copy 
of the newspaper ￿Drapelul￿ of the 19th of September 1911. 
 
Maria Bacsilla was present during the house search ￿ the sister of the suspect stated 
that Csena made the 11 maps because, as church president, he intended to sort out 
the land register of the church lands with water infiltrations and those that had been 
ploughed over, followed by the settlement of the land register contributions. 
 
By means of the testimony of K.M., S.S., T.E., P.J, A.L., as witnesses, and of B.F. as 
equally accused party, it can be established that: 
 
In the month of June of the current year, on the command of the head of the Orsova 
royal tribunal were delivered to FMLt Mikl￿s Csena, on his request, original maps 
from the tribunal land registers representing the area of the Mehadia parish; Csena 
collected them with receipt and returned them, having kept them for 14 days; 
however, Kriznyik, the local tribunal clerk, gave the receipt, via Toldi Elek, to 
Sergeant Grozescu Dome for the future use of the Orsova station commander. 
 
Three years before, FMLt Mikl￿s Csena sent, on several occasions, to Alscher, the 
Orsova photographer, ready-made photographic plates and plates to be developed 
with a view that they should prepare a photograph from every plate and send them to 
him and that they should kept the plates; on various occasions, he bought ready-
made plates. 
 
Most of the plates show bridges in various positions and many plates show the 
flooded railway tracks between Orsova and the Hercules Baths; other plates, 
however, also depict individual houses.   363
 
To the photographer￿s question Csena gave the information that he needed the 
photos of bridges as, when he was a pioneer [engineer] officer, he took an interest in 
such things. Mikl￿s Csena denied that he intended or that he perpetrated any 
criminal acts or spying by means of the maps or photos. 
 
Mikl￿s Csena denied that he intended or that he perpetrated any criminal acts or 
spying by means of the maps or photos. 
 
In his written defence handed in to the Caransebes royal prosecutor he stated that he 
was retired since 1st August 1904 and in Mehadia there were no military institutions 
or fortifications for him to spy on; he wrote an article entitled ￿￿ber den Fund einer 
r￿mischen Inschriften Basis in ad Mediam /: MehÆdia:/ der Peutinger-schen Tafel￿ 
published in the 1911 yearbook of the academy of sciences in Vienna. 
 
He wanted of late to write a work entitled ￿Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde Mehadia￿ and for this writing he needed the old 
maps of Mehadia, for which he also searched in the TemesvÆr cadastre department.  
 
In support of his trustworthiness he adduced that, in 1878 when he was a first 
lieutenant, he was sent out by the then FMLt Scudier to the Russian-Romanian-
Turkish frontline as a undercover man. However, during the interrogation before the 
Caransebes royal prosecutor, he stated that, when he was head of the Greek-Oriental 
parish in Mehadia, he endeavoured to improve the relations of the parish; in 1911 he 
attended in Romania the military celebrations held in honour of the [Romanian] 
king, and there he also got acquainted with high-ranking officers ￿ among them 
[being] one named Mujka, a Romanian colonel. 
 
On 12th of July this year the mentioned Colonel Mujka and General Musztecza 
visited his house in Mehadia dressed in civilian clothes. They praised the Romanian 
army and said: what if Romania were to get involved in a war with Austria-Hungary, 
to which he replied with indignation that one cannot compare the army of our 
Monarchy to the Romanian army and that, in the event of a war, as mentioned by the 
Romanian officers, ￿I am very sorry, but we will be on different sides.￿   364
 
Csena also stated that he wanted the maps from the royal tribunal because they 
represented the fortresses of Mehadia in ancient times and he wanted to use these in 
his work. Likewise he needed for his work those photographs, which he himself took 
of the peripheries of Mehadia and sent to be processed by the photographer in 
Orsova. 
 
These are the data of the investigation: 
 
Against Mikl￿s Csena were given the following grounds for suspicion: that in 1911 
he attended the military ceremony in Romania; that in July of the current year, two 
Romanian generals visited him and had the [above-] mentioned discussion with him; 
that even 3 years before, that is, in 1911, he developed photographs, which showed 
bridges and tunnels from various perspectives; that in June he wanted to take maps 
of Mehadia from the tribunal, and that the visit paid by the Romanian officers took 
place during the first part of July of the current year; that he gave no evidence for the 
subsequent utilization of his maps and photos for the mentioned purpose in his recent 
work. 
 
As a result of these incriminating circumstances I need to know the following: to 
what extent the maps from the old Mehadia land registers copied out by Mikl￿s 
Csena and the photographs developed by him can benefit an inimical state from a 
military point of view if such a state were to acquire them; and to what extent can 
these photographs harm the state interest ￿ in particular with regard to the fact that 
the photos are taken from various angles ￿ do they hold military significance for 
state defence and would spying on these be harmful to the state interests? Were the 
ancient fortresses represented on the Mehadia old land register maps and could the 
knowledge thereof be considered important from a military point of view? Are the 
mentioned photographic plates and the photos made from them legal from a military 
point of view and from the point of view of state interest? Finally, can it be 
ascertained that he spied on actions and matters regarding state military defence ￿ 
which he knew or could have known were to be kept secret - and did he, through this 
action, harm the state interest? 
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I would like to respectfully remit to the imperial and royal general staff department 
the investigation documents, which were confiscated as evidence: 11 copies of maps, 
3 printed maps, 98 photographic plates, one letter addressed to Csena, a draft letter to 
the land register authority, notes entitled ￿Mehadia under Turkish rule￿, one copy of 
the newspaper ￿Drapelul￿ and a copy of the newspaper ￿Technical World￿. I would 
like to request that you look at the above mentioned and make a detailed expert 
military statement given that an inspection of the objects on the photographic plates 
and of the places and old fortresses suppossedly represented on the land register 
maps can be essential to the formation of a verdict with a substantially conclusive 
impact. 
 
I would like to respectfully ask for the prospective inspection of the terrain and, if 
needed, the prospective inspection at the Orsova tribunal of the original maps and a 
comparison of these with the copies made by Mikl￿s Csena in order to [ascertain] if 
the copies with his own annotations can serve as incriminating evidence against him. 
 
Given the high social standing of Mikl￿s Csena and the fact that he is under 
preliminary arrest, I am asking for the urgent issuance of this statement. 
 
TemesvÆr 22nd of August 1914 
Dr. Gozsdu Elek 
Royal Head Prosecutor 
 
The Royal Tribunal 
in TemesvÆr   366
3.3. Lupu trial 
 
OeStA, KA, KM MK, 1917, (1731-2320), Karton 218, Aktenzahl 2196. 
 
Iorga Alexander Stefan & Gen. 
Aussp￿hung 
 
Pr.Z./ 18 Z.St. 
Jorga Alexander Stefan und Genossen ￿ Verbrechen der Aussp￿hung 
Zur h.o. Berichte v. 13.II.1918 
Pr.Z.329/9 Z.St. 
 
 An 
die Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. Kriegsministerium 
in Wien 
 
Der k.k. Milit￿ranwalt des k.u.k. Milit￿rkommandanten in Wien hat dem 
Evidenzb￿ro des k.u.k. Generalstabes in Wien mit der Zuschrift vom 31. J￿nner 
1918, G.Z.A. 1942/17 gemeldet, dass der zust￿ndige Kommandant die Ausdehnung 
des beim k.k. Landwehrdivisionsgerichte in Wien gegen Alexander Stefan Jorga 
anh￿ngigen Ermittlungsverfahrens gem￿ss § 144 M.St.P.O. gegen den Generalmajor 
d.R. Alexander Lupu auf freiem Fusse in der Richtung des Verbrechens nach § 321 
StG. bezw. § 326 M.St.G. angeordnet hat, weil dieser verd￿chtig ist, in Kenntnis der 
strafbaren Beziehungen zwischen Jorga und dem Milit￿rattachØ Styrcea, dem 
Erstgenannten materielle F￿rderung durch gelegentliche Geldzuwendungen und 
durch Verschafung von besoldeten Sekret￿rstellen bei mehreren rum￿nischen 
Instituten gew￿hrt, dem Styrcea durch Jorga anscheinend einem milit￿rischen Werke 
entnommene ethnographische Karte der Monarchie mit handschriftlichen 
Bemerkungen ￿ber die Anzahl der den einzelnen Regimentern angeh￿rigen Personen 
rum￿nischer Nationalit￿t ￿bergeben zu haben. Ausserdem wird dem General Lupu 
zur Last gelegt, er habe die Bekanntschaft Jorgas mit einem Ingenieur namens 
Trimbitoi zu dem Zwecke vermittelt, damit dieser dem Styrcea eine Erfindung   367
bez￿glich der Verankerung der Kanonenlafetten auf Grund eines staatlichen 
Prinzipes behufs Verwendung derselben in der rum￿nischen Armee vorf￿hre. 
Dieser Bericht ergeht gleichlautend an das Pr￿sidium des k.k. Ministeriums 
des Innern, das k.k.n.￿. Statthaltereipr￿sidium, die Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. 
Kriegsministerium und an das Pr￿sidium des k.k. Ministeriums f￿r Kultus und 
Unterricht. 
 
Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. Kriegsministerium 
Wien, Pr￿s. am 8 Mrz 1918 ￿ 4 Apr 1918 
M.K./K.M. No. 1516   368
4) Appendix to Chapter Nine: 
 
Telegrams and letters to and from Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic 
agent in Vienna, and Ion C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister, between May 
and July 1877 
I have kept the original text and provided an English translation for each of 
them. I have also tried to order them chronologically, although in some cases the 
date is probable, not certain. 
 
Arhivele Naţionale Bucureşti, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286 
 
1) Dosar 22/1877, p.80/recto 
Transcribed telegram ￿ handwritten (from Bălăceanu to Brătianu) 
 
8 mai (aprilie crossed out) 1877 
Andrassy a ØvitØ de me faire conna￿tre la rØponse de l￿empereur au sujet du gØnØral 
roumain. J￿ai appris nØanmoins qu￿il Øtait trŁs disposØ ￿ nous l￿accorder mais que la 
certitude que notre armØe agira de concert avec l￿armØe russe l￿a arrŒtØ ici. Personne 
ne croit plus que la guerre peut Œtre localisØe. 
 
￿8 May 1877 
Andrassy avoided communicating to me the Emperor￿s reply on the subject of the 
Romanian general. I gathered, however, that he was very willing to give it to us but 
that he was prevented by the certainty that our army would collaborate with the 
Russian army. No one believes anymore that the war will remain local/be localised. 
Balaceanu￿ 
 
2) Dosar 21/1877, p. 87/recto 
 Typed-out letter from Vincenţiu Babeş to Bălăceanu 
 
￿Pesta, ￿n 19 maiu 1877  
Inaltu Onorate Dle Agentu   369
Dlu gen. Doda sosi aici, precum mi-anunciase prin telegrama sa, domineca 
dimineţia. Acea diuă ￿ntreagă petrecută cu amiculu meu i-am explicatu, prec￿tu mi 
permiteau informaţiunile ce aveamu, situaţiunea,  şi i-am comunicatu cuprinsulu 
prepreţuitelor dvostre epistole. M-a ascultatu cu mare interesu, şi a poftitu apoi 
timpu de 24 de ore spre a pondera bine toate ￿mprejurările, şi a lua o deciziune fermă 
şi seriosă. 
 Aseră petrecurămu ￿mpreună p￿nă c￿tre mediulu nopţei şi cu părere de rău 
vinu a vă descrie precisele sale respicări: 
  ￿Este pres? t￿rdiu. ￿ In preseeră acţiunei neconsciendu de feliu organele, 
capacităţile essistenti, şi ne mai av￿ndu timpu de a le essamina eventualmente 
completa, ori ￿nlocui: este imposibil a se imagia la vun lucru at￿tu de gravu, cu at￿ta 
respundere.￿ 
  Mai vine ca: Monarchia vostra? nerecunoscendu independenţia Romaniei, 
dalta parte pastr￿ndu neutralitatea (p. 88/recto) nu se poate se autorize pe unu 
generalu alu seu, - măcar şi numai ￿n modu oficiosu, d-a participa, şi ￿ncă ￿ntr-o 
calitate cardinale, la acţiunea resbelică a Rom￿niei.￿ 
  Timpulu era deca nu la 1868/69, c￿ndu şi Doda şi C. Ursu, sondaţi prin D-nii 
Brătieneşci  şi-oferiseră servitiele, dar fuseseră reu desconsideraţi, macar toamna 
trecută, c￿nd Doda prin dl. Senatore Deşliu  şi ￿ncuragiatu chiar prin voia 
Domnitorului, sta gata să plece, dar, - neaşteptate de odată se vediu refuzatu de Dl. 
Bratianu! ...￿ 
 De  atunci  şi p￿nă astădi era posibilu a se familiariza şi chiar contopi cu 
puterile şi factorii de acolo şi anume din armata rom￿nă. Astă-zi nu mai este posibilu 
şi ar fi o neertabilă uşurinţă, a se ￿ngaja pentru d-a produce doră numai o mai mare 
confuziune! 
  In multu mai pucine cuvinte, seu adecă ￿n c￿te-va pucine linii m-a 
￿ncunoştiinţiatu ￿ la o provocare a mea confidenţială, dl. Colonel Caron Ursu din 
Sibiu, că ￿n stadiulu unde ne aflăm, sub nici o condiţiune să nu se conteze pe d￿nsul. 
(p. 89/recto) 
Şi eu cumpenind seriosa situaţiunea şi trecutulu, trebue să-ţi mărturisescu, că pricepu 
pe deplin scrupulu cari provini din consciinţia curata şi soliditatea caracterului 
acestor matadori militari. 
  Dl. I. Bratianu precum de comun Rom￿nia pururea prea mare a ţienutu contu 
de noi cei din coci, şi din nenorociri ￿nveţiendu a ne cunoşte mai vertosu din   370
mulţimea de omeni slabi, parte mari fanfaroni şi ciarlatani, ce trecu de la noi dincolo 
şi-şi dau aerul de martiri apostoli, bărbaţi cu influenţia: tocmai soliditatea şi 
realitatea a perdut-o din vedere! 
  Eu asta ierna intieleg￿ndu de ￿ncercările forte nepotrivite ale celor mari din 
Bucureşci ￿n părţile noastre, ￿n două r￿nduri mi-am permisu a recomanda D-lui 
Brătianu alte procedere şi multu mai multu precauţiune,  şi anume a-i lega de 
c￿scigarea numai de c￿tu a generalului Doda, carele pe acelu timpu ardea de poftă se 
a intra ￿n armata rom￿nă dă a o prepara la cele ce toţi le prevedeam că au să urme. 
Dar Dl. Primu Ministru alu Rom￿niei nici că mi-a datu vun răspunsu, prec￿nd daltă 
parte, precum tocmai ier află Dl. General Doda, este timpu pe la pasci, c￿ndu (p. 
90/recto) un missionariu al Guvernului Maghiar, deputatulu de la Camera 
Ungurească Al. R., petrecea la Bucureşti de bună seamă pentru a da        Dl Brătianu 
n-a pregetatu alu ￿nsărcina pre acesta ca să ￿ngajeze pre gen. Doda! Celu mare, ast-
fel se rosti cu tota posivitatea ieri Dlu Al.R. naintea amicului meu D. prec￿nd noi 
aici ne ferim a da măcar ￿bună ziua￿ cu atari subiecte. 
 V ă scriu acestea, Dle Agente, curatu numai pentru ca se vedeţi de c￿tu de       
buna socotela a procesu Dl Bratianu ￿n aceste cause momentose şi delicate, ceea-ce 
eu din a mea parte cu at￿t mai multu trebue se regretu de oare-ce de la 1866 ￿n coce, 
de c￿nd am avutu fericirea de a conosce mai de aprope pe Dlu J. Bratianu, n-am 
perdutu nici o ocasiune fără a lu ruga să nu pregete a studia să conosce mai bine 
personele  şi ￿mprejurările nostre de dincoci, ￿ndeget￿ndu-i pururea şi isvorele şi 
căile. 
Nu ve pot descrie m￿hnirea mea pentru lipsa de rezultatu ￿n acesta causa, de 
carea mi legamu mult frumose speranţe pentru Rom￿nia şi Rom￿nia ￿ntrega. 
Ve rogu deci, tocmai pentru motivulu acestei profunde ((p.91 is identical to 
(carbon copy of) p. 90)) (p.92/recto) m￿hniri ale mele, a-mi scusa iritaţiunea tonului 
şi, ￿n fine, a fi convinşi despre perfecta mea plăcere la ori-ce sacrificiu pentru causa 
Rom￿niei. 
Remanendu al D-voastre 
Devotatu Stimatoriu şi Servitoriu 
ss/ V. Babeşiu 
P.S. D-lu General D, de [...] n. va petrece 4-5 zile ￿n Viena; er otelul unde de comun 
descăleca e la ￿Wandel￿ am Peter. Me semţim indetoratu a-mi completa prin această 
notiţia; - aici ￿n Pesta d-sa locuiesce ￿n Otelul ￿Frohner￿.   371
 
￿Pest, 19 May 1877   
To the honourable diplomatic Agent 
General Doda arrived here on Sunday morning as announced in his 
telegram. I spent the whole day with my friend and explained to him the situation, as 
much as the information I had allowed me to, and communicated to him the content 
of your valuable epistles. He listened to me with great interest and then asked for 24 
hours of thorough deliberation in order to make a firm and serious decision. 
Last night we talked until midnight and I regret to inform you of his 
explanations. 
￿It is too late. It is impossible for me to commit myself to such a momentous 
thing, full of such responsibility, on the eve of the event, ignorant of the means 
available and without having the time to examine and possibly amend or replace 
them.￿ 
Then: as our Monarchy does not recognize Romania￿s independence and, on 
the other hand, wishes to remain neutral, it cannot authorize one of its generals, 
even in an official way??, to take part, and in a cardinal capacity too, in Romania￿s 
war/bellicose action.￿ 
The time was ripe, if not around 1868/69, when Doda and C. Ursu, sounded 
by the Brătianus, offered their services, but were rebuffed [reu desconsideraţi], then 
at least last autumn, when Doda, through the mediation of Senator Deşliu and 
encouraged even by the Prince [prin voia Domnitorului], was ready to go, but 
suddenly he was rejected by Mr Bratianu!...￿ 
Since then he could have familiarized himself with and even integrated into 
the Romanian army [a se familiariza şi chiar contopi cu puterile şi factorii din armata 
rom￿nă]. It is no longer possible to do that today and it would be an unforgivable 
foolishness to get involved now only to produce more confusion! 
In much fewer words Colonel Caron Ursu from Sibiu informed me, upon my 
confidential inquiry, that, in the stage we are in, under no circumstances should we 
count on him. 
Having pondered over the serious situation and the past events, I must 
confess that I fully understand the scruples coming from these two soldiers￿ clear 
conscience and solid character.   372
Mr Bratianu as well as Romania as a whole have taken us, the people from 
across the mountains, into consideration, and having come to know us in our 
misfortunes, to tell us apart from the hosts of weaklings, some of them clowns and 
charlatans, who crossed the mountains and play the martyrs, apostles and influential 
men: it is precisely the wholesomeness and reality that they lost sight of. [muddled 
sentence] 
Having heard about the highly inappropriate attempts made by the Bucharest 
leaders here in Transylvania, I took it upon myself to recommend to Mr Bratianu 
twice to use other methods and much more caution, that is, to get them to win over 
General Doda, who at that time was burning with desire [ardea de poftă] to join the 
Romanian army and prepare it for that which we all knew was going to follow. But 
Mr Prime Minister did not answer, and General Doda found out that around Easter 
Mr Brătianu did not hesitate to commission a missionary of the Hungarian 
Government, the Hungarian MP, Al. R., to hire [ca să ￿ngajeze] General Doda. Al. R. 
thus openly expressed himself before my friend D., whereas we here avoid even as 
much as touching upon such subjects. 
I am writing this to you, Mr Agent, so you can see how Mr Bratianu 
proceeded in these important and delicate matters, which is all the more regrettable 
to me because, ever since 1866, when I had the good fortune of making Mr 
Bratianu￿s acquaintance, I have missed no opportunity to ask him to get to know 
better the people from across the mountains and their situation, always pointing out 
to him the sources and the ways.   
I cannot describe my disappointment over the lack of results in this matter, to 
which I had pinned such high hopes for Romania and for a greater Romania. 
I ask you, therefore, on account of this deep disappointment, to excuse the 
irritation of my tone and to be persuaded of my readiness to any sacrifice for the 
Romanian cause. 
Your devoted servant, 
V.  Babeşiu 
P.S. General Doda is in Vienna for 4-5 days. The hotel he usually stays at is 
￿Wandel￿ am Peter. I feel obliged to add to this note: here in Pest he is staying at 
the ￿Frohner￿ hotel.￿ 
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3) Dosar 19/1877, p.3/recto (original in cipher) 
 
Iunie 1877 [archivists￿ input] 
￿Ministerul Financelor 
Cabinetul Ministrului 
Monsieur Balatchano agent diplomatique de Roumanie 
Vienne 
Prince sera heureux si l￿empereur autorisait Doda venir ￿ nous lui ferions positions 
trŁs avantageuses et la plus sßre et je vous rØpŁte nous serions dØsireux en coulisse 
gouvernement Austro-Hongrois envoyer (p.3/verso) un officier attachØ aupres du 
Prince ￿ l￿armØe de la petite Valachie 
I.C.Brătianu￿ 
 
￿June 1877 
The Prince would be happy if the Emperor were to authorize Doda to come to us. We 
will offer him a very advantageous and safe position and, I repeat, we wish that the 
Austrian-Hungarian government should send an officer attachØ to the Prince￿s army 
in Oltenia. 
I.C. Brătianu￿ 
 
4) Dosar 141/ 1877-1879, p. 28/recto  
(a copy of this letter translated into Romanian and typed out is to be found in Dosar 
21/1877, p. 16/recto) 
  
￿Vienne, 14 Juni, 1877 
Confidentielle 
Mon cher PrØsident, 
C￿est sur une dØmarche spontanØe de M. Babesiu (prononcez BabŁche) que je vous 
ai tØlØgraphiØ au sujet du gØnØral Doda. Le dernier avait promis d￿Œtre ici la semaine 
derniŁre; mais des affaires urgentes le retenant ￿ KaransØbes, il a remis ￿ deux 
reprises dØj￿ son dØpart. Je vous envoie ci-inclus son dernier tØlØgramme (adressØ ￿ 
Babesiu) qui nous autorise ￿ croire qu￿il arrivera samedi ou dimanche. (p. 28/verso) 
Doda, Øtant le favori de l￿Empereur, parviendra peut-Œtre ￿ en obtenir la permission 
d￿aller en Roumanie, au risque des mesures que le gouvernement hongrois ne   374
manquera pas de prendre contre lui; mais il ne faux pas songer ￿ ce que les ministres 
de Vienne et de Pesth consentent ￿ l￿envoi d￿un officier attachØ ￿ l￿Øtat-major du 
Prince; or, c￿est une chose que l￿Empereur ne peut pas faire sans eux. ￿  
  Fort intriguØ de ce que le Ct. Andrassy ne voulait pas me faire conna￿tre la 
rØponse de son souverain (p.29/recto) ￿ la demande qu￿il s￿Øtait chargØ si volontiers 
de lui soumettre de notre part, (relativement ￿ un gØnØral et ￿ quelques officiers 
supØrieurs roumains) alors qu￿il lui aurait ØtØ si facile de me dire: «l￿Empereur ne 
veut, ou ne peut pas », j￿ai cherchØ ￿ en dØcouvrir la cause et j￿ai appris ￿ sans vous 
le garantir toutefois ￿ qu￿on avait consultØ Berlin, qui avait rØpondu par un signe de 
tŒte nØgatif! Si cela est vrai, je doute que l￿Empereur autorise Doda ￿ partir. [￿] 
 
 
￿Vienna, 14 June 1877 
Confidential  
My dear Mr President, 
 It was on the spontaneous initiative of Mr Babesiu (pronounce Babesh) that I sent 
you a telegram on the subject of General Doda. The latter had promised to be here 
last week but, as urgent matters kept him in Karansebes, he has twice postponed his 
departure. I am sending you here enclosed his latest telegram (addressed to 
Babesiu), which leads us to think that he will arrive on Saturday or Sunday. Doda 
being the Emperor￿s favourite may succeed in obtaining permission to go to 
Romania at the risk of measure which the Hungarian government will no doubt take 
against him; but one should not think that the ministers in Vienna and Pest will 
agree to send an officer to the General Staff of the Prince. It is something that the 
Emperor cannot do without them. 
I am quite intrigued by the fact that Comte Andrassy would not let me know the 
Emperor￿s answer to the request which he (Andrassy) had so willingly taken upon 
himself to submit on our behalf (relative to a general and several high-ranking 
Romanian officers), when it would have been so easy for him to say: ￿The Emperor 
will not or cannot￿, I tried to find out the cause and learnt that ￿ although I cannot 
guarantee it ￿ they consulted Berlin, who answered by a negative shake of the head! 
If this is true, I doubt that the Emperor will allow Doda to leave. [￿]￿ 
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5) Dosar 24/ 1877-1890, p.78/recto: Typed-out telegram 
￿Vienne, le 29 juin 1877 
S.E.M. Bratiano 
PrØsident du Conseil 
Bucarest 
Doda arrivØ. Je viens de confØrer trois longues heures avec lui. Je suis parvenu ￿ 
calmer son ressentiment qui est l￿￿uvre de Desliu. Le seul obstacle est dans la 
manque de temps pour Øtudier et conna￿tre tous les rouages de la machine que nous 
voulons lui confier. Il demandera ￿ l￿Empereur permission d￿aller comme simple 
particulier en route. De l￿, il enverra sa dØmission s￿il se dØcide ￿ entrer au service 
du Prince. Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne veut pas attacher un officier ￿ notre 
quartier gØnØral parcequ￿il ne nous a pas reconnus comme belligØrants. 
Balatchano￿ 
 
￿Vienna, 29 June 1877 
His Excellence Mr Bratiano, President of the Council, Bucharest 
Doda arrived. I conferred with him for three long hours. I succeeded to abate his 
resentment, which is Desliu￿s doing. The only obstacle lies in the lack of time in 
order for him to study and get to know all the workings of the machinery that we 
want to entrust him with. He will ask permission from the Emperor to come to 
Romania as a civilian. From there he will send in his resignation if he decides to 
enter the Prince￿s army. The Austrian-Hungarian government will not send an 
officer to our General Quartier because it has not recognized us as belligerents. 
Balatchano.￿ 
 
6) Dosar 19/1877, p.122/recto [partially ciphered original]  
￿30/6 1877 [written in a different ink] 
f.f. urgentă 
Dlui Ministru Brătianu 
Severin 
(sau ori unde va fi)  [written in a different ink] 
Ece cele două depeşe. Cetiţile cu cheia Brăila: 
Doda a sosit, am conferit cu el trei ore am parvenit a ￿mpăca superarea lui care e 
opera lui Deşliu ￿ singura piedică este lipsa de timp pentru a studia ş￿a cunoşte tot   376
mecanismul maşinei pe care voim a o ￿ncredinţa lui. Va cere la ￿mpărat voe a merge 
simplu particular ￿n Romănia. De aci va trămite demisiunea sa de ca s￿a hotăr￿t a 
intra in armată. Guvernul austriac nu voeste a trimite ofiţer la armata nostră, fiind că 
nu ne￿a recunoscut ca beligerant. ￿ In a duoa depeşă sunt pl￿ngeri contra Domniei-
Voastre că nu daţi atenţiune scrisorilor lui şi că ￿l insultaţi prin telegraf. 
G. Cantacuzino.￿ 
 
￿To Mr Minister Brătianu 
Severin 
(or wherever he may be) 
Here are the two dispatches. To be read with the Brăila key. 
Doda has arrived. I have conferred with him for three hours and managed to abate 
his discontent, which is Deşliu￿s doing ￿ the only obstacle is the lack of time to study 
and get to know all the workings of the machinery we want to entrust him with. He 
will ask the Emperor for permission to come to Romania as a civilian. From here he 
will send in his resignation if he decides to join the army. The Austrian government 
will not send an officer to our army because it has not acknowledged us as 
belligerents. ￿ The second dispatch contains complaints against you that you ignore 
his letters and insult him through the telegraph. 
G. Cantacuzino.￿ 
 
7) Dosar 19/1877, p.128/recto [ciphered original] 
￿3? Iulie? 1877 
Mr Bratiano, President du Conseil, Bailesci 
Vienne 
Je crois que sur une demande du Prince l￿empereur nous cØderait un ou plusieurs 
officiers supØrieurs si son Altesse Øcrit ￿ l￿empereur au moins pour le remercier 
priez-le de mettre dans sa lettre quelques paroles flatteuses pour le Ct.  Andrassy. 
Balatchano￿ 
 
￿3rd July ? 1877 
Mr Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Bailesci 
Vienna   377
I think that upon a request from the Prince the Emperor will give us one or several 
superior officers. If his Highness writes to the Emperor at least to thank him, ask him 
if he could include in his letter some flattering words for Count Andrassy. 
Balatchano.￿ 
 
8) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.112/recto 
Transcribed and translated telegram 
￿Brătianu. Preşedinte de Consiliu 
Calafat 
Bucureşti 2 Iulie 1877 
Doda va vedea m￿ine pe ˛mpărat dela care speră un răspuns favorabil. D￿nsul a venit 
să mă vază şi să mă roage a aduce la cunoştinţă D-voastre că trecerea Dunărei din 
sus de Vidin ar fi o imensă greşală, findcă ￿n caz de am fi ￿nvinşi nu ar răm￿ne altă 
alternativă dec￿t aruncarea armatei ￿n Serbia, ceeace ar atrage imediat acolo armata 
austriacă. După Doda, trecerea armatei noastre va trebui a se face prin prejurul 
Bechetului, astfel chiar ￿n cazul c￿nd am fi ￿nvinşi nu am fi siliţi a trece din nou 
Dunărea, ceeace ar fi rău pentru noi. Ne-am putea retrage de-a lungul Dunărei şi a ne 
reuni cu corpul de armată tus cel mai apropiat. Doda recomandă şefilor de a se păzi 
ne￿ncetat noaptea şi ziua de surprindere. 
G. Cantacuzino￿ 
 
￿Brătianu, President of the Council, Calafat 
Bucharest, 2 July 1877 
Doda will see the Emperor tomorrow, from whom he hopes to obtain a favourable 
answer. He came to see me and tell me that I should inform you that crossing the 
Danube upriver from Vidin would be an immense mistake, because in case of defeat 
we would have no other alternative than to drive the army into Serbia, which would 
immediately attract the Austrian army there. According to Doda, our army should 
cross over around Bechet, thus, even if we were defeated, we would not be forced to 
cross over the Danube again, which would be bad for us. We could retreat along the 
Danube and reunite with the nearest Russian army corps. Doda recommends to the 
commanders that they should keep alert day and night to avoid surprise attacks. 
G. Cantacuzino.￿ 
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9) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.110/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
 
￿Brătianu. Preşedintele Consiliului, Craiova 
Viena 2 Iulie 1877 
Pentru A.S. Prinţul. Andrassy după ce a luat ￿ncă odată, azi dimineaţă, ordinele 
suveranului său mă ￿nsărcinează să fac cunoscut direct Alteţei Voastre, din partea 
￿mpăratului, următoarea comunicare: Din ￿ntreitul punct de vedere al neutralitaţei 
Austriei c￿t şi acela al situaţiei noastre financiare şi al argumentului ce s-ar da 
Cabinetelor ce nu sunt dec￿t prea dispuse a ne refuza neutralitatea ce am solicitat, 
˛mpăratul nu poate sfătui pe Alteţa Voastră să treacă Dunărea. Dar dacă Principele 
socoteşte că datoreşte poporului şi armatei sale această satisfacţiune, de a fi 
contribuit la desrobirea creştinilor din Turcia, Austro-Ungaria nu va pune nici o 
piedecă nici direct nici indirect şi nu va adăoga un soldat mai mult la garnizoanele 
ordinare ale oraşelor limitrofe Rom￿niei, aştept￿nd ca Independenţa Rom￿niei să 
treacă din domeniul faptului ￿n acela de drept. Austro-Ungaria nu va face nici o 
deosebire ￿ntre noi şi ceilalţi beligeranţi. ˛mpăratul cere Alteţei Voastre două 
(p.111/recto) lucruri fără de care s-ar vedea silit să se ￿ndepărteze de la atitudinea 
amicală pe care doreşte s-o păstreze p￿nă la sf￿rşit faţă de Rom￿nia: 1) de a nu călca 
cu nici un batali on hotarel e Serbiei,  2) de a nu urm ări o cucerire de teritoriu ￿n 
Bulgaria. ˛n schimb guvernul imperial este cu totul dispus a face să se cedeze A-ţei 
Voastre prin viitorul tratat de pace o oreşicare parte din Dobrogea. O desvoltare a 
acestui mesagiu prin scrisoare. Rezultatul acesta favorabil al delicatelor negocieri 
care au avut loc asupra acestei chestiuni e datorit Contelui Andrassy, a cărui 
neobosită bunăvoinţă şi trainică simpatie pentru Rom￿nia nu s-au desminţit cu acest 
prilej. Motivele care au ￿mpiedicat pe ˛mpărat să autorizeze pe Generalul Doda să se 
ducă la cartierul general rom￿n sunt toate de ordin politic. Le voi comunica D-lui 
Brătianu ￿n scurt timp. Vom putea avea un ofiţer superior de egală valoare, dar din 
care Rom￿nii din Ungaria să n u  f i  f ăcut un drapel naţional, acesta pare a fi din 
nenorocire cazul cu Generalul Doda. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
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￿Brătianu, The President of the Council, Craiova 
Vienna 2
nd July 1877 
For H.H. the Prince. After receiving once again the Emperor￿s orders this morning, 
Andrassy asked me to directly inform your Highness of the following, on behalf of 
the Emperor: From the triple point of view of Austria￿s neutrality, as well as that of 
our financial situation and of the pretext that would be given to the Cabinets which 
are only too willing to deny the neutrality we have requested, the Emperor cannot 
advise your Highness to cross the Danube. But if the Prince considers that he owes 
to his people and his army the satisfaction of having contributed to the liberation of 
the Christians in Turkey, Austria-Hungary will not put up any obstacles directly or 
indirectly and will not add a soldier more to the regular garrisons in the towns 
bordering on Romania, waiting for Romania￿s independence to turn from de facto 
into de jure. Austria-Hungary will not make any distinction between us and the other 
belligerents. The Emperor asks your Highness for two things, without which he 
would be forced to desist from the amicable attitude he wishes to retain towards 
Romania to the very end: 1) that no battalion should cross the Serbian border; 2) 
that they should not pursue territorial conquests in Bulgaria. In exchange for this, 
the imperial government is entirely willing to have a certain part of Dobrogea ceded 
to your Highness in the future peace treaty. An extended version of this message via 
letter. The favourable result of these delicate negotiations on this subject is owing to 
Count Andrassy, whose tireless benevolence and steady sympathy towards Romania 
were proved on this occasion as well. The reasons that prevented the Emperor from 
authorizing Doda to go to the Romanian General Quartier are all political. I will 
communicate them to Mr Bratianu shortly. We can have a superior officer of equal 
value, but one whom the Romanians of Hungary will not have turned into a national 
hero. This, unfortunately, seems to be General Doda￿s case. 
Bălăceanu.￿ 
 
10) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.118/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
￿Excelenţei Sale Domnului Brătianu. Preşedintele Consiliului, Craiova   
Viena, 3 Iulie 1877 
Vă voi telegrafia m￿ine mai pe larg motivele prudente ce mi-a dat Andrassy ￿n 
sprijinul refuzului ˛mpăratului de a lăsa pe generalul Doda să plece. Majestatea Sa n-  380
a desemnat un alt ofiţer ￿n locul său căci ar avea prea mult aerul că ne ￿ncurajează să 
trecem Dunărea şi cu at￿t mai mult cu c￿t Andrassy, care se aşteaptă la interpelări 
furioase, e hotăr￿t să răspundă că ar fi putut poate să ne ￿mpiedice să trecem dar că 
nici nu a ￿ncercat să  
............................................................................................................................. 
(pg.20) 
˛mpăratul va permite oricărui ofiţer superior să meargă ￿n Rom￿nia, nu vom aştepta 
prea mult. Andrassy e ￿ncredinţat că nu se poate salva Turcia. Ambasadorul turc a 
venit azi dimineaţă să-i spue că armata rom￿nă era pe punctul de a intra ￿n Serbia şi 
că armata turcească ar voi să o preceadă. Contele Andrassy a răspuns cu aceste 
cuvinte: Scrieţi la Constantinopole că orice armată care va (p.119/recto) intra ￿n 
Serbia va avea după 24 de ore armata austro-ungară ￿n spate. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
￿To his Excellence Mr Brătianu. The President of the Council. Craiova 
Vienna, 3
rd July 1877  
Tomorrow I shall send you a telegram enlarging on the cautious reasons Andrassy 
gave me in support of the Emperor￿s refusal to allow Doda to leave. His Majesty did 
not designate another officer in his stead as this would give too much the impression 
that he encouraged us to cross the Danube, all the more so as Andrassy, who expects 
to be furiously interpellated, is determined to reply that he could have prevented us 
from crossing over, but that he did not even try to [missing section in the transcribed 
telegram]. The Emperor will allow any superior officer to go to Romania. We will 
not wait too long. Andrassy is persuaded that Turkey cannot be saved. The Turkish 
ambassador came this morning to tell him that the Romanian army was about to 
enter Serbia and that the Turkish army would like to precede it. Count Andrassy 
replied with the following words: write to Constantinople that any army that enters 
Serbia will have within 24 hours the Austro-Hungarian army at its back. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
11) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.130/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
￿Excelenţei Sale Domnului Brătianu. 
Bucureşti   381
Viena 7 iulie 1877 
Rog pe Alteţa Sa să erte ￿nt￿rzierea ce am pus pentru a-i scrie. Ochii ￿mi sunt ￿n acest 
moment ￿n afară de serviciu. Doda mă ￿nsărcinează să vă spun că cu nici un preţ să 
nu trecem Dunărea fără şef de Stat Major av￿nd o complectă experienţă a răsboiului 
şi dacă trebuie să vă mărginiţi a lua un general rus, vă recomandă pe Dragomiroff. 
Cum sunt doi cu acest nume, e vorba de acela care a scris o lucrare foarte apreciată 
asupra războiului Austro-Prusian din 1866. Andrassy mi-a dat să ￿nţeleg că dacă am 
fi cerut un ofiţer superior mai puţin ￿n evidenţă dec￿t Doda, l-am fi obţinut. Nu am 
putut şti la cine făcea alusie. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
￿His Excellence Mr Brătianu, Bucharest 
Vienna 7 July 1877 
I pray his Highness to forgive the delay with which I am writing. My eyes are out of 
order at the moment. Doda asks me to tell you that under no circumstances are we to 
cross the Danube without a General Staff Chief with complete war experience and if 
you have to confine yourselves to taking a Russian general, he recommends 
Dragomiroff. As there are two of this name, this is the one who has written a much 
appreciated work on the 1866 Austro-Prussian war. Andrassy signified that, had we 
asked for a high-ranking officer less conspicuous than Doda, we would have got it. I 
could not find out to whom he was alluding. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
12) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.134/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
Dlui Bălăceanu 
Agent Diplomatic al Rom￿niei 
Viena 
Bucureşti 1877 Iulie 10 
Eram ￿n judeţ ￿n inspecţie, iată de ce n-aţi primit imediat felicitările mele pentru 
asigurarea bunăvoinţei ce aţi reuşit să dob￿ndiţi. C￿t priveşte ofiţerul superior, 
informaţi-vă de Guran, de oarece celălalt nu e cu putinţă, dar lucraţi repede căci 
suntem grăbiţi. Scrisoarea cerută vă va fi trimisă. 
Ministru Preşedinte Ion C. Brătianu￿   382
 
￿Mr Bălăceanu, Diplomatic Agent of Romania, Vienna 
Bucharest 1877 July 10 
I was in the county in inspection. This is why you did not immediately receive my 
congratulations on the benevolence that you managed to secure. As regards the 
superior officer, find out about Guran, as the other one is impossible to get, but work 
fast because we are in a hurry. The requested letter will be sent to you. 
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.￿ 
 
13) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.135/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
Excelenţei Sale Domnului Brătianu. Preşedintele Consiliului, Bucureşti 
Viena 10 Iulie 1877 
Guran a refuzat de la ￿nceput. Voi face nouă ￿ncercare dar fără nădejde de izb￿ndă. 
Rog a avea deosebita complesenţă a-mi comunica dacă aţi primit telegrama mea 
adresată Principelui şi aceia prin care vă rugam a plăti 500 lei fiului meu. 
Bălăceanu 
 
￿His Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of the Council, Bucharest 
Vienna 10 July 1877 
Guran refused from the very beginning. I will make another attempt but without any 
hope of success. Pray have the goodness to communicate to me if you received my 
telegram addressed to the Prince and the one in which I was asking you to pay 500 
lei to my son. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
14) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.139/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
￿Excelenţei Sale Domnului Brătianu. Preşedintele Consiliului 
Bucureşti 
Viena 11 Iulie 1877 
˛mpăratul nu poate autoriza pe nimenea să vie la noi at￿t timp raporturile armatei 
rom￿ne faţă de armata Rusă şi s￿rbă nu vor fi mai bine stabilite. Nu ar servi dec￿t 
dacă odată trecută Dunărea, armata rom￿nă nu va coopera cu s￿rbii şi nu va fi forţat   383
pusă sub comanda marelui Cartier rus. ˛n acest din urmă caz orice ￿nfr￿ngere a 
armatei rom￿ne ar fi imputată de Karageorgevici şi de Ruşi ca o trădare a gralului 
[generalului] austriac. Sunt ￿nsăşi cuvintele ˛mpăratului. Trebue să m ă puneţi ￿n 
măsură, ca prin AndrÆssy, ˛mpăratul să fie complect edificat ￿n această privinţă. 
(p.140/recto) ˛n orice caz trebuie să i se lase alegerea ofiţerului. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
￿To His Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of Council 
Bucharest 
Vienna 11 July 1877 
The Emperor cannot authorise anyone to come to us as long as the relations between 
the Romanian army and the Russian and Serbian armies are not better defined. It 
will not work? unless, once they cross the Danube, the Romanian army will not 
cooperate with the Serbs and will not be forcefully subordinated to the Russian 
Great Quartier. In this latter case any defeat of the Romanian army will be 
interpreted by Karageorgevici and the Russians as a betrayal of the Austrian 
general. These are the Emperor￿s very words. You will have to put me in a position 
that, through AndrÆssy, I can provide full explanations to the Emperor. At any rate 
the officer￿s choice will be his. 
Bălăceanu.￿ 
 
15) Dosar 19/1877, p. 69/recto [original] 
￿14 iulie 1877 
￿Monsieur Bratiano 
President du Conseille 
[in cipher] 
Gu-ra-n absent est attendu chaque jour une lettre du Prince ￿ Empereur me parait 
seul moyen d￿obtenir un gØnØral roumain. 
Balatchano 
 (telegram translated into Romanian in Dosar 22/ 1877, p. 148/recto) 
 
￿14 July 1877 
Mr Bratiano 
President of Council   384
Guran is away. He is expected every day. A letter from the Prince to the Emperor 
seems to me to be the only way of obtaining a Romanian general. 
Balatchano.￿ 
 
16) Dosar 22/ 1877 
p.155/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
￿Domnului Brătianu. Preşedintele Consiliului, Craiova 
Viena 16 Iulie 1877 
Guran refuză categoric. Printre ofiţerii rom￿ni catastrofă de a fi la Statul Major. Nu 
mai e dec￿t Colonenul Trapşa care nu este aici. Voi avea răspunsul său poim￿ine. 
Bălăceanu￿ 
 
￿Mr Bratianu, President of the Council, Craiova 
Vienna 16 July 1877 
Guran refuses categorically. Among the Romanian officers [it￿s a] catastrophe to be 
with the General Staff. There is only Colonel Trapsia left, who is not here. I will 
have his answer the day after tomorrow. 
Balaceanu￿ 
 
17) Dosar 22/ 1877 
p.160/recto  
handwritten and transcribed telegram 
￿Dlui Bălăceanu 
Agentul Rom￿niei la Viena 
Piteşti 18 Iulie 1877 
Numele Colonelului Trapşa complect necunoscut aici. De altfel neput￿nd parveni a 
avea fără ￿nt￿rziere grad superior, nu ar avea nici o autoritate asupra ofiţerilor noştri. 
Cu neputinţă a scrie scrisoare ˛mpăratului ￿n această privinţă căci nu putem cere 
oficial un general Austriei fără a cere şi Rusiei. 
Ministru Preşedinte 
Ion C. Brătianu￿ 
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￿To Mr Bălăceanu, Romanian Agent in Vienna 
Pitesti 18 July 1877 
Colonel Trapsia￿s name completely unknown here. Besides, if he cannot get 
promoted without delay, he would have no authority over our officers. Impossible to 
write a letter to the Emperor in this respect as we cannot officially ask Austria for a 
general without asking Russia as well. 
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.￿   386
Capsule Biographies 
 
Vincenţiu Babeş (1821-1907), Transylvanian lawyer, journalist, and politician. He 
was one of the founding members of the Romanian National Party. Elected to the 
Hungarian Parliament (1860-1890), he militated for Transylvanian autonomy and for 
the separation of the Romanian church from the Serbian one. He contributed to the 
foundation of the Orthodox Metropolitan See in Sibiu (1864). He was president of 
the Romanian National Party between 1881 and 1891. (Dicţionarul general al 
literaturii rom￿ne, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 
293) 
 
George Bariţiu (1812-1893), Transylvanian journalist and cultural mentor. He was 
the editor of Gazeta de Transilvania and Foaie pentru minte, inimă şi literatură. In 
1848 he participated in the Blaj assembly. He went to Cluj together with Bishop I. 
Lemeni to present the programme of the Blaj assembly to the Diet and returned to 
Braşov disappointed by the vote for the union of Transylvania to Hungary. He 
established the first Romanian printing house in Braşov. He travelled widely and 
kept in touch with Romanian intellectuals from the Regat. After 1860 he entered 
politics and, following the Ausgleich, he was a supporter of political passivism. In 
1861 he helped set up Astra (The Transylvanian Association for Romanian literature 
and culture). He moved to Sibiu where between 1878 and 1885 he edited 
Observatoriul. In 1881 he was among the founding members of the Romanian 
National Party, whose president he became in 1884. (Dicţionarul general al 
literaturii rom￿ne, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2004, 
pp. 378-379) 
 
Ion Bălăceanu (1828-1914) was a Romanian diplomat and minister, the descendant 
of an old boyar family. 1849 found him in the General Staff of General Josef Bem. 
After the 1859 union of the Romanian Principalities he was appointed Police Prefect 
in Bucharest, then he acted as Prince Cuza￿s emissary to Piedmont and France, 
where he pleaded for the recognition of the union. He helped remove Cuza from 
power. In 1876 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He pursued an active 
diplomatic career as diplomatic agent in Paris (1866-1877), Vienna (1876-1878) and   387
Constantinople (1870-1871) and as extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister 
to Vienna (1878-1882), Rome (1882-1884), Paris (1884-1885), Constantinople 
(1886-1889), and London (1893-1900). (Dicţionarul general al literaturii rom￿ne, 
Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 422-423)  
 
Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809-1886), Saxon statesman and supporter of the 
triad idea (there should be a third dominant German state in addition to Prussia and 
Austria). He became Austrian Foreign Minister in 1866 and Prime Minister 
(Minister-Pr￿sident) in February 1867 and played an important part in the drawing 
up of the Ausgleich. (￿sterreichisches Biographisches Lexikon, vol. 1, p. 79) 
 
Valeriu Branişte (1869-1928), Transylvanian journalist. He was editor of Tribuna 
and founder of the Timişoara newspaper Dreptatea. He was involved in the 
Memorandum trial on account of his articles. He was sentenced to two years￿ 
imprisonment and spent 15 months in the VÆc prison. He moved to Lugoj in 1901 
where he founded two newspapers, Drapelul and Banatul. He participated actively in 
the Banat artistic and cultural life. He was imprisoned again in 1918 for refusing to 
sign the declaration of allegiance to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After 1919 he 
was placed in charge of the public instruction and religion division of Consiliul 
Dirigent for Transylvania and Banat, in which capacity he signed the founding act of 
the University of Cluj. (Dicţionarul general al literaturii rom￿ne, Letters A to B, 
Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 641-642) 
 
Ion C. Brătianu (1821-1891), Romanian politician and leader of PNL (Partidul 
Naţional Liberal). He acted as President of the Council of Ministers between 1876 
and 1888. He was born into a boyar family and initially pursued a military career. He 
studied in Paris and, together with his brother, Dumitru Brătianu, was an active 
member of the Romanian student society in Paris. He joined the French freemasonry. 
He returned to Wallachia, where contributed to the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. 
He was instrumental in bringing about the 1859 Union of Wallachia and Moldavia. 
He helped topple Prince Cuza and bring to the throne Carol I, under whose rule he 
became a leading politician. He created the notion of ￿prin noi ￿nşine￿ (single-
handedly, by ourselves), which advocated a limitation of reliance on foreign capital   388
and an orientation towards economic self-sufficiency. (Dan Stoica (Ed.), Dicţionar 
biografic de istorie a Rom￿niei, Editura Meronia, Bucureşti, 2008, pp. 81-91) 
 
Heinrich Graf von Calice (1831-1912), Austrian diplomat, who acted in turn as 
Vice-Chancelor with the Consulate in Constantinople (1857), Secretary and Protocol 
Leader for the Commission of the Danubian Principalities in the Ministry of 
Commerce (1858), Consul in Liverpool (1864), General Consul and Minister 
Resident at the imperial courts in China, Japan and Siam (1871), diplomatic agent in 
Bucharest (1874), extraordinary Envoy and plenipotentiary Minister in 
Constantinople (1876), and Ambassador with the extraordinary Mission to the Sultan 
(1880). Several times decorated, he became Graf in 1906 (￿sterreichisches 
Biographisches Lexikon, (1815-1950), (Eds.) Leo Santifaller and Eva Obermeyer-
Marnach, ￿sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 1, p. 133.) 
 
Carl Bernhard Edler von Hietzinger was a prominent figure in nineteenth-century 
Habsburg administration. He was a law and philosophy graduate who entered civil 
service (Staatsdienst) as part of the Auditoriatskanzlei in the Viennese 
Generalcommando and then went on to occupy various posts in military and civil 
bodies of the imperial administration. In 1807 he entered the Milit￿rgrenz Direction 
within the Hofkriegsrat  (Imperial War Council). The following year he was 
appointed Unterlieutenant (Second Lieutenant) in the administration of the 2
nd Banal 
Border Regiment and transferred a year later to the German Border Regiment in the 
Banat. In the years up to 1817 he worked in the Milit￿rgrenze Departement of the 
Hofkriegsrat. He was subsequently appointed as Kriegssecret￿r and Referent of the 
General Command in Karlstadt and Warasdin. It is while occupying this position that 
he embarks on the first volume of his Statistik der Milit￿rgr￿nze des 
￿sterreichischen Kaiserthums, to which he would devote more time upon his return 
to the Grenz Departement in 1818. He completed his work in 1823. (Constant von 
Wurzbach,  Biographisches  Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich (enthaltend die 
Lebensskizzen der denkw￿rdigen Personen, welche seit 1750 in den ￿sterreichischen 
Kronl￿ndern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben), Neunter Theil, 
K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, Wien, 1863, pp. 7-9.) 
 
   389
Alexandru Mocsonyi 
The Mocsonyi family (Rom. Mocioni) was one of the prominent Romanian noble 
families of nineteenth-century Banat. They were the descendents of Macedo-
Romanian merchants from Moscopole who had sought refuge in Hungary at the end 
of the seventeenth century. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the family 
bifurcated into two separately ennobled branches (Mocsonyi and Mocsonyi of Foen). 
Members of the two branches such as Andrei Mocsonyi (1812-1890) and Alexandru 
[Sandru] Mocsonyi (1841-1909) were involved in Hungarian politics and 
ecclesiastical debates. Of the two, Alexandru Mocsonyi was the first president of the 
Romanian National Party in Hungary founded in 1869 and a supporter of the 
principle of a ￿modus vivendi￿ between the Romanians and the other nationalities in 
Hungary (Vincenţiu Bugariu, Figuri bănăţene, (Ed.) Aurel Bugariu, 19 --, pp. 93-94; 
Teodor Botiş,  Monografia familiei Mocioni, Fundaţia pentru Literatură  şi Artă 
￿Regele Carol II￿, Bucureşti, 1939, pp. 16-17). 
 
 
Ioan Slavici (1848-1925), Transylvanian writer and journalist. He was the first 
president of Rom￿nia jună and one of the main organizers of the Putna Monastery 
celebration in 1871. He worked in Bucharest as an editor of Timpul, then moved to 
Sibiu where he founded in 1884 the Romanian-language daily Tribuna. His articles 
triggered five press trials. His support for Trajan Doda in the 1887 elections had him 
condemned to a year￿s imprisonment, which he spent in the VÆc prison between 
1888 and 1889. After 1890 he moved to Bucharest. On the eve of the First World 
War his pro-Habsburg views made him unpopular and he was imprisoned in 1916 by 
the Romanian authorities. During the German occupation of Romania he contributed 
to Gazeta Bucureştilor. In 1919 he was arrested again and sentenced to 5 years￿ 
imprisonment but released after one year. (Dicţionarul general al literaturii rom￿ne, 
Letters S to T, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 242-243) 
 
Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg (1751-1833), Romanian priest and scholar, director of the 
Romanian schools in the Banat Military Border. He is the author of Cronica 
Banatului (The Banat Chronicle), written between 1825 and 1827, in which he 
recounts the history of the region from ancient times to his day. He also wrote 
numerous religious, didactic, and administrative writings in German, Serbian, and   390
Romanian. According to his own testimony, he acted as an interpreter for Joseph II 
during the latter￿s visit to the Banat in 1773. He worked as a translator and military 
priest and recorded his experience of the 1787-1791 war against the Turks in a 
number of notes known as Cronica Mehadiei. He took an interest in numismatics 
and Roman artefacts. (Damaschin Mioc and Costin Feneşan (Eds.), Scrieri. Cronica 
Mehadiei şi a Băilor Herculane. Poveşti moşăşti şcolarilor rum￿neşti. Varia, Editura 
Facla, Timişoara, 1984, pp. 71-74.) 
 
 
David Urs Baron de Margina (1816-1897) was an officer in the First 
Transylvanian Border Regiment. He was decorated during the 1866 war, promoted 
to Colonel, and accorded the title of Baron. He was a founding member of Astra and 
actively involved in cultural projects after his retirement (Simion Retegan, George 
Bariţ şi contemporanii săi. Corespondenţă trimisă, Vol. X, Editura Enciclopedică, 
Bucureşti, 2003, p. 451, footnote 4). He held the MVK (Milit￿r Verdienst Kreuz) and 
was a knight of the Theresian Order (OeStA, KA, KM Pr￿s, 1877, Aktenzahl 47 ￿ 
11/1-40, Report No. 33, p. 3 recto and p. 7 verso).   391
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